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ABSTRACT  
“Culture talk” figures prominently in the discussions of and about Muslims, both 
locally and globally. Culture, in these discussions, is considered to be the underlying 
cause of gender and generational divides giving rise to an alleged “identity crisis.” 
Culture also presumably conceals and contaminates “pure/true Islam.” Culture serves as 
the scaffold on which all that divides Muslim American immigrants and converts is built; 
furthermore, the fear of a Muslim cultural takeover underpins the “Islamization of 
America” narrative. This dissertation engages these generational and “immigrant”-
“indigenous” fissures and the current narratives that dominate Muslim and public 
spheres. It does so through the perspectives of the offspring of converts and immigrants. 
As the children and grandchildren of immigrants and converts come of age, and distant 
as they are from historical processes and experiences that shaped the parents’ 
generations while having shared a socialization process as both Muslim and American, 
what role do they play in the current chapter of Islam in post-9/11 America? Will the 
younger generation be able to cross the divides, mend the fissures, and play a pivotal role 
in an “American Muslim community”?  Examining how younger generations of both 
backgrounds view each other and their respective roles in forging an American Muslim 
belonging, agenda and discourse is a timely and much needed inquiry. 
 This project aims to contribute by shedding more light on the identities, 
perspectives and roles of these younger generations through the four dominant 
narratives of identity crisis, pure/true Islam vs. Cultural Islam, the Islamization of 
America, and creation of an American Muslim community/identity/culture. These 
narratives are both part of public discourse and themes generated from interviews, a 
questionnaire\survey, and personal observation. This ethnographic study examines how 
American born and/or raised offspring of both converts to Islam and immigrant 
ii 
Muslims in the Phoenix and Chicago metropolitan areas define self and community, how 
they negotiate fissures and fault lines (ethnicity, race, class, gender, and religious 
interpretation) within their communities, and how their faith informs daily life and 
envisions a future. I utilize participant observation, interviews, and surveys and examine 
digital, visual and published media to answer these questions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Vignette I 
 
On a cold damp Philadelphia day, the Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA) 
held its inaugural conference on the first weekend of November 2007. According to its 
website, MANA defines itself as an organization that is “committed to Muslim issues and 
concerns that especially impact indigenous Muslims” (MANA 2012). The conference’s 
title was “The State of the Blackamerican1 Muslim Community.” As the speakers assessed 
the state of their community, there was a recurring theme. One of the speakers summed 
up their sentiment and the theme; he stated that “immigrants, who did not come to the 
US for Islam but to make money, took on the leadership role in the community without 
consulting or incorporating people of the land”2. These “foreign Muslims,” he noted, 
have become the face of Islam in the larger society. In Black America, he pointed out, the 
face of Islam used to be the Nation of Islam (NOI), which engaged the problems of their 
communities; that was an Islam that is “grounded in the American soil”. He 
acknowledged that this “Islam” and the NOI no longer wield the same influence they 
once did in Black America. Immigrant Muslims and their institutions have over time 
gained greater visibility, assumed community leadership, and have come to define the 
face of Islam. Nevertheless, to most Black Americans, Islam is not a foreign religion 
because many have a brother, a cousin, an aunt, or a friend who is a Muslim. Another 
speaker proposed “engineering a paradigm shift” because a person cannot be practicing 
an Islam “based on someone else’s reality,” one that is not local, not personal.  In every 
session, there were repeated calls for asserting the role of “indigenous” Muslims in 
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defining the face of and the agenda for Islam (community issues and priorities) in 
America. The second conference in 2008 at the same venue picked up where the 2007 
one left off as reflected in its theme: “Forging an American Muslim Agenda”. 
 
Vignette II 
   In 2008, Robert Spencer, an influential American author and blogger, published 
his book Stealth Jihad. The thesis of the book is that “America could be conquered and 
Islamized through a slow and steady process of ‘absorption’—a kind of reverse 
assimilation in which Muslim immigrants and converts in the United States gradually 
impose their values, and ultimately, their laws upon the larger population” (2008, 19). 
This conquest will not be through violent jihad exercised by fringe extremist groups but 
by Muslims engaging in “Stealth Jihad.” They will demand religious accommodation 
under the cover of multiculturalism and pretext of civil rights, use the American’s 
national wound of racism to fight what they claim is “bigotry” to silence criticism, create 
political, financial, cultural and social institutions and publications and media outlets. 
He is careful to distinguish “moderate Muslims” from those engaged in this radical 
project of conquest and subjugation. These moderates accept full assimilation, shun the 
belief and practice of jihad and “Islamic supremacy”, and make no demands for 
accommodations. Spencer’s moderates would essentially have to discard much of Islam 
since Islam, as he sees it, has no “core teachings [that are] essentially peaceful” (2008:5). 
Rather than those who think Islam is corrupted by radicals, Spencer has long argued that 
“Islam is unique among the major world religions in having a developed doctrine, 
theology, and legal system mandating warfare against and the subjugation of 
unbelievers. There is no orthodox sect or school of Islam that teaches that Muslims must 
coexist peacefully as equals with non-Muslims on an indefinite basis” (2008:5). He 
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warns that the “large pool of Muslims raised on a pedagogy that resists assimilation and 
instead emphasizes the need for societal ‘accommodation’ to Islam” is “a promising 
group of future activists for the cause of Islamic supremacy” (Spencer 2008:217). 
Spencer might be dismissed as a marginal figure and conspiracy theorist were it not for 
the significant following he commands among members of the Tea Party and 
conservative groups and the wide readership of his books that elevated him to the New 
York Times bestseller list. Together with Pamela Geller3, Spencer founded Stop the 
Islamization of America (SIOA) which has played a central role in the 2010 “Ground 
Zero Mosque” affair—a project which, they argued, exemplified this Stealth Jihad and 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6.    
 
Vignette III 
 
In the fall of 2009, the first ThinkDot event was held at the west campus of 
Arizona State University. It was built up to be the first of its kind and framed as “not the 
same old stuff” but something “for the youth, about the youth, and by the youth.” This 
breaking away from the “same old stuff” started with publicity methods which included a 
glossy colored post-card, Facebook and text messaging. Tickets were sold exclusively 
online and sold out. With an audience of 335, it was an exceptionally well attended 
gathering for a Muslim event in Arizona.  On its website, rather than the typical text-
based method to explain “about” the group, ThinkDot founders use graphic arts and 
short sentences to explain the birth of an idea. The poster explains how the founders, two 
twenty-something Chinese brothers, children of a very active and artistic Muslim 
immigrant family, concluded that: 
Muslim events SUCK! Okay, so maybe not in those exact words. But who 
could deny that at Muslim events and presentations are dull, repetitive, 
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and too long…But what is worse, all the adults are asleep, or about to be 
anyway. And all the youth have migrated outside, playing on the elevators, 
chatting, eating, flirting, you name it. Can you blame them? Funny thing, 
these events were supposed to be FOR THE YOUTH. It is hard for the last 
generation to communicate across such a large disconnect [the caption 
next to world map and arrow originating in Asia and ending in US]. All 
those back-home methods of hammering ideas into our heads with 
incessant shouting HARAM!HARAM!HARAM [illicit]! aren’t working 
‘cause, when you get right down to it, we are more AMERICAN THAN WE 
ARE Bosnian, Somali, Palestinian, Syrian, Indian, Egyptian, Yamani, 
Malaysian or whatever, no matter how fiercely you or your parents would 
like to maintain the contrary…(see appendix D) 
 
In this passage, “the youth” are bored by irrelevant and “unprofessional” lectures 
and with the ever present fundraising segment, and are talking back to the “aunties and 
uncles” (parents’ generation) as much as they are to their cohort. Critiquing their 
community’s methods and styles, the youth define “being Muslim” by what it is not: not 
mediocre, not embarrassing, not unprofessional. Grounding their belonging in/to 
America and not their parents’ country of origin, while careful to demonstrate deference 
and humility by conceding they are not “Islamic experts,” the youth assert their authority 
as “cultural experts” and demonstrate their standards of excellence. They say, they are 
not just putting a presentation together, they are planning to improve their community4 
and call the youth to Think and Act: from disengagement and hanging out in the hallway 
to critical Think[ing] and transformative Act[ion]. The event was indeed an all-out 
performance complete with months of rehearsal, music, lights, cameras, and action!  
These three seemingly unrelated occasions represent three interwoven threads 
that are embedded within multiple narratives which are themselves parts of the larger 
narrative of Islam in/of America: a narrative about being and belonging, and about the 
politics of identity in a globalizing world where grand narratives of secularism, national 
and civilizational histories, and global wars are summoned. The first and third occasions 
demonstrate two primary fissures that run across generational and ethno-racial lines 
among the Muslims of America. These fissures are frequently framed in homogenizing 
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terms of immigrant/indigenous groups and youth/parents and uncles’ generations. A 
frustrated discontent, long reserved for intimate circles, has in the past decade broken 
the surface erupting into assertive critical examination of Muslim America by those who 
for too long felt marginalized within the community. These events represent story 
threads within three larger narratives about younger Muslims ostensibly suffering from 
“identity crisis”. This crisis purportedly leads them to espouse an intolerant cultureless 
“real/pure/true Islam” which is a path to radicalization. The related narrative is one 
about the necessity of intervention by creating an “American Muslim identity and 
culture.”  Here, then, are three of the four larger narratives that this dissertation aims to 
engage: identity crisis among younger Muslims, a pure/true Islam vs. a cultural Islam, 
and the imperative of creating an American Muslim identity and culture. 
The second occasion represents the larger narrative of the “Muslim problem” that 
has made America’s followers of Islam into America’s latest “problem people”, which is 
the fourth narrative this dissertation will engage.  This narrative has transatlantic links 
and deep American roots but it has intensified and gained greater public traction in 
“post-9/11”5 America. It also makes up the backdrop of the aforementioned three 
narratives. All of these narratives shape and are shaped by Muslim individual and 
collective identities and their sense of belonging.  Additionally, they also (re)construct 
and (re)define America and Islam. These narratives and this dynamic and dialectical 
process of identity construction serve as the focal point for this dissertation project 
which aims to explore these topics from the perspectives of younger Muslim Americans.  
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Background 
 
Outside of the pilgrimage to Mecca, the United States stands out singularly as a 
place where the diversity of Muslims approximates that of the global Muslim community 
(ummah) and includes a sizeable non-immigrant community of mostly Blackamerican 
Muslims. Managing diversity is a formidable task for any collective; for Muslim 
Americans, however, managing their unparalleled diversity is even more challenged by 
the peculiar position of having to debate and (re)define self/community identity and 
Islam itself within a public discourse that sees them as Other. This is a discourse that 
more intensely than ever dichotomizes “Islam” and the “West.” Managing this diversity 
is further complicated by the history and position of Muslims in American society which 
poses hurdles to the normalization of Islam in America: a) the history and position of 
Blackamericans in society and the early encounter of many of them with Islam through a 
nationalistic movement that was seeking a distinct identity to counter whiteness and 
fight back against racial injustices, b) the steady waves of migrants and the nature of 
contemporary immigration, and c) the geopolitical relationship of America with Muslim 
majority countries in a postcolonial world. The disorienting experiences of immigration 
for some, and of conversion for others, entail a long struggle to find one’s footing in a 
new society and religious community and make difficult the cultivation of a sense of 
belonging and authenticity in a rapidly changing world.  
The first generation of immigrants and converts to Islam in America are at 
varying stages along this journey and they have generations of descendants. Unlike their 
parents’ generation of new Muslims (converts) or new Americans (immigrants), the 
younger generations of Muslim Americans bear this dual heritage from childhood and 
are uniquely positioned to elaborate on the meaning of both. Generational gap is a 
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common phenomenon varying in types and degree within, as much as across, societies 
and is well-studied in sociology, psychology and immigration studies. The generational 
gap among American Muslims is further marked by the complexity of the context in 
which it occurs: the history of Islam in America, unparalleled ethno-racial diversity, a 
minoritized community in a racialized society, and the contentious history of recent and 
remote encounters of the “Islam and the West.”  The unique position of younger Muslim 
Americans makes their perspectives and roles critical; and yet to date, they have rarely 
been explored.  
Studies of younger Muslim Americans tend to focus on those of immigrant 
backgrounds. Consequently, the dominant narrative that has emerged is that these 
young people are torn between two worlds, the religious and cultural world of the home 
and secular mainstream society (Ajrouch 2004; Kaplan 2005; Peek 2005; Sarroub 2005; 
Sirin and Fine 2008). As these young people struggle to negotiate their identities in the 
“fault lines of global conflict,” as Sirin and Fine put it, they face discrimination, 
alienation, and experience dissonance and “identity crisis,” which, it is posited, lead to 
their assertion of an “Islamic identity.” Peek (2005), for example, drawing on Stryker’s 
(1980) identity salience concept, provides three stages of religious identity (ascribed, 
chosen, and declared) through which these young people “become Muslim” – that is, 
more overtly Muslim – as this aspect of their identity gains primacy in the hierarchy of 
identities. In many of the studies of young Muslims in the West, there is an overtone of 
concern and alarm about the “identity crisis” and religiosity of these young people 
(Hermansen 2003; Peek 2005; Roy 2004; Schmidt 2004; Chouhoud 2010; Sirin and 
Fine 2008). Part of a larger frame that holds Muslims in general as experiencing identity 
crisis where tradition and modernity collide, this notion of identity crisis among younger 
Muslims has become salient in public discourse and within the Muslim community 
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especially post-9/11. It also figures centrally in the discourse on radicalization and the 
“war-on-terror”.  But what exactly is this “identity crisis”? What does it mean and how 
does it manifest? These questions are explored in this dissertation project which will 
illustrate that the term is consequential and has multiple meanings to those who use it. 
Another recurring theme in research on young Muslims of immigrant parentage 
is that they are challenging the “cultural Islam” of their parents and advocating for a 
“purer” and “cultureless Islam” (Hermansen 2003; Kaplan 2005; Karim 2007; Mir 
2006; Naber 2005; Peek 2005; Roy 2004; Sheikh 2007). This development alarms many 
who see it as an internalization of revivalist discourse of the Muslim majority world, or 
worse yet, of literalist Wahhabi ideology6. It has, for example, been interpreted as a 
“mindless and rigid rejection of ‘the Other’ and the creation of a de-cultured, rule-based 
space where one asserts Muslim ‘difference’ based on gender segregation, romantic 
recreations of madrasa experiences, and the most blatantly apologetic articulation of 
Islam” (Hermansen 2003, 310). That may be the case for some or may even be a stage in 
the lives of some young people as they react to the disorienting experience of that age 
and of entering college life; however, this theme of challenging immigrant generations’ 
“cultural Islam” does not only emerge from the religiously conservative. As will be 
elaborated on later, demands for disentangling “immigrant culture” from the “pure/true 
Islam,” are articulated by many practicing and non-practicing participants in this project 
–and others – be they of immigrant or non-immigrant background. These two 
narratives, “identity crisis” and “pure/true Islam”, are intimately connected.  
  Surveying the literature on Muslim Americans, one is left with the impression 
that this is an immigrant community. Whether this is due to the frequent focus on 
particular immigrant groups (usually Arab or South Asian) or –when a few non-
immigrants are included – due to the theoretical underpinning and analysis, Muslim 
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Americans are typically portrayed as “in between” and struggling to come to terms with a 
dual heritage. Unfortunately, this perception is reinforced by the tone and discourse in 
conferences and public events organized by the mostly immigrant-led Muslim 
organizations where the dominant narrative is one of immigrants trying to find their 
footing in society. Except for historical accounts like African Muslims in Antebellum 
America (Austin 1997), African American Islam (McCloud 1995), Islam in the African-
American Experience(Turner 1997), Black Muslim Religion in the Nation of Islam 
(Curtis 2006), and Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking toward the Third Resurrection 
(Jackson 2005), few studies directly engage Blackamerican Muslims. The rare exceptions 
include Karim (2005; 2007), Khabeer (2007; 2011), Rouse (2004) and Nashashibi 
(Nashashibi 2011). Non-immigrant Muslim voices and perspectives are generally 
conspicuously absent from the scholarly literature. Karim (2007) and Khabeer (2011) 
offer a rare look into the relationship between second generation Muslims of immigrant 
and convert background and how they struggle to cross ethnic and class lines as they try 
to negotiate the ideals of their Islamic faith and their American socio-cultural realities.  
White and Latino/a Americans conversion to Islam is not new; they and their 
offspring make a small but growing, particularly since 9/11, part of the Muslim 
community. Their growing numbers are mentioned in the demographic sections of 
published works on Muslims, but there is a dearth of research on this growing segment 
of Muslim America. Except for A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander 
Russell Webb by Abd-Allah (2006), which is a historical account of the first 
Whiteamerican convert, scholarly works on Whiteamerican Muslims are few and mostly 
focus on women’s conversion. One such example is the edited volume Women 
Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Van Nieuwkerk 2006). Early 
Latino/a encounter with Islam has been through contacts with Blackamerican Muslims 
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or marriages with immigrant Muslims. There are several news articles pointing to the 
growing numbers of Latino/a Americans embracing Islam7 but little actual research. 
Bowen (2010) is one of the few studies to explore the identity and institutions of these 
Muslims and, again, the focus is mostly on the process of and reasons for conversion. 
The absence of native-born Muslims, who are not of immigrant background, in scholarly 
work and in public discourse and media images, makes a large segment of the Muslim 
American community invisible and seem voiceless, but not for long. They are speaking 
up and standing out to reclaim “indigenous” American roots for Islam and challenge the 
immigrant face by and through which Islam has come to be defined. 
 
Dissertation Questions, Objectives and Structure 
 
 In general conversations throughout this project’s fieldwork and beyond, among 
project collaborators and in Muslim as well as public discourses, “culture talk” figures 
prominently in discussions about Muslims, both locally and globally. Culture, in these 
discussions, is considered to be the underlying cause of gender and generational divides 
giving rise to an alleged “identity crisis.” Culture also presumably conceals and 
contaminates “pure/true Islam.” Culture serves as the scaffold on which all that divides 
immigrants and converts is built on; the fear of Muslim cultural takeover of American 
underpins the “Stealth Jihad” narrative. This dissertation engages these generational and 
“immigrant-indigenous” fissures and the current narratives that dominate Muslim and 
public spheres. It will do so through the perspectives of the offspring of converts and 
immigrants. As the children and grandchildren of immigrants and converts come of age, 
and distant as they are from historical processes (the legacy of slavery and colonialism) 
that shaped the parental generations while having shared a socialization process as both 
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Muslim and American, what role do they play in the current chapter of Islam in post-
9/11 America? Will the new generation be able to cross the divides, mend the fissures, 
and play a pivotal role in an “American Muslim community”?  Examining how younger 
generations of both backgrounds view each other and their roles in forging an American 
Muslim belonging, agenda and discourse is a timely and much needed inquiry. This 
project aims to contribute by shedding more light on the identities, perspectives and 
roles of these younger generations through the four dominant narratives mentioned 
earlier, namely: identity crisis, pure/true Islam vs. Cultural Islam, the Islamization of 
America, and creating an American Muslim community/identity/culture. These 
narratives are both part of public discourse and themes generated from interviews, a 
questionnaire\survey, and personal observation. This ethnographic study examines how 
American born and/or raised offspring of both converts to Islam and immigrant 
Muslims in the Phoenix and Chicago metropolitan areas define self and community, how 
they negotiate fissures and fault lines (ethnicity, race, class, gender, and religious 
interpretation) within their communities, and how their faith informs daily life and 
envisions a future. Through participant observation and interviews and by using surveys 
and examining of digital, visual and published media, I aim to answer these larger 
questions by exploring answers to the following more specific questions:  
1) To what extent do young Muslim American experience “identity crisis”?  
2) What is “pure/true Islam” all about? What are its distinguishing or defining features 
and sources? How and who (or what process) authenticates this Islam as normative? 
And how is it experienced in the daily life of Muslim Americans? 
3) How does the post-9/11 public discourse shape these younger Muslims perspectives 
and how do they respond? 
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4) What relationships, if any, do second generation Muslims have across ethno-racial, 
sectarian, and gender lines and how do they view each other? 
 5) What does the narrative of creating “Muslim American Culture/Identity” reveal or 
conceal and what significance does it hold for the future of Islam in the U.S.? Are there 
visible cultural products (institutions, art, literature, knowledge) of this “American 
Muslim culture”? 
 6) How do second generation Muslims view the future of Islam in America? What role 
do they see themselves playing in shaping that future? 
 
Dissertation Organization 
 
After this short introduction, chapter 2 sketches the methodology of this 
dissertation detailing the centrality of narrative framework from the conception of this 
project, to its methods, to the challenges encountered, to the analysis, and ultimately to 
the production of this ethnographic narrative. Chapter 3 will provide a brief historical 
tour of Muslim America to provide a backdrop and a context that situate participants 
both in intra-community and societal dynamics. In each of the subsequent four chapters, 
I engage important issues of the day that circulate as dominant narratives in Muslim and 
public spheres. The narratives are “identity crisis,” “cultural versus real/pure Islam,” 
“the Islamization of America,” and creating an “American Muslim identity and culture”.  
In these chapters, I interrogate each of these narratives, examining its roots, meanings, 
relevance and implications as it engages and informs the perspective of younger 
generations of Muslim Americans based on data from interviews, questionnaire and 
fieldnotes (from the physical and virtual fields). These four narratives, as noted earlier, 
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are interwoven and in dialogue with one another but are addressed separately in these 
chapters to allow for deeper exploration.  
Chapter 4 problematizes the narrative of “identity crisis” which conceptualizes 
identity as a stage which one succeeds or fails to achieve. After dissecting this narrative, I 
explore the theoretical landscape of identity formation and conclude with an alternative 
synthesis. This synthesis will serve as the theoretical framework for this dissertation 
where one’s being and belonging (that is, identity) is the central issue that runs through 
all the chapters. I then explore participants’ self-narration of how they see themselves 
through childhood experiences at home, school, and college and as adults. Torn between 
seemingly irreconcilable poles (home/society, being in the secular West/belonging to the 
religious East), younger Muslim Americans are often thought to be ensnared in poles 
pulling them in different directions in an ostensibly centuries old conflict between Islam 
and the West. The pathologized “identity crisis” narrative must be situated within that 
discourse and within the self-narrations of those presumably suffering from it. My 
analysis will demonstrate that participants –whether the offspring of immigrants or 
converts – are aware of their differences and of the multiple demands (by family, faith, 
peers, and society) on them. They recognize that their non-Muslim counterparts also 
struggle to balance the person others expect them to be with the person they want or 
hope to be. They acknowledge that the process is a harder for them, but they learn to 
navigate that and construct a sense of self that incorporates all of the different “parts” of 
themselves as one of them put it. They do not see these parts as mutually exclusive. As 
they narrate this self, one sees the heteroglot or intertextual nature of these narratives 
where bits and pieces of other discourses are engaged or appropriated and enter inner 
speech8 to construct each subsequent instantiation of self. They become comfortable 
with (and in) their difference but that difference seems to be an issue for some parents 
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and for a society that expects them to fit an image that is either/or. The collaborators in 
this project were comfortable in their own skin. That is not to say, however, that some do 
not struggle with contradictions imposed upon them through simplistically framed 
“good/bad Muslim” alternatives. If there is identity problem among some younger 
generations of Muslims, it could be argued that it is a problem resulting from society 
and/or some parents who deny them the space and time to experiment with their 
different “parts”, to ponder and to come to their own understanding of self and faith. 
In chapter 5, I explore the salient idea of a “pure/true/real Islam” as compared to 
a presumably “cultural Islam.” This narrative frame has multiple stories and meanings 
woven upon it by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Those drawing on it come from 
across the ideological spectrum of groups labeled “fundamentalists/Islamists,” 
“modernists,” “traditionalists,” and “secularist.” Younger generations of Muslim 
Americans as well as many converts to Islam invoke this narrative to argue that the first 
generation immigrants’ understanding and practice of Islam is colored by their “back 
home culture.” This culture, so the argument goes, privileges certain norms and 
traditions and relegates anything different, especially if Western, to the category of un-
Islamic. Often, critics of this narrative describe those who invoke it as puritans who 
advocate an austere form of religion and—whether they are merely quietist/pietistic or 
radical extremists—deeply reject the West and “Muslim World” and are dangerous to 
both. Exploring this narrative speaks to fundamental questions about the definition of 
religion in general and to the anthropology of Islam in particular. Are there one or 
multiples Islam(s) and who decides which is pure or true? This chapter explores these 
issues and subsequently demonstrates that this narrative of purifying the faith is 
grounded in Islamic discursive tradition; additionally, it is a structural narrative frame 
holding many stories, some of which are indeed worrisome. However, the strand of 
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purity narrative invoked by the collaborators of this project, as well as many Western 
Muslims, is neither rejectionist nor dangerous. In fact, rather than discarding culture 
altogether, these Muslims are seeking to alter the immigrant cultural mantel that has 
“covered” Islam in order to cloak the faith with a cultural garb that is grounded in their 
American [or European] realities. They are neither fully rejecting nor uncritically and 
fully embracing either cultures but are selectively appropriating both. 
Muslims of different political ideology and interpretive trends invoke the 
narrative of true/pure Islam to ground their actions and ideas in the Islamic tradition 
and to argue against all those whom they see as defiling that tradition. But there is 
another unlikely group that also invokes the narrative of true/pure Islam and references 
the Islamic tradition through its own interpretive framework and ideology. This group 
consists of an alliance of right wing conservatives, Tea Party members, some political 
and religious leaders, some new atheist icons and a cadre of former and current 
Muslims, many of whom claim to be “feminists”. The common thread in the discourse of 
this group is that true Islam is a threat not only to the security of America in particular 
and the West in general but to the very foundation of Western civilization. Group 
members posit that backwardness, violent extremism, misogyny, intolerance of the 
other, and opposition to the freedom of belief, thought and expression are not aberrant 
ideas of a fringe Muslim group but are in fact rooted in the Islamic religious tradition. 
Those Muslims who argue otherwise are either guilty of Taqiyya (an allegedly religiously 
sanctioned lying), or they are reforming Islam to rid it of these dangerous and backward 
ideas. In chapter 6, I examine the structure and the different ideological trends within 
this group and explore how this strand in the purity narrative has constructed a narrative 
of the “Islamization of America.” Whether the rhetoric and actions this narrative inspires 
can be called Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism, or merely a legitimate critique of 
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Muslims and Islam is greatly debated and I will delve into the significance of these 
debates. This narrative serves as a strong instrument in the racialization process of 
Muslims and everyone who “looks Muslim”, particularly Christian Arabs and South 
Asians of other faiths like the Sikh men who wear turbans as part of their religious 
tradition. This racialization process and the associated discourses have significant 
consequences for how Muslims, and particularly the younger generations, see 
themselves individually and collectively (religiously, ethnically, and nationally) and how 
they engage their community and society. I explore how this narrative has been both 
challenging and generative in the ways Muslims see themselves and assert their 
belonging. 
In chapter 7 and 8, all the connections and implications of the preceding three 
narratives come together as I interrogate the final narrative, one that consists of a call for 
crafting an “American Muslim community” and creating an “American Muslim culture”.  
Here, I draw on the insights gained from the previous chapters and the perspectives of 
younger Muslims to delve into the intra-Muslim community dynamics and the genealogy 
of this narrative and its multiple and contested meanings. Chapter 7 details the rifts 
within Muslim America across gender, ethno-racial, immigrant-convert lines. I argue 
that this narrative indexes a rapprochement between the constituting groups of Muslim 
America. This is taking place in and through the process of constructing a coalitional 
socio-political identity inspired by models from American society (for example; Asian, 
Latino/a, women, gay/lesbian communities) and from the Islamic discursive tradition 
(the concept of ummah). Chapter 8 shows how this process is one of cultural citizenship 
that creates a space to at once be different and to belong, a space for creative self-
expression, representation, engagement and contribution. It at once challenges the 
black/white color line that defines authentic citizenship and the nativist anti-immigrant 
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discourse which marginalize cultural differences, especially that of “new minorities” 
(Flores and Benmayor 1997). I examine the resultant institutions and expressive culture 
because, as products, they are essential to the primary concern of this dissertation, the 
identity formation and expression of younger generations of Muslims. Cultural products 
are technologies for the dialogical process of construction of self, community, nation and 
the meaning and relationships that sustain each. Additionally, they serve as tools to both 
present and represent oneself and one’s group and to struggle against marginalizing and 
racist ideologies and practices.  
Having explored these various topics and the trials and triumphs of being young, 
Muslim and American, chapter 9 closes with the vision of project collaborators for the 
future and the role they see for themselves and their community in society and on the 
world stage. Here again, one sees the interwoven nature of the various discourses and 
the narratives that circulate locally, nationally and internationally and their role in 
shaping the perspectives of individuals and collectives. Throughout these chapters, 
project collaborators are quoted extensively, not so much to “give them a voice” but to 
get out of their way and let their thoughts, emotions and perspectives come through. 
This dissertation attempts to highlight the critically important role of narratives in 
identity formation as they are used both as tools to marginalize or mobilize and as 
technologies for understanding and (re)presenting self, group, faith and nation.   
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1 Blackamerican is a term borrowed and modified by Sherman Jackson from C. Erick Lincoln’s 
Blackamerica.  Jackson prefers this neologism to the terms black or African American because 
one hides whiteness and the other denies centuries of New World history and locates blacks in 
Africa (Jackson 2005). His book introduced the concept to Muslim public sphere and, as noted in 
the title of this conference, is being put into practice.  For these same reasons, and to distinguish 
them from African Muslims of immigrant background, I also use the term Blackamerican in this 
project. Similarly, to challenge the normativity of whiteness as the unhyphenated unqualified 
standard American, to acknowledge these centuries of history, and to distinguish European 
Muslims of immigrant background, I introduce and use Whiteamerican. I use these terms and 
others to refer to the ethnic background of project collaborators. Additionally, while new a binary 
of “immigrant-indigenous” is now in use in Muslim public sphere (I discuss this in chapter 7), I 
uncomfortably stick with immigrant-convert to distinguish the backgrounds of participants. 
While I see the problematics of this binary and have asked myself and others how long one has to 
be in America or be a Muslim before one is no longer an immigrant or convert (with all the 
baggage each terms carry), the immigrant-indigenous binary presents another set of problems 
particularly since it is American born and raised individuals who are the focus of this project.    
2 All quotes in this vignette are my fieldnotes from this event which I had attended as I was 
preparing for my dissertation proposal. The conference was organized and attended primarily by 
Blackamerican Muslims. On the board of MANA, however, there are two second generation men 
of immigrant background. One is of Arab background and the other of South Asian background. 
They were among the speakers in this conference. 
3 Geller is a blogger turned author whose role and rise to a status of spokesperson will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
4 “Muslim Community” is a salient term among Muslims and in public discourse but it should not 
be understood to mean a cohesive homogenous group. Furthermore, this community, like all 
collectives, is not a ready-made group. It might be accurate to speak of Muslim communities 
considering the unparalleled ethno-racial diversity and the segmentation resulting from the 
intersection of that diversity with class, gender, and generational lines.  “Muslim Community,” 
however, remains an important and powerful concept that is discursively and practically 
constructed as this dissertation will demonstrate.  
5 “post-9/11” is itself a grand narrative where the tragic murder of over 3000 people in New York, 
Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11th 2001 has come to be seen as a decisive historical 
moment cleaving the world into a pre-9/11 and a post-9/11. Like all other “post” narratives (post-
modernity, post-racial, post-colonial etc.), post-9/11 is also a contested term. Not only are its 
different meanings and significations challenged but what is also debated is whether or not 
anything has in fact changed. Academic and intellectual debate about the validity of this narrative 
notwithstanding, to the average person several things mark the change: new vocabulary and 
images of “war on terrorism” where one is “with us or against us,” the indignities associated with 
airport security that include body scanning, pat-downs, no-Fly lists, 3-oz liquids and shoes-off, 
and most importantly the normalization of fear and suspicion. For Muslims globally, the post-
9/11 world is one of more than a decade long wars and the death of Muslims in hundreds of 
thousands killed by soldiers, Drone strikes, and improvised suicide bombs and where the “war on 
terrorism” is understood as a code word for war-on-Islam. For American Muslims, this has been a 
defining transitional moment from invisibility to hyper-visibility which, as this dissertation 
illustrates, has been both greatly challenging and generative.      
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6 An ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam introduced by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (1703-
1792) in Saudi Arabia that was rebuffed by Muslims scholars but which nevertheless spread with 
the petrodollars of Saudi state. Though not inherently violent, because of the involvement of 
Osama Bin Laden and several other Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist acts, Wahhabism has 
become equated with violent extremism.   
7 See for example: Amy Green’s “More US Hispanics drawn to Islam” in The Christian Science 
Monitor on 9/28/2006, or Steve Mort’s “More Hispanic Americans are Converting to Islam” in 
the Voice of America on 2/ 9/2007 or Daniel Wakin’s “Ranks of Latinos Turning to Islam Are 
Increasing; Many in City Were Catholics Seeking Old Muslim Roots” in the New York Times on 
1/2/2002. For a list of news items on Latino/a Muslims see 
http://hispanicmuslims.com/articles/ accessed 4/1/2013 
8 Language is the means by which social speech finds its way into the body and becomes inner 
speech and the constituting elements of thoughts and emotions infused with meaning and values 
that reflect one’s specific perspective. 
20 
CHAPTER 2 
NARRATIVE AS METHODOLOGY 
Scholars from fields as diverse as neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and 
literary theory differ and debate the origins and evolution of the concept of narrative in 
the human story, but there is consensus that people are skilled storytellers.  From 
infancy to old age and from the cave dwelling era to the Internet surfing days, people 
have told and continue to tell stories to impart values and inculcate cultural knowledge, 
to create community and nation, to console and condemn, inspire and entertain and 
most importantly to know themselves, make sense of and give meaning to their world. 
Narratives are essential to human communication; damages or dysfunctions of the brain 
often manifest in impaired ability to comprehend and/or construct coherent narratives. 
At bedtime or at campfire, in village courtyard or a judge or king’s court, on the stage or 
film screen, in novels, religious texts or academic journals, narratives – simple or 
complex– abound. Dautenhahn contends that “human narrative intelligence might have 
evolved because the structure of narrative is particularly suited to communicate about 
the social world” because it is overloaded with social information that guides individuals 
in navigating their social reality (2002, 68).A narrative is a structure within which 
multiple but related sub-stories are woven. The stories can be added to or subtracted 
from, and the content of each can be modified in small or big ways but they hang 
together in a coherent narrative framework (Talib 2011). Narratives are accounts of 
events and experiences which follow a sequence and have a plot that moves and holds 
the stories together. In general, narratives have content (what is being told), discourse 
(how it is told), and the context (temporal-spatial-social) which is essential to the 
content and the discourse (Talib 2011). It might seem that in our technological age of 
Facebook, Second-Life and Tweets, storytelling and narratives are diminishing in 
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importance. In fact, the very technology that enables existence of/in these virtual worlds 
is seeking new frameworks and is looking at narratives to conceptualize itself (see 
Mateas and Sengers 2003). This illustrates the centrality of narratives for human 
communication, be it face–to–face or virtual.  
The framework of narratives has marked this project from its conception, shaped 
its methodology, and guided its analysis and writing. I was prompted to undertake this 
project by recurring themes including the “true/pure Islam” narrative in my masters’ 
thesis1 and by narratives I encountered through many years of work within Muslim 
American communities. These narratives pertain to inter-ethnic, gender, and 
generational issues as well as the interface between religion and culture. Dominant 
narratives in the public sphere regarding immigration, multiculturalism, national 
identity, the problematics of “Islam and the West,”, and the “post-9/11” world informed 
not only this dissertation but also my own identity and disciplinary journey. Academic 
narratives about “good” research methods and ethics, authority and credibility and their 
marginalizing or empowering effects influenced my thoughts and the lens through which 
I observed, analyzed and interpreted. Narratives of identity formation, about the 
“fieldsite” and what constitutes “real anthropology” also infiltrated my thoughts and 
informed my work. I listened to and followed the narratives of others with attention to 
my own narratives. In the theories and methods that informed data collection, analysis, 
interpretation and writing, the concept of narrative remained constant and central. 
 
Narrative as a Way of Knowing 
 
Socio-cultural and linguistic anthropologists have long documented the role of 
the narrative and storytelling in cultures through folklore and myths. But narratives are 
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also essential to identity formation. The narrative approach is particularly suited to the 
exploration of identity as conceptualized in this project. Through it, individuals tell their 
stories laced with emotions, memories, beliefs, and values that give meaning to their and 
others experiences and actions as they try to make sense of the world within and around 
them. Cohen and Rapport note that “[t]hrough an appreciation of the narratives by 
which individuals locate themselves in their natural, social, and cultural milieux, as 
continuously expressed in their words and behavior, the anthropologist can gain access 
to the grounds…for their actions ”(1995, 9).  These personal stories, of being–in–the–
world, give a glimpse of people’s ability to anticipate, attend and remember, and to link 
past, present and future. As I will illustrate in the ensuing chapters, a narrative approach 
also allows for exploration of how social others and society inform and shape the 
individual and inculcate a sense of belonging or otherness in the way both the “what” 
and “the way” of narration may signal inclusion or exclusion. While an individual’s 
narrative is co-constructed with a specific audience and, thus, is flexible and particular to 
that individual and context, multiple individuals’ narratives can be useful in providing 
insight into shared experiences. It is this characteristic of the narrative that feminists 
and others capitalize on to highlight the experiences and knowledge(s) of women and 
other marginalized groups (LeCompte and Schensul 1999).  
Narrative is both a qualitative methodological strategy and an object of 
examination because  “[t]he method and the inquiry always have experiential starting 
points that are informed by and intertwined with theoretical literature that informs 
either the methodology or an understanding of the experiences with which the inquirer 
began” (Pinnegar and Daynes 2006, 5). Narrative focused research acknowledges the 
value of what people have to say to the arguments being made in the research and their 
collaborative role in knowledge production, thus decentering the notion of an “objective” 
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researcher observing, measuring, and analyzing (Pinnegar and Daynes 2006). This 
methodology does not privilege the individual at the expense of the society but attempts 
to gain insight into the social through the self–consciousness of individuals whose 
interactions make up the social. The temporal nature of narratives should alert the 
researcher that it is at once incidental, because it is one of many experiences in which the 
narrator is engaged, and enduring because it is an essential component in the narrator’s 
life story. Narration inevitably involves making choices (stated or not) about what is 
brought forth, emphasized or left out and the researcher’s presence and interactions 
influence these choices and account for the co-constructive nature of narrative (Hunter 
2010).  
Narratives are also integral to the identity and products of the field of 
anthropology. Anthropologists rely on natives’ narratives to gain insights into every 
aspect (family and social structure, political, economic, religious institutions, and 
history, and local/global connections) of the cultures they study. They subsequently 
construct their own narratives in ethnographic accounts of these “natives” narrations. As 
Geertz composed his ethnographic narrative where he asserted that a cultural ritual is “a 
story [natives] tell themselves about themselves” (Geertz 1973, 448), he was creating a 
narrative in which he recounts his fieldwork experiences and in which he analyzes and 
theorizes the stories he was told. In this process, he was both participating in and 
contributing to anthropology’s own disciplinary narrative: the stories anthropology as a 
field tells itself about itself. This narrative has consequential effects on every 
anthropological project and this one is no exception. 
 
 
 
24 
Anthropology’s Narrative and Finding “My Village” 
 
Every community has its origin story, founding elders, traditions, rituals, and 
rites of passage, all of which are passed from generation to generation and drawn on to 
authenticate knowledge and practices. Anthropology as a field of knowledge and 
community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991) as well as discourse (Nystrand 1982) is 
no different. Narratives produce (and are produced by) anthropologists to understand 
their professional identity and the world. In this narrative, fieldwork remains central and 
is both a “rite of passage and maker of professionalism” (Clifford 19977). In the story the 
field tells about itself and inculcates in its disciples, there are normative anthropological 
practices and characteristics of “real” anthropologists. These include doing fieldwork in a 
distant and different place and engaging in prolonged participant observation with 
specific people and culture—one’s village and people. These ideas are “at the base of the 
enduring power in anthropology of the prospect, or experience, or memory, or simply 
collectively both celebrated and mystified notion, of ‘being there’” (Hannerz 2003, 202). 
As initiates into this community, graduate students study how anthropological 
theory and ethnography have undergone long soul-searching and deep critique from 
within and without. They see these theoretical debates operationalized in research. Yet, 
“fieldwork” still maintains a mythical and mystical place. Often these works leave the 
impression that the “field” was out there, ready to be found by the researcher who only 
had to gain entry and establish rapport to start fieldwork. The disorientation, messiness, 
and anxieties inherent in locating and being in “the field” and the foreboding sense that 
overwhelms one in the process of making sense of all the “raw data” is hidden from the 
novice anthropologist who aspires to emulate the polished and insightful ethnographies 
based on such romanticized fieldwork.  
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Working in an urban setting and conducting research in a residentially dispersed, 
ethnically diverse religious “community” was very challenging. I often longed for the 
“classic” field site where I would presumably live in “my village” and interact with “my 
research people” from morning to late night. In my project, this proverbial village 
spatially extended to two states and across cyberspace; temporally, it compressed and 
expanded from interactions lasting few minutes to hours with a frequency of a few times 
to daily, weekly or monthly. Nothing seemed stable! The potential participants were 
everywhere; young Muslims were in the market place, the university, the mosque, and 
the not-for-profit institutions, the streets and elsewhere. But they were there only briefly 
then they retreated to their workplace, college classes, and homes. How does one make 
contacts with these seemingly transient subjects? If fieldwork is about studying people in 
their “natural habitat”, the people here belong to a diverse urban community in a 
pluralistic society, making fieldwork a convoluted multi-sitedness and complex 
endeavor.  If ethnography is studying as deeply as possible and describing as thickly as 
possible a way of life of a group, in this setting it seemed to be an impossible task. My 
potential collaborators seemed to be everywhere and nowhere. I had to locate them 
through social networks, emails, and community events but this “community” is one in 
constant flux. Its members are dispersed geographically, come together frequently or 
occasionally, change in makeup depending on the event, venue location, or time of the 
year. “Fieldwork”2 under these circumstances was a daily struggle with multiple choices 
of possible venues or events to attend and individuals or groups to join or follow. There 
were countless moments of being gripped by the anxieties to locate “the field” and the 
consequences of failing to do so. I began to wonder if and how others dealt with these 
challenges. What is the “field” to look like in today’s world of multiplicity and dizzying 
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mobility? Like questions about the nature of identity and narrative, is the “field” there to 
be claimed or does it emerge in a process of (co)construction?  
The privileged status of fieldwork in anthropology is rooted not only in the 
history of the discipline but also in the contemporary politics of the academe. Fieldwork 
plays a vital role in distinguishing anthropology from related fields where the “on the 
ground” participant–observation–based fieldwork is what has marked anthropology “as 
a discipline in both senses of the word”— a space and its borders and where the “field of 
anthropology” and “‘the field’ of ‘fieldwork’ are thus politically and epistemologically 
intertwined” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 3). Fieldwork defines what makes true 
anthropology. However, Gupta and Ferguson argued for a deeper revaluation of the 
notion of fieldwork. They proposed to “decenter and defetishize the concept of ‘the 
field,’” such that it is “not with time–honored commitment to the local but with the 
attentiveness to social, cultural and political location and a willingness to work self–
consciously at shifting or realigning our location while building epistemological and 
political links with other location” (1997,5). In an interconnected world, this seems to be 
the unavoidable task and in this project it was imperative. 
 
“Locating” The Field 
The nature of the questions that I wanted to explore called for a multi-sited 
project approach from the start. For reasons I will explain, this was to be a project with 
the offspring of Muslim immigrants and converts in the greater Chicago and Phoenix 
metropolitan areas (henceforth Chicagoland and the Phoenix–Valley respectively). 
Because diversity of perspectives is critical here, it was not going to be limited to a 
specific institution or location within these cities. But in expanding and transcending 
boundaries from a single site and locale, what seemed as a positive and necessary 
27 
characteristic to capture the complexities I anticipated posed many challenges during 
fieldwork. In her critique of multi-sited ethnography, Candea sees weakness in its lack of 
“attention to processes of bounding, selection and choice – processes which any 
ethnographer has to undergo to reduce the initial indeterminacy of field experience into 
a meaningful account” (2009, 27).  This indeterminacy presented itself in my case in 
questions and choices of: do I include all suburbs, go to every mosque and/or 
organization, or should I select a few people and follow them everywhere including their 
houses or work places; is that even possible without being intrusive? How much media 
analysis of the public discourse and other sources with which collaborators engage 
should I consider? The freedom of multi-sitedness was almost overwhelming and at 
times paralyzing. Like Candea in her Corsican village, I grappled with the questions of 
“how many leads to follow? How much context to seek? How much information is 
enough information?” (2009, 33). I constantly had to choose between “hanging out” at 
the mosque or organization, or the Muslim student association, or attending a lecture 
versus a comedy show, meeting someone for coffee or attending a study circle or a youth-
group meeting or social gathering. The constant fear of missing something important or 
of not being comprehensive in capturing the complexities that I have experienced is due 
to what Candea aptly calls the “arbitrariness” of the field and the “tyranny of choice” 
(2009, 34). As I selected one option or another, like her, I felt that “the imagination of 
freedom and unboundedness made any choice, boundary or restriction feel like an illicit 
practice, just as the thought that ‘fieldwork’ included every possible interaction, practice 
or observation, left me with the uneasy sense that any moment spent alone was evidence 
of ‘shirking’ – nothing was out of bounds, and no time was off duty” (2009,34). I 
questioned my motives and possible agenda for every inclusion and exclusion.  
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As I reflected on my fieldwork experience, I realized that, while the impression 
left by the traditional fieldsite was one of stability and “sitting” rather than a dizzying 
mobility and multiplicity, the experience outlined above is not limited to multi-sited 
methods. Yet this sense of incompleteness is obscured in ethnography perhaps in part 
because the singularity of the conventional site somehow defines and delimits the 
choices to some degree. Additionally, the ethnographic products of fieldwork, rarely if at 
all, give insights into the methodological struggles of defining the field site or make 
explicit that it is an expected and acceptable methodological practice to make choices 
and delimit the multiplicity and take responsibility for it. Rather than a defect in the 
design that must be overcome, defining the field through a continuous and deliberate 
process of inclusion and exclusion is what Marcus calls a “strong norm and 
accountability for intended, structured partiality and incompleteness in ethnographic 
research design” and where some sites are “treated ‘thickly’ and others ‘thinly’” 
(2009,185).   
As I spent time in different venues (homes, mosques, not-for-profit 
organizations, schools, conference halls, coffee shops or online), met individuals and 
groups at dinners, lectures, dhikr (remembrance) or dars (study) circles or read books, 
newspapers, Facebook and blogs, or watched YouTube clips, I was not striving to capture 
nor simplify the whole of the Muslim American reality. Rather, I was attempting to 
explore it from different viewing points and frames and show the complexities, 
incongruities and diversity inherent in such reality to gain understanding of experiences. 
If anthropology’s objective is to study the “lifeways of its informants” (Gatt 2009, 109), 
then I must follow the paths of such lifeways however unlocatable the field may seem.  
I was working part time during my fieldwork in Phoenix-valley but that was not 
the case in Chicagoland. In consequence, the rhythms of my days were different at the 
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two sites. Yet, I was in a way at both sites at any given day through online research, email 
and phone exchanges, and Skype chats. My day typically started with email 
correspondences, sending surveys, or scheduling interviews, or following up on a 
discussion. I checked community calendars for upcoming events to attend and also read 
the day’s headlines from Google news-alert that I had set up for the keywords “Muslim 
Americans”. When I was out moving around, I was most frequently meeting a participant 
or two for lunch or tea and second most frequently attending either a social gathering or 
community event at a mosque or another venue. During these gatherings, I engaged in 
individual or group discussions and I recruited participants for my study. I attended 
programs at different mosques, sometimes on the same day. The interactions I had and 
relationships I formed were not always connected nor were they all through prolonged 
face–to–face encounters. Some were in sporadic meetings in different events and venues 
or through structured emails or planned interviews; some were hours–long deep 
conversations, others were long–term relationships or encounters that have since turned 
into deeper collaborations or friendships.  
Participants’ involvement in religious communal activities varied from those who 
never took part, to Ramadan and Eid “holiday Muslims,” to those who were community 
organizers and leaders. On occasions, it seemed the only thing that connected the 
activities I joined was my participation. This is not uncommon in multi-sited research. 
Amit and her contributors ,for example, studied networks that did not seem to exist 
independent of the researcher; in fact, the fieldworker’s “movements and contacts still 
served as the key articulation between all the individuals, events and sites she 
encountered” (Amit 1999, 14). When the processes we are exploring “produce common 
social conditions or statuses…but not necessarily coterminous collectivities” Amit argues, 
“it may not be sufficient or possible for anthropologists to simply join in. They may have 
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to purposively create the occasions for contacts that might well be as mobile, diffuse and 
episodic as the processes they are studying” (1999,15). Under such circumstances, 
ethnography has become a series of “polymorphous engagements” with collaborators at 
diverse sites and on the phone or skype or email and where data is obtained from various 
sources including popular culture, digital and print media and documents (Hannerz 
2003).   
The absence of the traditional single fieldsite where one interacted with the same 
people in the same limited locations could be viewed as problematic in terms of the 
depth of the knowledge gained or the relationships cultivated in this project. But this 
multi-siteness in fact duplicated the very characteristics of my collaborators’ lives and 
was not one created by the nature of this project. Among Muslim Americans, 
relationships are cultivated through invitations and rendezvous at and outside 
community venues/events as participants traverse places (home, university, work, 
mosque and other public and private venues) and spaces (online social networks, 
conferences and cyberspaces). One’s social network crisscrosses state and national lines. 
Long before, during and after fieldwork, my own life within this religious community, 
whether in the Phoenix-valley or Chicagoland, resembled my collaborators. Like them, I 
engaged in “mosque hopping,” found out about events and community news through 
emails lists, Facebook or friends, or community calendars of the various mosques or 
organizations. I would attend events and be immersed in “Muslim atmosphere” and 
leave to my neighborhood or work or school and have no contact for days or weeks at 
times.  These are the rhythms or “lifeways” of many of my participants and mine as well, 
as Muslim Americans.  All these places and spaces are interconnected. Rather than 
finding the “field” out there existing prior to and post fieldwork, it is through these 
processes and deliberately with the labor and attention of the researcher that the field is 
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constructed and defined. Through identifying links and threads, spaces and places and 
through exclusion as much as through inclusion does the ethnographic field emerge 
(Amit 1999, Hannerz 2003,Marcus 1998) . Yet making these choices was not without 
struggle and an aboding sense of missing something, a shared feeling undoubtedly due to 
our internalizing the anthropological narrative. 
 
Phoenix-valley and Chicagoland: Connections and Disjunctures 
 
Humans are affected by the physical as much as by the social landscape they 
inhabit. The physical landscape (places and spaces) determines our activities and alters 
our moods and opportunities available to us. As Clifford (1997) points out, space is a 
place plus meaning but conceptualizing space as a social construct does not relegate the 
physical environment to irrelevance; indeed the physical environment shapes and is 
shaped by its inhabitants (Gatt, 2009). The historical and geographical distinctions 
between and within the Phoenix-valley and Chicagoland is not without significance. One 
could argue that the relationships and experiences project collaborators have “do not 
‘transcend’ place, but are made possible and co-produced by what the manifold non–
human as well as the human constituents of their environments afford” (Gatt, 2009, 
113).  Regional geographical and cultural differences, population size and makeup, 
membership in smaller and more recently established community (Phoenix-valley) 
versus membership in a larger, older and socially/politically engaged community 
(Chicagoland) are consequential differences between the two. But the Phoenix-valley and 
Chicagoland also have historical and current connections that became more and more 
noticeable during this project.   
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The desert landscape of Arizona figures in the history of Islam in America. In 
1856, the United States Army was experimenting with the use of camels for 
transportation in the desert Southwest. The army employed the services of an Arab from 
the then Greater Syria, Hajj Ali, who came to be known as Hi Jolly. Hi Jolly lived and 
died in Arizona where the Hi Jolly monument is favorite tourist attraction in the Town of 
Quartzsite.  Desert climate health benefits brought Elijah Muhammad, the founder of the 
NOI, to Arizona in the 1960s and he split his time between Phoenix and his base in 
Chicago. He and his followers established three temples that represent the earliest 
contemporary Muslim presence in Arizona. These temples eventually became mosques; 
the change in the name marks a transition that imbued new meaning to the same place. 
After the death of the NOI founder, his son W.D. Muhammad (d.2008) transitioned the 
overwhelming majority of NOI followers –including the Arizona community–to Sunni 
Islam. The first Sunni Mosque in Arizona is still led by and frequented by members of 
the late W.D. Muhammad community and thus remains connected to the Chicago 
community, however tenuous this connection may be.  
In general, demographically, Arizona is home to many Chicagoans who relocated 
here for weather, work, or college and many of these are also Muslims. Those long term 
residents in the valley maintain contacts with families and friends back in Chicago and 
were a great resource for me during the Chicago phase of this project. The movement is 
ongoing. On a regular basis, I met people who moved between the two sites. For 
example, in one way or another, I became involved with four young Chicagoans 
relocating to the Phoenix-valley during my project and was able to draw on my 
connections to facilitate their transition here. Additionally, Chicago is often the site for 
the largest Muslim American annual conventions, attended by Muslims from around the 
country. For many Arizona Muslims, especially activists and leaders, these conventions 
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are venues for networking and religious and organizational education which they bring 
back to the valley. For many activists, Chicago Muslim organizations and 
intracommunity, interfaith and civic engagements are models to be emulated. Nearly a 
century long history of Muslim presence and the unique position of Chicago as home to a 
very large and well organized and socially/politically active immigrant and 
Blackamerican Muslim communities along with its centrality to today’s Muslim 
American presence, distinguishes Chicagoland from the Phoenix-valley.  
Chicagoland’s racial geography divides the metropolitan area into ethnic 
neighborhoods. Unlike in Phoenix-valley, the Muslims in Chicagoland reside in these 
ethnic neighborhoods. Though mixed to some extent, each neighborhood is dominated 
by one ethnic group (for example, Bosnians in the North). Chicagoland’s residential 
segregation places people who are in the same income bracket in different areas. For 
example, poor South Asians, many of whom are Muslims, live on the north side of 
Chicago while Blackamericans live on the south side. Middle class members of the two 
groups live even further apart; a great majority of South Asians live in the north and 
northwestern suburbs, while most Blackamericans live in the south and southwestern 
suburbs (Karim 2008). Devon Avenue on the north side of Chicago, for example, is like 
little India and Pakistan with sights, smells and sounds that give glimpses of the 
subcontinent. There are ethnic stores and restaurants, and elderly men and women 
dressed in traditional South Asian garb stroll the sidewalks in summer. Here one can sit 
down to have Pizza with halal lamb meet at a restaurant and pre-order halal 
Thanksgiving turkey dinner then browse the shelves of Kazi bookstore, the largest and 
oldest Muslim American publisher and bookstore. A male second generation Indian 
American interviewee, commenting on how little interactions Muslims in this area have 
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with other Muslim groups or the larger society, noted that some children here speak 
English with a South Asian accent even though they may have been born and raised here.  
Many poor and recent Arab immigrants live on the south side of Chicago while 
most middle class Arabs live in the southwest and northwest suburbs (Hanania 2005). 
The interaction among Arabs and Blackamericans is strained on the south side of 
Chicago and often marked by mutual contempt, nourished by the reality that some Arabs 
own convenience stores and sell alcohol. As one interviewee told me, most then take the 
money to the suburbs where they live and build million dollar mosques. This residential 
segregation means that where they worship and interact as a community is also 
segregated, creating what Jamillah Karim terms ethnic Muslim spaces. She notes that 
though not exclusive to one group, typically one group is predominant in such ethnic 
spaces or immigrant spaces since most South Asian and Arabs tend to share mosques. 
Regardless of how ethnically mixed such spaces might be, Blackamerican Muslims do 
not make the distinction and “most lump them all together as immigrants” (Karim 2008, 
54).  
My connections to Arizona and to Chicago reach beyond this project into 
friendships developed through years of permanent residence in the Phoenix-valley and 
frequent visits to Chicagoland. Additionally, I lived in Chicago for three months in 2010 
to engage in extensive fieldwork.  The relationships and interactions I cultivated for 
more than a decade while I worked, studied, lectured, organized, mentored and 
volunteered in the community did not become external artifacts that needed to be shed 
to strive for “objective” scholarship. Ignoring or breaking these links to “immerse” myself 
in the fieldwork would, in fact, have been, as Amit concluded, “an oxymoron” (1999, 6). 
These connections and relations enriched this project and in many ways the people 
involved are also collaborators in the co-construction of this ethnographic narrative. 
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Situated Individuals in Socio-cultural Landscapes 
 
The collaborators in this ethnographic project are the adult (eighteen years or 
older) children and grandchildren of immigrants and converts who identified themselves 
as Muslim regardless of their level of observance. The collaborative nature of this work 
materialized rather quickly as I had to change the terms I used in the recruitment script 
stating the inclusion criteria. I initially used the term “second and third generation” and 
explained that this meant American born and/or raised regardless of background, but I 
had to modify that once I learned the different ways the term was being understood. I 
then specified “the children or grandchildren of immigrants or converts” who were born 
in the U.S. or whose parents immigrated or converted before the children were thirteen 
years old.  My collaborators are individuals whom I encountered at Muslim places of 
worship, events, and organizations or who responded to email messages circulated 
through social networks, Muslim student associations, and community email lists. As a 
snowball and convenience sample and due to its necessarily small size, 
representativeness of the full diversity of this demographic is limited and was not the 
objective of the project from the start. During participant observation in mosques and 
organizational events and in social gatherings, I paid particular attention to the 
demographics and interactions of attendees, noting differences between generations, 
topics and themes of events, religious discourses and rituals and cultural practices. I 
engaged in many informal conversations and discussions with members of both first and 
subsequent generations where things might be said that would not be revealed in a 
formal interview. Some of these conversations turned into passionate debates about the 
topics that will be delved into throughout the ensuing chapters. 
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I utilized a self-administered questionnaire for greater participation and to 
survey a wider range of perspectives. In the end, 246 men and women returned hard 
copies, emailed forms or completed a secured online questionnaire (Appendix I).  The 
hardcopy forms and electronic document surveys were then entered into the online 
survey, downloaded into a spreadsheet, and analyzed for themes and patterns. The 
survey instrument included short answers, multiple choice questions/statements 
including Likart scales. One set of questions inquired about participants’ sources of 
Islamic education and sampled their perspectives regarding the key issues of 
generational/gender/ethnic relations and what they viewed as differences – if any – 
between their religious understanding and that of their parents. Another set gathered 
information about what collaborators perceived as the challenges or opportunities for 
Muslim Americans and about how they envision the future. Yet another set of survey 
questions gathered demographic information such as age, sex, ethnic background, level 
of education, languages spoken, and level of involvement in Muslim gatherings and 
events. Except for age, sex and city of residence, all questions had multiples line available 
for further elaborations of answers or for general comments. The relationship between 
these demographic variables and the variations in participants’ responses to the other 
questions were analyzed to identify themes and patterns.  
I engaged in many rich informal conversations, but interviews provided a space 
for longer narratives of self through which understanding and meaning of experiences 
emerged. All interviews were semi-structured and began with an opened ended 
statement of “let’s start with you telling me about your age, your background, your family 
and anything else you’d like to add.” The co-constructed nature of narrative was 
apparent from the start in the topic of the discussion, the “semi-structured” format of the 
interview, and my subsequent and follow-up questions as the narrative progressed. I had 
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a list of questions but invariably did not go through all of them because I often had to 
follow my narrator who took me into different and deeper paths of self-exploration and 
experiences, sometimes surprising both of us. Initially, I was worried about not sticking 
to my prepared list of questions, but after the first few interviews I realized what was 
gained in the process. Chase (2005) notes that understanding the process by which 
people make sense and meaning of their experiences entails a recognition that rather 
than obtaining straight answers to our questions, it is these narrations that “constitute 
the empirical material” of our research. This, she notes, requires considering the 
interviewee as a narrator and necessitates “a conceptual shift away from the idea that 
interviewees have answers to researcher’s questions and towards the idea that 
interviewees are narrators with stories to tell and voices of their own” (Chase 2005, 659). 
 Participants had an opportunity in the survey to indicate their willingness to be 
interviewed. Some opted to only take part in interviews or informal discussions and 
contacted me through emails or text messaging. In the end, 43 people (19 from Phoenix-
valley and 24 from Chicagoland including 28 women and 15 men) took part in interviews 
that varied in duration from 45 to 120 audio-recorded minutes.  The open-ended 
interviews aimed at eliciting narrations of the self, belongings and representations and 
allowed for a more nuanced exploration of issues of identity and religious 
understanding/perspectives and the positional variables that shape each. After the first 
open-ended question that began the narrative, questions like “how do you answer the 
question ‘where are you from?’ ” and “tell me what it was like in school” followed. Other 
questions explored their sources and resources for religious knowledge. To address the 
research question about intra-community relationships, interviewees were asked about 
their social networks and about the makeup and quality of community leadership 
(religious and political). Additionally, I asked interviewees about their views on ethnic 
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and religious differences and relations and about the roles, needs, and interactions of 
younger Muslims. I also inquired about their views on differences and similarities 
between Islam as practiced/understood by themselves, their parents, immigrants and 
converts, and by Muslims in America compared to those living in Muslim majority 
countries.  
This line of questioning also aimed to address research questions about the 
characteristics and authentication process of Islam in America and its possible cultural 
products. I entered the transcribed interviews into Nvivo data management software and 
analyzed for themes and patterns within an interview and across the various interviews 
and survey material. As I analyzed, I was keeping in mind the five intersecting lenses and 
the approaches proposed by Chase (2005) for examining narratives: 1) narratives as a 
“distinct form of discourse” and meaning making; 2) narratives as a “verbal action” 
which constructs and performs self and social reality; 3) narratives are “both enabled 
and constrained by a range of social resources and circumstance” and this produces both 
similarities, differences and contradictions; 4) narratives are “socially situated 
interactive performances” and thus fluid and specific to that context; 5) researchers are 
also narrators as they analyze, represent and write what they researched and their 
narrations are, therefore, subject to the previous four lenses (Chase 2005,656-7). The 
inherent co-constructed nature of narratives and the approach to them as a space for 
both self-performing and self-discovery was brought home to me on more than one 
occasion when my collaborators shared with me during or after our exchanges that they 
learned something about themselves or better understood something about events or 
experiences in their lives. They were eager to learn the outcome of this project and asked 
me if they alone had these ideas or if others shared their views. I promised to share my 
findings and plan to go back and present to the communities where I worked.   
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To contextualize the religious and public discourses that engaged or affected 
participants, interviews included discussions about Muslim religious scholars and 
leaders and what is written or said about Muslims. I also explored oral and written 
discourse of the primary religious personalities that interviewees identified as most 
influential. This research project took place not only in the charged post- 9/11 
atmosphere but also in the context of the recent extremely partisan, intensely anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments. Though already growing in the past decade, 
these sentiments seem to have been accelerated and exacerbated by the election of 
Barack Obama as a U.S. President— a Black man with African Muslim roots. The Tea 
Party and the Stop the Islamization of America movements as well as the increasing 
arms sales and Minute Man militias may well reflect the rise of nativist sentiments and 
present examples of re-articulation of old racism with new enemies. Because identity 
formation takes place within a socio-cultural milieu that individuals shape and are 
shaped by, it was critical to examine the dominant narratives regarding Islam and 
Muslims in print, broadcast or digital media. I dedicated chapter six to exploring this 
issue. 
This study does not focus on a particular locale, such as an organization, or 
mosque, or residential neighborhood, and those who frequent it. Doing so might have 
been easier and could have provided a “thicker” description. But the questions of this 
project required a larger and more diverse set of participants, not in order to generalize 
but as a way to gain greater breadth and depth in order to “assemble a composite picture 
of a group’s experiences” (LeCompte and Schensul 1999, 87). As such, the project 
involves individuals – or follows identities as suggested by Marcus – who engage and/or 
identify with Muslim Americans, a particular community of knowledge and practice 
rather than a group inhabiting a particular locale. At the same time, I did not follow a 
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specific group of individuals. Instead, I chose to focus on generational cohorts as they 
engaged in daily life and in religiously-centered activities and discourses. These activities 
and discourses both define and are defined by these participants and their socio-political 
context, which, they in turn shape and by which they are shaped. In doing so, the 
individual is not fetishized to the neglect of the culture or society but there is a 
recognition that individuals create and are shaped by cultural and social landscapes. 
They are not passive vessels molded and overcome by social structure or culture. The 
individual here is considered, as Chomicka noted, the site of the “anthropological 
concrete” because ultimately it is individuals, not their culture or society that can and do 
act (2007, 9). On the other hand, while it is critical to give the individuals due focus— 
after all they are the ones individually and collectively experiencing and creating these 
larger structures—it is important to heed the cautionary words of Metcalf not to “be 
deceived by models of the individual as simply a cultural consumer picking from a 
suddenly expanded range of products” (Metcalf 2001, 169). To balance this demand, one 
needs to engage in a double gaze that alternates focusing the observation and analytical 
lens on the individual with panning out to the larger social and cultural landscape before 
zooming back in again on the individual. Additionally, how one conceives the research 
subject and ultimately frames whatever knowledge that is gained is critically 
important. Viewing participants as objects mined for information (Marcus 2009) would 
only provide individual stories, but when they are viewed as collaborators in weaving a 
narrative system, the cultural landscape emerges from their multiple stories. As Fotour 
points out, individual subjects enable us to access these “distributed knowledge 
systems” where individuals are “manifest at the nexus of cross-cutting discursive, 
political-economic, cultural currents” and could be considered as “nodes” in this systems 
(Marcus 2009, 189).    
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 In this project then, understanding the lives of Muslim Americans is an attempt 
to shed light not only on the individuals but also on the Muslim American “community” 
and its culture. Here culture is understood in Fotour’s “trans-individual sense”, where 
culture is assimilated differently by different individuals and in the process creates 
different kinds of subjects. These subjects are constantly changing and continuously 
engaged in digesting and interpreting this culture and where there is as much 
“knowledge making” as there is “knowledge holding” (Marcus 2009, 189-90).  In this 
framing, understanding an individual’s “embedded perspective” (Marcus 2009, 193) is 
an entry point into understanding this distributed knowledge of culture that shapes and 
is shaped by these individuals. Participants and the researcher’s positionality in the 
socio-cultural landscape, therefore, determine the views they narrate and co-construct.   
 
Being a Muslim, Black, and Woman Researcher 
 
For years, as a youth mentor and member of organizations and committees 
working with men and women of diverse backgrounds, I had countless discussions about 
the issues that interest and concern many Muslim women and men, young and old, 
converts and immigrants. So the questions I aim to explore in this project are inspired by 
these experiences and observations. But the sociopolitical context of these experiences 
and questions poses a challenge. Being a Muslim researcher afforded me many 
advantages in the field: easier access and familiarity with religious discourse; cognizance 
of the relevant identity politics; and ability to frame my inquiries with proper attention 
to community sensibilities. While I share a religious and some cultural heritage with my 
collaborators, my position in terms of gender, class, religious understanding, race and 
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ethnicity is on constantly shifting grounds, making me sometimes a relative insider and 
sometimes a relative outsider, depending on the makeup of the group.  
From the start, however, I knew that the legitimacy of my questions and my 
motives would be of concern. Being a woman asking questions about gender issues when 
outsiders are calling for liberating “oppressed Muslim women,” being Black and asking 
questions about inter-ethnic relationships in a racially conscious society, asking about/of 
younger Muslims in the midst of heated debates about radicalized young Muslims and 
stories about FBI infiltration, all warrant some suspicion and raise questions about my 
motives and agenda. The fact that a cadre of avowedly feminist Muslims or former 
Muslims is on a mission to “save Muslim women,” often collaborating with or being co-
opted by right wing neo-cons and sharing both a last name and country of origin with 
one of them (Ayan Hirsi Ali), did not help my case, especially in Chicago where I was an 
outsider.  
To address these issues, I employed multiple strategies:  
1) In the Phoenix-valley, people have known me for years and that 
afforded me some credibility. But at both sites, I made a point of 
meeting community scholars, leaders and organizers to receive their 
approval and support. I then made that fact known to all participants. 
In Chicago, before I even started, I attended a public lecture by a 
renowned Muslim scholar with whom I had worked for years and I was 
introduced to key figures in the community.  
2) Beyond a data gathering method, I used participant observation as a 
way to be seen and known in the community and to discuss my project 
in details in informal settings where people could comfortably ask me 
probing questions. 
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3) I employed a multiple method research design using participant 
observation, a questionnaire, and interviews. Participants were offered 
a choice to do one or both of the latter. 
  I had thought of the anonymity of a survey as a positive feature that would 
minimize participants’ self-censorship. For many who did not know me, however, the 
survey was a source of concern and surely deterred some from participating. Others said 
they would not participate until we met face-to-face. Some collaborators took issues with 
my questions about gender or inter-group relations. They argued that, as a Muslim and 
since “Islam liberated women” and “there is no racism in Islam,” I should know better 
than to ask! So what were my motives? Though these concerns were allayed through our 
discussions, I have no doubt that suspicion and concern about questions and the 
questioner dissuaded some from participating. I know the jokes about the FBI using this 
information were in fact not just jokes. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of 
people I met were immensely helpful and incredibly generous and open. Those who 
participated, both men and women, surprised me with the depth and breadth of their 
responses and honesty. Interviews scheduled for an hour often lasted twice as long and 
continued as conversation over dinner or tea/coffee.   
I was initially concerned that male participants might be reluctant to be 
interviewed by a female, and a Muslim one at that. But my gender did not seem to be 
much of an issue even for very observant men, once the above concerns were addressed. 
In those long interviews, men and women discussed in detail their childhood and family 
dynamics, their thoughts on community leadership and inter-group relations, Islam in 
America, and their hopes for the future. They also spoke frankly and in depth about 
gender relations and interactions.  Some, both men and women, accepted my invitation 
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for lunch or dinner to thank them and these instances became great opportunities for 
further discussions where they also had a chance to ask about my thoughts.  
 
Research in the “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” Era 
 
Islam and the West have for long been constructed as mutually exclusive 
universes. This narrative, rooted in recent and remote encounters and histories, is 
frequently instrumentalized for ideological and political ends by Muslims and non-
Muslims. The social and political consequences vary, but a common narrative of the 
“Muslim problem” is emerging in the West. The public referendum against minarets in 
Switzerland, the French headscarf ban and criminalization of niqab (face veil) in public, 
the lower Manhattan Muslim center and Qur’an burning controversies, and the belief 
that President Obama is a crypto-Muslim –read: “dangerous” – exemplify the current 
“Muslim problem” narrative. This vociferous discourse and its anti-West counterpart 
have great consequences for ordinary Western Muslims. Undertaking any research in 
this charged atmosphere, therefore, is fraught with ethical dilemmas and methodological 
challenges. Part of the challenge is that this discourse and my research are taking place 
in the context of a post-9/11 world dominated by “culture talk,” the most prominent 
among which is a “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” (Mamdani 2002) narrative. This 
narrative erases all diversity and creates gendered monolith images of violent 
misogynistic Muslim men and oppressed women. Lumped together in the “bad Muslim” 
category are: those Muslims critical of U.S. foreign policy, violent extremists, social 
“conservatives’ and “fundamentalists,” and political and social movements that draw on 
Islam in one way or another (Mamdani 2002). The “good Muslim” camp includes those 
perceived as “liberal,” Sufis, non-practicing and, strangely, former Muslims. Membership 
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in the “good Muslim” camp is only provisional, as the planner of the lower Manhattan 
Muslim cultural center –Sufi imam and participant in State Department public 
diplomacy project—found out in the summer of 2010.   
The “good/bad Muslim” discourse seems to have a call-and-response relationship 
with that of Muslim ideologues who define Islam in terms of and in opposition to the 
West. Though the “dangerous man” image (terrorist/fundamentalist Muslim and 
heathen/imperial Westerner) is essential to these ideologies, women bodies are the 
battle ground and the borderlines. The hijab (the headscarf, though often referred to as 
the “veil”) is a potent symbol that has become the litmus test in this discourse among 
non-Muslims and Muslims alike. The “Muslim woman” is, therefore, essential to this 
narrative. To one side, her headscarf or face-veil is a sign of piety and of her status as a 
“good Muslim” and it is often a pre-requisite for her to “represent” the community in 
public. To the other side, unless she is “unveiled” and critical of Islam and Muslims, she 
is oppressed and is the symbol of all that is wrong with Islam. In this context, colonial 
civilizing missions and narratives of “white men saving brown women from their brown 
men” (Spivak 1988, 297) have been revived along with feminist complicity in that project 
(Mohanty 2003; Scott 2010).  In today's version, the “war on terrorism” is also about 
western military men liberating Muslim women (Abu-Lughod 2002; Hirschkind and 
Mahmood 2002). Meanwhile in the homeland, as former President George W. Bush had 
noted, good Christian and Jewish women were apparently helping the Muslim women – 
“women of cover” - who were too afraid to go in public because of backlash3. 
For a network of critics of Islam, Muslim women confirm the worst of the trope of 
misogyny and patriarchy, (as though Muslims have exclusivity) and hence serve as the 
best validators. For example, Canadian Irshad Manji and second generation American 
Asra Nomani, both journalists of South Asian background, are the public image of “good 
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Muslims” and credible insiders who expose the “truth” about Islam. They wrote books 
about personal traumas they attribute to the Muslim-ness of their family and the local 
Muslim communities that shunned them because of their sexuality4. They advocate that 
Islam must follow in the footsteps of the Christian Reformation and criticize Muslims for 
outdated practices and beliefs. Women who left Islam make even better validators. 
Egyptian-born Nanie Darwish founded Former Muslims United and argues that those 
“who take time to read the Qur’an and Hadith and want to follow the example of 
Mohammed cannot help but be terrorists” (2008, 231). Ayan Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim 
of Somali origin and a former member of the Dutch Parliament, is touted as the premier 
insider who was subjected to female genital cutting, forced marriage, and sexual 
repression. Their stories may differ, but these validators contribute to one narrative and 
share an intellectual and political stance of uncritical exaltations of secularism and 
Western civilization, unquestioned support of the U.S. and Israel, alarm-sounding about 
a Muslim threat, and promotion of Muslim profiling, surveillance and whatever else is 
“necessary” for security. In a racialization process that Muslims and other groups 
undergo, Comaroff (1996, 166) noted that constructing difference takes place in the 
minutiae of everyday practices and encounters and that the bodies and dress of women 
are key sites for construction of difference. 
Because of the centrality of “the Muslim woman” to the hegemonic discourse on 
Islam, I wanted to examine how and whether this one-dimensional category interfaces 
with and informs participants’ narratives and experiences. Young women shared their 
frustration with being painted as voiceless and invisible. Those who do not wear the 
headscarf were bothered that people assumed they were either not Muslims or were non-
observant. Many of those who wear a headscarf (hijabis in 2nd generation Muslim 
parlance) said they are tired of having to always be the “cheery nice Muslim” in public 
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lest they be thought of as extremists or oppressed. They expressed frustrations that 
Muslim women without headscarves were presumed to be liberal when, in reality, they 
may hold much more socially and politically conservative views than those with 
headscarves. To illustrate this point, Zakiyah, a thirty year old hijabi woman of African 
background, told me of an incident where a producer from a major TV network, doing a 
program the summer of 2010 on Muslim Americans, came to her work place at a Muslim 
majority organization and asked to interview a “moderate Muslim woman”. Her non-
Muslim colleagues assured the producer that all the women there qualified and 
introduced the producer to this young woman. But the producer saw her and said “sorry 
but we are looking for a moderate Muslim, one who doesn’t cover”.  
The headscarf looms large in discussions inside and outside the community and 
permeates casual conversations and formal discussions of men and (non)hijabi women. 
Since those wearing it are framed in public discourse as oppressed, often some of them 
equally reduce and stereotype non-hijabi women as oppressed by a materialistic culture 
that exploits their bodies. The image of hijabi women in public in America was to 
Harvard historian Leila Ahmed a stunning and “disturbing sight,” and the telltale sign of 
Islamism (2011, 3). This was concerning to Ahmed whose childhood encounters in Egypt 
with Islamic revival and its ethos of public piety (symbolized by a particular style of 
hijab), service, civic and political engagement left an indelible negative imprint on her. 
The new public piety, she says, was unlike the widely practiced “old Islam” personal piety 
which she and her parents knew. Consequently, the sight of women in hijab and the 
visceral negative reactions she had toward that image propelled her to ask if there was 
some kind of “extremist, militant Islam taking root” in Europe and United States. She 
wanted to know how did these young women learn they had to wear hijab and more 
importantly why would they —living in a free society—feel compelled to accept what they 
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were being told (L. Ahmed 2011, 5). This makes her findings all the more significant and 
surprising. The hijab, she concludes, signifies something worrisome to her and others 
but had different meanings to younger generations – in the West and elsewhere –who 
did not share her generation’s history. The meanings of the hijab lost its “older, 
historically bounded moorings” and became imbued with concurrently circulating new 
meanings and significations: a sign of Muslim Otherness, a sign of oppression or, to 
those electing to wear it, a sign of obedience to God or expression of spiritual 
commitment. It may be a performance of self or an embodied practice that defines 
certain bodily and behavioral comportments as possible or not and serves as a 
technology to cultivate a pious inner state (Mahmood 2005).  
Regardless of their position on hijab, in this project, in Ahmed’s research, and in 
the community, women’s activism for social justice was inseparable from gender justice. 
Women pursued gender equity grounding it in Islamic discursive tradition by debating, 
challenging and introducing different religious interpretations. For example, Asifa 
Quraishi-Landes at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, who specializes in 
comparative Islam and U.S. laws, titled a lecture on “Who Says Sharia Demands the 
Stoning of Women? A Description of Islamic Law and Constitutionalism” (2008). A 
second generation of South Asian and Whiteamerican background, Asifa presented her 
lecture at Muslim conferences on family law emphasizing the requirement of gender 
justice. Committed Muslim women, hijabis or not, be they converts or immigrants from 
different generations and backgrounds, and across the interpretive tendencies are 
revisiting canonical texts and engaging the discursive tradition, challenging and 
proposing new perspectives5. Their primary concerns are local, but their commitments 
extend to society and the global ummah.  
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I was surprised by how often feminism came up in my fieldwork, because I 
avoided appearing to be motivated by it. Those averse to critical community assessment 
by a woman or suspicious of the legitimacy and priority of these questions to a 
“community under attack,” blamed Western feminist ideology and Islamophobes for 
defining Muslim women’s agenda. But even those who accept the caricature of feminism 
as the ideology of “men-hating aggressive women,” do so as they take for granted the 
advancement of women and champion pushing that agenda forward, illustrating 
Baumgardner’s and Richards’ point that to younger generations “feminism is like 
fluoride” (2000, 17). This was exemplified by a twenty-five year old man of Palestinian 
parentage who told me that he “detest[s] feminism” and thinks Muslim women should 
never identify with it. And then without skipping a beat, he noted his scathing criticism 
of restrictive gender interactions among Muslims and was passionate about Muslim 
women having active roles in the community. He advocates women pursuing careers and 
developing intellectually rather than “being obsessed” with marriage, and he had told his 
parents he would do whatever it takes for his sisters to pursue their education and 
professional lives. If these sisters need to move out of town to pursue the best 
opportunities and parents oppose their living alone away from home, this brother would 
move to the same city to overcome parents’ opposition and in doing so enable his sisters 
to pursue their dreams. His detest for feminism is in part informed by the image and 
stance of the women validators of anti-Muslim discourse who are, even as they 
collaborate with the conservative right, are nevertheless portrayed as feminists. The 
good/bad Muslim ideology and discourse and Muslims’ reaction serve multiple functions 
including concealing injustices against women in Western societies and Muslim 
communities alike.  
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In such a context, talking about gender-related issues or about self and 
community is a difficult task. Often there seems to be an imagined interlocutor for whom 
participants need to show the “real Islam” and defend the community. It is also 
challenging for a researcher to balance building rapport and methodological and political 
accountability with critical scholarship, interrogating both apologist and neo-orientalist 
narratives while championing social justice without confirming the worst stereotypes. 
 
Multiple Accountabilities 
 
 As researchers, we too grapple with complex identities and with contradictions. 
Our accountability is not only intellectual but also social, ethical, and political. 
Methodologically, I am accountable to represent my collaborator’s views honestly while 
maintaining their anonymity but, to do so, for some simply using a pseudonym will not 
be sufficient. On the other hand, the important context of their views will be lost if I 
overly disguise their identity. I also realize that in being evaluated through it, resenting 
it, and working against it, I too do not escape the “Good Muslim, bad Muslim” narrative 
frame. As a member of Muslim America, I also shape and in turn I am shaped by the 
other narratives presented in this project. I am vigilantly aware of the effects of that.  
In the current context, my political accountability is not limited to how my 
findings will be perceived by Muslims –though that is crucial – but extends to how this 
study could invite state surveillance and be used against them. At the same time, my 
questions did not originate in mere intellectual curiosity. As the feminist scholar Harding 
noted: “questions that an oppressed group wants answered are not a request for ‘pure 
truth’ but are queries about how to change its conditions; how its world is shaped by 
forces beyond it…[how] to neutralize those forces arrayed against its emancipation, 
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growth, or development” (1987, 7). Since a narrative framework inspired this project’s 
theory and methodology, this project in turn aims to challenge the pervading narratives 
and contribute to the stories that could potentially create new narratives. As a woman, a 
member and researcher of a religious minority made up of ethnic minorities, my project 
is not apolitical and I realize it could have serious consequences beyond academia and on 
real lives; this is at once a source of great encouragement, empowerment, and anxiety.    
 
Significance 
 
This project aims to add to the general literature on Muslim Americans by 
bringing attention to the perspectives and positionalities of the offspring of both 
immigrants and converts. Because they represent and express multiple heritages 
(Islamic, ethnic and American), these younger generations of Muslim Americans are 
redefining Islam and America; this has significant implications. As members of the 
second and subsequent generations re-examine Islam in America and do so with an eye 
and ear on local and global discourses, Islam could be rooted in America just as it has 
been in many other areas. If and when this happens, Muslims will become producers of 
Islamic knowledge in the heart of the West.  Since American cultural exports span all 
fields, American-produced Islamic knowledge is bound to be exported back to the 
Muslim majority world. Such a development would have consequential effects, including 
the undermining of dichotomizing discourses of extremism on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Furthermore, as Islam begins to speak uniquely to American realities, as second and 
subsequent generations of Muslim Americans operationalize their religious values into 
civic engagement and contribute to addressing societal problems, and as art, literature 
and other cultural products of American Islam continue to appear, the American public 
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may come to see Islam as just another American religion—as Judaism and Catholicism 
became. Only then might Islam and Muslims no longer be seen as foreign. Such a 
development could have great public and foreign policy implications. This project’s 
contribution, hence, is to explore the status and state of second and third generation 
Muslim Americans and how they might be contributing to this process, one so significant 
to our understanding of pluralistic societies.  
I also aim to contribute to identity studies. My theoretical point of departure is 
that the complex task of understanding individual and group identities requires 
simultaneously focusing the ethnographic lens on the individual, the social other, and 
society’s structure and culture. Therefore, rather than selecting one theory of identity 
formation, I draw upon a synthesis of several theoretical perspectives. This synthesis 
provides a framework that takes into account both micro and macro processes while 
interrogating recent and remote histories in which these individual and group self-
images and (re)presentations were and continue to be shaped.  
Muslim Americans’ minority status – as a religious minority of mostly ethnic 
minorities –necessitates exploration of the minority-majority relationship. Here a 
dialogical perspective on ethnicity focusing on power relations within social intercourse, 
without losing sight of the symbolic elements and the instrumental features of the 
politics of ethnicity, elucidates the complex nature of this concept. Critical Race Theory 
also provides a useful framework to deconstruct the duality (minority-majority and 
Black-White) and examine how whiteness maintains normativity, access to power 
(material and symbolic) and the simple privilege of being unhyphenated and neutral. 
Interrogating whiteness also challenges its exclusive claims to the creation of American 
culture by exploring the contribution of minorities, including Muslim Americans, to the 
(re)making of American culture. 
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Additionally, I hope to illustrate that the characteristic dynamism of identity 
construction extends to religions, which are neither fossilized dogmas nor fashionable 
trends. Any discourse on religion in a secular democracy inevitably involves questions 
about secularity’s public–private divide and what is appropriate in the public sphere. 
This study strives to contribute to those re-conceptualizations of the public sphere that 
challenge its singularity and problematize the private-public and secular-religious 
divides. In exploring Muslim American communities, this study will illustrate that public 
spheres are neither singular, homogeneous, nor culturally and status neutral; but they 
are instead contested places where some are privileged and others marginalized. These 
are not merely arenas for policy and intellectual debates but powerful discursive spaces 
for the (re)construction of religious praxis, cultural beliefs, and mental schemas as well 
as individual, communal and national identities 
When religion is examined in the context of immigration, it is typically seen as an 
important ethnic institution which ameliorates the disorientation caused by the 
immigration experience. Immigrants are pressured to adopt the language and the 
cultural ways of their host countries but they are generally not expected to change their 
religious beliefs. As such, immigration studies have long acknowledged the role of 
religion in facilitating the integration of immigrants into host societies by allowing them 
to carve their own space while providing them cultural and ethnic shelters from the 
vicissitudes of life in their new societies. But the significance of religion in the lives of 
second and subsequent generations, particularly those from non-Christian traditions, 
has not been well studied. Furthermore, recent immigration theories, such as segmented 
assimilation, have often neglected religion. This project endeavors to make some 
contribution in this field as well. First, it will show what becomes of religion among 
immigrant offspring as they develop their own understandings and practices of faith in 
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dialogue and negotiation with their parents and with peers of immigrant and convert 
backgrounds. Second, this project will point to the limitations of the three tracks6 
envisioned by segmented assimilation theory by considering how the religious identity of 
immigrant offspring may propel them on yet a different trajectory on their path to 
“becoming American”. Third, it will problematize the widely accepted idea that religion 
plays a supportive role to immigrant cultures by highlighting how, in subsequent 
generations, religion might also challenge the practices and norms of these cultures.   
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1 See M. Ali (2011) for a summary of the findings and themes of this thesis project.  
2 In the contemporary world, the notion of fieldwork in a “bounded village” if it ever existed 
became untenable. Consequently, as anthropology grappled with how to study subjects who are 
always on the move in the new global context, the stories in the anthropological narrative -like 
any narrative- have been modified to accommodate the new social realities of subjects and a 
world in motion. To accommodate the new methodological requirement of fieldwork and “being 
there,” Marcus (1995) proposed a multi-sited ethnography where fieldworker may follow people, 
ideas, products, people, or conflicts. The “field” remains central but here it is conceived of as 
multiple but interconnected locations. However, these multi-sited ethnographies have had mostly 
a transnational focus following migrants and other networks (Burrell 2009), products (Bestor 
2001) and ideas (Krauss 2006).  
Critics of multi-sited ethnography contend that not only does expanding the fieldwork 
sacrifice depth and “thick description” but it also purports holism it cannot deliver (Candea 2009; 
Wogan 2004). In the debates that ensued, proponents of multi-sited methods responded to the 
lack of depth argument noting that it is based on a traditional understanding of the field that 
focuses on boundaries of particular locale rather than on connections. Critics contend that such 
focus is untenable in the rapidly changing interconnected contemporary world (Clifford 1997; 
Hannerz 2003; Horse 2009; Marcus 1995). Furthermore, they argue, staying put in one place also 
lacked depth for it delimited the field by severing the locale from the multiple networks in which 
it was embedded. The presumed depth characterized by intense and long interaction in a 
mastered native language in the single site was always more of an ideal than a practical research 
reality (Clifford 1997, 54). Additionally, if participant observation is the trademark of 
anthropological research and if our research participants are on the move, then we too must 
experience the world as they do (Clifford 1997). Falzon argues that in participating in the moving 
world of the participants, the researcher experiences “a broader but possible ‘shallower’ world, as 
they did” and that “understanding the shallow may itself be a form of depth” (2009, 9). 
3 President George W. Bush’s Press Conference. October 11, 2001.  
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911e.html accessed on 6/20/2012 
4 Manji is openly gay and Nomani had a child outside of marriage 
5 For example, Amina Wadud’s (1999) Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a 
Woman’s Perspective,  Asma Barlas’ (2002) “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal 
Interpretations of the Qur'an; Laleh Bakhtiar’s (2007) English translation of the Qur’an titled 
The Sublime Qur’an, Kecia Ali’s (2006) Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur'an, 
Hadith, and Jurisprudence 
6 Unlike traditional assimilation theory, in segmental assimilation, the children of immigrants to 
America may follow three different trajectories: they might become absorbed into middle class 
suburban life, or incorporated into inner-city minority underclass and adopt oppositional 
attitudes towards middle-class norms, or they might become educationally and economically 
upwardly mobile while maintaining their ethnic cultural norms (Rumbaut 1999).   
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITY AND COLLABORATOR PROFILES 
 
Since the U.S. census does not take religious affiliation into account, the actual 
size of any religious community in the U.S. is but an approximation with important 
sociopolitical –and in the case of Muslims- geopolitical implications. Often 
underestimated by outsiders and overestimated by insiders, estimates of the number of 
Muslim Americans ranges from 2.6 million1 to 7 million persons (Bukhari 2003). The 
actual number is more likely around 5 million persons and rapidly growing because of 
immigration, a high birth rate, and conversion. While Islam’s public image is that of a 
foreign religion practiced by Arabs, Islam’s historical roots in the United States reach 
much deeper and today’s Muslims are hard at work to unearth these deeper roots. Some 
suggest that Islam’s initial contact with America’s indigenous population might even 
predate Columbus (Quick 1996), while others point to West African explorers and 
Muslims from Spain (known as Moors) who accompanied Columbus in 1492 
(Muhammad 2005; Nyang 1999). While these findings are rejected by most American 
studies scholars, there is general acceptance that at least 10 percent of the Africans 
brought to America through slavery were Muslims (Austin 1997; Diouf 1998; Leonard 
2003).  Although little is known about these early Muslims, since many lost their religion 
and cultural practices, some of their stories are preserved in slave narratives (Austin 
1997).  
From the founding days2 of the Republic through its various wars, Islam and 
Muslims were part of the nation’s history. The first recorded Whiteamerican convert to 
Islam was the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, Alexander Russell Webb, who was the 
spokesperson for Islam in 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago (Leonard 
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2003). Muslim immigration begins in earnest in the second half of the 19th century. 
South Asians as well as Arab citizens of the Ottoman Empire from Greater Syria (today’s 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine) arrived in the early 1880s in search of better 
economic opportunities in the wealthy West (Curtis 2010a). These Black, White and 
Brown roots of Muslims in America might appear insignificant but they are ones to 
which today’s Muslim Americans are reaching back in order to ground themselves firmly 
in the nation’s history and assert their belonging.   
 
Divergent Origins and Converging Histories 
The modern history of Muslim Americans, however, starts in the late 19th 
century and is a story of transcontinental migration, from south to north, and of 
transatlantic migration, from east to west. It is a chapter in Blackamerican history as well 
as a chronicle of America’s immigration history. Contemporary Muslim history begins 
with the migration of southern Blacks to the north in search of better economic 
opportunities and the arrival of immigrants from the former Ottoman Empire in larger 
numbers for the same reason. This latter group consisted mostly of young men from 
rural areas. The numbers and the diversity of immigrants increased dramatically after 
the 1965 Immigration Act, which abolished national origin quotas. Unlike earlier Muslim 
immigrants, post-1965 immigrants were mostly urbanites, well-educated, and 
professionals or students who came from the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, 
Africa, and Eastern Europe. Their arrival marked a new phase of Islam in America and 
changed the demographics and dynamics of Muslims in the U.S. (Haddad and Esposito 
2000; Leonard 2003; Burke 2010). In subsequent decades, immigration through family 
reunification, refugee resettlement and undocumented immigration brought more 
educationally and demographically diverse groups.  
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The story of the Muslim community in America is one of continuous struggles by 
its differing constituent groups to self-understand and self-define in a nation defined 
from its inception by difference in color and origin. The public narrative on Muslims cuts 
them off from a deep history and locates them in a post-9/11 temporal-scape. This erases 
centuries of Muslim presence and double erases Blackamerican Muslim history. Though 
public, academic, and some Muslim discourse today gives Islam an immigrant face and 
voice and creates competing narratives of “foreign/immigrant” and “indigenous” 
Muslims that suggest mutually exclusive histories, the reality is otherwise. The two 
groups have co-authored the various chapters of Islam’s history in the United States and 
continue to do so.   
Early 20th century Blackamerican movements inspired by Islam and Pan-African 
anticolonial movements, such as the Moorish Science Temple (MST) and the Nation of 
Islam (NOI), were attempts by Blackamericans to define a dignified self with a glorious 
origin story and a noble mission to uplift Black people spiritually, socially, economically 
and politically. Many Muslims consider the theology of such movements heretical3. The 
NOI theology, for example, could be described as a syncretism of new concepts and novel 
practices and some Islamic as well as Christian concepts and rituals. The founder, W.D. 
Fard, was deified and his successor Elijah Muhammad was considered to be his prophet. 
The Bible and the Qur’an served as references to the NOI. This theology and ideology of 
racial supremacy of these movements are antithetical to Islam’s teachings. Nevertheless, 
these movements remain an integral part of Muslim American history and critical to its 
unfolding story. The NOI created educational, economic, and civic organizations to strive 
for Black self-sufficiency and uplifting. The NOI is the most important of these early 
movements and while most of its followers transitioned to Sunni Islam in the 1970s, it 
remains relevant to both Black and Muslim America.  
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Sunni Islam, however, has had deeper roots in Black America that predate the 
transition by the NOI members to Sunni Islam. There were several early Sunni groups 
most notable among which was a community created by Sheikh Daoud Faisal in 1939 in 
New York City (Curtis 2010b). Wali Akram, who converted in 1923 in Philadelphia, 
joined forces with two other Blackamerican Muslims and, in 1943, created the United 
Islamic Society of America, a Black Sunni organization (McCloud 2003). The significance 
of NOI, however, is due to its being the path through which the single largest community 
conversion in Islamic history occurred as W.D. Mohammed, the son of the NOI leader, 
transitioned most of his followers to Sunni Islam in 1975 (Jackson 2005). W.D. 
Mohammed’s new community had several name changes and, though he died in 2008, 
his work and community continues under the name The Mosque Cares project. He was 
an influential figure among Muslims at home and abroad as evident by the CNN-blog 
post titled “Farewell, America’s Imam” (Rehab 2008) penned by Ahmed Rehab director 
of the Chicago chapter of  the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR)  
Like their American-born counterparts, immigrant Muslims also went through 
stages in terms of their self-definition, focus, and attitudes vis-à-vis the larger society. 
Race played a significant role here as well, since legal citizenship was long restricted to 
“free White persons” and immigration itself was race-based. Muslim immigrants from 
the Middle East, South and East Asia, Africa or Eastern Europe encountered a legal 
classification that vacillated between White and non-White several times but socially 
they continued to be seen as non-White and as “Other”.  The majority of the earliest 
immigrants were single male laborers who, being socially people of color, lived among 
other people of color and often married American women –usually Latina or 
Blackamerican. Some Muslim immigrants and Blackamericans united in common cause 
as they viewed colonialism and racism to be two sides of the same White supremacist 
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coin, so they joined forces with pan-Africanists and anti-colonial activists.  Egyptian 
American artist and activist Duse Mohammed Ali, for example, edited the Journal of 
African Times and Orient Reviews in 1922 and was chosen by Marcus Garvey to head up 
the African Affairs Division in the latter’s Universal Negro Improvement Association. Ali 
also joined with two other immigrant Muslims to form the interethnic Universal Islamic 
Society in Detroit in 1925 (Curtis 2010c).  
The next wave of Muslim immigrants arrived between the two World Wars 
bringing mainly relatives of those from the first waves. Later, those who arrived between 
1947 and 1960 opened the door for educated urbanites seeking higher education or 
economic opportunities. These families were concerned with maintaining their various 
ethnic and cultural traditions and created ethnic institutions. But there were also some 
like World War II veteran and second generation Arab American Abdallah Igram who 
created the first interethnic Muslim organization. Others established affiliations with 
Blackamerican nationalist efforts. One significant organization among them is the 
Ahmadiyya Mission to America which introduced Islam to Black Americans and is 
central in the history of the early iterations of Islamically inspired movements like MSI 
and NOI. Early and mid-20th century immigrants created mosques that served more as 
cultural centers than exclusively religious spaces. In these early centers dinners, social 
gatherings and celebrations of culture including dances followed religious services 
(Curtis 2010).  
The post-1965 immigrants continued to include urban professionals (doctors, 
engineers, scientists) and students. They, however, differed in that they were coming 
from a postcolonial world and a growing Islamic revival, and they saw religion as an 
inoculation against the perils of an imperial Western culture during their “temporary” 
stay in the United States. However, as many of them settled and established families, 
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these later immigrants began to establish more permanent and elaborate Islamic centers 
and weekend schools. Furthermore, as they made peace with the idea that “returning 
home one day” was a myth, they began the long process of working to reconcile the 
culture and institutions of their new home with their religious understandings and 
attempting to balance that with their ethnic cultures (Bukhari, Nyang, and Ahmad 2004; 
Haddad and Esposito 2000; Leonard 2003; Schumann 2007). Nevertheless, their 
understanding of Islam— informed as it was by colonial encounter— had an indelible 
impact on the practice and understanding of Islam not only among immigrants but also 
among converts. The focus of Islamic revivalist movements on public piety, education, 
and social justice work gave rise to the creation of many of today’s national 
organizations. A Muslim Student Association (MSA) was created in 1953 by those who 
came to study in the United States and sought a sense of community to maintain their 
faith. As many of these students remained in the United States after college and 
established families, they realized that this new situation required an organization to 
serve their needs outside of college campus. Subsequently, the MSA they created was 
restructured and named the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and changed 
through the years to become more socially and politically engaged. A campus-based 
student organization continued to run as the Muslim Student Association with chapters 
all over North America. In the 1990, other national organizations were created, such as 
the Islamic Circle of North America, Muslim American Society, and the Council on 
American Islamic Relations (a civil rights organization) to name a few. These 
organizations work to educate Muslims and non-Muslims alike and to advocate for 
Muslims; the effort to belong—especially for the first generation immigrants—is an 
ongoing process and a project that was, ironically, accelerated by the tragedy of 
September 11, 2001.  
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National and global events and ideologies along with unparalleled ethno-racial 
and economic diversity pose enormous challenges to the journey of self-definition and 
reconciliation among Muslim Americans. Today’s Muslim Americans reflect the ethnic 
and cultural mosaic of America and trace their roots in America back centuries.4 A 
Gallup 2009 study has identified Muslim Americans as the most diverse religious 
community in America5. Though studies identify Blackamericans, South Asian 
Americans, and Arab Americans as the largest ethnic groups in the Muslim American 
community, the studies differ on the percentages they assign to each. For example, the 
previously mentioned Gallup study found Blackamericans to be 35 percent of Muslim 
Americans while a Pew survey found this group to only make up 20 percent (2007). A 
study conducted by Muslim scholars examined several demographic studies of Muslim 
Americans and provided the following breakdown: Arabs (32 percent), Blackamericans 
(29 percent), South Asians (28.9 percent), followed by Turks, Iranians, Bosnians, 
Kosovars, Malays, and Indonesians to which the study did not assign specific 
percentages (Ba-Yunus and Kone 2006). 
Whiteamerican and Latino/a Muslims make a small but growing segment of 
Muslim America. Whiteamericans’ conversion to Islam dates back to 1800s and has 
accelerated post-9/11. Though female converts make a majority of Whiteamerican 
Muslims, male converts often garner more visibility and make up a disproportionally 
high number of the prominent American Muslim scholars or imams. The Latino/a 
Muslim community has been growing steadily since the 1970s but dramatically increased 
since 9/11 and captures headlines. Many of Latino/a converts see their journey to Islam 
as a return and reclamation of centuries of lost history that connects them to Muslim 
Spain. While White converts join existing organizations and mosques, Latino/a 
American Muslims have created a number of organizations to meet their cultural and 
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linguistic specificity. The oldest of these organizations, Alianza Islamica, was created in 
1975 in East Harlem, New York by a Puerto Rican convert (Barzegar 2003).  
Consequently, the current chapter in the history of Islam in America is one where 
assertive voices emerge among different groups (younger generations, converts, women, 
and gay/lesbian/transgender, to name few). It is also a time where efforts are being 
made to (re)claim a convergence and a common history of the various groups and of the 
nation. 
According to the Georgetown University’s Project MAPS (Muslim American in 
the Public Square), Muslim Americans are relatively young, with 74 percent under the 
age of fifty. They are well educated (50 percent are college graduates compared to 25 
percent for Americans in general), they are well off (50 percent have annual family 
income of $50 thousand or more), and they are socially engaged (77 percent are involved 
in programs helping the poor, elderly, or homeless) (Bukhari 2003).  A nationwide study 
in 2011 found 2,106 Islamic centers compared to 1,209 in 2000, with the 2011 total more 
than double that in 1996 (Bagby 2012).  Despite their sizeable numbers and relatively 
high socio-economic status, however, the influence and socio-political standing of 
Muslim Americans lag far behind communities of comparable size and economic status.  
The historical, socioeconomic and political reasons for this marginalization will 
be discussed later. However, a crucial factor is that, though to some degree the cultural 
and ethnic differences among immigrant groups seems to have been bridged in the 
interest of common cause (building institutions and places of worship), there continues 
to be a great divide between immigrant Muslims and those Americans who convert to 
Islam, particularly Blackamerican Muslims. The causes will be discussed in greater detail 
in the ensuing chapters, but suffice it to say for now that it is rooted in the encounter of 
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postcolonial and post-slavery subjects in a national space of stigmatized blackness and 
privileged whiteness.  
 
Project Collaborators: A Profile 
 
The participants in this project are the American born and/or raised offspring of 
converts and immigrants. The definition of second and subsequent generation usually 
relates to immigration status. But for this study, I also include in that term children who 
were born after their American parents converted to Islam and who are thus raised in a 
Muslim household. In this study, I also include the 1.5 generation, those children who 
were under thirteen when their parents adopted a new country or adopted Islam as their 
new faith. Although the term 1.5-generation is usually reserved for child immigrants 
(Park 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), I use it here also to apply to child converts. 
Members of the 1.5 generation are unique in that they are very young when their families 
are experiencing either a spiritual or physical immigration and may have memories of a 
previous homelands or a prior family faith tradition while growing up in the new faith or 
country. Consequently, they share something both the parent generation’s past and the 
present experiences of second and subsequent generations. To make reading less 
cumbersome, I will identify which generation (1.5, second, or third) individual speakers 
belong to, but the term second generation will serve as an umbrella concept that 
juxtaposes the younger generation with a parent generation.  
Two hundred and fifty6 people participated in this study, ranging in age from 
eighteen to fifty one years with 77 percent of them being thirty years old or younger7. 
Twenty three percent of them were born outside the U.S. but moved back or immigrated 
here before the age of thirteen. Sixty six percent of them are female and 34 percent are 
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male.  They are mostly single (71 percent) but some are married (26 percent) or divorced 
(2 percent). As noted earlier, Muslim Americans are the most diverse religious 
community in the United States and this diversity is reflected in the participants in this 
project. Rather than providing a list of ethnic categories from which participants had to 
choose, this information was collected by asking an open-ended question “What ethnic 
background best describes you?” The answers varied; few listed Black, White, even 
Brown or Muslim. The standard categories of Middle East (8 people), Arab (35 people), 
Asian/South Asian (27 people) or African American/Black (16 people) were also listed.  
However, the overwhelming majority of those of immigrant background listed the 
family’s country of origin rather than the standard regional categories. For summary, the 
background of participants are listed (table 1) by having standard category, countries, or 
regional designation listed together (For example, Arab, Egypt, Middle East). Rather 
than “multi-ethnic,” those of mixed background listed the backgrounds of their parents 
for example: “half Syrian (my father), half Russian American (my mother's grandparents 
were born in Russia)” or “Mexican and Lebanese”. Some expressed frustration with this 
line of questions exclaiming that “How long does it take for you to become American?” or 
“how I understand [it] is that I'm defined as a black/white person or mixed 
(father/mother). How I define myself is complicated. I would first say a Muslim.” This 
illustrates that while ethnic and racial categories could be useful for the bureaucracies of 
the state and society – and even academia – the way people self-identify is more complex 
and often these categories force people to choose one box over another even if they deem 
themselves to fit in neither.  
Though 86 percent of the participants—including children of converts who 
learned Arabic—speak more than one language, English is the primary language at home 
for the majority of participants. Often, however, as is the case with bilingual groups, 
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participants engage in code switching where English and another language are used in 
the same utterances. For example, non-Arabic speaking Muslims everywhere sprinkle 
their speech with Arabic phrases that are typically religious formulae8. At the time of this 
fieldwork, all participants, except for two, either had obtained or were pursuing college 
degrees, including graduate ones. Being a doctor or an engineer has been the typical 
career path that immigrants—especially post-1965 immigrants— tend to pursue, and 
they want their children to follow in those footsteps. While some still do follow this path, 
many younger Muslims have followed divergent paths including teaching, social services, 
and social sciences. This is reflected in the fields participants listed as their field of study 
or occupation. It is noteworthy that law has become a career of choice for many young 
Muslim men and women in the past decade. Cognizant of legal and political challenges 
facing Muslims post-9/11, law students and attorneys began to organize for networking 
and advocacy, often with the explicit purpose of providing legal representations to 
Muslims and safeguarding their liberty and civil rights. For example, Muslim students at 
Arizona State University began to enroll in the Sandra Day O’Connor law school and 
formed a student organization in 2003. The National Association of Muslim Lawyers 
created the Muslim Advocate (MA) in 2005. MA is a nonprofit organization founded to 
defend the individual and community rights of Muslims. In doing so, MA attorneys are 
not just fighting for their community but for “protecting America’s promise.”9 These 
organizations reflect the fear among Muslims that their freedom and civil rights are 
under threat, the more so since 2001. This fear appears to be fueled by fierce anti-
Muslim rhetoric that has become what Edward Said once called the “last sanctioned 
racism”10. This public discourse and the resulting fear have had serious consequences for 
how the Muslims of America see themselves at individual and collective levels, for their 
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sense of belonging, and for how they expend their energies and resources. These matters 
will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.  
 
Collaborators’ Schooling 
Every community has its own conceptualization of what an “educated person” is, 
but always the path of education starts at home where social and cultural values and 
norms are inculcated. In the contemporary world, schools play a vital role in shaping 
young people’s selves and they are sites for competing narratives that often marginalize 
minorities (Levinson and Dorothy 1996). Early experiences in schools have profound 
effects with lifelong consequences, which is why many people choose private schools 
(religious or secular) or home school their young. The University of Islam was the first 
private school system created to provide Muslim parents such an alternative to public 
schools in America. It was founded in Detroit in 1932 by Clara Muhammad, the wife of 
the Nation of Islam’s leader. This elementary and secondary school system, later 
renamed the Sister Clara Muhammad Schools, provided religious and character 
education to supplement reading, writing and arithmetic. It also offered a safe place for 
children to be comfortable with their race and religion. It soon branched out to nearly 
everywhere the NOI had a temple11. The school system persists and still caters mostly to 
Blackamericans (whether Muslim or not). Islamic schools have increased exponentially 
since 1980s as Muslim immigrants began to realize they were here to stay. Evidence of 
this is seen in Arizona, which has two full time Islamic schools, and in Chicago which has 
at least nine. In addition to this school system, nearly all mosques across the nation offer 
weekend Islamic schools for K-12 students for those who do not go to full time Islamic 
schools.  
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The participants in my project reflect the national trend among Muslim 
Americans in that, as children, the majority of them attended public schools (86 
percent), while some (43 percent) supplemented that with weekend Islamic school. 
Those who attend Islamic school full time at some point in their childhood were a 
minority (22 percent). There are several reasons, including tuition, that account for the 
low enrollment in private Muslim schools. A concern about academic rigor, however, is 
one of the primary reasons. Critics, including some alumni, also argue that such schools 
create an artificial “Islamic” environment that does not prepare students for living in a 
pluralistic society. Others argue that discrimination and other social ills also exist in 
these schools. Frequently, students may start in a public or Muslim private school then 
switch at one point, and sometimes more than once as parents try to balance their desire 
for having their children in a “Muslim environment” and the need for a more rigorous 
academic curriculum. The switch may also occur when a community can only support a 
K-8 school.  
Like all other religiously-based schools, Islamic schools have to include a core 
curriculum (English, math, science, social studies and history among others) to which 
they add Arabic and Islamic studies. Student government, community service, debate 
team, and other extracurricular activities vary from school to school depending on the 
perspective of the administration and the school’s guiding philosophy. Muslim schools in 
America, like their public or private school counterparts, reflect the social class of the 
student body. This is something that subsequently determines the caliber and 
qualification of the teaching staff they attract, resources at their disposal, and the 
activities they provide for students.  For example, Universal School in Bridgeview, 
Illinois which serves the large well-to-do Arab Muslim community there, lists among its 
activities for this 2012 academic year “competitions such as: Dr. Seuss Week in Kg–3rd 
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grade, Author J. Awlesworth [children’s books author] reading to our students, Illinois 
Math Competition, Freedom Express Bus, Character Count Presentations…Shakespeare 
performances for High School, Science Fair Regional and State, Model United Nations, 
WYSE competition, NHS ceremony” and Spelling Bees. Though this is an Islamic school 
in a mostly Arab community, the activities are uniquely American Muslim. They include 
spelling bees in both Arabic and English, a school newspaper published by journalism 
students, and team sports (a school alumni returned to coach the girls basketball team)12.  
Likewise, Arizona Cultural Academy (ACA) caters to mostly middle class immigrants 
with scholarships for those of lesser means. This K-12 Muslim school offers a Montessori 
program, PTA, sports teams for boys and girls, as well as a students’ blog with opinion 
sections and a style corner for the fashion conscious Muslim girl– hijabi or not13.  
Unlike Universal and ACA which have large facilities including recreational ones, 
many schools are housed in smaller buildings and offer just the basic curriculum and 
limited other activities because the families that patronize them simply lack the financial 
means. Because of the cost, often communities have only full time K-8 Islamic schools 
after which students must return to public schools. Often students experience both 
private and public schools as they switch from one to the other in the course of their 
schooling, and that is not without challenges. Nasser, a nineteen year college sophomore, 
exemplified the challenges young Muslims encounter as they switch back and forth. 
Nasser went to public school until the third grade and then attended Islamic schools in 
the Phoenix-valley. He talked about how he understood his parents’ choice of Islamic 
school in order to “get Islamic education and full-time exposure to the mosque, Jumah 
[Friday communal prayers], and Muslim teachers, be able to celebrate holidays, things 
like that, that helped build our identity” but he still “really didn’t like the change.” When 
asked to elaborate on what he did not like, he mentioned the small space, stricter rules 
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and teachers’ classroom management. Nasser adjusted over time and liked being with 
Muslim children; however, he switched back to public school at 8th grade and faced 
similar social challenges in addition to academic ones.  
In some public school, Muslim youth are creating Muslim student organizations 
and many find support in that. Nasser stated that “I don’t know what I would’ve done 
without that. I mean that was the main club I participated in. We organized. We had 
Jumah prayer every week. So we rotated giving the Khutba. Sometimes I would come to 
the mosque for halaqas [study circle] and programs and different Islamic events around 
the valley but [the MSA] was my main way of learning more.” The khutbas (Friday 
sermons) covered relevant topics including “a lot of things about avoiding peer pressures 
and studying, for instance. It depends, we need training. We don’t have a lot of training, 
but we used some books. When I gave the khutba it was usually about, a story from the 
Qur’an, one of the prophets or about let’s say a good quality to have, like forgiveness for 
each other”. These student organizations serve, as noted from this excerpt, as venue for 
education, training and socialization for Muslim youth. 
 
Collaborators’ Social Networks 
 
Unlike today’s young Muslims, those who grew up the 1970s and 1980s were 
often the only Muslims in their neighborhoods, and the only Muslims they would meet 
and interact with might be relatives or family friends living further away. Although many 
Africans and South Asians come from religiously pluralistic societies, and so do some 
Arabs (those from Iraq, Iran, Egypt and the Levant with old Arab Jewish and Christian 
communities), for many Muslim immigrants and their children, dealing with differences 
based on color and culture was something new. Being Brown or Black in all White 
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neighborhoods was an early schooling in the color lines and the realization that they did 
not fit in. An example of this is seen with Thuraya, who was born to Indian immigrant 
parents and was raised in Michigan and lived early on in a “blue collar” neighborhood 
where her family stood out as just a “little weird”. They were called “those Injuns, or 
Indians” and neighbors wondered if they were American Indians. Once in fourth grade, 
she had to explain to a boy “ad nauseam”  the story of Christopher Columbus and why 
native people were named Indians, and after explaining “the whole nine yards” he asked 
her “So, are you Navajo?” In exasperation, she said “No, I’m Apache!” To minimize 
appearing “weird”, her parents allowed her to participate in American holidays. She 
dressed up for Halloween and, as long as she did not have to say “Jesus our Lord” she 
could even be the star in her school’s Christmas play. As she moved on in school and got 
out of her “freaky looking” early teens, she made deep friendships. As children, 
sleepovers were not common among the immigrants or converts; if they occurred, they 
took place in their homes because parents were concerned about the presence of alcohol, 
interactions with the opposite sex, adequate supervision and so forth.  
Project collaborators’ friends are ethnically and religiously diverse. Many are 
non-Muslim childhood or college friends and some of these non-Muslim friends do not 
drink, party or date because of their own religious or cultural traditions. Having non-
Muslim friends or college roommates who do not engage in those activities made some 
project participants, especially the women, feel less pressured to live up to the image of 
“college life” expectations posited to be a time of fun and experimentation.  
Many of the collaborators’ Muslim friends are either ones they grew up with or 
ones they got to know in youth groups. Others are from their college days and MSAs. 
Over and again, my collaborators mentioned that if they “clicked” as friends, then the 
ethnicity or sectarian differences were not a significant factor in choosing their Muslim 
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friends; they had Islam in common and that was sufficient. This pluralistic sentiment 
notwithstanding, the ethno-racial or socioeconomic background of their Muslim friends 
in reality depends on the makeup of the particular youth group, the MSA and the mosque 
where they typically encounter each other. For example, when growing up in an 
environment or attending a mosque that is predominantly a Desi14 (South Asian), then 
most of their Muslim friends at that stage are typically Desis. On the other hand, if they 
attend colleges that draw students from different areas, then their social networks are 
more diverse.  
 
Generation Next and the Current Chapter of Islam in America 
 
Unlike their immigrant or convert parents, these offspring of immigrants and 
converts now in their second, third and fourth generations are born into both Islam and 
American culture. They have experienced America’s educational system and weekend 
Islamic schools, minority status (ethnic and religious) and American popular culture. 
They are the inheritors of shared religious education and cultural traditions even as they 
differ along ethnic, class and gender lines and religious interpretations.  In their 
grandparents’ and parents’ generations, Muslims in the United States were typically 
referred to by their race (Black Muslims) or their ethnicity/country of origin (Arabs, 
Turks, and Pakistanis etc.). More recently, however, the pan-ethnic “Muslim American” 
label—which is analogous to the pan-ethnic “Asian American” or “Latino/a American”— 
has emerged (Sheikh 2007; Leonard 2005a; Naber 2005). A racialization process 
underlies such labels which are both given and appropriated for political reasons to, 
ironically, homogenize and marginalize but also to mobilize and empower. These terms 
are institutionalized through the state’s organizing technologies and through public 
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discourse, but they are also ones with which individuals can identify in terms of ethnicity 
in a multiethnic racially conscious society. However, while Arab, Latino/a, and Asian are 
homogenizing terms, they are still geographically and/or linguistically based15; on the 
other hand, “Muslim American” denotes people who represent every group in American 
society and who only have religion in common. “Muslim American” may, therefore, 
suggest that Muslims have somehow transcended their ethno-racial and sectarian 
differences. 
 It is important to point out here, however, that participants in my project 
claimed both their ethnic heritage and their American upbringing and sensibilities. But 
they similarly asserted their religious understandings of a “pure/true Islam” to challenge 
parental and communal interpretation and attitudes which they saw as contradicting 
religious ideals. This typically occurs with issues of intragroup relations across 
race/ethnicity, gender, class lines and on matters pertaining to marriage, leadership, 
civic engagement, and membership in a pluralistic society.  Naber (2005), for example, 
argues that the “Muslim first” assertion by the Arab American youth she studied allowed 
them to challenge parental authority, particularly on issues of gender and marriage 
across ethno-racial and class lines. The youth invoked Islamic teachings or demanded 
textual evidence for parental proclamations on religious matters. My collaborators 
expressed similar attitudes but not in terms of “Muslim first”. Challenging authority, 
however, demands deeper knowledge of faith and young Muslims – both those of 
immigrant or indigenous background – are eclectic in the avenues they take to such 
knowledge. While the majority of the participants in this project cited parents as the 
most important source of their Islamic knowledge, their path to self-education includes 
books, friends, the Internet (including online classic textual references), the mosque and 
Muslim conferences. They have an assortment of interpretive or hermeneutic approaches 
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and teachers. They patronize Islamic conferences, attend intensive religious courses or 
travel nationally and internationally to study Arabic or deepen their understanding of 
classic Islamic studies. The knowledge and understanding gained through these paths 
have consequences for shaping one’s perceptions about self, the Other (Muslim no not), 
and about Islam in America. What was noteworthy is that only a few of the participants 
listed college courses as one of their (re)sources. This points to the peculiarity of Islamic 
Studies in most Religious Studies departments. The origins and history of the field and 
the fact that, unlike most other religious traditions, it is typically taught by faculty with 
no other relationship to Islam make Muslim students – and many in the community– 
skeptical of Islamic studies. Consequently, they do not see it as a means to learn (about) 
Islam.   
While their respective histories and their differing socio-economic and political 
concerns created an often difficult-to-bridge divide between immigrants and converts, 
their children’s shared American and Islamic heritage provides the younger generations 
a common ground, shared concerns and an opportunity for rapprochement. For some, 
such interactions and relationships come naturally and easily, while for others the 
opportunities must be actively sought out because their life trajectories and places of 
worship provide limited opportunities for such encounters. Still for some others, such 
rapprochement is not necessary because they deny the existence of a divide in the first 
place. In all cases, rapprochement is a difficult process that requires Muslim Americans 
to engage in critical reflections, to acknowledge grievances, to deconstruct mutual 
stereotyping and to overcome mistrust. 
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1 The Pew report predicts that the Muslim population in the U.S. will double from 2.6 million in 
2010 to 6.2 million in 2030. For more details, see Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life. The 
Future of the Global Muslim Population Projections for 2010-2030 at 
http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx . While their 
starting number of one million Muslim in the U.S. is far too low, the 2010 report (released May 
2012) by Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies indicated that the number of 
Muslims have tripled (now 2.6 million) and this study illustrates this rapid growth. “Numbers of 
Muslims, Mormons rising sharply: report” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/01/us-usa-
religion-census-idUSBRE8401NK20120501 accessed 6/12/2012 
2 Muslims served in all of America’s wars including the Independence and Civil Wars (Bennett 
2010). Morocco was the first country to formally recognize the United States as a new nation and 
welcome it into the global community in 1777. A clause in the Treaty of Tripoli (1797), which 
ended the hostilities between the U.S. and North African states that were triggered by piracy in 
the Mediterranean, has been cited frequently by historians to push back against the recent 
discourse of the Christian roots of the nation. This ARTICLE 11 states that “As the government of 
the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,-as it has in 
itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen,-and as the 
said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is 
declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an 
interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.” Musselmen and Mehomitans 
were the terms used for Muslims then. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1796t.asp 
accessed 6/12/2012 
3 Introduced to Islam and African nationalism, some Blackamericans initiated movements to 
uplift their people. For example, Noble Drew Ali founded the Moorish Science Temple (MST) in 
New Jersey in 1913 (Leonard 2003). Ali adopted some Islamic terminology and concepts and 
wrote his own “holy Koran”. He rejected Negro salve identity and labels such as Colored or Black 
or African American and instead created an alternative origin myth. In this new origin story, 
Blacks were the original human and Whites were the product of a biological manipulation by 
Yakub, a brilliant a brilliant Black scientist (Allen 2000). The Blacks of America, in this origin 
myth, were Asiatic people and descendants of the Moors of North Africa and heirs to the Arabo-
Islamic civilization. They were kidnapped and striped of their heritage and identity. The mission 
of the Moorish Science Temple (MST) was to restore that heritage and pride and to uplift black 
people (Allen 2000). The MST ideology was not Islamically based but it adopted some Islamic 
practice such as prayers, prohibition of alcohol and fornication, and strict cleanliness. With the 
death of Noble Drew Ali in 1929, several groups branched out of the MST. A former member, W. 
D. Fard, founded the Nation of Islam (NOI) in 1934, which explains the similarities in their 
ideology (Allen 2000). For NOI, the Black people of America were the Lost Tribe of Asiatic people 
whose original home was in Mecca, current day Saudi Arabia and the birth-place of Islam. The 
Lost Tribe of Shabazz idea is a reference to Biblical accounts, not Islamic references (Allen 2000).  
4 How many centuries back is a subject for debates but Muslims are reconstructing that history. 
For example, Moroccan historian and professor of American civilization and culture, Abdul 
Hamid Lotfi (2001), wrote “Muslims on the Block: Five Centuries of Islam in America”. Young 
Muslim American historian of religion, Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, challenges the notion of Muslims’ 
presumed recent arrival in his “A History of Islam in America: From the New World to the New 
World Order” (2010). A group of Blackamerican Muslims have compiled this history in a 
documentary “8 Centuries of Muslims in America” 
http://www.baitcal.com/8_Centuries_of_Muslims_in_Ameri.html accessed 4/1/2013 
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5 Gallup, Inc. 2009. Muslim Americans: A National Portrait An in-depth analysis of America’s 
most diverse religious community. 
http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153572/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-National-
Portrait.aspx   Accessed on 6/15/2012  
6 246 people participated in the survey and thirty-nine of them were interviewed. An additional 
four opted to only take part in the interviews. 
7 Nearly thirty-two percent were twenty-five-years-old or under.  
8 For example: masha’a Allah (literally means as God so willed but used as praised be God, in 
sha’a Allah (God willing), khair (something good),  
9 The MA was founded because:  “As the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath 
continue to reverberate, it is more vital than ever that skilled Muslim American lawyers, who 
understand U.S. legal, legislative and political systems, bring their unique perspective and skill 
sets to the table.” http://www.muslimadvocates.org/about/main.html).  
 A Muslim Legal Fund of America was created in 2001 as non-profit organization that raises funds 
to assist defendants in their legal battles. One of the cases that MLFA supported was the case of 
the six imams from Arizona who were heading home from a national imams’ conference and who 
raised suspicions for having prayed the obligatory sunset prayer, speaking Arabic, and switching 
seats. They were removed from the flight and interrogated to determine the level of security risk 
but though cleared they were prevented by the airline from boarding a subsequent flight. The 
MLFA likewise appropriates national discourse and appeals to American ideals and strives for 
“restoring the fundamental American principles of fairness and equality for which our Founding 
Fathers fought so hard to establish. MLFA enjoys the support of thousands of Americans of 
diverse backgrounds who believe that the ideals of freedom, liberty and justice for all apply 
equally Muslims in America.” (http://www.mlfa.org/brief-history). Accessed 6/18/2012 
10 Edward Said on Alternative Radio, 4/25/95. Source http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/islam-
fundamental-misunderstandings-about-a-growing-faith/ accessed 2/1/2013 
11 By 1975 there were 41 schools but this number declined to below 30 in subsequent decades. The 
school system continues to operate today adding, in the 1990s, Muslim Teachers College for in-
service and continued teacher education and training (Rashid and Muhammad 1992).   
12 Universal School, Bridgeview at http://www.universalschool.org/ accessed 6/18/2012 
13 Arizona Cultural Academy, Phoenix at http://www.azacademy.org/ accessed 6/18/2012 
14 Desi is a term that generally refers to the cultures and peoples of South Asia especially those 
outside of the region regardless of their religious background. In America, the term is used by 
younger generations of Muslim of all backgrounds as they use pan ethnic terms (Arab, Desi, 
African America, Latino/a and so forth) to categorize themselves and their peers.  
15 For historical and (geo)political reasons, Jewish American is a label that straddles ethnicity and 
religion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE “IDENTTY CRISIS” OF YOUNGER MUSLIMS 
 
The term identity crisis was coined by psychologist and theorist Erik Erikson in 
the 1930s and 1940s and arose from his “personal, clinical, and anthropological 
observations”(1970, 732). It was his childhood struggles with differences and belonging 
that sparked his interest.  He was raised by a stepfather—a biological fact hidden from 
him for many years—as a Jewish child of Scandinavian background in a Lutheran and 
Catholic area in Germany. About how this affected him, he says:  
I was blond and blue-eyed, and grew flagrantly tall. Before long, then, I acquired 
the nickname “goy” in my stepfather’s temple; while to my schoolmates, I was a 
“Jew.” Although I had tried desperately to be a good German chauvinist, I 
became a “Dane” when Denmark remained neutral during the First World War 
[…] like other youths with artistic and literately aspiration, I became intensely 
alienated from everything my bourgeois family stood for. At that point I wanted 
to be different. [1970, 743] 
 
Erikson immigrated to the United States in 1933 and the disorienting experience of 
immigration had an indelible effect on him as did, later, the othering process of 
McCarthy era hyper-patriotism. He and others were required to take a loyalty oath and, 
if they refused, they faced calls to send them back to their countries of origin. All of these 
experiences furthered his interest in issues of identity. This along with his studies of 
American Indian children’s forced dislocation and boarding school experiences 
deepened his interest and shaped his understanding. Erikson noted that he and others 
began to study and think of identity matters and theories precisely at the time and place 
where identities became a problem.  It was the particularity of the historical place (the 
United States) which tries to create a “super-identity” out of the multiplicity of identities 
that immigrants brought with them, and at a time when “agrarian and patrician 
identities” of the countries of origin were being challenged by rapid industrialization 
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(Erikson 1970). In fact, identity problems, he posited, were “the mental baggage of 
generations” of immigrants dislocated from their homeland by the “cruel and heartless” 
process of immigration (Erickson 1970, 748). 
Theorizing identity formation from the start, then, was grounded in dislocation 
and marginalization. The experiences and observations that shaped Erikson’s thought 
led him to conceptualize psychosocial personality development as occurring in 
sequential stages: 1) Trust vs. Mistrust, 2) Autonomy vs. Shame/Doubt, 3) Initiative vs. 
Guilt, 4)Industry vs. Inferiority, 5)Identity vs. Confusion, 6)Intimacy vs. Isolation, 
7)Generativity vs. Stagnation, and 8) Ego Integrity vs. Despair (Carducci 2009). Each 
stage is marked by a degree of conflict and possible crisis. Success or failure in resolving 
this conflict/crisis is detrimental to the next as one moves from one stage to another. 
Erikson considered youth to be a critical period in identity formation; a stage during 
which “individuals overcome uncertainty, become more self-aware of their strengths and 
weaknesses, and become more confident in their own unique qualities” (Buckingham 
2008, 2). But adolescents’ ascent to this stage is fraught with challenges and conflict, for 
they must first experience a “crisis” where they confront critical questions about their 
values, ideals, plans for the future and their sexuality. Through a rigorous process of 
reflection and “self-definition”, adolescents ultimately “arrive at an integrated, coherent 
sense of their identity as something that persists over time” (Buckingham 2008, 2).  
Crisis, however, in Erikson’s conceptualization is a normal and essential element to 
development; it is a time of questioning, reflecting and focusing on self-understanding 
and meaning-making rather than a pathological occurrence. Erikson distinguishes this 
normative process from an “identity confusion” which he notes is not merely about 
“contradictory self-image or aspirations, roles or opportunities but a central disturbance 
dangerous for the whole ecological interaction of a mind” (Erikson 1970, 749).  
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Though his childhood experiences could be seen to “predispose a person to a 
severe identity crisis,” Erikson considered the challenges he encountered to be a 
normative identity crisis, one that he was able to transcend, rather than the 
“malignan[t]…identity crisis [which] is determined both by defects in a person’s early 
relationship to his mother and on the incompatibility or irrelevance of the values 
available in adolescence” (Erikson 1970, 745). He was saved from this latter type of crisis 
because, though his mother was aloof and his stepfather coaxed him to follow in his 
footsteps, Erikson knew they both cared deeply for him and in the end gave him time and 
space to find what resonated with him (Erikson 1970). 
Yet while the challenges young Muslims encounter may not seem that different 
from those Erikson faced, the “identity crisis” narrative regarding younger Muslims is 
typically framed as that second and malignant type of identity crisis. After the events of 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent launch of the “War on Terrorism”, the greatest 
fear and dominant narrative has been “homegrown terrorism.” Though the term easily 
applies to extremist right wing militias like the Oklahoma City bomber, abortion clinic 
bombers and the Norway shooter, it is exclusively reserved for Western born and/or 
raised violent Muslims. These younger Muslims, according to the widely distributed New 
York Police department intelligence unit report, “carry out ‘autonomous jihad’ via acts of 
terrorism in their host countries” (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 6). According to this report, it 
is not hopelessness, a reaction to oppression or a retaliation impulse that drives the 
“Western-based individual” to become a terrorist, but rather it is these young people’s 
quest for an “identity and a cause” which they usually find in “extremist Islam.” Those 
young people living in Europe whose host country failed to “integrate” them 
economically and socially, the report says, are “torn between the secular West and their 
religious heritage” and this internal conflict renders them an easy prey for extremism. 
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But even in America, which has purportedly done better integrating its guest Muslims, 
“the powerful gravitational pull of individuals’ religious roots and identity sometimes 
supersedes the assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a 
professional career, financial stability and material comforts” (Silber and Bhatt 2007, 6-
8 emphasis added).  
Muslims, in this view, are not at home but are guests in these host countries of 
the West, no matter how many generations they have been there, and no matter the large 
segments of Muslims who are native to the West. The seemingly logical assumption is 
then that the “Shoe Bomber”, the “American Taliban” and other Latino, White or Black 
converts allegedly involved in terrorist activities are somehow also overcome by the 
“powerful gravitational pull” of their religious identity and become the Other of the West 
by virtue of their conversion. The stories in this narrative may include the 2005 London 
subway attack, the 2004 Madrid attacks, or the 2009 Fort Hood shooter, but the 
narrative is one about an identity crisis that fits neatly into grand narratives of the 
civilizational conflict of Islam and the West. The salient narrative about younger 
Muslims is that they are experiencing an identity crisis illustrating that Muslims are 
difficult to integrate and that this crisis must be managed lest it leads to breakdown or, 
worse yet, radicalization. Zuhdi Jasser, an Arizona physician and Navy veteran of Syrian 
parentage, testified in the 2011 Congressional Hearing on Radicalization as a Muslim 
expert. He noted that radicalization occurs when Muslims fail to get their “young adults 
to identify with secular Western society and its ideas” (Jasser 2011, 2).  Another Muslim, 
Ebo Patel, a second generation Chicagoan of Indian origins and founder of the now 
internationally known Interfaith Youth Core, noted in his memoir that extremists who 
recruit young Muslims are:  
exceptionally perceptive about the crisis facing second-generation immigrant 
Muslims in the West. They know that our parents, whose identities were formed 
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in the Middle East, North African, and South Asian half a century ago, have a 
dramatically different sets of reference points than we do. They know that the 
identity we get from them feels irrelevant, that it is impossible to be a 1950s-era 
Pakistani or Egyptian or Moroccan Muslim in twenty-first-century Chicago or 
London or Madrid. In many cases, our parents built bubbles for themselves when 
they moved to the West- little worlds where they could eat familiar food, speak 
their language, and follow the old ways. And because they re-create a little piece 
of Karachi in Manchester, England or a part of Bombay in Boston, 
Massachusetts, they assumed their children would remain within the cocoon. But 
we second-and third- generation Muslims cannot separate ourselves from the 
societies we live in. We watch MTV, go public schools, cross borders that are 
invisible to our parents dozens of times a day, and quickly understand that the 
curves of our lives cannot adapt to the straight lines our parents live by.  Raised 
in pious Muslim homes, occasionally participating in the permissive aspects of 
Western culture, many of us come to believe that our two worlds, the two sides of 
ourselves are necessarily antagonistic. this experience of “two-ness” is 
exacerbated by the deep burn of racism....As we grow older and seek a unified 
Muslim way of being, it is too often Muslim extremists who meet us at the 
crossroads of our identity crisis. [Patel 2007, 12] 
 
Yet, as he narrates his life in this biography, Patel makes it clear that it was not his 
parents’ Eastern ways and religious upbringing that alienated him but the “gut-
wrenching feeling” of exclusion from mainstream society caused by  the “constant 
barrage of racist bullying” (Patel 2007,11). Additionally, learning that people who looked 
like him were being “horribly treated elsewhere” by people who looked like his 
playground tormentors led him down a risky path keeping company with troubled youth. 
His “free fall” ended not because suddenly his Eastern and religious home changed— he 
always knew his parents loved him— but because children at the YMCA embraced him 
and adults there demonstrated they cared about and for him.  
 Immigrant parents everywhere and always are deeply concerned about their 
offspring losing their cultural heritage. Furthermore, in a globalizing world and 
particularly in secular societies, all people of faith are concerned about passing on their 
religious beliefs and practices to the next generation. Muslim parents— whether converts 
or immigrants— encounter these same challenges. Over the past decade, however, this 
narrative of “identity crisis” has also taken hold among some Muslim parents and 
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community leaders and has come to permeate Muslim public discourse. Its meaning is 
mostly in regard to the young losing their “Muslim identity” and opting out of Islam as 
they “get lost” in society. As in its public version, “culture talk” is also essential to this 
intra-Muslim narrative. Various organizations have, over the past few years, included 
variations on the themes of addressing the identity crisis among the young, of 
reconciling their “Islamic” and “American” identity, and of fostering an “American 
Muslim identity.” Muslim organizations have dedicated sessions in their conferences for 
dealing with issues of “identity crisis” and the North American Imams Federation tackled 
the issue in 2009.1  More recently, they are also concerned about radicalization, though 
they do not see it reaching the extent that the general public gives it2. Some organizations 
have created projects to address issues of identity that might lead to radicalization. For 
example, the Muslim American Society’s Straight Path Project aims to “assist Muslim 
youth in their bicultural competence, i.e. [the ability to] effective[ly] communicat[e] 
between several cultural identities [and to] assist in the full integration in society while 
maintaining their Muslim identity”3. The 2010 Muslim Student Association annual 
convention organized a talk show-style session called “Deen Talk:  Radicalization”. The 
panelists were a second generation Muslim woman and a lead Gallup center researcher 
on Muslims, a Whiteamerican convert to Islam with a degree from Al-Azhar University—
the world’s oldest university and a premier Sunni institution— and a European Muslim 
scholar and Oxford professor. The panel grappled with the definition and the process of 
radicalizations and necessary interventions.  
 The narrative of young Muslims’ “identity crisis”, therefore, might have different 
stories and interpretations but it has become salient. Much has been said about identity 
crisis being the condition of (post)modern global world. However, when it comes to the 
younger generations of Muslim Americans, it is not merely a philosophical/academic 
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discussion; it has urgent and dangerous consequences in the context of a post-9/11 world 
dominated by the “war on terrorism” narrative.  Underpinning this crisis narrative is a 
particular and narrowly-defined conceptualization of “identity” and a view that somehow 
what Muslims experience is unique because of their religious and cultural differences. In 
this understanding, one possesses one “normal” identity which is expected to blend with 
society, leaving behind cultural or religious practices as relic of the past. Difference 
creates crisis which, here, has a detrimental and almost pathological connotation. 
Narratives of melting pot, assimilation and integration of ethnic difference underpin this 
notion of “identity crisis” as presumably suffered by Muslims.  
 Do those who grew up in Muslim households in fact experience “identity crisis” 
as discussed above? And if so, how do they see themselves? Do they shun their ethnic 
background in favor of religion and take on the label “Muslim American,” or do they 
shun both? To gain insights into these matters, I will explore the narratives of the 
younger generations of Muslims who collaborated on this project. I will consider how 
they see themselves and whether or not their narratives suggests a malignant (to use 
Erikson’s distinction) type of identity crisis. Through their responses and narrations, I 
will problematize this narrative of identity crisis and conclude by offering an alternative 
explanation.  Because one’s conceptualization of identity influences one’s framing and 
analysis and because, as evident from the disciplinary origins of this narrative, academic 
discourse and concepts are incorporated into public discourse with serious 
consequences, it is necessary to first survey the theoretical landscape on identity. In 
doing so, I explore answers to some important questions about identity. Is identity 
something we possess as a product finalized or a state “achieved” in adolescence? Are 
there multiple and conflicting identities? And where does the “self” fit into this notion of 
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identity? Through this engagement, I will elaborate on the conceptualization of identity 
that guides this project and then return to the narratives of my collaborators.  
 
Identity Matters 
 
A salient feature of contemporary societies is identity politics that is locally 
rooted but plays out on a global stage. The discourse of identity politics, claims, and 
demands are made in essentializing and seemingly primordial terms; however, these 
politics and claims are rooted in the formation of the modern nation-state. The politics of 
difference, both those in the developed former center and the developing former 
periphery, are based on various claims about territory, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, 
religion, or language. Ultimately, however, they are demands for what Charles Taylor 
terms recognition: an acknowledgement of one’s identity and the entailed legitimacy of 
one’s claims to self-determination or belonging and equal citizenship (Taylor 1994). Yet, 
the concept of identity itself is fraught with varying significations and contested 
meanings for those who struggle to claim particular identities and for those who study 
them. The nature of identity, its definition and construction, and whether it is egocentric 
or sociocentric has been the subject of great debates. The terms identity and self, like 
many concepts in social sciences, do not have agreed upon definitions. This is in part due 
to the diversity of disciplines that write about and research these topics; disciplines that 
include psychology, sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. Whether they take 
place within or between disciplines, debates about identity always involve discussions 
about individuals’ internal processes (psycho-cognitive), external processes (those taking 
place within their socio-cultural environment), and the relationship between the two. 
The various theories about identity differ in the degree to which they focus on one 
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process or the other and in how they conceptualize the relationship between the two. The 
debates and the theoretical perspectives they have generated have also reflected the 
intellectual climate of the 20th century and the debates that have engaged the 
Enlightenment project and modernity (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Cerulo 1997; 
Holland et al. 1998). 
 
Self and Personhood: An Interactionist Approach 
 
Generally committed to the Enlightenment project but presenting an alternative 
to its ideas of a unitary independent self, the early studies of identity focused on 
individuals and how their interactions with social others mold a sense of self. This focus 
gave rise to two main perspectives: identity theory and social identity theory. The first 
aimed to elucidate a person’s social roles and the associated meanings and expectation 
while the latter focused on a person’s identification with a social group with which he or 
she shares views and other characteristics.  Identity theory, introduced by Sheldon 
Stryker in 1968, traces its origin to the sociologist G. H. Mead and is rooted in the 
symbolic interactionist perspective. According to this theory, an individual occupies 
multiple roles (daughter, businesswoman, wife and mother so on) in a society, and there 
are shared standardized meanings and behavioral expectations associated with each role 
within a particular social milieu. This individual internalizes these meanings and 
expectations and behaves according to her interpretation of them. She compares her 
behavior to others, noting their reactions to this performance; she then adjusts her 
interpretation and behavior accordingly to achieve positive self-verification (Stryker and 
Burke 2000).  Identity is defined here as parts of the self and consists of these “cognitive 
schemas” of internalized shared expectations and meanings. Due to the multiple roles 
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individuals occupy, they “possess as many selves [i.e. identities] as groups of persons 
with which they interact” (Stryker and Burke 2000, 287). These various and potentially 
conflicted identities/selves –especially those closely related– are arranged within the self 
in a salience hierarchy. The more frequently a particular identity becomes activated, the 
more salient it is and this salience provides stability for the identity through time and 
situations (Stryker and Burke 2000). How and what causes a particular identity or self to 
be activated more frequently and how the conflict between these competing interrelated 
selves is managed is not clear. This framework often underpins questions like the ones 
addressed to adherents of Islam: “are you Muslim or American first?”  
Social identity theory, on the other hand, examines how membership in groups 
with which one believes to share common characteristics affects one’s sense of self. The 
theory focuses on intragroup dynamics, intergroup interactions and the processes by 
which membership is defined. Social categories and groups (nationality, political party 
affiliation, religious community, teams and so forth) towards which one has affinity 
provide “a social identity that both describes and prescribes one's attributes as a member 
of that group—that is, what one should think and feel, and how one should behave” 
(Hogg, Terry, and White 1995, 259-260). Individual members engage in self-evaluation 
and categorization to determine the degree to which they differ from the out-group and 
reflect the stereotypical attributes of the in-group.  Because of the multiple 
groups/categories to which one belongs, an individual has multiple selves/identities 
arranged in a hierarchy of salience. Like identity theory, social identity theory examines 
individual behavior but proposes to do so by “formally articulat[ing]…basic 
sociocognitive processes of categorization and self-enhancement with subjective belief 
structures” (Hogg, Terry and White 1995, 260).  
87 
 Both theories conceive of multiple selves/identities that are constructed within a 
particular social context. They use similar terms, including categorization, salience and 
personal identity, though with different connotation, with each theory focusing on one 
sphere to the neglect of others. Stets and Burke (2000) note these different foci of 
examination and point out that where identity theory focuses on “being,” social identity 
theory focuses on “doing.” Scholars have called for bridging the two theories and 
combining them to arrive at a more rounded understanding of identity (Hogg, Terry, and 
White 1995; Stets and Burke 2000). The two theories have been criticized for focusing 
too much on the individual’s behavior to the neglect of collective dynamics. Critics also 
argue that the theories neglect the “macro statuses” such as gender, race/ethnicity and 
class (and I would add religion) and how these social constructs and characteristics 
influence one’s sense of self and the meanings and expectations associated with the roles 
and one’s relationship with society’s institutions (Cerulo 1997). These concerns 
combined with growing interests in agency and the proliferation of social and national 
movements during the 1980s and 1990s shifted the focus of identity studies from the 
individual to the collective.  
The new theories about collective identity came to challenge essentialist 
perspectives that rooted such identity in natural primordial elements (Cerulo 1997). This 
new perspective was advocated by social constructionist theorists who posited that all 
collective identities are social “artifacts.” They argued that identities are negotiated 
products of interactions within a cultural context and a socially constructed reality. 
Consequently, a society’s culture, its socializing agents, linguistic constructs and 
categorization needed to be examined (Cerulo 1997). This viewpoint has had an indelible 
effect on the studies of identity as noted by Holland and her colleagues, who conclude 
that “[w]hen anthropologists and other contributors to cultural studies of the person 
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write on ‘identities’ they are usually concerned with ‘cultural identities,’ identities that 
form in relation to major structural features of society: ethnicity, gender, race, 
nationality, and sexual orientation” (Holland et. al 1998, 7), and to that list I would add 
religion. 
 
Deconstructing the Self 
 
Poststructuralists and postmodernists took the critique of the Enlightenment and 
the project of modernity further. They rejected the view of many Western scholars who 
conceptualized self as an independent and bounded entity. This new intellectual 
movement argued that this old model of self was nothing more than “a political artifact 
of the European Enlightenment.” In essence, these scholars declared the “death of self” 
(Callero 2003, 117).  The most influential scholar of this perspective is Foucault, who 
contended that “the self is the direct consequence of power and can only be apprehended 
in terms of historically specific systems of discourse. So called regimes of power do not 
simply control a bounded, rational subject, but rather they bring the self into existence 
by imposing disciplinary practices on the body” (Callero 2003, 117).  Postmodernist 
theorists criticized social constructionists for ignoring the effects of discourse, power 
differential in social interactions, and the power of classification. These scholars called 
for deconstructing the categories of identity and argued for the multiplicity of identities 
that are dynamically constructed through discourse within fields of power differential 
and at the borders and intersections of multiple variables.  For example, Black and White 
American women may be influenced by the notions of femininity which are produced by 
discourses constructing gender in their society.  However, their identities as women not 
only vary between them based on race but also within their respective racial groups 
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based on personal history, class, religion and regional differences. Among Black women 
further identity differences emerge based on the lightness or darkness of their skin color.  
This poststructuralist-postmodernist viewpoint on identity along with post-colonial 
critique has informed the methodology and analysis of scholars of identity from diverse 
fields, such as anthropology, cultural studies, political science and sociology.  
One might argue, however, that conceiving of an individual as having unstable 
and fragmented multiple identities that are the products of competing powers and 
discourses, is not a step beyond modernity. Rather than capturing a transhistorical 
human condition, this point of view might instead be nothing more than a description of 
aspects of -or the nature of- a self that is produced by Western modernity’s project.  One 
could also argue that contrary to conventional wisdom about a “Western self”, neither 
Western philosophers, religious scholars and psychologists nor Western publics had ever 
reached consensus on this ostensibly bounded and independent self which post-
modernism was de-centering (Holland et. al 1998). Consequently, if that bounded self 
has not existed, then in the words of Bruno (Latour 1993), “we have never been modern”.  
And while the examination of discourses, power relations and social/cultural practices is 
essential in identity studies, what is also needed is “a conceptualization of the self as an 
embodied agent, a knowledgeable, problem-solving actor rather than an amorphous 
‘subject position.’ In other words, it requires an appreciation of the reflexive process of a 
social self” (Callero 2003, 119).  
 
In Defense of the Self 
 
Anthony Cohen (1994) argues that the tendency to “neglect [the] self” by social 
scientists is inherent in methodologies which have the society as their starting point.  
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The individual, he points out, is usually abstracted from groups and the structures of 
society (also see Sokefeld 1999). Cohen calls for attention to selfhood and for individual 
centered studies. He admits that individuals are not more valued than the collective but 
they are “in a logical and theological sense prior to community” (Cohen1994, 18). The 
“authorial self” as, he calls it (or the narrating self in this project), tells its story and is 
self-conscious, able to generate and interpret meaning, and it has the ability to enhance 
and emphasize aspects of itself in various situations; it is creative and thinking.  But it is 
not “wholly autonomous and sovereign [, rather] it has a unique essence formed by the 
individual’s personal experience, genetics, intellectual development and inclinations” 
(Cohen 1994, 21). Cohen and Rapport dedicated their edited volume, Questions of 
Consciousness(1995), to exploring issues relating both to the self and to collective 
consciousness as they attempt to correct for this neglect of self. While they concede the 
difficulty of this proposition and do not propose a concise definition of consciousness or 
even one agreed upon by the contributors, the editors propose the use of the metaphor of 
narrative as a way to access consciousness.   
 
New Perspectives and Creative Synthesis 
 
Burkitt (1998) rejected dualisms based on the Cartesian dualism of body-mind 
that carried over to the nature vs. nurture and individual vs. society debates. Dualism 
contributed to the conceptualization of the physically rooted, concretely objective 
independent self which, in turn, has been so vehemently criticized by postmodernists. 
Instead, Burkitt envisions a complex unicity that connects the body, mind, and 
environment (both physical and social). His main argument is that the activity of 
thinking is not an isolated inner dimension of the mind and something removed from 
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the body but that “being embodied and located in the extended world of time and space 
is not only a necessary precondition for thought, it is, rather, it’s very basis” (1998, 65). 
He notes that before existing as a thinking being, one –as a body– coexists with the 
world, and here lies the potential for the development of consciousness. Therefore, the 
body, the conscious, time and space are all one reality: a way of being–in–the–world 
with other beings doing the same. This produces ways of thinking and ways of acting and 
speaking that create and recreate artifacts both material and symbolic, many of which 
become embodied.  
Having argued for uniting the body and mind, Burkitt then defines a person as a 
human thinking body infused with cultural praxis and meaning. This person has an 
identity that, like a face, slowly changes though it has an enduring quality. This 
conceptualization that unites the body and mind with the aim to transcend that 
particular dualism is very promising until the author tackles the issue of sameness and 
difference over time/space and social context. Here he seems to reproduce the idea of 
unitary self (person) and multiple identities (selves). He contrasts the singular semi–
stable person with multiple selves that are context dependent. According to Burkitt, 
person and selves differ in that selves allow for a degree of reflective distance from 
embodied personhood and for the ability to take a more universal, although still partially 
situated, stance towards other people and things. In other words, we are able to see 
ourselves from the viewpoint of others or from the perspective of other things.  It is this 
capacity that allows us to take a more objective view of our own embodied being. 
According to this viewpoint, it is our ability to take a stance towards our embodied 
position through the mediation of symbols that enables us to create various self–images 
that form the impression of a “deep” subjectivity (Burkitt 1998, 79). While this 
conceptualization attempts to do away with the body–mind divide, it maintains not only 
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a distinction between self and identity but also holds that an implied multiplicity of 
context-dependent selves exists.  
Reyna (2002) also tries to do away with the dualism that separates the 
individual’s internal reality from the socio-cultural environment that is believed to be 
external to the body. Instead, he argues for a monism based on cultural 
neurohermeneutics.  Here, the activity of the nervous system brings external occurrences 
(E-space) to the internal workings of the mind (I-space). This initiates an interpretative 
process which evokes previous experiences and emotions associated with them, all of 
which are stored in the association areas in the brain. The interpretive process is 
hierarchical due to the various neural associations made with each event and this leads 
to multiple shades of meaning. This is what the author calls the neurohermeneutic 
system, which exists in the I-space and is “compose[ed] of linked neural circuits in the 
brain that interpret antecedent events in the E-space to make action that becomes the 
basis for subsequent events in E-space” (Reyna 2002, 12). This neurohermeneutic 
system is the connector of the social monism. The interpretive hierarchy draws on 
learned cultural memories of past realities to represent the antecedent events in ways 
that form the basis for desires about future realities. Reyna argues also that there are two 
cultures in each individual: 1) a neuronal culture that is within the person, within the 
neurohermeneutic system of the I-space, and 2) a discursive culture in the E-space and 
thus external to the person. The two cultures are, again, connected because the later 
penetrates the neural network of the brain and becomes part of it; as such “culture is 
embodied.” Since people occupy different social positions and have different 
experiences, no two people have identical cultures nor is there a specific monolithic 
culture such as (e.g., American or Asian or Arab culture). Instead, “there are as many 
shreds and patches of culture as there are individuals, and these cultures 
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are…‘constructed anew by each person over time’” (Reyna 2002, 134) and put out into 
the E-space. 
More recent studies have tried to achieve a synthesis of multiple perspectives that 
take into account both the micro and macro process. In creating this synthesis, many 
draw directly or indirectly on Mead’s ideas on reflexiveness. Mead defined this as “the 
turning–back of the experience of the individual upon himself” and sees it as the means 
by which “the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals 
involved in it” (Callero 2003, 119). Mead’s conceptualization of an “I” allows for a self 
that is to some degree universal and is constructed within and through discourses but 
“without being reduced to it” (Callero 2003, 120). This reclaims the agency of the 
individual from the dominating discourses and the hierarchy of power – which 
postmodernists reacted against– while still taking them into account. For example, 
countering Descartes’s dualism and aiming for synthesis, Norbert Wiley proposes a 
thirdness. He proposes a self that is social and constantly shifting by combining Mead 
and Pierce’s views with his semiotic self whereby the “lived reality” is understood 
retroactively by the self through signs (symbols, icons, indices). He argues that we 
interpret signs within an interpretive community, then add further signification and that 
“we are what we are in this immediate moment as a living breathing ‘I’ but the I of the 
present moment is in large part the remembrance of the socialized ‘me’ of the past. 
Moreover, the ‘I’ of the present moment is also the anticipation of the self that will be 
‘me’ in the future” (Bakker 2005, 78).  
Another example of this synthesis is the approach taken by Holland and her co-
authors in their 1998 book Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds. They draw on 
Mead’s reflexivity, Vygotsky and Bakhtin’s semiotics, and sociohistorical developmental 
psychology as well as on Bourdieu’s metatheory of practice in a synthesis they call the 
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“heuristic developmental” approach. In this approach, the self is historically and socio-
culturally grounded yet also cognizing and creative. Further, through “semiotic 
mediation”, the self is able to objectify itself, which affords it “at least a modicum of 
agency or control over [its] own behavior” (Holland et. al 1998, 40).  
Wong (2002), adopting a Hegelian view, conceives of identity as self-description 
plus recognition by the other. This recognition, he contends, is so critical to one’s sense 
of self that non-recognition or misrecognition is a severe injustice. This point is also 
argued by Charles Taylor (1994) work on the “politics of recognition”. Wong goes on to 
note that since identity is not permanent, recognition does not entail an expectation of a 
fixed identity nor should it demand a change of it. The author agrees with the thinking 
that meanings attributed to gender, class and other categorizations are contested and 
vary depending on one’s subject position in society. But he calls for research focusing on 
identifying the mechanisms of change that lead to the transformation or “instability” of 
identity, research he contends is currently lacking. He acknowledges that people see 
themselves as belonging to various categories that classify them according to sex, 
national origin and so on.  But the category and the individual are not analytical units. 
There is nothing essential about these social identities–these categories. Yet, individuals 
see them as important and identify themselves and others through these categories often 
engaging in serious struggles to affirm these identities. The recognition of the other is 
necessary for leading a meaningful life, the author argues. He points to the “interplay” 
between the individual and collectivity. This takes the form of a “looping effect” whereby 
those classified respond to the classification, often appropriating and redefining it and 
consequently changing the characteristic and meanings of the social identity (Wong 
2002).  
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Conceptualizing Identity in this Project 
 
In these and numerous other formulations, scholars attempt to apprehend the 
relationship of the individual being to self and to his or her social and physical 
environments. They attempt to account simultaneously for the sameness and difference 
over time and space that is observable in ourselves and others. Self, identity, person, 
personality are terms that attempt to capture that quality but do so only partially and in 
any case mean different things for different users, as we saw above. In fact, in their 
article Beyond “Identity” (2000), Brubaker and Cooper called for doing away with the 
term identity altogether because it has come to mean too many things to be a useful 
analytical tool. In its place, they suggest using paired terms like 
identification/categorization, commonalities/connectedness, self-understanding/social 
location to capture the different nuances the term is often used to convey. The term 
identity, however, has so much currency and public and policy implications that it is not 
likely to be given up any time soon and perhaps it should not be. I would argue that its 
usefulness lies precisely in the possibility that it could shed light on all facets of human 
relations (with self and with the social or physical environments) that the authors listed 
which are interdependent and mutually constitutive and cannot be effectively examined 
separately. 
In this project, I consider identity as shorthand for the images of the self for 
oneself (I-for-myself) and for the social other (I-for-other) that emerge from a narrative 
structure on which multiple stories are woven and authored by a cognizing, reflexive, 
and creative self in dialogue with an actual or imagined social other. My conceptual 
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framework is a synthesis of aspects of several of the theories discussed above leaving 
aside some of the issues I noted above with some of them. For example, I take on 
Burkitt’s (1998) concept of complex unicity that connects the body, mind and time/space 
as one reality of embodied thinking but forgo his distinction between one person and 
multiple selves. Additionally, I argue that as this embodied thinking interacts with its 
environment, it produces ways of interpreting, acting, and speaking. These ways 
(re)create artifacts both material and symbolic which constitute the output the embodied 
thinking then presents into its physical and social environments. Social others engage 
that output and their engagement and reactions return as a modified input for the 
(re)consideration of this embodied thinking. This mutually constitutive process is what 
Renya (2002) calls neurohermeneutics where the nervous system brings the external 
occurrences (E-space) to the internal workings of the embodied thinking (I-space) and 
what Holland et.al (1998) call the space of mediation. Here, stimuli carried through the 
nervous system bring the external occurrences—interactions with social others through 
discourses mediated by power differential in a particular space and time— into the body 
and initiate an interpretive process that evokes previous experiences and memories laced 
with emotions. Each interpretive process leads to multiple shades of meaning as it draws 
on learned individual and cultural memories and depending on the context that initiated 
it. This initiating stimuli and corresponding associated interpretive process generate a 
narrative that weaves together the various experiences, memories and associated 
emotions into stories. Through this narrative an individual authors self and creates an 
image of how one sees oneself and sees an actual or imagined social interlocutor 
(representations of I–for–me and other–for–me) and how one presents oneself to others 
(I–for–other). The narrating/authoring self has a reflexive capacity that enables the self 
to ruminate about, analyze, and criticize its own thoughts, emotions, and experiences as 
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well as those of others. These are the effects of inner speech in the stories the self tells 
itself. The self, here, gains insights into itself (self–understanding) and formulates ideas 
about its social and physical world. The stories included in the narrative might be 
modified, deleted or added depending on the context and in anticipation of the response 
of others. As we tell our narratives, we desire and need the recognition of the social other 
(Taylor 1994 and Wong 2002), and the stories in our narratives are evoked and modified 
in response and with the aim of achieving consonance and coherence between who we 
see ourselves to be and how we are seen or want to be seen by others.  
So identity, as conceptualized in this project, is not multiple with the multiplicity 
of social categories or roles one belongs to or occupies or assigned. It is, instead, the 
image emerging from a narrative occurring at a particular temporspatial context in a 
dialogue with an actual or imagined social other where this dialogue is taking place in a 
field of power deferential and competing discourses. As such, I eschew the notion that 
there is an executive self that is managing multiple identities which compete for 
dominance and which frequently conflict with each other potentially reaching crisis 
levels. Identity, in my view, is an instantiation of self, a momentary halting in a running 
narrative. The similitude of identity to my mind is that of a perpetually woven cloth 
(narrative) from threads (stories) varying in color, length and texture. Some threads are 
short but nevertheless powerful and permanently altering the cloth, others are long and 
provide defining characteristics to this cloth. The cloth is affected by the weather and by 
the shape of and tension in the weaving frame. Similarly, the self-narrative is affected by 
the internal (dispositions/desires/drives and experiences) and external (social and 
physical environments) contexts. The weaving is continuous and changing with physical 
elements and the creative impulses of the weaver, who is assessing and altering the 
threads and tensions; but observers only see aspects of what has thus far been woven and 
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give it their own meanings. So is identity, that unfolding self-narrative of which others 
only hear segments; and the very presence of these others shapes and alters, in large and 
small ways, these self-narrations. As I analyze the narratives of my project collaborators, 
we see the stories within the narratives and see how the gaze and statements of the social 
other, including this researcher, enter inner speech and engage in creative tension with 
the (re)presentations of self. 
 
Claim All Your Parts 
 
Aisha, daughter of Indian immigrants:  “who are you? Do you know who you are? 
How would you identify yourself to answer that question? Well, I used to ask myself this 
question all the time, especially when I moved here from India at the age of seven with 
my family. I used to ask myself, what is my identity? Am I Muslim, am I Indian, or am I 
American? Who am I? And as I got older, this struggle to find myself only got harder 
[…].Before, I always thought I had to choose one aspect over the other, pick from one 
part of myself over the other but through my experiences in life, I learned that I don’t 
have to choose and you don’t have to choose. And why should you have to compromise 
any part of yourself when you can be all that you are? As the saying goes “you weren’t 
meant to fit in, if you are born to stand out”. So claim your identity!  I am a Muslim 
Indian American. Who are you? 
 
Leslie, daughter of Whiteamerican converts: Actually people will say to me “you 
speak really good English for being a foreign person”. “No, I’m from here”. So I’ve gotten 
those. And you get a lot of really weird looks when they hear you speak and they kind of 
look at you [wearing hijab], like that doesn’t match, so what’s going on? 
 
Talib, son of Blackamerican converts: We used to get up in the morning after Fajr 
and have Arabic class for like two hours [at home]…we had to wear kufis every day and 
suits. Like my family made us wear suits every day. I mean, growing up nobody’s doing 
that, you’re like, I don't want to go in that all the time.  But at the same time, I remember 
growing up in a village. We had, back where it wasn’t that many issues with the 
particular masjid that we used to go to that was built by Muhammad Ali in Chicago, up 
from the ground, and our community, that was the central location. And so growing up 
there, going to Clara Muhammad Islamic Elementary School, even later being 
homeschooled, we grew up in a Muslim state of mind. So I didn’t realize that people 
weren’t really Muslims until I started interacting with them as I got older, you know 
what I mean? If I was at football or gymnastics I would meet a kid that they weren’t 
Muslim and they were asking me like, well, how are you Muslim?  And tell me about 
Islam. I’d be like what?  I’d be like, hey, Mom, they believe that Jesus is God; even 
though I lived in America, that was crazy to me! Like, wait.  Are these the people, like 
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they believe differently, what? Like, they don’t know who Prophet Mohamed is?  What?  
Mom’s straight African American, you know. 
 
Naeema, daughter of Blackamerican converts: I was in public school, I wanted to 
do the things that the other kids, so I’m like “mom, why can’t we have Christmas? I want 
a Christmas tree.” You know she’s like, look, Christmas tree is the devil, [laugh] all of the 
people that celebrate Christmas they’re evil.  So she and I talked about this as an adult 
and we kinda laugh about it and she is like “I didn’t know how else to deal it, I know you 
had to be in that environment but if you look at them in a negative light then you 
wouldn't wanna be them”. I was like, “now that’s crazy!” But you know, we work with the 
tools that we have, and she was like “that was it”. It was very interesting …[in school] 
nobody knew I was a Muslim…I just didn’t eat pork and looked like everybody else, nor 
did I at that point want to stand out. So it was more about fitting in and making sure that 
nobody knew that I had any differences than it was about asserting myself and being an 
individual.  
 
 These excerpts from longer narratives convey some of the issues encountered by 
those growing up Muslim in America; they are issues about being (seen as) different. The 
questions and insecurities are not unique to Muslims. Children, adolescents and 
frequently adults of all backgrounds struggle with differences—be they based on race, 
gender, class, sexual orientation or religion. The differences are compounded by the 
intersectionality of these categories which then reveal the problematics of simplistic 
categories and labels. The first of this excerpts is part of a long narrative presented by 
Aisha a twenty-year old college sophomore female who presented this narrative under 
the tile “Claim your Identity” in the ThinkDot youth event that opened this dissertation. 
In it, she details the embarrassment and awkwardness of looking “foreign” because her 
parents made her wear Indian clothing every Friday when they usually picked her up for 
Friday prayers. She “smelled foreign” because her mother packed masala spiced Indian 
lunch and she had a foreign sounding name. She struggled with difference and as she got 
older this challenge to “find [her]self only got harder.” She acknowledges that this is not 
unusual since “every youth” struggles with that. She then speaks for her generation and 
the audience recognize themselves in her statement when she says: 
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except that I realized that with this generation of Muslim youth, it is much more 
complicated ! [snapplause4] Because here is the thing, everybody has 
expectations from us: with Islam we have to devote our time to Allah, I have to be 
the best Muslim I can be while living in a non-Muslim country and that’s really 
hard because Islam is a way of life and it influences everything I do. And then 
there is our parents. Every parent has the image of the ideal daughter or son and 
part of that for my parents is to follow my Indian culture, a culture that I’m barely 
even exposed to.  And then there is school, media, friends, and basically the rest 
of the world. Fitting in, societal expectations, peer pressure! So here you are, 
pulled in all these directions, and as human beings it is just easier to just pick one 
and go with it. And in doing so many of us resort to the following: some of us, we 
hide our identity. You know, change your name so people won’t know you are 
Muslim, or Arab or Chinese and then there are some of us who go with the flow, 
follow what is convenient, do what everybody else does, because it is cool.  
 
 The struggle Aisha refers to is occurring in the midst of adolescence. As she and 
others try to balance different expectations and relationships with self, peers, parents, 
and God, she searches for an alternative to the choices of hiding or following the crowd. 
She tells the audience: “But guess what? You don’t have to hide yourself. You don’t have 
to be another clone [snapplause]. Because if you understand each part of yourself, you 
can balance it out! You can still strive to be the best Muslim while following your Indian 
culture and your American culture.” This last statement received a long snapplause. It 
was in high school that Aisha became comfortable with the different aspects of herself 
and she recalls a critical moment that helped her in this process. This incident illustrates 
the role of the social other in self-understanding and identity formation. A non-Muslim 
friend asked her if she would convert out of Islam when she turned eighteen and no 
longer had to do what her parents said. We do not have the context of this friend’s 
question, but we can glean the friend’s perception of Aisha, her parents and her faith 
which was likely to have been shaped by observing Aisha’s awkwardness and her 
discomfort with difference. Whatever triggered this question, it jarred Aisha; so she 
responded, “why would I even think to convert?”. The friend replied that she thought 
Aisha was a Muslim only because her family was. The question and the response enter 
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Aisha’s inner speech and interface with emotion-laced memories of experiences at school 
and home about her Indian-ness, her Muslim-ness, and about her difference; she begins 
to grapple with whether these are accidents of her birth or choices she can make. The 
friend’s question prompted more questions in Aisha’s inner speech: “What is my faith? Is 
this my faith or is this my parents’ faith? Why am I a Muslim?” After some reflection and 
critical self-assessment, she came to a conclusion which she said she “hate[d] to admit”, 
that her friend was right! But this was not the end, it was the beginning of a process 
where she questioned her faith and took a cultural inventory of her heritage. This process 
led Aisha to decide that not only does she want to be a Muslim but that she would 
“choose Islam over any other religion even if [she] was born a non-Muslim”. Aisha said 
that she realized with that question that she had to claim her faith and cultures (Indian 
and American) as her own. By the end of freshman year in college, a Jewish high school 
classmate whom she hardly knew sent her a text message “out of the blue” to tell her how 
impressed she was with Aisha. The message said: “thank you for being a great example of 
a Muslim woman, for showing me what Islam is really about, that Islam doesn’t hold you 
back from who you really are but it makes you a better person”. This and other life 
experiences helped transform the awkwardness of childhood to a new confidence. She 
grew to claim “all [her] parts” because she believes “you are not meant to fit in, if you 
were born to stand out”. This last statement, appropriated from pop-culture, is also the 
motto of Al-Muminah5, a young Muslim women’s group Aisha periodically joined. This 
illustrates how bits and pieces of other discourses shape one’s self-narrative and identity.   
 In her narrative, Aisha’s difference is something she becomes aware of both 
compared to what she perceived to be “normal” in her peers and from their questions 
and statements about her clothes, smells and name but also from her parents. She 
develops her own understanding of her religion’s expectation as she makes it her “own, 
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not as [her] parents’” and then engages in cultural inventory. This theme is one that is 
frequently mentioned by participants in this study and will be discussed further in the 
subsequent chapter. The process of self-understanding and self-(re)presentation (both 
how she sees herself and how she wants others to see her) is made more explicit through 
Aisha’s narrative. It illustrates the process by which the various stories that make up the 
narrative are woven together to culminate in a consonant sense of self. From the young 
child who desires “not to be different” to the high school and college student who thinks, 
analyzes and recognizes that difference is not a liability: “what makes me different, 
makes me interesting and makes me who I am. It is a part of me. Me being Indian is 
never going to change for me and it is up to me to decide how much I let it influence me.” 
While her parents might have wanted her to grow up as they did, she says, they realize 
that is not going to happen because the reality is she did not.  She, and many children of 
immigrants, Muslim or not, note that when they do not follow their parents’ instructions 
or when they argue, parents tell them they are “being too American.” Some times in 
frustration, Aisha (and her audience shows agreement) respond: “we’re like ‘being 
American!’ What does that mean? We are American! We are born or raised here, we go 
to school here, we have American friends; this is our country.” But immigrant’s children 
also realize what parents mean by that is they want them to follow the ethnic norms and 
practices because “in most cases American culture …is associated with being bad”. While 
some norms might be different, Aisha and others conclude that American and Islamic 
values do not contradict each other; they can select the best of American and their ethnic 
culture and still be “good Muslims.”   
 But this project of self-understanding is not a solitary one; the (mis)recognition 
of the social other plays a critical role. In Aisha’s narrative, we hear the voice of others 
(parents and peers) and sense their gaze. She is embarrassed by how her mother dresses 
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her as well as by how she smells, sounds, and looks to her peers. As Aisha approaches 
late adolescence and college, the positive reactions of her peers and her parents 
understanding that she is not “Indian like them” help reinforce her evolving self-image 
and self-(re)presentation. These later experiences gave her a sense of belonging to her 
peer group, being “just like them” and having similar experiences. But, she grows 
comfortable with being different in faith and in her selected additional Indian “cultural 
values.” She says:  
In high school, my friends thought I was the coolest thing because I would match 
my hijab with my clothes. They saw that I could still be modest and stylish. That 
my religion didn’t stop me from expressing myself, whether it be fashion or 
words or anything else. And they saw that my American culture didn’t stop me 
from being modest [snapplause]. And what is even more amazing is that a 
Muslim hijabi who was born in another country was picked to be featured on the 
senior profile page in the year book. It didn’t matter that I was wearing a hijab, it 
didn’t matter that I was a Muslim [snapplause]. It didn’t matter that I was born 
in another country or that English was my second language. I was just like them, 
going through the same experiences as them, except I had an immense amount of 
faith and cultural values. So if you pick the good qualities from each aspect of 
yourself, you can keep all of them, if you balance it out, you don’t have to choose 
one thing.  
 
The image of Aisha that emerges from this narrative is an instantiation of her self-image 
(I-for-myself and I-for-other) at the specific context (time, place, her peers, and the 
audience) and in dialogue with circulating discourses about young Muslim and identity 
crisis. It is an excerpt from an ongoing narrative, a snapshot of an ongoing process held 
momentarily still by this researcher in the process of fieldwork. 
 Leslie, in the second excerpt, is a thirty year old White female with blue eyes and 
blond hair that she covers in public. Her parents trace their roots to centuries in America 
and by the time she was six both of her parents had converted to Islam and she was 
raised as a Muslim. Unlike many converts, Leslie’s parents did not change their names 
and gave their children “American” names rather than Arabic or “Muslim sounding” 
names. So though they sound American (in name and language), Leslie and her mother’s 
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headscarves confuse people about whom they are. Are they nuns? They do not quite look 
the part. So they must be foreign who speak English really well and sound American. 
When Leslie informs her questioners she is from here, they are more confused and give 
her “really weird looks” because the sight and sound do not match, do not fit! It is only 
when, and if, they know she is a Muslim that her foreignness is explainable. As a child, 
she was shielded from the scrutiny of curious non-Muslim children and confused adults 
because she was homeschooled. This also spared her the pressures of prom, dating and 
having male friends all of which her parents, she says, would have opposed. Her friends 
were from other Muslim homeschoolers – who were incidentally mostly converts’ 
children – or young women’s groups. Leslie’s father and brother do not stand out. Their 
faith and difference is only known if they wished to reveal it. White converts and their 
offspring’s confidence in their belonging to America is conferred upon them by the 
normativity of whiteness as the default American and that privilege also has great 
currency within the Muslim community. Yet by joining a minority community and a 
marginalized religion with a negative public image, they for the first time experience the 
plights of minoritization. Women, who also make up the majority of Whiteamerican 
converts to Islam, are asked why—living in a free society— would a woman, an American 
woman, choose to join such a “patriarchal religion.” Women converts and their children 
have to deal with assumptions that they only converted because of romantic interests of 
foreign Muslim men. While some women are indeed introduced to Islam by Muslim 
male (boy)friends, their ultimate conversion usually is rarely a function of marriage (Van 
Nieuwkerk 2006). 
 Hassan, a twenty-four year old male graduate student of Bosnian background, 
relates how his whiteness makes it very easy for him to hide in the crowd, if he so wished 
because nothing –other than his name – marks him as a Muslim. In fact, it was difficult 
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for his public school classmates to understand how he was “born Muslim.” He became a 
curiosity when he started attending a school in mostly White Chicago suburb. He says 
they often exclaimed “what is that? Wow, European Muslim, White Muslim, nah, it’s not 
possible?” and then would add “nah, you’re White you can’t be Muslim”. Hassan said he 
heard this challenge to his identity “thousands of time” and he would retort “like really! 
My name doesn’t give it away?” His color also confuses other Muslims who assume he is 
a recent a convert.  
 The third excerpt is part of a rich and long narrative by Talib, a twenty-six year 
old Blackamerican whose parents were members the NOI and transitioned to Sunni 
Islam in the 1970s. But long before his parents’ conversion, Islam was part of Talib’s 
extended family some members of which converted to Islam with Elijah Muhammad in 
the 1930s.  Talib’s amazing life starts as the son of Blackamerican converts to Islam who 
as he put it “have not had the best experience in society” and for whom converting was a 
spiritual migration “pretty much just wanting a better life, just like [their] ancestors that 
came up here from the south to the north for a better life.” Seeking that better life meant 
practicing Islam the best way possible and that included strict upbringing of their 
children. His parents envisioned him becoming an imam one day. The preparation for 
that, as the excerpt above notes, began early in his life and in his day with two hours of 
Arabic lessons at dawn. This spiritual migration also meant distinguishing self with dress 
style; so his older sisters wore headscarves and Talib and his younger brother wore kufis 
(skull caps) every day. Though the Muslims in Chicago were then as now geographically 
dispersed and only a few families in his neighborhood were Muslims, he grew up in a 
closely-knit community that made him feel like he grew up in “a village.” Talib went to 
Muslim schools or was homeschooled and “hung around” mostly Muslim kids. Though 
he played ball with neighborhood children who were not Muslim, it was not until he was 
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eleven or twelve that he realized that he and they were different. They were not Muslim, 
they do not know about Islam or Prophet Muhammad and they were asking him about 
both.  
 Reflecting back, Talib now realizes it must sound strange that, living in America, 
he was not aware of this difference. But he notes that young children might notice 
difference but the meaning of it is often lost on them. All they know is that the friend 
who plays ball with you is a girl or the boy with “funny felt hat on top of his head 
sometimes. And you don’t know why, you just know that’s your friend.” At the age of 
fourteen, his parents sent him to Damascus to learn Arabic and his religion, but he was 
abandoned by the people whom he accompanied and by his Chicago community which 
was supposed to financially support him. This betrayal wounded him so deeply that 
retelling this story, which figures prominently in his narrative and the course of his life 
until the day of the interview, evokes raw emotions of anger, sorrow and defiance as he 
fights back the tears. Being on his own and the youngest in an Arabic language school 
attended only by foreigners, he had to learn to survive and in the process he learned 
more than Arabic and Islam. He said he learned about trust and betrayal and about 
himself and the reliance on God; he also learned about being an immigrant and the need 
to bond with “your people” to make the experience less traumatic. He learned about the 
nuances and the grammar of color and difference in another society. For the first time, 
he saw that being American and a Black Muslim in foreign land was a positive thing: 
“then you’re just like, I’m American. People, you realize, people know a lot. People know 
you! They know you! That was the crazy part. Like people would tell me about Michael 
Jackson, Michael Jordan, Mike Tyson and Martin Luther King, Muhammad Ali Clay. I 
used to be like, what? You know me? You know me! So it was a different kind of 
experience, [that] really increased my confidence!” In Talib’s narration, we witness the 
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significance of the recognition of the social other. He recalls the strangers who helped 
him and those who mistreated him and these experiences profoundly shaped, but did not 
determine, the person he is (becoming).  
 Talib does not fault his parents who lived in abject poverty and could barely feed 
their children, but he is touched by the love and sheer determination of his younger 
brother who at ten years old “sold body oils and hustled” to raise the funds to bring Talib 
home after a year abroad. When he came back, those who abandoned him and ignored 
pleas for help brought out the rage in him and he wanted nothing to do with them. As he 
recounts these experiences, the mixture of sadness and anger made his eyes well up, but 
he held back the tears. Lest I wonder if he had abandoned his faith, Talib affirmed that 
he still was a Muslim and did his prayers, but he did not want anything to do with his 
community. Instead, he “just wanted to be in the streets.” He notes that the sense of 
betrayal and anger in his teens made him rebel. He also became well-schooled in racism 
and the criminalization of Black, and in how immigrants quickly internalize society’s 
racist image of blackness and climbed the socio-economic ladder on the shoulders and at 
the expense of Blacks. In his rebellion, he joined gangs, sold drugs, and “collected tax” 
from the Arab gas stations and shop owners whom he knew looked down upon their 
Black clients. Through it all, however, he says he never denounced Islam and never 
stopped praying and feeling God’s protection, but he also says his surviving of the bullets 
and drugs and avoiding a criminal record was because he was very smart. He says:  
because I understood, even though I was in it, I used to always feel like I was 
manipulating it, everything, the environment… Because I understood!  I was 
always a reader, so I understood why people did what they did. I was fifteen [and] 
was reading Frantz Fanon and Malcolm X and George Jackson and just different, 
a lot Black history, revolutionary manifesto type books.  So for me, being a thug 
was like being a rebel. And I understood because being a thug, if you understand, 
being Black in this country has always been criminalized. Even the formation of 
police, police in this country were first slave catchers, and then over time they 
became police. So the formation of having people to enforce laws comes out of 
criminalizing Black people from being free.  So I always looked at, us being here, 
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civil rights movement is over. The 70’s are over.  The pro-Black movement is the 
last movement that came out of civil rights.  Now we’re into hip-hop. So we went 
from fighting to dancing. But for me being a thug was like being a revolutionary 
because I wanted to fight somebody, you know what I mean? So being a thug, it 
was an extension of rebelling, because even though crime has socioeconomic 
reasons why those crimes are committed, a form of it is still activism and still 
rebellion. Because Niggas6 don’t know why they do crimes. They just know they 
have to. They don’t understand that for them it’s a feeling of how do I continue to 
fight these people that I feel like are my enemy? I don’t know why I fight nobody, 
I just gotta fight them. I understood that at a young age. So I manipulated it.  I 
manipulated it to the max.   
 
He saw Islam as an “ideology” and not “just rules”; the discipline it gave him 
along with smarts enabled him to understand himself and recognize that crime was but 
“an outlet”.  Believing that to honor Black suffering he must “reap the benefits of what 
[his] ancestors fought and died for,” he hung out on the streets but excelled in school. He 
was on honor student and class president and knew once out of high school, he was 
college bound to embark on a professional career.  
From a child knowledge-seeker abandoned in the streets of Damascus, to the 
rebellious youth gang member on the corners of Englewood, Chicago to a caring medical 
practitioner with lofty ambitions and a solid plan, this young man’s life narrative 
continues. In these excerpts from Talib’s self-narration, we see the stories that constitute 
the narrative and the memories of experiences laced with emotions, the bits and pieces 
of other discourses (race, civil rights and post-colonial, social science on criminality, and 
so forth) and the reflexive self as it becomes the object of its own contemplation. We 
witness how these elements together paint the image of self and others (relatives, Blacks, 
immigrants, community, and society). 
 Naeema, in the fourth of the above excerpts, grew up in the 1970s and 1980s. Her 
foreign sounding name did not seem out of ordinary in the context of her all-Black 
school or neighborhood.  She just did not eat pork but otherwise she “looked everybody 
else.” Like Aisha above, Naeema did not want to seem different; because, she says, at that 
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point in her life “it was more about fitting in” and the only difference for which she 
wanted to be known was “asserting [her]self and being an individual.” However, trying to 
be like everybody else and just fitting in a Christian majority Black setting was not going 
to be easy for a child of parents who converted to seek a different path and came through 
the NOI to Sunni Islam. The “tools” available to her mother for setting and explaining 
the boundaries of the new lifeway she wished to impart to Naeema were limited; so the 
mother used what she knew. When Naeema wanted to celebrate Christmas like her 
classmates, her mother – drawing on the narrative of the NOI– said Christmas was the 
devil’s practice. Cognizant of how that must have sounded and to distance herself from 
this statement, Naeema laughs and says “that’s crazy” but she excuses her mother 
because these were the “tools” she had then. 
  Naeema “discovered” race, herself, and her faith in the military. She talked about 
how disoriented she felt when she transitioned from her all-Black childhood 
environment on the south side of Chicago to the diversity of military life overseas. She 
called her sister to tell her “I have to sleep in the same room with White people”, a 
situation that “freaked [her] out”. She always thought her religious practice was shallow 
and she was “doing so many wrong things”, including living with a boyfriend for a few 
years. She realized, however, that others such as her military superiors and colleagues 
took notice of the subtle difference Islam made in her character and behavior. Prompted 
by their gaze and questions and becoming identified by them as “the Muslim” and the 
“designated driver,” she began to delve deeper into her faith. Here, in the military and in 
life overseas, is where she learned to see diversity of colors and cultures. Naeema said 
these interactions and experiences transformed how she saw her faith, herself, and 
others and resulted in a “paradigm shift on how [she sees] the world” and practiced her 
faith. These experiences and their impact inform her identity and life today. 
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Taking the World into the “Bubble” 
 
If “identity crisis” in the formative years arises from the difference between one’s 
identities at the home and the outside world that is encapsulated in the public school and 
in social norms (gender interactions and dating among others), then one would expect 
that those attending Islamic schools would be spared all struggles. But being immersed 
in a Muslim environment does not mean it is the idealized “Islamic environment” 
everyone hopes for. After all, these students, parents and staff are individuals struggling 
with all the shortcomings and idiosyncrasies that everyone else struggles with and often 
fall short of this idealized environment they are trying to create. Furthermore, they are 
not closed to the outside world or protected from the internal world of their own body 
and desires; both of these things are the same issues that Muslim youth struggle with 
even in Muslim majority countries and the same ones that non-Muslim parents and 
children also struggle with.  
Many students from different backgrounds, who have attended or were attending 
Islamic schools, have told me that parents seem to think that putting children in an 
Islamic school “protects” them from the world, when in reality they take the world with 
them anywhere they go. Former students of Islamic schools stated that dating and drugs, 
the two most serious reasons that the make parents choose Muslims schools, took place 
in their schools though not in the open or to the same extent as public schools. As Musa, 
a twenty year-old second generation African American Muslim male who attended and 
worked in Islamic schools notes, the youth still listen to music and watch movies with 
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images of drinking, drugs, and with sexual language or images. He knew of boys and girls 
who have done “horrendous” things with each other and of girls who took off their hijabs 
or no longer wanted to be Muslims. Parents, he said, often put their children in Islamic 
school and avoid confronting these issues. But even in the absence of these issues, Musa 
noted the school environment “doesn’t prepare you for reality,” you just hide from these 
issues until college. The free mixing and freedom of college life is not something these 
schools prepare you for; he added that, it is like “you’re sending a sheep with wolves. I 
mean you’re asking for your kids to get eaten up, you have to take more initiative to 
prepare them”.  
Sami, a nineteen year-old college senior of African background, echoes the 
sentiment expressed by several of collaborators both female and male who attended full 
time Islamic school:   
I felt like it was a bubble. I felt like it didn’t prepare me for interaction in the real 
world, so it didn’t prepare me for all these influences that will be there once I 
transferred from high school and went to college. You know, I felt that it didn’t 
make me a well-rounded person, to be able to engage with discussion or 
friendship or a professional connection with any segment of society and succeed 
at it. You know, I felt that it put me at a disadvantage socially in being able, 
around a limited group of people who aren’t by any mean representative of the 
greater macrocosm of American society. And so I felt in a lot of ways it shelters 
kids and then when all these influences do hit and the peer pressure does hit, 
they completely fold.  And it takes a really strong person to be able to find 
themselves in that whole huge mess. Because then they go to college and it’s like a 
huge culture shock.    
 
Participants said that they got over the shock and adjusted eventually, but that initial 
experience exacerbates the usual disorientation associated with starting college life. 
These are also the critique many parents lay on Islamic schools and the reason that they 
opt out of them. Supporters of these schools, on the other hand, think that such a 
protective environment in these formative years instills values and shields children from 
racism. Furthermore, though they may experience an initial shock in college, they in fact 
draw on these values and affirmations to find their footing. Additionally, so the 
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argument goes, Muslim and ethnic student organizations on campus usually provide a 
safe and supportive corner on college campuses.  
 
Learning Difference in the Playground and in the Mosque Courtyard 
 
The experiences of Muslim students in public schools varied by the diversity of 
their neighborhoods, by the student’s sex and religiosity, and by the decade and 
sociopolitical context of the student’s childhood. For most, it was not avoiding pork, 
dating and prom that made them “different” so much as it was the color of their skin 
and/or their headscarves or ethnic clothing. Since most Muslims are either Brown or 
Black, color was a major issue for many school children. Though the whiteness of many 
Arabs and European Muslims, especially of the men, often affords them the ability to 
“pass”, even they report color-based difference as an issue when attending a less diverse 
school. Hassan, the Bosnian man quoted above, noted that his being Muslim and White 
was not issue until he went to a less ethnically diverse school. Children of immigrants, 
whose parents came to the United States as adults and were unschooled in the dynamics 
of racialized society, encounter color and race issues for the first time in school, as the 
examples of a young man of African background and a woman of South Asian heritage 
illustrate.  
Sami, quoted earlier, noted that when he was in third grade a White girl touched 
his skin and said “ewww, you’re Black. That’s disgusting” and that, he recalls, was when 
he “started struggling with actually the Black identity.” He also relates a White student 
presenter on Martin Luther King Day using two cardboard-hands shaking each other and 
notes that he did not understand why the White cardboard-hand was peach color “like 
skin tone” while the Black one solid true black. He looked at himself and saw he did not 
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look like this solid black that meant to represent people who look like him. He was 
confused. He has been called a “nigger” several times and resigns himself to the fact that 
“growing up with 99 percent White, you’re going to hear that often.” We had the 
following exchange:  
Muna:   What did it feel like to be called that? 
Sami:   That’s like you being in a completely different country, being called an 
insult that you’ve never heard of that; you have no idea what the history is behind 
it, and, really, you feel that it doesn’t even apply to you because you don’t even 
share that ancestry. But at the same time, you’re expected to react to something 
that inherently doesn’t offend you, because you’ve never been conditioned to be 
offended by it. You know, it’s not as if it’s something that we’re born with to be 
offended against and to me it was just like, well, I didn’t understand. I didn’t have 
that anger; I didn’t have all those emotions.  I didn’t appreciate or understand the 
struggle that all the African American slaves went through to get the opportunity. 
It took me a while to come with a conclusion or a firm result as to whether I 
should be offended or not but I came to the conclusion that we’re here because of 
the struggles of these people. Not only me as an African American but all other 
ethnicities, whether you’re Chinese or Arab or whatever, we really benefited from 
those freedoms of the African Americans and their struggles. And out of respect 
we should definitely appreciate them. Also at the same time, if someone is saying 
something to you that may not even directly apply to you, but at the same time 
has the intent of offending you, I think you have a right to be offended. 
Muna: So if you were called that today, would you react differently than you did 
then? 
Sami:  Well I mean, I wouldn’t react violently or negatively. But I mean, yes, I’d 
react differently. Because I understand the term much more and I have a lot more 
experience in social situations than I did back then.   
 
Sami’s learns that he is a person of color and that his skin color connects him to a 
historical legacy to which he had no other links. As a person of color, he learns to take 
offence to a word intended to denigrate people of his color.  
The childhood of Salma, a thirty three year old daughter of immigrant Indians, 
illustrates the role of the Other in self-defining and self-understanding in ways that leave 
a lifelong imprint. She grew up in Chicago in the 1980s in an all-White suburb and she 
noted how “White children make you feel different. You stick up like a sore thumb. You 
just wish you could be blond and blend in. But I wasn’t blond and wasn’t anywhere 
blending in.” She was placed in an English as a Second Language class where Spanish 
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was spoken until her mother went to school angry and pulled her out of class. But Salma 
recalls one incident vividly and describes it as a “defining moment” that forever colors 
her views. She, a brown child, was playing in the sandbox at kindergarten with her two 
friends, one Black and one White, and then  
the little White girl says, “oh, [salma] is just dirty.  She’s just dirty”. And I was so 
devastated, like, what do you mean?  And she says “you don’t take a bath! You 
must not bathe.” I’m like, yes, I do!  And she says, “no, you must not, because 
look, Latisha she’s Black. That just makes sense.  She’s dark and that’s her color 
and there it is.  But look, you’ve been playing in the sand all this time and your 
skin isn’t even getting dirty because look, it’s just like dirt.” And she would look at 
her hands and she’d say, “see, my hands are dirty.” And I just remember being 
very shocked and going home to my mother crying. And I remember my little 
Black friend sticking up for me and saying [to me] “you know, she’s just stupid” 
and to her “just be quiet. You know, you don’t know what you’re talking about, 
she takes a bath.”  I don’t remember the whole situation, but I just know that 
feeling of wow, you know, you’re five years old, playing in the sandbox just so 
innocently and something so big [happens to you]. In retrospect as an adult, that 
is when I first identified that moment [as] a very self-defining moment. That I am 
different, and this White girl, she sees me obviously very differently. And I bathed 
every day, every evening. 
 
 Salma added that when she went home and told her mother, the mother “not being from 
here” did not quite understand “all the racial divisions in this country and the history of 
it all.” But the mother told her that “in this country you have to pick yourself up, dust 
yourself off, and move forward.” Salma has taken those words to heart ever since but still 
chocked up as she recalled this “very painful” episode. She played again with that girl but 
never invited her home. When the neighborhood changed and became more diverse, her 
color was no longer a distinguishing factor. There she and Mary and Susi could only be 
differentiated if one knew their names or asked about Christmas, but her closest friends 
have ever since been non-White. Religious restrictions did not mark her as different that 
much. All through elementary school, she celebrated all secular holidays including 
Halloween and Valentine’s Day until she reached junior high school, when her father 
“put his foot down” and said she can no longer do that. This change caused her a great 
deal of confusion. She argued with her parents that there was nothing religious about 
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those holidays and they said that is even more of a reason because they are pagan 
holidays and they are all trying to become better Muslims. Salma said that as a child, she 
began to think “being Muslim sucks…you don’t have any holidays or traditions” 
especially because Eid and Ramadan were mainly celebrations of “food and love and 
gathering” and did not involve the many gifts as children get for Christmas. But as she 
got older and had friends of diverse background who had discussions about their 
differences, holidays were not as much an issue and she was more comfortable with 
being different.  
Color and race are also an issue within Muslim communities and I will discuss 
them in more detail in chapter 7. But at this juncture, it is worth noting that the 
race/ethnicity of the children of converts puts their belonging to Islam into question. If 
the children of immigrants are always the Other regarding their American-ness and are 
asked where they are from, the children of converts (Black, Whites or Lantio/a) are 
always asked by Muslims about their Muslim-ness. “When did you convert?” is the 
typical question. When they say they were born into Islam, their questioners assume the 
person is evoking the Muslim notion of fitra (the first natural human state) that every 
child is born a muslim (with a lowercase ‘m’)7 and that it is parents who raise them in a 
different faith tradition. This is the reason many converts prefer the term “revert” as they 
presumably come back to their original state of submission to the one God. When these 
second and subsequent generations of Muslims, explain they are not converts/reverts, 
the subsequent response depends on background of the questioners. Often, first 
generation immigrants seem puzzled. Several of the participants relayed how they were 
asked by first generation immigrants to recite something from the Qur’an, as a way of 
authenticating their Muslim-ness. One Blackamerican second generation woman who 
used to wear headscarf said that, during her hijab period, immigrant Muslims often 
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assumed she was an immigrant and asked her where her family was from. Because 
Blackamericans make up the majority of the converts, this is a particular issue for their 
offspring who are now into their third and fourth generations and are still asked if they 
converted. If the questioner is a second generation of immigrant background, once the 
person says s/he was born into Islam, there is no further inquiry as noted by Malik, a 
third generation Blackamerican Muslim whose grandmother was of Arab background:  
if we didn’t talk which is often the case, like you just see each other, and say “as-
salamu alaykum” whatever, there’s this initial perception and whole bunch of 
initial assumptions but it’s fairly easy to work through them. It’s easier to work 
through them with my peers. I guess. Because we have a lot more similarities it’s 
easier to get you’re point across, we’re like, alright well, we have this in common, 
and so we can sort of build on that. 
 
Similarly, those of Eastern European background whose families have been 
Muslims for generations encounter this kind of questioning because of their whiteness. 
Hassan, the Bosnian man quoted above, relates how prior to the war in Bosnia many 
Muslims did not know much about Islam in the Balkans and he was always asked when 
he converted. But even in college, a few years ago, he was still assumed to be a convert. 
He relates an incident when he joined the MSA for Friday prayers. After the obligatory 
prayers, he stayed longer and performed optional prayers and an MSA member waited 
patiently for him to finish until they were the last in the prayer hall. Hassan did not know 
the man was waiting for him but when he finished praying the man came over and told 
him “so brother I just wanted to introduce myself, I just wanted to give you support. 
When did you convert?” Hassan laughed and said “no man, I was born Muslim” and 
notes that “it was very awkward and very funny.” He brushes it off, but having to affirm 
his Muslim-ness to both non-Muslim and Muslim gets old and frustrating.  
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“Home” Culture 
 
Because culture is in a process of continuous change as each generation 
(re)interprets inherited tradition, challenges old practices, and notions and innovates 
new ones, gaps always and everywhere emerge between parents and children’s 
generations. As immigrants settle in new lands, often the culture of their origin tends to 
become frozen in their minds at the moment of departure and they look back 
nostalgically and romanticize norms and practices of the “back home culture.” Fearing 
its loss, they try to hold on ever more strongly to preserve that culture and pass it on to 
their children. Therefore, Muslim parents of immigrant backgrounds are concerned not 
only about the religion of their children but also about passing on their cultural heritage 
as it was when they left home. Converts, on the other hand, are themselves trying to find 
an authentic way of being a Muslim without becoming Arab or South Asian8. As they try 
different ways, this process of experimentation adds to the post-conversion 
disorientation; not being of a Muslim background also leaves them open to questions of 
authenticity, generations after they have been Muslim.  
Those of immigrant parentage are acutely aware of their parents’ desires and 
attempts to preserve the cultural heritage of their countries of origin. As young children 
who want to “just be blond and blend” in school or among neighborhood friends and are 
mortified to have to wear ethnic clothing among their friends, they, as we saw above with 
Aisha, at one point realize they can engage in a cultural inventory and claim aspects of 
that culture. Sometimes a trip to the country of origin clarifies things and can both instill 
a degree of belonging and difference and also can help them see that the parents’ 
perceptions of “back home” are frozen in the moment when they left home decades 
earlier. Khadija and Sara, nineteen and twenty year old sisters of Bengali parentage, 
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recount a trip to Bangladesh to visit their grandmother. Their mother had them put 
traditional shalwar khamis (Bengali attire) in their carry-on bag to later change into so 
when they land in Bangladesh they would be “dressed appropriately”. Once there, they 
saw their peers dressed in jeans and T-shirts instead of traditional clothes. They felt like 
they were a “blast from the past” dressed and behaving like their mother and 
grandparents. They realized that their cousins go to hotel parties which are like night 
clubs in the U.S. and dress in “night club clothes”, things they are not allowed to do in 
the U.S. Still, the sisters are the ones perceived as “not knowing” what they are doing 
because they are: “outsiders here, outsiders there, we don’t know what we’re doing 
anywhere, apparently. So yeah, like we never got to just hang out and do what kids there 
do because we basically live in the 70’s like they [parents and grandparents] did, their 
Bangladesh. So it’s pretty crazy”. 
Sara’s remark questions the notions that designate them both here and there as 
“outsiders” who “don’t know what [they] are doing”. In her statement and question of the 
accuracy of this assessment since it is only “apparently” and not necessarily accurately, 
we hear an address/response to an Other in whose glances and words, spoken or not, she 
and her sister read doubts about their identity and belonging. It is not sufficient that the 
sisters – and other children of immigrant – think and see themselves as insiders who 
belong to both cultures, the image of self needs to be consonant with how they think the 
Other sees them. The recognition of the Other is essential. 
While these parents’ views of their culture of origin might be a frozen frame from 
the moment of immigration, the “culture back home” changes in subtle and dramatic 
ways that make the immigrants seem to be a “blast from the past,” as Sara notes. 
Additionally, these immigrants are not a closed-off system immune to change. They too 
experience the culture of their adopted home and their religious adherence goes through 
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ebbs and flows with new understandings and learning. They might have fasted and 
prayed always or occasionally and perhaps even dropped the children at the weekend 
Islamic school to learn the basics of their faith, but they are also busy pursing the 
“American dream.” And even if they only socialized with their co-ethnics, “American 
culture” almost imperceptivity enters their discourse, dress, home décor and mannerism 
even as they chastise their children for being “too American.” Sometimes that trip to the 
“old country” also makes parent realize that they and their society/culture of origin have 
also changed. In a previous project, first generation immigrant Muslims shared with me 
how surprised they were to go back home only to feel like outsiders and “stick out like a 
sore thumb”. Even though they did not lose the language and thought they knew the 
norms, both have, in the decades, since gradually changed. Many also talked about how 
they learned more about Islam after they moved to the U.S., often prompted by having to 
answer the questions of non-Muslims and of their children who demand to know why 
and how something is Islamic or not. Some, who were not so religious in their youth, 
become more observant after immigration and many others became so as they grew 
older (M. Ali 2011). Recognizing the evolutionary nature of their own religious 
observance helps parents understand and better deal with their children because they 
see how they themselves did not come to religion until they were older. Parents may not 
understand that their children struggle with being a child of color and a Muslim in 
America but they realize these children are growing up in a different time and place; so 
they attempt to adjust their parenting methods and their expectations.   
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Growing up the Child of Convert 
 
Convert parents better understand the experiences of growing up in America but 
they too have not known what it is like to be Muslim child and how the intersection with 
religion complicates color and gender for a young person. For the children of converts, 
their parents have experienced a conversion process where they questioned their entire 
belief system in the process of learning a new worldview. For Blackamericans who came 
through the NOI, their initial religious experience was still within a community of other 
Blackamericans. Their children might have attended an all-Black religious community 
and schools like Sister Clara Muhammad School but others went to public school and did 
not have the support of a religious community. In either case, limited interaction with 
immigrant Muslims allowed them to experiment with social norms without having an 
immigrant referee telling them what is presumably Islamic or not.  For example, one 
collaborator recalls how her parents let her participate in Halloween dressed as an 
African princess while another said his parents did not permit taking part in Halloween 
and instead created a tradition of a family dinner and movie night as an alternative.  
Sumayya, a thirty-four year old Blackamerican, whose parents converted before 
she was born, did not know any Muslims when she was growing up. In fourth grade, her 
father told her she was no longer allowed to wear shorts or short sleeves. He also said 
that when she started her menstrual cycle (the age of religious obligation), she would 
have to wear a headscarf. So in eighth grade, she started the year with her headscarf 
which she styled after a Libyan friend’s mother who wore it in the style of the “old 
country” (scarf pinned under her chin) unlike her mother who covered her hair and 
pulled her scarf back in bun-like fashion. Sumayya says that though her father prepared 
her for this day, she was mortified to go to school with a headscarf and upon arrival 
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dashed to the bathroom crying. All her friends followed to comfort her. Even though her 
friends did not seem to care that she now looked different, Sumayya for a while told 
schoolmates she wore the scarf because she lost her hair to cancer treatments. Beyond 
the initial awkwardness, however, the headscarf did not limit her activities as she 
participated in swimming, ran track and played hockey. She never went to school dances, 
prom, or any parties where alcohol was served. In seventh grade and in a new school, her 
parents let her go to a dance for the first time but when she got there she thought “this 
doesn’t feel right” and asked her parents to go home. Since then, though, her parents 
made it clear that going to dances and parties with alcohol were not appropriate. That 
was fine with her since she neither had the desire to go nor felt like she missed anything. 
This indifference was because she had non-Muslim classmates who did not engage in 
those activities and with whom she instead stayed home to watch movies and make 
cookies.  
Twenty-nine year old Shareefa, on the other hand, grew up being the only 
Blackamerican in her otherwise diverse class in the Phoenix-valley. Her parents were 
involved in the school and that made it much easier for her. Her mother, who wore the 
hijab, started a Black History month in Shareefa’s elementary school and prepared the 
students by coming to class and telling them that Shareefa was one day soon going to 
start wearing a headscarf and what that means. She even brought headscarves for kids to 
try which, Shareefa recalls, they thought was “cool.” So when Shareefa finally went to 
school donning a headscarf, it was a non-issue. Her classmates were also made aware 
that she does not celebrate Christmas or Valentine’s Day so her friends made her 
“Arizona’s birthday cards instead of Valentine’s day card.” She noted that her parents 
created alternatives outlets including Muslim youth groups so she did not feel like she 
was missing out on anything.  In junior high, her classmates insisted on nominating her 
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for prom queen and she had to figure out how to do this in a way that would not conflict 
with her faith. She wore a formal gown with jacket and a matching headscarf and rather 
than a date, she went with her brother. To her surprise, she won and she says “it was so 
amazing.” Her friends knew she could not dance with the prom king and suggested they 
instead do a group hug. She was touched by this and it shaped her views on public 
schools which she defends from their Muslim critics arguing that it pays to be involved.  
 
Dates and Dances 
 
There is no monolithic way that Muslim “immigrants” or “converts” dealt with 
dating or gender interactions in general. Like all parents, there were broad guidelines 
and variations based on the sex of the child but also on each child’s temperament. 
Interestingly enough, many of the participants had permission (some parents only 
consented after their children insisted, but for most it was not a battle) to go to prom on 
the conditions they dress modestly and go with a family member, another Muslim, or 
with a group and there was to be no overnight hanging out. Some, like Ishaaq, opted out 
even when his parents gave him permission without conditions because not attending, he 
said, was an important distinction of his Muslim-ness that he did not want to lose.  
Omar, a twenty-eight year old son of Indian immigrants, noted that in high 
school as a Muslim kid with a long list of don’ts (don’t eat pepperoni pizza, don’t drink, 
don’t dance, don’t date) you feel a bit left out and not belonging; but once out of the high 
school environment, you “create your own social circle and your own environment, then 
it’s very easy like, that’s just not part of my life. Like, I don’t know any good bars in LA, 
what are you gonna do! (laugh) but I know a lot other great places in LA that me and my 
friends would go to.” When he socializes with his non-Muslim friends, he is able to 
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“navigate those [lists of don’ts]” because friends become cognizant over time that 
restaurants are fine but bars and clubs may not be. 
Dating and opposite sex friendships are probably the two main points of 
contention between parents and children. Conventional wisdom and studies may suggest 
that Muslim parents are adamantly opposed to and uncompromising on both. A 
workshop on parenting by imam Magid of ISNA sums up the perception of the general 
instructions parents give to their children on gender interaction: “Don’t talk to the 
Muslim girls, ever; but you are going to marry them. As for the non-Muslim girls, talk to 
them, but don’t ever bring one home.”9 The reality, however, is that parents might hope 
for that but they often try to be understanding and pragmatic about this. Therefore, they 
do not always outright forbid dating; instead, they employ diverse strategies to deal with 
the issue. Sara, the older of the two Bengali sisters quoted earlier, says she was a “crazy 
kid in high school.” So when her parents realized she was “hanging out with boys”, the 
father printed a list of family rules and posted it on the fridge. One of the rules was “no 
dating until you have a college degree.” So dating, she said, was not out of the question 
but it was to be delayed until after college, when it would be time to explore possibilities 
of marriage partners.  Her grandmother back in Bangladesh, however, told her she 
understands that girls her age have boyfriends and that it is fine to date so long as the 
boy is a Muslim from the Muslim world from Malaysia to the Middle East. Sara says she 
could see a map in her head and, though she realized that her grandmother’s map 
excluded her “home country, America,” she was intrigued by the fact that her 75 year old 
grandmother was open to the idea of dating and understood the peer pressure to date. 
Sara describes her mother as the first feminist she ever met for one because she always 
told her daughters that “you need to be in a position where you won’t be dependent on 
anybody else”.   
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I asked Ibtisam, a nineteen year old of North African descent, who was schooled 
in a private Islamic school and lived in an Arab neighborhood, if her parents talked to 
her about dating when she got to college. She said that 
my mom is so cool. She’ll say “listen, if you meet anyone who is cute and smart at 
school just tell him I want you to talk to my dad”. She’s like, “because I know 
you’re going to meet people, but I don’t want you to give yourself too fast or do 
anything you’ll regret”. But she trusts me so she doesn’t say the stupid things like 
“don’t date” and stuff because she knows I’m gonna do that. So she just says 
things like “if you meet someone good, bring him home”.    
 
Ibtisam appreciated her mother’s pragmatism and recognition that it is not a matter of if 
but of when and how her daughter will grapple with interests of/in the opposite sex. In 
her mother’s instructions, Ibtisam reads awareness of the reality of young people’s lives. 
She also reads trust, care and concerns rather than suspicions and parental dictates. This 
gives Ibtisam confidence in herself as she navigates the labyrinth of “college life” where 
dating is the norm. In this short excerpt of self-narration, we observe the workings of the 
embodied thinking self as it interprets the message of a significant social other and forms 
images of itself and of this social other. The image of the mother for Ibtisam (other-for-
me) is that “mom is so cool”, “she trusts me”, “she knows” me so she is not “stupid”. 
Ibtisam also assesses that her mother knows her and that she is worthy of the trust. She 
recognizes herself in the image the mother has formed of her. This recognition of the 
social other, as noted earlier, is crucial for a consonant self-image.   
Contrary to the monolithic narrative of identity crisis that paints all young 
Muslim as torn between a restrictive home and permissive society, these young people 
and their parents have diverse approaches. Hassan, for example, notes that because in 
Bosnia dating is not unusual and gender interactions are very relaxed, his parents never 
spelled out a particular position on these issues but he had imposed some limitations on 
himself. In senior year in college, however, he “might have” become “a little bit…loose” 
as he experimented a little with drinking and smoking. Because it happened so late in 
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college rather in high school or even the early years in college, however, he does not 
think he was succumbing to peer pressure, though it might have been a factor. As he was 
relaying his narrative, he was still trying to understand what might have led him to that, 
perhaps “sort of latent desire that [he] never expressed.” He regrets this youthful 
indiscretion and sees these explanations as “complete fabrication, it’s bullshit! Excuse 
me.” As he tries to understand himself and to figure why he acted as he did, we are privy 
to the process of theorizing and evaluating where the self becomes the object of its own 
reflection and critical assessment. This process leads him to dismiss some reasons as 
“complete fabrication”.   
One could also see differences even within a family on how either parent dealt 
with the situation and here one also sees some of cultural difference in gender 
interaction norms. Layla is the daughter of a Whiteamerican convert mother and 
Pakistani father, her parents made it clear that there would be no dating. She said she 
could understand that but had a harder time upholding her father’s rule that she was to 
have no friendships with boys because, especially if they were not Muslim, boys have 
only one thing their minds. As an adult reflecting back, Layla says she could see their 
reasoning and agrees “with it to a certain extent” but as a child she could not 
comprehend why she was not allowed to have male friends. She says that her mother, 
having grown up in the U.S., was more understanding about American gender 
interactions. So she let her mother know about her male friends but hid that fact from 
the father.  
Many of the female participants – and others with whom I interacted through youth 
groups and women gatherings – were often resentful of the double standards within the 
community. Religiously, the code of conduct for both sexes is the same, they argue, but 
within families and in the community the boys had more freedom of hanging out even 
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with girls and everyone seemed to be turning a blind eye. The boys would not date 
publicly, but it often is an open secret. This is the sentiment captured by imam Magid 
quoted above. This topic came up in my conversations with male collaborators some of 
whom confirmed they had a little more freedom than their sisters. Others like Ramy, a 
nineteen year old son of Arab mother and Persian father, says he did not observe double 
standards within his family though his sisters often complained about that, so he 
concedes there might be some truth to it.  
While parental discussion and openness about how to deal with emotions and 
natural sexual desires beyond the notion that satisfying these desires outside of marriage 
is haram (illicit), the community typically avoids such topics. Lately, however, this has 
been changing. Imams and advisors are getting questions from youth about how to deal 
with attractions or how to deal with feeling of guilt if they acted upon those feelings 
outside of marriage. In a workshop in Arizona titled Love and Dating and conducted by 
two male speakers and moderated by a second generation Arab American husband and 
wife team, many of these issues were discussed.  Dr. Kamran Rais (second generation 
male of South Asian descent) and Osama Cannon, (a convert who is half Black, half 
White) both in their early to mid-thirties and nationally known speakers and imams, 
were the two speakers spearheading a frank conversation on the topic. Cannon reminded 
the audience that young people are not living in an “asexual bubble;” indeed, they are 
sexual beings living in a world inundating them with sexualized images and messages in 
advertising, music and videos. He exhorts the community to have these frank and crucial 
conversations. To add credibility to his proposal, he grounds it in Islamic history. He 
gives an example of a young man who came to Prophet Muhammad asking him 
permission to fornicate. Cannon highlighted the Prophet’s pedagogy: rather than 
scolding the youth, the Prophet acknowledges that sexual desires are only natural. Then, 
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employing Socratic teaching methods, the Prophet guides the young man to help him see 
how if he would not want that to be done to his sister or mother then others too would 
not want that for theirs. The Prophet then prays for the young man placing his hand on 
his head, in a show of affection. In summoning the Prophetic tradition, Cannon 
demonstrated his credential as scholar of Islamic tradition and consequently one 
qualified to speak from a religious perspective on such sensitive issues. He also paved the 
way to argue for his proposal. Through this prophetic pedagogy, Cannon reminded the 
audience that feelings of attraction and love are natural and must be acknowledged. 
There must also be ways to channel and manage these feelings and the role of parents, 
community teachers, and imams is to know and to give young people the tools; they need 
to show empathy and understanding to the young. But the young also need to see this as 
spiritual struggles and not merely as natural urges to be satisfied.  
The first half of this workshop was attended by parents and children but separate 
sessions were planned for the afternoon. The later session was intended to allow the 
youth and the speakers to have a more candid conversation and to feel more free to ask 
the questions, written or in person. Questions during the youth’s session were dominated 
by issues such as how to deal with peer pressure, how to control desires, how to get 
parents to understand the experiences of young people, when is one prepared for 
marriage, and whether a person who had a relationship before marriage should tell 
his/her future spouse. This last question generated back and forth discussion. The reply 
from the discussants was that it depended on whether or not revealing that serves a 
constructive purpose. They then added that if God has concealed one’s sins from public 
judgment, it is not necessary to publicize them. The response did not sit well with some 
of the audience. This Islamic etiquette of modesty by not revealing repented-for-sins was 
perceived by some of the younger people as not being forthcoming. They noted that 
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withholding truth is no different than lying. Two women, one of Arab background the 
other of Blackamerican background, in their mid-twenties argued the above point. They 
added that if all the parties in this scenario lived in the same area and the affair was 
known, then the new spouse will sooner or later find out and will resent being played for 
a fool. Withholding such information is dishonest and will jeopardize the marriage.  
The second and subsequent generations of Muslims are, themselves, taking the 
lead in opening this topic to Muslim public discourse. A new anthology, titled Love 
InshAllah, presents twenty-five stories of dating, love, and marriage experiences showing 
the divergent ways Muslim women and their families (immigrants and converts) deal 
with these issues. It attempts to problematize the homogenizing discourse from within 
and outside the community. Discussions of these issues, led by second generation 
women and men, are also taking place on social media and on websites. A very popular 
webzine, AltMuslimah.com, with an international readership and a second generation 
female founding editor-in-chief with busy public engagements, is dedicated to 
“[e]xploring both sides of the gender divide.” Among other topics, the editors and 
contributors discuss Muslim gender relations and sexuality. Titles there include, for 
example, Muslims Need Dating Dialogues to Open Communication, Sex and Islam do 
Mix, but not in America, Relationships: An anti-teen-dating diatribe, Hook-up culture: 
No sex on campus?, and Sexuality: Body-talk and the Limits of Islamic Erotica. 
Technology and social media have changed gender interactions and “dating” in 
society in general and Muslims have also adapted to that. There are Muslim matrimonial 
websites and even conferences now have matrimonial sessions similar to speed dating 
though no one would call this “dating” since parents and other chaperons are outside 
waiting for good news of a possible match. The words dating and pre-marital sex are 
seen as synonymous and while the reality is that Muslims are not immune to engaging in 
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pre-marital sex, acknowledging that in public is considered not only a sin but also 
ruinous to a family’s reputation. One is expected not to broadcast one’s indiscretions.  
 
 
 
“Where are you from?” The Geographies of Belonging 
 
“Where are you from?” is a simple question but depending on the context, it 
could either be a simple conversation opener at an airport or a coffee shop or one with 
complex implications about origins and belonging, about national identity, boundaries 
and exclusion. In this latter case, “where are you from?” implies you are not from here, 
not one of us. While the question is common in American social interactions and often 
the answer is the state where one is born or lives, for those perceived to be outside the 
national imaginary of belonging such an answer is usually followed by “no, where are you 
really from?” or “originally” or “your homeland.” Being asked this regularly and 
sometimes more than once a day can leave one frustrated at best and excluded and 
alienated from where one thinks is (and feels at) home. This question about a place is 
more than about a physical location; it is one about the emotional attachments and 
connections and the meanings and memories that are essential to a sense of belonging 
and being part of a place, its history, and people. As noted earlier, the physical and social 
spaces and environments are essential to identity, one’s sense of self (re)presentation.  
In the survey, along with the demographic information, I included “how do you 
answer the question: where are you from?” and allowed space to “explain as needed.” 
Even in that limited space, participants’ responses reflected the loaded nature of the 
question and the complexity of the answer. Of the 246 participants who answered this 
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question, only 48 of them simply answered by stating country of origin and half of those 
were of Palestinian background to whom maintaining that link with the land is rooted in 
understandable historical and political reasons. Obviously, for the children of converts 
the answer is simply the state where they were born/raised but as noted earlier even 
they, particularly women who wear headscarf, are often then asked where they are 
“really” from. The great majority of those of immigrant background have a context-
dependent formula response, which they say, depends on location (school, work, social 
gathering), the background and tone of the questioner and what they think the 
questioner is getting at. For most of them, the answer is the city or state where they were 
born or grew up and they may add their parent’s background because they “know” the 
person will not be satisfied with just their childhood city. They know the person is asking 
about their roots; or as one interviewee put it, “they want to know why I’m brown.” So 
they would explain, “I was born and raised in Chicago but my parents are from India” or 
Egypt or Eretria or Somalia or Bosnia or China. Being asked so frequently, however, and 
because usually it is about origins, many are bothered by the question and find it 
exclusionary. Their parents might be comfortable answering that question because first 
generation immigrants assume their accents signal their foreignness but young Muslim 
Americans know it is the color of their skin (or dress) or name that often motivates the 
question. Some names are presumed to not be American no matter how many 
generations they have been American. So they let the questioner work for the answer. 
Yasmeena, a forty year old mother and student captures this sentiment and formula as 
she noted in her survey:  
I have a system…just to play around with people and have a little mischievous 
fun! First, I tell the person I am from Chandler. Usually the person is not satisfied 
with the answer so they give me a confused look or they will ask the question a 
different way….and then I say Chicago. They will not say anything because they 
are still confused or uncomfortable or they will say something like…“where are 
your parents from?”…and then I will say India with a big smile or grin. I usually 
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end up asking them similar questions, but I get to the point right away “what 
country did you or your family/relatives migrate from?” 
 
In the interview, I asked Yasmeena to elaborate on the reasons behind her “system.” She 
said the reason is “the way they ask it.” If she thinks the person is “sincere,” she would 
just say India. But when she gets “that feeling” that the questioner is “being a little more 
superior” which has “been mostly the white people”, then she employs her system and 
ends it with asking her questioner about his/her ancestors too. She does this because she 
feels there is an implied statement in the question: “like they own this place. They ask it 
like ’ah, I own this place, where are you from?”. So with her system, she tries to convey 
“uh no honey, you don’t own this place, you came here just like I did, you know, maybe 
you came earlier or your family came earlier or whatever; [so] no you don’t own this 
place!” She resents, in fact “hate[s]”, that implied ownership which excludes her. So she 
asserts her belonging by challenging the legitimacy of the question by not readily 
revealing her family’s origin. Yasmeena’s husband, a first generation immigrant, liked 
her system so much he appropriated it to assert his belonging, no matter his foreign 
birth or late arrival in the U.S.  
 Yasmeena asserts her belonging and challenges her questioners in the same 
way by asking in return where the person is from. She points out that her system is 
activated mostly with white people. In this exchange with her questioner, we see the 
power differential inherent in the privilege and normativity of whiteness as the standard 
American and her maneuvers to usurp that power from her questioner. In doing so, she 
wants to drive home the point that if the question is about roots, then the questioner too 
“is from somewhere else.”  But if is about home, then they are both from a particular 
hometown, USA. In the Black and White racial boundaries that define who is an 
American – though whiteness is unhyphenated – both at home and abroad, those who 
do not fit this these poles are constantly asked about their “real” identity. Often it is 
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when they return to the “home countries” that they are seen as Americans and as they 
feel and sense their difference that solidifies a sense of belonging. Omar a twenty-six year 
old male of Indian descent captures this experience. He noted that when he travels 
abroad, he realizes he is not only American but more specifically as an Angelino. He 
states that  
I felt different because for instance in Pakistan you know they can spot you from 
a mile away as you’re an American you’re foreigner even though you look the 
same mostly as they do. And I think society is so different in that it’s hard to 
identify other than on a superficial level. I think it’s funny that you when you are 
here in America you have certain identification with Pakistanis and Indians but 
when you’re in Pakistan you have certain identifications with Americans. You 
know, it’s just each one bring out the contrast. 
 
I asked him if he feels torn about two worlds and he noted that “this honestly is what I’ve 
always felt. I felt much more in common with Americans and America and because 
growing up in Los Angeles, I really primarily identify with Los Angeles and its cultural 
institutions. I feel like these are MINE (emphasis in tone). 
For women, whether or not they are of immigrant background, the headscarf – 
and how they wear it – is a symbol that immediately marks them and places them 
outside the national imaginaries and imbues their identity with various meanings. Najla, 
a nineteen year old college student of East African descent, donned the headscarf in the 
summer break between her first and second year of college. She was visiting some family 
in another state for the summer and surprised her parents with it when she came back. 
The change was not so much of an issue for her friends; in fact, a part of her was 
disappointed that it did not generate much reaction or questions from her friends. Prior 
to the headscarf, her features made her background ambiguous to people who typically 
would then ask if she were Indian, Arab or mixed Black and White. In spite of these 
questions, she thought that they always assumed she was “American” and to those who 
have known her, the headscarf did not change anything so far. But shortly before our 
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interview, she had gone to Hungary and Romania on a school trip and was constantly 
asked where she was from, while her co-travelers were assumed to be American. She 
thinks this is because she was both “the only African American and the only Muslim girl 
wearing a scarf there”. So the questioners thought of her as an international student or 
tourist. In frustration, she would say “oh, no I’m from America too, we’re all from there.” 
Even though in the past she had often been asked about her ethnic background, part of 
her frustration on this occasion was that she was “not used to standing out and being 
different because [she] just started wearing the hijab last year. So [she was] not used to 
being perceived as something as other than an American.” She clarifies to herself and to 
me that she thinks of herself foremost as American; she does not deny her African roots 
and is interested in and someday hopes to visit to learn more about the culture. Lest I 
wonder if she abandoning her culture of origin, Najla points out that her family’s 
connection to their country of origin is itself tentative: mainly through food, clothes and 
the language, though she and her brother are not fluent. She thinks her father might be a 
bit more “into their culture”, because he would like her to marry someone with the same 
cultural background. To her mother, on the other hand, the ethnic background does not 
matter so long as the potential spouse is a Muslim. It is interesting to note that while 
Najla did not like how wearing the hijab marked her so that she was not recognized as an 
American while traveling abroad, she was also disappointed that her friends did not take 
notice or remark on her hijab. She wanted to be asked about this new self-presentation, 
for this change to be recognized.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the dominant narrative of “identity crisis”, identity is conceived of as a stage 
that one succeeds or fails to achieve. This leaves the impression that it is a condition or a 
product rather than an ongoing process throughout the person’s life. As this project 
illustrates, questioning, trying to understand and to give meaning to self, faith, and the 
Other (family, community, society) is a lifelong process. As a process, it is dynamic, with 
varying rates of change that are affected by multiple variables. Growing up in 
contemporary society, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, class or religious background 
is fraught with challenges at every turn. The challenges are compounded and multiplied 
in the matrix for those marginalized by the intersections of these categories. Social 
problems from school dropouts to abuse of drug, alcohol and sex are now globalized 
issues and bullying and school shootings make public schools seem more like 
battlegrounds rather than socializing institutions. Yet, “identity crisis” is not the 
narrative that frames the public discourses on these societal problems. But it is the one 
through which Muslims (from teenagers to those in their thirties and forties) who are 
born/raised in the United States or the West in general are typically discussed. Torn 
between seeming irreconcilable binaries (home/society, country of origin/American, 
being in the secular West/belonging to the religious East), younger Muslim Americans 
are thought to be ensnared in poles pulling them in different directions in a presumably 
centuries old conflict of Islam and the West. The background to this history and its re-
articulation in current public discourse will be discussed later, but for now I argue that 
the pathologised “identity crisis” narrative must be situated within that discourse and 
within the narratives of those presumably suffering from it. There is no denying that 
there are Muslims who are born/raised in the United States and Europe who have 
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committed or are contemplating violent acts; some have or will join violent extremists. 
But the paths that led them to that position of self and other destruction are not one 
paved by their parents preventing them from dating, partying, or telling them they are 
“too American” when they talk back. After all, there are “mainstream” Americans who 
join gangs, militias or become religious extremists and bomb abortion clinics.   
As this analysis demonstrates, the offspring of immigrants or converts are aware 
of their difference and the multiple demands (family, faith, peers) on them. They 
recognize that others in their generations who do not share their faith or family 
background also have challenging experiences where they try to balance the expectations 
of others with the persons they want or hope to be. They acknowledge that the process is 
harder for them, but they learn to navigate it and construct a sense of self that 
incorporates all of the different “parts” of themselves, as Aisha put it. They do not see 
these parts as mutually exclusive. As they narrate this self, we see the heteroglot or 
intertextual nature of these narratives, as bits and pieces of other discourses are engaged 
or appropriated and enter inner speech. Their difference is not an issue for them, but it 
seems to be one for some parents and for a society that expect these Muslims to fit an 
image that is an either/or proposition. The collaborators in this project were comfortable 
in their own skin. That is not to say, however, that there are not those who are struggling 
with contradictions imposed upon them through the simplistic “good/bad Muslim” and 
“American first or Muslim first” framing.  
If there are identity problems among younger generations of Muslims today, they 
might be problems resulting from the post-9/11 discourse that demands they be 
“Muslim” – a particular kind of Muslim – above all else. They are not given the space and 
the time to experiment, ponder and come to their own complex understanding of self, 
family, faith and society. The effect of the new pressures younger Muslims face is 
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articulated by Omar, who points out that pre-9/11 there were those to whom piety was 
important, others to whom religion was marginal in their lives, and every gradation 
between these tendencies. Things, he observed, changed in the aftermath of 9/11. Some 
younger people now feel compelled to present themselves as pious when among Muslims 
but then to step out of the community and be “the craziest club-going partying guy ever.” 
This happens, Omar theorizes, because 9/11 brought about a “major cultural shift” where 
one can no longer eschew preconceived notions about one’s religious beliefs or 
behavioral expectations by just putting one’s “ethnic identity out there” and let that be 
the primary identifier. Since 9/11 
if you’re Indian automatically the next question is “oh, are you Muslim?” you 
know. So even people who didn’t want to identify with their religion were forced 
to answer questions about their religion and become identified with their 
religion. And I think that kinda leads people who wouldn’t have otherwise 
bothered with that kinda of identification [to] try to find some balance or some 
solution.  
 
The solution for some who are “just trying to cope” with this new pressure is to be 
a pious Muslim in the community and a “partier” outside. In the aftermath of 9/11, some 
sought to conceal their Muslim-ness, but many more found it necessary to self-identify 
as Muslims as a way of standing in solidary with a community perceived to be under 
siege. It might be more accurate to say that it is society and/or families whose own 
“identity crisis” is projected on the younger Muslim who, otherwise, might just want to 
claim aspects of or all “the parts” of his or her self.   
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1 Taha Hassane. 2009. “The role of Imam in crafting future youth leaders”. Accessed on 
6/15/2012 at 
http://www.imamsofamerica.org/files/The_role_of_Imam_in_crafting_future_youth_1_.pdf 
2 The 2011 Mosque Report notes that in a survey, mosque leaders around the country were asked 
if they agreed with the statement “radicalism and extremism is increasing among Muslim youth—
in their own experience in their area.” An overwhelming majority of 87 percent disagreed with the 
statement adding that their challenge is not radicalization as much as it is bringing the youth in 
and keeping them attached to the mosque ( Bagby 2012) 
3 Straight Path iBelong campaign accessed an 6/15/2012 at http://islampath.org/ 
4 Rather than the usual “Allahau-Akbar” phrase that Muslim conference audience shout out when 
they are moved by the speaker or clapping that is difficult to talk over or maintain one’s track of 
thought, in this event approval, agreement, or appreciation was expressed by snapping together 
the thumb and middle finger as it is done in coffee shops and poetry reading particularly poetry 
slam events.   
5 Al-Muminah provides mentoring and a space for diverse young Muslim women to share their 
experiences and support one another and to engage in recreational activities. It also puts together 
a graduation gala for Muslim women of all ages complete with formal evening gowns, a talent 
show, and inspiring talks on learning, “women power” and the responsibility to change the world. 
The gala started as an alternative to school prom and grew into the largest Muslim event in 
Arizona. 
6 He explains there is a difference between Negroes who are Black professionals and “movers and 
shakers” and Niggas who do not follow society’s rules or expectations. He liked the latter for their 
rebellion against society.  
7 In Islamic discursive tradition, the first and natural state for humans and for the natural world is 
a state of submission to the one God but that humans, endowed as they are with the intellect, have 
to make the conscious choice to submit to the Divine Will and guidance.  
8 The difference between culture and religion will be covered in more details in the subsequent 
chapter. But it is sufficient to say here that the issues of potential conflict between parents and 
children have to do not so much with actual religious practices or rituals but with dating, dress, 
dietary rules, and participating in holidays like Halloween or Valentine’s Day or Christmas. 
Immigrant parents might explain these restrictions to their children in cultural terms “we are 
Indians and don’t do that”; or they, like most converts might explain them in religious terms, “we 
are Muslims and don’t do such and such.” Interestingly enough, even the most lax non-practicing 
Muslim might drink alcohol but would abstain from eat pork. There is diversity of opinion about 
other meat and many Muslims take the dispensation that allows them to eat meat that is not 
slaughtered according the rules of Islam (dhabiha) under the rubric that is the food of the people 
of the book. Those who insist on only eating dhabiha either pack their children’s lunch or tell 
them to eat vegetarian meals.  
9  Neil MacFarquhar. 2006. “It’s Muslim Boy Meets Girl, but Don’t Call It Dating”. September 19, 
2006 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/us/19dating.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 accessed 
6/15/2012 
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CHAPTER 5 
“PURE/TRUE ISLAM” VS “CULTURAL ISLAM”• 
 
In general conversations throughout this project’s fieldwork and beyond, among 
project collaborators, and in public and academic discourses, “culture” figures 
prominently in discussions about Muslims locally and globally. In the previous chapter, I 
explored the notion of an “identity crisis” presumably resulting from differences between 
a home culture that is ethnic and religious and a societal culture that is presumably 
secular. In this chapter, I explore the related idea of a “pure/true Islam” as compared to 
a presumably “cultural Islam.” This narrative frame has multiple stories and meanings 
woven upon it by Muslims and non-Muslims alike from across the ideological spectrum 
of groups variously labeled “fundamentalists/Islamists,” “modernists,” “traditionalists,” 
and “secularists.” Younger generations of Muslim Americans, as well as many converts to 
Islam, invoke this narrative to argue that the understanding and practice of Islam by first 
generation immigrants is colored by a “back home culture” that privileges certain norms 
and traditions and relegates anything different, especially if Western, to the category of 
“un-Islamic” practices. Critics often consider those invoking the “pure/true vs. Cultural 
Islam” narrative as puritans who advocate an austere form of religion. These critics claim 
that whether they are merely quietist/pietistic or radical extremists, these puritans 
deeply reject both the West and the “Muslim world” and are dangerous to both. 
 In this chapter, I will demonstrate that this narrative of purity has many stories 
woven into the same narrative framework; in other words, it has different versions. 
There are indeed those who advocate an austere form of Islam and who are hostile to 
Muslims and non-Muslims verbally or physically. Yet the version of this narrative 
invoked by the collaborators of this project and many other Western Muslims is neither 
rejectionist nor dangerous. I argue that, rather than discarding culture altogether, these 
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Western Muslims are seeking to alter the immigrant cultural garb of Islam in order to 
cloak the faith with a culture that is grounded in their American [or European] realities. 
They are neither fully rejecting nor uncritically embracing either culture but are instead 
selectively appropriating elements of both. 
 
Individual Believers, Practice Communities, and Changing Societies 
 
The following excerpts are the voices of five participants in this project expressing this 
narrative of a pure/true Islam as compared to a cultural Islam. 
 
Omar (28 year-old male, Indian background): I think in particular my parents have a 
much more culturally tinged practice of Islam in that some of the cultural practices they 
have, you know, certain Indian things. 
 
Mukarram (24 year-old male, Palestinian background): My family’s practice of Islam 
is fundamentally culturally motivated. 
 
Zahra (19 year-old female, Chinese background): their [my parents’] interpretations are 
more culture based, and I don’t look at religion through culture’s eyes but its true 
essence…[ Also,] culture and Islam have become intermixed in most Islamic countries 
and people start using cultural basis for religious ones 
 
Heather (26 year-old female, Whiteamerican background): Non-immigrant Muslim 
Americans tend to be more focused on the core principals of Islam and going back to the 
essence of the religion as opposed to culturally traditional ways of practicing the deen 
[religion]. I see non-immigrants as bringing Islam back to being a way of life distinct 
from culture practices. 
 
Sadiqa (20 year-old female, Blackamerican background): Many beliefs of immigrant 
Muslims are based on cultural practices of their homelands and have little or no support 
in the Qur'an and Sunnah 
 
Differences between generations and between converts and immigrants are 
frequently discussed in cultural and religious terms. Here, the immigrant generation’s 
culture of origin is seen to have too great an influence on their interpretation and 
practice of Islam. These culturally based views of Islam, the argument goes, are then 
normalized by immigrants who expect others to adhere to them on the ground that this 
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is the Islamic way. Immigrants too invoke culture as they attempt to practice and 
transmit the “pure/true” Islam they know. They worry about cultural impurities entering 
Islam at the hands of converts and young people who try to “Americanize Islam.” All 
sides of this debate want to practice a more authentic and “pure/true” Islam free from 
what they perceive as the cultural baggage acquired in America or brought from back 
home.  
The above excerpts were responses to survey or interview questions about 
differences in the understanding or practice of Islam between participants and their 
parents; about differences and similarities between how immigrants and converts 
interpret or practice Islam; and about how participants see the relationships between the 
converts and immigrants. Culture was also identified as the reason for differences 
between Islam in the U.S. and in Muslim majority countries. Slightly more than half (54 
percent) of the respondents confirm that their understanding or practices differ from 
that of their families, and a great majority (72 percent) said that immigrants and 
converts slightly or mostly differ in how they understand or interpret Islam. The sample 
excerpts above also illustrate the ethnic diversity (South Asian, Arab, Blackamerican, 
Chinese, Whiteamerican) of those who hold the view that the understanding the 
immigrants have of Islam is cultural and is not “pure/true” Islam. While culture was the 
most frequently-cited difference, there also were differences couched in terms of the 
degree to which participants were “liberal” or “conservative” compared to their parents. 
Some framed the differences in terms of focus. For example, parents were said to focus 
on rituals, while children sought a “deeper” understanding and a relationship with God. 
Even some who said there was no difference between their understanding and practice of 
Islam and that of their parents qualified their responses by commenting that any 
differences were minor ones. For example, Maryam, a twenty-four year old of Pakistani 
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descent, notes these “minor” differences as follows: “my mother doesn’t wear hijab while 
I do; my father doesn’t have a beard while my brother does [and] my parents do not eat 
strictly zabiha halal meat, whereas my brother and I do.”   
The first of the excerpts above is from an interview with Omar, a twenty-eight 
year old male of Indian parentage. Omar notes certain “Indian things” that he says 
“twinge” his parents’ Islam. These “things” include claiming religious bases for things he 
concluded were merely cultural. He gives the example of having to visit grandparents 
after Eid prayers; he would do this anyway, he emphasizes, but his parents say it must be 
done because the Prophet said so somewhere. Putting it this way, he notes, makes it 
sound like a religious obligation when it is not. The more contentious issue for him, 
however, concerned the background of his potential spouse. His parents had often said 
that the ethnicity of his future wife did not matter so long as she was a Muslim, though it 
would be nice if she were Indian and even better if she were from Hyderabad, their 
hometown. Narrowing his pool of choices beyond religion, however, was not something 
he was willing to negotiate: 
I flatly told them at that time, and I’m by nature a conciliatory person and I like 
compromises, [but] that was one respect where I kinda knew right away, no! I’m 
going to draw a line and I said no! If I find the right girl and she is African 
American would you like me not to marry her? And they didn’t really have an 
answer for that. I did, you know throughout, I talked to an Egyptian girl and 
different ones just to show them you know that look, I’m serious about this! In 
the end, it is the qadr [fate] of Allah that the right girl was Hyderabadi you know 
[laugh]. 
  
The second excerpt is from an interview with Mukarram, a twenty-four year old 
single college student of Palestinian background. Mukarram was born and raised in a 
mostly Arab Chicago suburb and to the question “where are you from?” he simply 
answers “Palestine.” He grew up in a moderately religious household and also considers 
himself moderately religious. But he thinks there is a noticeable difference between his 
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and his family’s understanding and practice of Islam. Having stated that his parents’ 
religious practice is fundamentally cultural, he explains: 
Although this may sound harsh, it was only after migrating to the US that my 
family began to practice Islam with more conviction and sincerity. Typically, 
when there is a contradiction between a cultural practice and the mainstream 
Islamic ruling on a matter, the cultural opinion prevails. This is the main 
difference between “cultural” Muslims and Muslims who were raised as 
minorities in the US. For American born/raised Muslims who practice their 
religion, what tends to take precedence is the Islamic ruling on a matter as 
opposed to the cultural Arab or Desi status quo. 
 
The idea of pure/true/real— interchangeable terms in this narrative — Islam is 
salient. For example, on the website of a popular Muslim program called The Deen 
Show— created and hosted by “Brother Eddie,” a second generation Bosnian American 
— is a declaration: “American Muslims are there in the United States and it is their 
pleasure and privilege to help educate and share the true message of Pure Islam without 
cultural, traditional or nationalistic prejudices and corruption” (emphasis added). The 
Deen — translated as “way of life”— show is carried online and on a few satellite 
“Islamic” TV stations. In an interview about an upcoming film documenting his journey 
from gangster to a daee (someone who calls people to faith), Eddie talked about growing 
up in a Muslim family which he described as “Muslims on Batteries” or “Cultural 
Muslims.” Finding his life of “fun” devoid of meaning, he started to research and study 
comparative religion and found his way back to “true Islam.” 1 Another example of this 
purity theme is a group called the Chicago Muslim Network that defines itself as “The 
place where the coolest Muslims meet, mingle, make friends, learn” (emphasis in 
original). The network’s goals are “to explore true and pure Islamic values of fellowship 
and peace, regardless of religion, sect or ethnicity”2 (emphasis added). 
I will return below to project collaborators and their perspectives. At this 
juncture, however, it is critically important to explore why and how this narrative of 
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pure/true Islam, invoked by young Western Muslims, alarms some parents and scholars 
(Muslim or not). I will do this at some length because it is integral to the discourse of 
radicalization and identity crisis addressed in the previous chapter. It is also relevant to 
subsequent chapters. It is understandable that parents see in their children’s 
declarations a possible rejection of their culture, but some scholars see something even 
more worrisome. 
De-cultured and Dangerous 
 
 In her book article titled How to Put the Genie Back in the Bottle? “Identity”, 
Islam and Muslim Youth Cultures in America, Muslim American academic Marcia 
Hermansen noted that the “simultaneous alienation both from American culture and 
from the culture of immigrant Muslim parents encourages the embrace of a culture-free, 
global Islamic militancy” (2003, 308). While she acknowledges that some young 
Muslims “flee from their Muslim identity, [while] others are progressive activists, [and] 
most are moderate,” (Hermansen 2003, 309) her concerns are reflected in the title of her 
piece. The genie that needs to be contained, if Muslims are to pass through a critical 
juncture in their history in America, is what she refers to as “identity Islam.” Hermansen 
notes that a central motto of Muslim youth movements is “rejection” of culture in favor 
of a purportedly pure and true Islam. The cultureless “true Islam” that her students often 
request to discuss in class is one that is “apparently floating above everything cultural. It 
is pristine and unassailable,” it materializes politically through “a utopian state where 
everyone is happy and honest” and the world would be better if this state were to “be re-
imposed on humanity today” (Hermansen 2003, 309).  Hermansen argues that this type 
of Islam is globally propagated and materially supported by revivalist movements such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jama’at Islami in South Asia. This ideology, 
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then, crossed the Atlantic with the post-1965 Muslim immigrants and appealed to 
Muslim masses in America, who saw it as a means to inoculate their children against the 
woes of assimilation. These parents, however, did not realize that it would also cause 
their children to eventually challenge their ethnic heritage.   
Hermansen is not alone in her assertion and concern. In his widely acclaimed 
and frequently referenced book, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah 
(2004), French academic and political analyst Olivier Roy raises similar concerns 
particularly about the offspring of immigrants in the West. He argues Muslims who 
invoke the narrative of “pure Islam” are part of a phenomenon he calls a neo-
fundamentalist or “Globalized Islam.” Roy chides those who attribute everything 
negative that Muslims do (violence, misogyny and so on) to Islam as religion or to 
culture, history and the politics in the Middle East. Instead, he contends, these problems 
together with identity politics and Muslim social and political activism in the West are 
rooted in a “born-again” re-Islamization movement that advocates a de-territorialized 
and “de-cultured” Islam with no connection to traditional Islam beyond the pillars of 
faith and basic rituals. These Muslims, especially those growing up as minorities in the 
West, reject both the “pristine” cultures of the home countries, which they see as un-
Islamic and Western culture, which they see as alien, “corrupt and decadent” (2004, 25). 
Roy acknowledges that no culture remains untouched by time and by global changes. 
Nevertheless, by “pristine” culture, he means “what is reconstructed by first-generation 
immigrants as their own past.” It is also, he clarifies, the “tradition” referenced by 
immigrant leaders and by Western specialists (social workers, anthropologists, and 
lawyers for example) when dealing with immigrant related issues such as immigration, 
honor crimes, and female circumcision. It is the “tradition” young Muslims confront 
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from family members objecting to their Western dress, dance, dating or language (Roy 
2004, 22).  
Roy asserts that fundamentalist Islamism, which aimed to bring about an Islamic 
state, has failed and no longer resonates with Muslims anywhere. It has been replaced by 
a post-Islamist, neo-fundamentalist movement that disassociates itself from any culture, 
asserts belonging to the ummah (global Muslim community), and engages in discursive 
or political activism, sometimes through (inter)national violence (Roy 2004). Even 
though only a minority of these Muslims might advocate or partake in violence, Roy 
argues, this “phenomenon feeds new forms of radicalization, among them support for Al 
Qaeda” and “a new sectarian communitarian discourse, advocating multiculturalism as a 
means of rejecting integration into Western society” (2004, 25). He contends that certain 
groups in Muslim countries and, more importantly, in the growing Muslim populations 
in the West, are undeniably linked to the “spread of specific forms of religiosity, from 
radical neo-fundamentalism to renewal of spirituality or an insistence on Islam as a 
system of values and ethics” (2004, 5). This development, he asserts, is cause for 
concern. Neo-fundamentalism, whether in its Islamic, Christian, Jewish or Hindu forms, 
does not harken back to a historical and authentic religion extracted from the past; 
rather, it is about envisioning an ahistorical and presumably “pure” religious tradition. 
He posits that neo-fundamentalism brings about a Western-style religiosity that is a 
product of a secular society and a globalizing world. This form of religiosity shares with 
Christianity, particularly with Protestantism, a  
stress on dogma…self achievement… reconstruct[ion of ] a religious community 
based on individual commitment of the believer in secular environment.. [and] a 
personal quest for an immediately accessible knowledge in defiance of the 
established religious authority, the juxtaposition of a fundamentalist approach to 
the law (to obey God in every facet of one’s daily life) with syncretism and 
spiritual nomadism, the success of gurus and self-appointed religious leaders, 
and so on. [Roy 2004, 6]. 
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Yet, Roy cautions, when it comes to Islam this westernization should not be 
confused with the Protestant Reformation, because Islamic dogma here remains 
unexamined.  Roy contends that this “pure Islam” is stripped of its content and 
conceived of as “mere” religion detached from its “inherited cultural habitus or collateral 
knowledge (literature, oral traditions, customs)” (2004, 25). Ironically, this demand for a 
“mere” religion is one neo-fundamentalists, secularists, and liberal Muslims share. The 
difference is that secularists and liberal Muslims want a religion-free public sphere while 
neo-fundamentalists want to “Islamize” that sphere through activism or violence (Roy 
2004). In both case, the individual rather than the collective is the essential element. Roy 
points out that “uprooted” younger generations of Muslims in the West are neither 
Pakistani or Egyptian nor French or American but they are “Muslims first” and 
foremost3. Unlike old Muslim minority communities in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa 
who have created (or shared the majority) culture, these more recent Muslim minorities 
in the West have to define what being Muslim means. They must do that in a context of 
great internal cultural diversity where the only thing they share is Islam (Roy 2004). 
That indeed is the unique situation of today’s Western Muslims and it has complex 
ramifications that I will discuss in this and subsequent chapters.  
Roy’s book is full of provocative insights and has contributed greatly to the 
discussion on Islam and Muslims in the West and on what has come to be dubbed 
“Political Islam”. Furthermore, his rebuke of the culturalist approaches of both 
detractors and defenders of Islam, who frame everything Muslims say/do in religious 
and cultural terms, is commendable and much needed. Nevertheless, his thesis and 
analysis are grounded in a particular conceptualization of secularism and in an 
understanding of culture and religion (particularly Islam) as separate spheres, an 
approach which, ironically, seems to reproduce the “de-cultured” religious phenomenon 
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he is aiming to critique and problematize. I will explore secularism shortly, but here it is 
worth pausing at the distinction Roy makes between Islam the religion (Qur’an, 
Prophetic tradition, and scholarly commentary) and “Muslim culture.” Literature, 
traditions, sciences, social relationships, cuisine, historical and political paradigms, and 
urban life are the elements he lists as parts of Muslim culture. This “Muslim culture”, 
Roy says, is “difficult to spot outside” beyond “certain historical areas or geographical 
regions” (2004, 10). Presumably then, these Muslim-produced traditions, social 
relations and literature and so forth are not to be found wherever Muslims might exist 
but only in certain historical territories. Religion, here, is sacred texts plus scholarly 
interpretation/commentary. That these texts – scriptural or commentary – engage, 
shape and are shaped by all the elements listed as cultural or that religion/worldviews 
are included in basic definitions of cultures does not seem to figure in Roy’s framework. 
Yet, the definitions he adopts are not inconsequential, as the primary thesis and 
arguments in his book rest on how he conceptualizes culture and religion in general and 
how they pertain to Islam specifically. Here, Islam has a presumably natural historical 
and cultural territory and, if it leaves, it becomes deterritorialized, de-cultured, and 
potentially dangerous.  
The different models of secularism and multiculturalism constitute the backdrop 
for the numerous debates and discussions about religious and ethnic minorities, 
particularly in Europe, which is grappling with its own identity. Therefore, 
understanding secularism, religion, the state and its relationship to its subjects, as well 
as the definitions of private and public spheres—all of which are part of a complex 
whole— is critical to understanding the socio-political context of Western Muslims and 
the purity narrative some invoke. Critics of the new visibility of Muslims in Western 
societies invoke secularism and contend that this new visibility threatens secularism by 
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seeking to Islamize the public sphere. At the same time, Western publics are reassured 
that there is a “silent secular majority” of Muslims amongst them. Yet, one could argue 
that this silent majority is also becoming visible and speaking specifically on the grounds 
of being Muslim and not on the grounds of being Arab or Indian or Somali, or Black. 
 A New York Times’ article featuring members of this theorized silent majority 
lists the markers of their secular status: they do not pray or fast regularly; some may 
drink alcohol, or date, or have a Christmas tree; and the women do not wear hijab. The 
article notes that most secular Muslims are second and first generation immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim countries where everyone was assumed to be a Muslim. In these 
home countries, one was neither pushed to be observant nor found it necessary to mark 
oneself as Muslim; faith was a personal matter back home and in the America, these 
Muslims do not stand out from the rest of society. While not following “all the rules,” 
these individuals still identify themselves as (and wanted to be known as) Muslims, as 
expressed by a woman quoted in the article: “People accept me as just another American 
woman, and I feel like saying, ‘No, I’m also a Muslim’” (Goodstein 2001). Prominent 
CNN and Time magazine journalist Fareed Zakaria is known for his analysis on global 
issues and his Newsweek cover story Why They Hate Us (2001) which analyzes the 
sociopolitical roots of Muslim anger. To the general public, he is not known for being a 
Muslim, and those who know him most likely consider him secular. But when in 2010 
the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) joined the opposition to the lower Manhattan Islamic 
cultural center project (the so-called Ground Zero mosque), Zakaria spoke and protested 
as a Muslim by returning the prestigious award and honorarium the ADL gave him a few 
years earlier (CNN 2010). 
By the definition of the New York Times’ article, several non-observant project 
participants would be classified as secular, but these participants never described 
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themselves as such and actually considered themselves moderate or mildly religious. 
Additionally, when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, they and their more observant co-
religionists hold similar views. One should recall that from what was said about the 
behavior of some of the 9/11 hijackers, they were not particularly pious or observant 
Muslims. Additionally, radicalization and violence, which presumably neo-
fundamentalists are predisposed to, are about politics and not piety. This is what 
Gallup’s World Poll of Muslims – the largest study of its kind – revealed, while Robert 
Pape similarly found that terrorism is a political strategy rather than a religious 
motivation4. Nevertheless, both the secular groups (for example, the Tamil Tigers) and 
religious ones (whether Muslim, Hindu, Christian, or Jew) employ religious rhetoric and 
symbols to frame their causes (Esposito and Mogahid 2007; Pape 2005; Pape and 
Feldman 2010). It is, therefore, worth pausing here to explore the relationship between 
religion and secularism that defines and confines citizens’ ways of being.  
 
Religion, Belief and Secularity 
 
     
Roy is not alone in finding it difficult to apprehend what is meant by the term 
“religion”. Scholars from various disciplines have attempted to define religion but a 
comprehensive and widely accepted definition remains elusive. Clifford Geertz defines it 
anthropologically as a cultural system “of symbols which acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of 
a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Asad 2003, 29–30). 
Generally, definitions of religion tend to be either in terms of the search for meaning (of 
divine reality, of morality and ethics) or in terms of practices (rituals, prayers, ethical 
behaviors). The focus of a definition on the individual experience or the social realm and 
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the approach of the scholar (descriptive, normative, functional, essentialist)5 also impact 
the definition (Swidler and Mojzes 2000). These approaches are useful but partial and 
fail to convey the complexity of religion, Swidler and Mojzes contend. They propose a 
definition which they claim is simple, yet broad: “Religion is an explanation of the 
ultimate meaning of life, based on a notion of the transcendent, and how to live 
accordingly; it normally contains the four Cs: creed, code, cult, and community 
structure” (Swidler and Mojzes 2000, 7)6.  
But to define something is not to merely name an already existing reality; to 
name and define is also to bring something about. This is why Asad (2012) is critical of 
these attempts at a universal definition of religion, arguing that defining is foremost an 
act which includes some elements and excludes others. For example, emphasizing the 
centrality of “transcendence” and “belief” risks excluding immanence and practice 
devoid of belief. Far from being intellectual abstractions, Asad contends, these 
definitions are entangled in fervent social debates and are not beyond the reach of state 
authority. It is not just which elements fall in the scope of religion that is problematic; it 
is the very concept of religion, a modern concept, which itself is a product of a specific 
Western Christian history and the emergence of secularism (Asad 1993; Masuzawa 
2005). 
Since a phenomenon is understood in contrast to its opposite, the concept of 
religion is elucidated by examining secularism: religion’s Other, or as Asad notes, “its 
Siamese twin.” Religion and secularism emerged in a process of “restructuration of 
practical times and spaces, a rearticulation of practical knowledges and powers, of 
subjective behaviors, sensibilities, needs, and expectations in modernity” (Asad 2001, 
146). In this mutually constitutive process, the presumed neutrality of secularism won it 
the public sphere—the arena of reason viewed as universal and as limited to facts. 
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Religion was then to be banished to the private sphere, the realm of passions, beliefs and 
provincial identities which could be declared but could not withstand public scrutiny 
(Cady and Brown 2002). Having left its supposed natural historical territory, it is in this 
private sphere where Islam too is to reside in the West. It is to limit itself to these 
“provincial” ethnic identities and make no demand on society. Furthermore, when its 
adherents bring symbols and practices of piety into the public sphere, they are a threat to 
secularism itself. But this strict separation of private-public and religion-state is 
mythical. 
Typically used as synonyms, secularism and the secular are different notions 
according to Asad. The latter is “conceptually prior to the political doctrine of 
secularism” (2003, 16) and is neither religion by another name nor a break with religion 
and a rejection of the sacred. It is “a concept that brings together certain behaviors, 
knowledges and sensibilities in modern life” and “works through a series of particular 
oppositions” (Asad 2003, 25). Secularism, on the other hand, is a 19th century “political 
and governmental doctrine” (Asad 2003, 24) that laid the foundation for the nation state 
and is the Other of the religious. Secularism is generally accepted as a religion-free 
political doctrine that fosters tolerance and is the outcome of compromises between 
warring sects who settled on the “lowest common denominator” in the religious wars of 
seventeen-century Europe (Mahmood 2006; also see Asad 1993 and Asad 2003). 
Secularism creates private and public realms, but instead of driving religion out of the 
public sphere and maintaining its avowed separation and purported neutrality toward 
religion, the state in fact regulates and defines public manifestations of religion and 
sanctions certain kinds of subjectivity and practices (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2006). 
Secularism presumably aims to protect politics from religion but also to protect 
religion from the interference of the government, so that individuals and religious 
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organizations can freely practice their faiths. To protect politics from religion, a 
definition of religion is critical. Here, the state grants itself the role of identifying what 
qualifies as religious and, in a sense, appropriates a theological role to define and then 
impose religious signifiers on its subjects (Asad 2006). The public sphere created in the 
process did not conform to Habermas’s idealized public sphere— if it ever existed. 
Instead, it became spaces based on social exclusions of which religion is but one. 
Consequently, religion must be either kept in private or it must concede to making no 
political demands. Such a requirement might not be objectionable were it not for a built-
in inequity. The undue focus on constitutional matters when it comes to the relationship 
between church and state tends to neglect the disparity between various religions in 
pluralist societies when it comes to their political and socio-cultural positions vis-à-vis 
the majority religion (Bader 1999). This hides the “administrative, political, and cultural 
nonneutrality of the state under the guise of ‘neutrality’” (Badar 1999, 602). By way of 
example, activism by the adherents of minority religion (Catholics, Jews, Jehovah’s 
Witness to name few) has led to further disestablishment of Evangelical Protestantism as 
America’s civil religion; nevertheless, Evangelical Protestantism remains dominant both 
in local and foreign politics (Bader 1999). 
 
Subjects and Agency in the Public-Private Spheres Divide 
 
In public discourse, references to secularism create an image of a singular model 
of the relationship between state and religion. In reality, however, eclectic arrangements 
of this relationship exist throughout Europe and North America, reflecting specific 
histories and societal identities7. The U.S. and France, for example, differ in how they 
conceptualize religious freedom. To Americans it means that religion is to be protected 
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from the state, while French Laïcité means that the state is to protect itself from religion 
(Gunn 2004). This difference has significant implications for the degree of freedom 
enjoyed by religious communities and individuals in the public sphere. Historically, 
French Laïcité emerged not from unifying events but from divisive ones. These events 
were rooted in the state’s usurpation of the Catholic Church’s hegemony over French 
society by curtailing its authority and activities and confiscating its properties. This 
legacy of conflict colors current controversies in France involving religion (Gunn 2004) 
that spill into global public spheres. While many French citizens and politicians interpret 
and utilize Laïcité to oppose multiculturalism and the public display of religion 
(particularly by Muslims), in legal terms, Laïcité concerns the absence of an official state 
religion and neutrality towards all religions; the state is to neither endorse nor prohibit 
public manifestations of religion (Chelini-Pont 2005). 
 Chelini-Pont points out that much of France’s apparent hostility to religion in 
public is rooted in its understanding of the public sphere, which differs from that of the 
U.S. In both countries, the public sphere is understood as a shared organized space, but 
their publics differ in how they conceptualize this common space. Americans draw their 
conceptualization of the public sphere from liberal theorists who see it as a common 
place to all citizens, to debate and deliberate and to engage in voluntary associations, and 
from theorists like Benhabib and Habermas, who situate the public sphere in civil 
society, where it is continuously critiqued and deliberated. The French, on the other 
hand, view the state as a mediator between society and citizens and as responsible for 
regulating civil society. Consequently, to the French the “true public sphere […] is the 
space where the State exerts its authority for the benefit of all at the service of all” 
(Chelini-Pont 2005, 617).  
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But it is not only this history and understanding that inform Europe’s treatment 
of its Muslims. Europe’s relationship with its Muslim communities and Islam has a 
complicated history rooted in the colonial project and contemporary national/global 
politics and the religious movements they have inspired. In France, for example, in spite 
of the large number of its adherents –second only to Catholicism – Islam has had 
difficulty attaining the privileged “official status” that Christianity and Judaism enjoy. In 
2003-2004, in the midst of the headscarf ban in France, purportedly “liberal Muslims” 
and the then Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, met and concluded that the existing 
organizations of French Muslims did not represent the allegedly non-practicing majority 
of Muslims. Therefore, these Muslim organizations should limit their activities to 
religious education, while new secular organizations were to be established to represent 
this non-practicing majority (Asad 2006). There was also much discussion about crafting 
a “French Islam,” more palatable to French society and in essence reforming Islam. At a 
time when the state strongly opposes communitarianism, it promoted the development 
of Jewish and Muslim “representative” organizations (Asad 2006). These inconsistencies 
raise questions about the logic of laws on religious dress and the truth about claims of 
the neutrality of the French state. Western states have different models of secularism 
that shape their relations to organized religion and specifically to Muslims. But the 
resulting controversies and associated political discourse permeate each state’s national 
public discourse and shape the private views of citizens, including their evaluations of 
each other and what they bring to the public sphere.  
From the above discussion, it should be obvious that the pairs religion–
secularism, church–state, and private–public are not separate realms but are mutually 
constitutive concepts that can only be grasped through each other. The entanglement of 
the secular state in the definition and regulation of religion and the contrived division 
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between private and public spheres where state determines what demands can made in 
the name of what and in which sphere present a challenge for pluralistic (religiously and 
ethnically) societies. From reproductive lives, to education and work, to public 
manifestation of religion, to social interactions and behavior, the state is omnipresent 
and its citizens and publics engage in continuous negotiations. Minorities and those 
marginalized by their race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or income have to challenge both 
the state and society and negotiate the right to be at once the same (i.e., with equal legal 
and cultural citizenship) and different. This relationship of the individual and/or 
collective to the state hinges on a particular fashioning of the individual as a subject. 
The challenge facing the secular state is how to balance an individual’s freedom 
and rights with his/her belonging to a collective and to the nation— and which comes 
first. To manage this challenge, a secular state, Asad argues, is not “simply the guarding 
of one’s personal rights to believe as one chooses; it confronts particular sensibilities and 
attitudes, and puts greater values on some against others” (2006, 18). Under this state of 
affairs, the new visibility and assertive demands by younger Western Muslims for 
recognition as equal citizens and freedom to be different (to be Muslim and French, or 
British, or American) present a challenge. Additionally, the narrative of “pure/true 
Islam” vs. “cultural Islam” confronts the state with a question: which Islam is the one 
that it should engage? 
 
 
Whose Islam Anyway? On the Anthropology of Islam 
 
 
 
Critics fault those who invoke the “pure/true” Islam narrative for calling for an 
imagined ahistorical Islam, for rejecting culture, and for their antipathy towards 
modernity. The narrative, however, is one invoked by diverse groups and is not limited to 
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the young or merely the observant. Muslim apologists who typically assert “Islam is a 
religion of peace” argue that Muslim violent extremists are not practicing “pure/true 
Islam,” if they are Muslims at all.  Those touted as “moderate Muslims” like Jasser— the 
Arizonan who testified on radicalization— also appeal to the “pure/true” Islam narrative. 
In his recent book, A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot’s Fight 
to Save His Faith (2012), Jasser says he was shocked and angered by the “bastards” who 
committed the 9/11 atrocities in the name of his faith. This, he says, propelled him to a 
public role to clarify to his “fellow Americans that true Islam, our Islam, was not what 
was represented by these madmen” (Jasser 2012, 1. emphasis added). Likewise, non-
observant or “secular” Muslims explain their perspectives and positions—even their non-
observance— on the bases of a true Islam that affirms that good deeds and consciousness 
of God are more important than mere ritualistic acts of worship. In these competing 
claims of “pure/true Islam”, Islam’s scriptural sources, history and intellectual heritage 
are equally and as passionately summoned by scholars and ordinary Muslims on both 
sides of a given issue. Those who marginalize and oppress women and those who 
advocate a gender jihad8 based on the egalitarian spirit of pure/true Islam ground their 
arguments in these sources and history. So do those who are against non-Muslims and 
who see only one culture of Islam, as do those who argue that religious and cultural 
diversity are a divine plan and an Islamic precept. Muslim and non-Muslim publics alike 
are puzzled by these contradictions, but so are researchers on Islam and Muslims who 
have always been caught in the dilemma of what is Islam? Whose Islam is the real and 
pure Islam? Is it the Islam of the ullama (scholars of religion) or the Islam practiced by 
the masses? If it is the latter, then is it that of residents of urban centers or the rural 
periphery?  When individual Muslims say Islam says this or says that, is it the 
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researchers’ responsibility to challenge or question their statements, if the version of the 
scholarly class is different? Who has the authority to determine what Islam is or is not? 
This dilemma has been tackled in different ways9. Gellner distinguished “folk 
Islam” from “scholarly Islam” and defined Islam as “the blueprint of a social order. It 
holds a set of rules that exist, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of 
men, which defines the proper ordering of society” (Gellner 1981, 1). This blueprint is 
accessible to literate Muslims and those who follow their teachings. Geertz, on the other 
hand, examined local manifestations of “islam” and from them inferred that “Islam” is 
“the assumed target of all the local variants” (Varisco 2005, 49). In his book, Islam 
Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation, Daniel Martin Varisco 
(2005) is critical of Islamicists, including Gellner and Geertz, for representing “an 
intellectualized and essentialized ‘monolithic conception of Islam’” which conceals how 
Islam is engaged and realized by ordinary Muslims (2005, 76 )10. Varisco contends that 
Geertz failed to represent anything individual Muslims said because his aim to represent 
a model of religion for comparative purposes distracted him from noticing the 
contradictions of everyday life. Had he focused on what these individuals said, he would 
have concluded that Muslims differed in their understandings and that “Islam with a 
capital ‘I’” seemed to elude them. Varisco notes that is would be “foolhardy” to search in 
the field for that Islam because there are countless “islams” that emerge from lively 
debates among Muslims with divergent biographies and ideological leanings (Varisco 
2005).  
Varisco’s idea of diverse “islams” was originally proposed in 1977 by Muslim 
anthropologist Abdul Hamid el-Zein. For both the anthropologist and the Muslim 
theologian, el-Zein argued, the starting point tends to be that a “pure and well-defined 
essence of Islam” exists out there against which local folk “islams” are judged and found 
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“less ordered, less objective” and contaminated by “magic and superstition” (1977, 243). 
Theologians then disregard these local forms and affirm a timeless meaning of Islam, 
while anthropologists disregard them as adulterated by magic and likewise reinforce the 
idea of a “pure and well-defined essence of Islam” (el-Zein 1977, 243). This juxtaposition 
of folk Islam versus scholarly Islam, he contended, is an unproductive pursuit in 
anthropological analyses. Instead, folk and formal theology should be seen as 
complementary. But where formal Islam begins with unity across time and guards 
against the unavoidable diversity of meaning by space, folk Islam begins with unity of 
space and guards against multiplicity of meaning across time. Consequently, el-Zein 
argued, there is no essential difference between the two that would make one more 
objective and pure. These two “islams” are equal and differ only as modes of expression: 
one exists as an institution and the other as literature (El Zein 1977). This proposal, 
however, raises even more questions than it answers. If these are merely forms of 
expression that are equally true, what keeps the potentially countless expression from 
diverging so far apart over time and space that a new and altogether different 
content/entity develops? In other words, is there something common to all folk “islams” 
that makes them recognizably Islam to both practitioners and anthropologists and 
different from a Christian or Hindu mode of expression or local invention?  
Another anthropologist, Talal Asad, picked up the discussion a decade later and 
proposed some answers as to what is the object of the anthropologists of Islam?  Asad, in 
his seminal paper An Idea for The Anthropology of Islam (1986) , summarized and 
dismissed three common answers; first, there is no theoretical object such as Islam; 
second, that Islam is but a term anthropologists use to describe whatever their diverse 
informants say is Islam; and third, that “Islam is a distinctive historical totality which 
organizes various aspects of social life” (1986, 2). Asad dismissed the first answer 
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because it is based on the idea of multiple islams and, therefore, is not a useful 
anthropological analytical category. Asad noted that while el-Zein’s effort was 
commendable, it was ultimately unhelpful. As for the second alternative, it too is not 
viable because there are Muslims within and across time and space who judge as un-
Islamic what others take to be Islam. While these views are particular to those who hold 
them, nevertheless, they are not inconsequential to social relations. Therefore, one 
should be aware of the diversity among Muslims both in belief and practices without 
falling back on the “nominalist view that different instances of what are called Islam are 
essentially unique and sui generis” (1986, 5). Asad dismisses the third answer on the 
grounds that while the scope of the Shar’iah might be comprehensive, compared to life 
under the highly regulating modern state, it has always only partially ordered or 
informed social life. So while the third option is intriguing, it too is ultimately 
inadequate. Islam, Asad argues, is “neither a distinctive social structure nor a 
heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals.” Rather, it is a 
discursive tradition which “includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an 
and the Hadith” (1986, 14). 
Consequently, to do the anthropology of Islam, Asad advises, one needs to do 
what Muslims do and to start from this discursive tradition. However, this tradition is 
not a fossilized relic and the Other of modernity. A tradition, in this conceptualization, is 
comprised of discourses that aim to teach adherents about the proper procedure and the 
objective of a particular practice which “precisely because it is established, has a history” 
(1986, 14). These discourses link to a past, a point in time when the practice, its 
meaning, and method of correct performance were established; to a present that relates 
a practice to other practices and social contexts; and to a future as present adherents fret 
over how the objective of the practice can be best achieved in the short and long range 
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(1986, 14). This discursive tradition does not subsume all acts or statements by Muslims. 
Additionally, it does not entail blind mimicry, because even when to the observer a 
practice appears to be an imitation of the past, “it will be the practitioners’ conceptions of 
what is apt performance, and of how the past is related to present practices, that will be 
crucial to tradition, not the apparent repetition of an old form” (Asad 1986, 15). 
When this is the point of departure, questions about differences between 
“classical” and “modern” or folk and elite Islam become moot, because now as then and 
here as elsewhere, the discourses for the why and how to instruct, learn, and assess the 
correct performance of a practice are all already constitutive of (or built-in to) the 
practice itself (Asad 1986). Additionally, assertions that it is rituals (orthopraxy) rather 
than doctrine (orthodoxy) that is crucial in Islam neglect the crucial role of the concept 
of “the correct model” to which all established practices must adhere to in order be 
authoritative. What determines whether or not a practice is Islamic is that it is deemed 
so by the Islamic discursive tradition and is taught as such to Muslims, be they ordinary 
folks or elite scholars, suburbanites or villagers (Asad 1986).  Since the etymological 
meaning of doctrine is teaching, it follows that “orthodox doctrine…denotes the correct 
process of teaching, as well as the correct statement of what is to be learned” (Asad 1986, 
15). Orthodoxy, here, is conceptualized as a power relationship rather than simply a 
collection of opinions. Subsequently, whenever and wherever Muslims “have the power 
to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, 
undermine or replace incorrect ones, there is domain of orthodoxy” (Asad 1986, 15). The 
form and societal circumstances that enable or delimit this power and the subsequent 
resistance it evokes from within and outside Muslim communities are all the domain and 
the object of investigation of the anthropology of Islam, be it in the city or the village 
(Asad 1986).   
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With this understanding of Islam, I would argue that Muslims who contest 
different practices and engage in this narrative of “cultural” vs. “pure/true” Islam in 
various socio-political and time-space contexts are engaging this long-standing 
discursive tradition. This tradition is the basis on which their arguments and appeals are 
made and evaluated. Those who see in such arguments signs of a crisis of tradition 
commonly conceptualize tradition as uncritical conformity; they also understand 
argumentation as debating, reasoning, and polemics that lie outside the purview of 
tradition. However, if argumentation is understood as the process of succeeding in 
persuasion and securing voluntary performance of a practice rather than merely 
knocking down the other party’s arguments, then the centrality of argumentation to all 
discursive traditions will be evident (Asad 1986). Such thinking, then, would allow us to 
view the diversity within Islam that we encounter in the field (across time, space, and 
people) not as an indication of deficiency or the nonexistence of Islamic tradition. 
Rather, it is illustrative of “different Islamic reasonings that different social and 
historical conditions can or cannot sustain” (Asad 1986, 16). It would be possible, then, 
to recognize that heterogeneity rather than homogeneity is an intrinsic characteristic of 
traditions. This heterogeneity, however, does not mean rampant incoherence. Although 
these traditions may not always achieve coherence due to the political and economic 
constraints of their time, they are constantly striving for it (Asad 1986). The researcher’s 
task, therefore, is to understand the context and social circumstances that fashion 
different “patterns for desires and forgetfulness” and the power relations which “enable 
the production and maintenance of specific discursive traditions, or their 
transformation—and the efforts of practitioners to achieve coherence” (Asad 1986, 17) .  
Asad’s idea for an anthropology of Islam inspired and informs the works of many 
but it also continues to generate debates. Marranci (2008), for example, argues that all 
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this concern about Islam or islams and true Islam is a moot point because the 
anthropology of Islam is not the theology of Islam. Therefore, rather than starting with 
Islam’s discursive tradition as Asad had suggested, we should start with Muslims and 
focus on their emotional aspects; after all, what Muslims and others ultimately have in 
common is that they are human beings who engage others and their environment. 
Emotions and feelings are the hallmark of these relations and are the foundations for 
identity. It is these feelings that anthropologists need to study; how the feelings are 
“rationalized, rhetoricized, and symbolized, exchanged, discussed, ritualized, 
orthodoxized or orthopraxized.” Islam can then be understood “as a map of discourses 
on how to ‘feel Muslim’” (Marranci 2008, 8). Feelings inform one’s discourse on Islam as 
they affect and are affected by the context of the individual.  
Marranci seems, however, not to go beyond the notion of multiple islams. There 
is the Islam of theologians, books and teachers, which is nothing but “a ghost hunted for 
by both the believers as well as the academics” (2008, 15). Then there is the Islam of his 
informants, like the Muslim salesman and the imam. None of these, concludes Marranci, 
is the “real Islam”. Yet, what these two men tell him Islam says “make Islam part of 
reality” (Marranci 2008, 16) and that, he postulates, is sufficient for him. Marranci 
acknowledges that the imam’s and the salesman’s interpretations share the same 
theology and history of Islam, which they learned from chains of interpretative others 
before them. But the two men live and embody that Islam differently due to their 
biographies and identities; multiplicity of interpretations also inevitability results in the 
multiplicity of ways of embodying Islam (Marranci 2008). Those studying Muslims, he 
notes, miss the point that “it is not Islam that shapes Muslims, but rather Muslims who, 
through discourses, practices, beliefs and actions, make Islam” (2008, 15).  
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But perhaps Marranci is missing something. The multiplicity of interpretations is 
the heterogeneity discussed by Asad and it is unlikely anyone would disagree that 
Muslims interpret and embody Islam differently. However, is the multiplicity unlimited? 
What keeps it from diverging too far and become unrecognizable to anyone? Marranci’s 
focus on the Muslim person’s feelings, actions and beliefs is crucial and is ultimately 
what anthropologists observe and write about. However, his assertions raise the question 
of what makes a person feel Muslim in the first place? Additionally, as discussed earlier, 
the recognition of others is essential to identity construction. Consequently, it is not 
sufficient for one to merely feel Muslim; an affirmation and recognition of that feeling by 
an actual or imagined Other is necessary. Both the salesman and the imam must refer to 
something to determine what Muslimness entails, something against which to check 
their practices and beliefs and to authenticate and ground their arguments if they 
disagree on something. That is the same reason why Marranci found it necessary to 
dedicate a chapter to “Islam: Beliefs, History and Rituals.” Therefore, there are some 
things, specific things, that make persons feel Muslim and their feelings, thoughts, acts, 
and discourses also shape those certain some things. This is the discursive tradition that 
Asad proposed and that constitutes the chain of interpreters that Marranci notes had 
taught the salesman and the imam. 
 
A Living Discursive Tradition 
 
This discursive tradition with which Muslims engage is not frozen in time but has 
been dynamic from its founding; it shapes, and is shaped by, Muslims themselves. From 
the early days of Islam, the impact of cultural and social differences became apparent 
when the Prophet and his companions left the city of Mecca and sought refuge in the city 
164 
of Yathrib (subsequently named Medina). This change in context was reflected in a shift 
in the Prophet’s focus and in the discourse of the Qur’an. For example, passages of the 
Qur’an referred to as the Meccan chapters focused on convincing people to abandon 
polytheism in favor of the “the One God” through reasoned argumentation and vivid 
imagery of Hell and Paradise commensurate with desert living sensibilities. While Mecca 
was a homogeneous society, Medina was religiously and culturally diverse and these 
differences needed to be managed. Chapters revealed in the Medina period focused on 
organizing a new society and shaping its members. For example, to the chagrin of 
immigrant Meccan men, the women of Medina, we are told through the tradition, were 
more outspoken, assertive and present in public. These cultural differences present from 
the birth of the religious community only multiplied in Islam’s formative years as it 
expanded into new territories and was embraced by new peoples.  
This diversity shaped the heterogeneity within the discursive tradition from the 
start. How culture and social realities affect the interpretive lens through which scholars 
engage religious texts was not something left to be revealed through reflexivity; these 
debates continue today. So important is recognizing the specificity of a context, that a 
fatwa (religious legal opinion) is invalid if it does not take into account the context of 
person(s) posing the question. Consequently, ordinary Muslims are not bound by every 
fatwa, but they necessarily engage, explain, and check their practices vis-à-vis a living 
tradition. The discursive tradition does not just reside in books or in the minds of 
scripture scholars; it shapes and is shaped by ordinary Muslims everywhere, though 
ultimately the degree to which they adhere to the beliefs and practices therein is up to 
the individual believer. Individual agency and responsibility is clearly articulated in the 
discursive tradition and Muslims are reminded of it often, both in speeches and in 
writings. Every Muslim, no matter his or her degree of observance, learns that in the end 
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every soul is accountable for itself and no one will be responsible for what another has or 
has not done11.  
When understood as static, tradition seems incongruent with modern times. It is 
difficult to see how tradition could inspire modern rational subjects whose claims and 
concerns are contemporary. But as conceptualized above and as defined by Alasdair 
MacIntyre, we may a grasp tradition’s relevance to our times. MacIntyre argues that a 
living tradition is a 
historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in 
part about the goods which constitute that tradition. Within a tradition the 
pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes through many 
generations. Hence the individual’s search for his or her own good is generally 
and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of 
which the individual’s life is a part. [2001:260] 
 
Muslims in the West and elsewhere, today as in the past, argue with and through 
their discursive tradition about what is considered “pure/true Islam.” Their questions 
and concerns are relevant to their time and are prompted by the challenges they 
encounter. In times of crisis, the debates become both more intense and prevalent. One 
such crisis has been dealing with modernity, which came to Muslims accompanied by the 
collapse of the last Caliphate (the Ottoman Empire) and on the heels of a colonization 
that derided Muslims for a backwardness purportedly rooted in Islam12. The successive 
fall of Muslim countries to colonialism was more than a tragic loss of sovereignty; it was 
a spiritual wakeup call for Muslims who had historically seen their civilizational success 
and expansion as “a sign and consequence of both the truth of Islam and their firm 
allegiance to the truth; for as Allah asserts in the Qur’an, ‘If Allah helps you, none can 
overcome you’” (Nasr 1994, 119). Thus, for many Muslim thinkers this decline in Muslim 
fortunes was a sign that “something very serious had gone wrong with the events of 
history and with the Islamic world itself, something which was not only transient and of 
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a purely worldly nature but of a practically ‘cosmic dimension’” (Nasr 1994, 119). This 
perceived decline triggered different reactions. One such response was a literalist trend 
spearheaded by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1792)13. It also precipitated the rise 
of late nineteenth century ‘‘modernist reformers” personified by Jamal ad-Din Al-
Afghani, his Egyptian student Muhammad Abduh, the latter’s Syrian student Rashid 
Rida and others. These modernists introduced Salafism14 as a new methodology 
advocating the reinterpretation of canonical texts in modern contexts (Abou El Fadl 
2005). The Salafism of these modernist reformers influenced Hassan Al-Banna to form 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 192815. All in all, this socio-political upheaval ushered in an 
Islamic revival movement to reawaken the masses and reclaim a “pure/true Islam”; a 
movement that reverberated around the world.  
The contemporary history of Islam in America, as elsewhere, is in one way or 
another a continuation of this movement, formed in the (post)colonial context and in 
dialogue with colonialism, orientalism and a stage in the project of alternative 
modernity. However, to accept the notion that the narrative of pure/true Islam is a 
modern invention, a de-cultured and dangerous phenomenon, is to reduce all the 
different versions of this narrative-frame and the various groups within this revival 
movement to their most polarizing and polemic strands. Yet even the most austere 
versions of this narrative or trend within the revivalist movement do not reject culture 
wholesale but only certain aspects of culture (for example, art, styles of clothing and 
some behavioral norms and practices). These aspects are replaced by a particular version 
of an Arab culture as it is imagined to have been16. Even the dress style advocates of this 
vision adopt is one, as Abou El Fadl (2005) notes, that demonstrates their greater 
familiarity with Hollywood and Egyptian period films than the historical records on the 
seventh century Arabia they are attempting to emulate. The different Muslim groups that 
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invoke this particular version of the purity narrative also function within the proposed 
Asadian discursive tradition; however, they selectively appropriate (and even reject parts 
of) it. They are also grounded within their cultures, be they Arab, Asian, African or 
European or American.  
 Colonialism and its orientalist gaze were critical to how colonial subjects saw 
themselves, and it also shaped how these subjects viewed the West. Colonial 
administrations sought to define religion, diminish its hold on society and relegate it to 
private spaces; these efforts had profound effects and lasting implications for post-
colonial subjects in general and for Muslims and Islam in particular. Muslims who are 
“secular” or “progressive” or “Islamist” or “moderate” are all in dialogue with and 
constituted by this encounter. But are efforts to reject cultural “adulteration” of the 
“true” faith new and invented? Is it a call for a “cultureless” religion? The reader should 
recall that a narrative is a framework for multiple stories. With this in mind, I propose 
that this pure/true Islam narrative is situated within the Islamic discursive tradition and 
is inextricable from Islam’s founding narrative.  Upon this old narrative framework, 
however, contemporary stories that are very much a product of their time and place are 
woven.  
 
Situating the “Purity” Narrative and its Multiple Stories 
 
For many who see globalization as merely another term for an increasingly 
monoculture and Westernizing world, patrolling cultural boundaries to maintain a 
presumed cultural purity is a matter of survival. This accounts for the emergence of 
fundamentalist movements from across the religious spectrum and even secular ones 
that, among other things, share a paradoxical relationship with “the West.”  The modern 
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iteration of the purity narrative notwithstanding, examining cultural practices/norms 
and discarding those deemed incompatible is deeply rooted in Islamic history from its 
birth in the cultural landscape of seventh century Arabia. It also extends across the time 
and place to the present globalizing world.  
For example, in the Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (2005), 
UCLA’s professor of Shari’ah and lawyer Khaled Abou El Fadl wades through the various 
categories to which contemporary Muslims have been divided: modernists, moderates, 
fundamentalists, radicals, extremists, conservatives, liberals, progressives and so on. His 
final verdict is that the primary schism within Islam is one between Muslim “moderates” 
and “puritans.” The book then takes up the task of elaborating the history and 
consequences of this divide; space limitation here prevents delving into this history. But 
the relevant point for my discussion is that both “moderates” and “puritans” claim to 
represent pure/true Islam and invoke the narrative of purity to expunge defiling 
innovations that they claim have entered the faith. Abou El Fadl states that Muslim 
moderates like him who comprise the mainstream majority must “seek to recapture the 
purity of the Islamic message as it was before it was twisted and altered by the puritans 
and forced to cater to the egoism and opportunism of puritanical causes” (2005, 105, 
emphasis added).  The “puritan” camp would argue that Abou El Fadl and his fellow 
“moderates” are in fact the problem; these moderates, it is said, are diluting and 
polluting Islam with foreign cultural practices and ideas. 
While Muslims engage a discursive tradition, this does not necessarily mean an 
unexamined acceptance of the ways of forbearers. Challenging inherited cultural ways is 
part of the founding story of Islam. One could even argue that Islam’s grand narrative is 
one of transformation and reform to, ostensibly, restore monotheism to its original 
purity and to perfect human character and morals17. Islam’s canonical sources and 
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scholarly heritage abound with references to this narrative. In the Qur’an and in Muslim 
discourse, the state of “heedlessness” of pre-Islamic Arabia is an era of jahiliyyah (state 
of ignorance) where idol worship and social ills had replaced monotheism and its “pure” 
message of justice and morality.  Prophet Muhammad did not bring about a new religion 
but came to restore the monotheism preached by all the prophets before him from Adam 
to Jesus and which, the narrative goes, were corrupted over time through customs and 
human interpretations. The Qur’an, which says about itself to be the best of narratives18, 
abounds with stories of prophets overcoming insurmountable struggles with their people 
who refuse to give up the practices and ways of life of their forefathers as exemplified in 
the following verse: 
But when they are told, “Follow what God has bestowed from on high,” some 
answer, “Nay, we shall follow [only] that which we found our forefathers 
believing in and doing.” Why, even if their forefathers did not use their reason at 
all, and were devoid of all guidance? (Qur’an 2, 171). 
 
Consequently, challenging the cultural practices of forefathers is not seen as 
modern innovation and an insubordination of the youth, but as part of this religious 
patrimony. Additionally, purity is integral to Islam’s discursive tradition, starting with 
the mission of Prophet Muhammad who was sent “to cause them [believers] to grow in 
purity, and to impart unto them the divine writ as well as wisdom” (Qur’an 62, 3).  Ritual 
cleansing to purify the body is required to enter the faith and for rituals. The main Shia 
school and all four Sunni schools of juristic thought (fiqh) dedicated extensive chapters 
to the fine details of this physical purity.19 Almsgiving (zakat) purifies wealth and the 
Hajj purifies the body, the heart, and the mind. There are compendia of literature for 
purification of thought and of the heart. 20 Purifying the faith from presumably 
corrupting cultural practices is thus in line with an old narrative of purity and is invoked 
throughout Muslim history and especially in time of socio-political crisis.  
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As Islam spread from its birthplace in the desert of Arabia and expanded to 
Africa, Asia, and Europe, these narratives of purity and cultural transformations 
continued. This did not mean, however, that Islam demanded that its new followers 
jettison their entire heritage and become culturally Arab. The observable cultural 
differences among Muslims today suggest that historically Islam has not been “culturally 
predatory” (Abd-Allah 2004, 2), but that it had a positive posture towards cultures. In 
fact, while some of the pre-Islamic cultural practices were deemed incompatible, most of 
the Arab cultural practices were retained by early Muslims. Some practices from that era 
of “ignorance” were even incorporated into religious acts of worship such as the Hajj 
(pilgrimage) and fasting on certain days. In Sahih Al-Bukhari, one of the primary 
collections of Hadith,21 we find examples of a process of cultural inventory whereby the 
early Muslims were reassured by the Qur’an or the Prophet that the previous cultural 
practices in question (for example, rituals during Hajj, fasting of ‘Ashura’a, trade during 
Hajj)22 were not in conflict with their new faith. Muslims frequently cite how Prophet 
Muhammad reaffirmed the universality of virtue and ethical character, when he told his 
companions that those who were best in character prior to Islam will be the best in Islam 
provided they comprehend the religious knowledge (M. M. Khan 1987)23. Consequently, 
embracing Islam did not require a full cultural overhaul, which is why in India or Egypt, 
in China or Kenya or Bosnia, Muslims and non-Muslims of these lands share common a 
cultural heritage with few differences.  
In times of crisis, people hold on tighter to what they believe to be true and seek 
authenticity. When societies are in turmoil or transition, they often attempt to reclaim a 
presumably more golden past and attribute current crises to having veered from what 
made that golden past possible24. With this societal and individual tendency combined 
with the cultural reform and purity narratives rooted in Islamic discourse, it is no 
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surprise that at different points in their history, Muslims invoke a return to a more 
glorious past and an ostensibly purer/truer form of Islam.  The more extreme 
movements calling for such return were always forced to moderate or were, over time, 
marginalized to irrelevance (Abou El Fadl 2005). Those that survived were often ones of 
islah (reform) and tajdeed (renewal). This perennial dual process involves the ihya’a and 
the tajedded (revival and renewal) of thought and of fundamentals of the faith (usual-al-
din) as well as the reform (islah) of individual and the collective conduct (see Auda 
2008;  Ramadan 2008; Voll 1983).  These concepts “represent a radical mode of critique 
indigenous to the Islamic discursive tradition, although the contexts in which they are 
mobilized and the crisis to which they respond to are historically specific” (Shakry 1998, 
152). For example, sociocultural and political upheavals in the eleventh century Muslim 
world had prompted Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali’s (b.1058-d.1111) extensive body of work in 
an effort to renew the faith and reform the community. In his work, Al-Ghazali seems to 
have “felt the need to underline the vital importance of true religion in a corrupt age in 
which known truths and spiritual certainties have become effaced, an era overflowing 
with strife and trouble” (Hillenbrand 2004, 600). The seminal product of this effort is 
titled Ihya' 'ulum al-din25 (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), a compendium about 
which Muslims say that if all of the Islamic intellectual history were lost and Ihya’ was 
the only thing remaining, it would suffice to reconstruct that heritage. To respond to the 
challenges in his time, Al-Ghazali rebutted heretical movements of the day and critically 
engaged Greek philosophy by refuting thoughts antithetical to revealed truths while also 
employing Aristotelian logic to produce thoughtful and important writings (Winter 
1995).  He was at once critical of scholarly elites and the masses; the first for being 
preoccupied with fame and fortune and the latter for being too consumed with the world 
and retaining from religion merely the rituals without the inner meaning or 
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transformative power.  The “[d]eliverance could only come through a rekindling of that 
sincerity and sanctity for which the early generations of Islam had been celebrated, by 
means of passing through the refiner’s fire of self-naughting” (Winter 1995, XVI) . That 
rekindling entailed a purifying process that first involves the Disciplining of the Soul, the 
subject of one fourth of the multi-volume The Revival of the Religious Sciences.   
The purity narrative, therefore, is an old indigenous element in the discursive 
tradition that Muslims engage to both authenticate and challenge their own and others’ 
beliefs, practices, and discourses. Within the purity narrative framework, there are 
different storylines and threads whose motivation, methods and means are context 
dependent. There are those who invoke the purity narrative while acquiescing to an 
inherent and accepted plurality in the tradition and also absolutists who narrowly define 
the discursive tradition. In both groups, there is a spectrum of opinions and ideologies. 
The absolutists have been labeled fundamentalists, literalists, radicals, extremists, or 
jihadists. While group members can be intolerant of all sorts of difference –most of all 
among Muslims– only a few are violent26. The moderates and puritans, to use Abou El 
Fadl’s terminology, draw on an Islamic discursive tradition and a long history of debates, 
disagreements and sometimes armed conflicts; yet, these groups and the movements 
they represent are products of their time. They are modern movements emerging from 
the colonial encounter, engaging a globalizing world and embedded within modernity’s 
hallmark, the nation state.  
 
The “Pure/True Islam” of Generation Next 
 
 
The notion of uprootedness and deterritorialism, as proposed by Roy and others, 
is based on a particular conceptualization of identity27 and of the world which constructs 
a “world of Islam” or as Roy (2004) puts it a “Civilization area.” This world, however, is 
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not so much a geographical region with a collective agency as it is a discursive 
representation and part of a historical narrative (Asad 1986). Likewise, Europe – or the 
West – itself is constructed through a particular rereading of history; it entails a 
geographical and historical redefinition of boundaries and of Europe where Islam 
became Europe’s other (Asad 2003). The “West” is not merely a geographical place, 
either, but a project, a discursive space constructed through a historical narrative of 
global imagination and management that granted it an unmarked category– the 
standard to which all must aspire to reach (Trouillot 2003). Essential to that self-making 
project of the West, as the cardinal direction implies, is a relative Other, a constructed 
East.  As Edward Said noted “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its 
contrasting images, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely 
imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture” 
(Said 1979, 1–2). From crusades to colonialism, Europe saw itself as not only Christian 
but more specifically as not Muslim.  
While Roy’s knowledge and writings on Islam and Muslim are deep, thoughtful 
and nuanced, I would argue that he nevertheless does not escape this historical 
narrative. That Roy locates Islam in a particular “historical area” beyond which it 
becomes de-cultured is part of that discursive representation. A discursive 
representation, however, is by its nature constructed and contested. Therefore, one could 
argue that today’s Western Muslims are active agents in this process, as evidenced by 
their visibility as well as their social and political activism. Rather than a rejection of a 
“corrupt” West or a “pristine” heritage of the East, perhaps the younger Muslims of the 
West see a third option:  challenging both fellow citizens and co-religionists who present 
a model of being Muslim that bounds Islam in the East and questions their belonging. 
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The perspectives of this project collaborators shed light on this process of contestation 
and construction.  
The reader may recall that in the late 1960s and through 1980s, Sunni 
Blackamericans and the growing population of immigrant Muslims were informed by 
and engaged in the Islamic awakening that was sweeping the Muslim societies. This 
awakening advocates piety and activism and inspired the creation of Islamic 
organizations, mosques and schools. These institutions and the religious literature they 
produced advanced a “pure/true” Islam through a particular personal comportment and 
public piety, social norms, social justice and dawah (inviting to faith) to both Muslims 
and non-Muslims.  This discourse privileged norms from the immigrants’ Muslim home 
countries and shaped what Jackson called “Immigrant Islam” which “universaliz[es] the 
particular” of home countries (2005, 12).  While exposed to this discourse at home, or at 
the mosque/Islamic school, or the MSA or in all three, most second-generation Muslim 
Americans have neither the affiliation nor the awareness of the genealogy and roots of 
this reawakening movement and the sociopolitical context of its birth (Ahmed 2011). To 
them, the Islam they wish to live and advocate for is the “moderate” Islam practiced by 
the early Muslims, whose seemingly more progressive ways were altered by the “cultural 
corruptions” that accumulated over time (Abou El Fadl 2005). It is noteworthy that even 
those more “conservative” Muslims, who advocate strict gender segregation or who are 
less tolerant of differences in opinion and lifeways, concede that the time of the Prophet 
and his companion might have been more lenient. But, they argue, people then were 
more devout. The decline and decadence of the current times, they note, require stricter 
approach.   
In this section, I will examine the ways project collaborators engage these 
competing claims and narratives and how they conceptualize pure/true Islam. Whatever 
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their interpretation and level of religiosity, what are the (re)sources on which 
participants draw in childhood and as they grow older to learn this purported “pure/true 
Islam”? In what follows, I will explore these (re)sources and examine differences in 
understanding and practice that participants perceive between themselves and their 
families, between immigrants and converts, and between Islam in majority countries and 
the United States.  I will also try to highlight some of the features of this presumably 
pure/true Islam. 
 
Resources and Religiosity 
 
It is often assumed that when offspring invoke the narrative of pure/true Islam, 
they are rejecting parental authority, knowledge, and traditions. However, the picture is 
more complex than that.  Asked to rank their sources of Islamic knowledge, 216 
participants in this project answered this question as follows (from highest to lowest 
frequency): parents, mosque, books, Internet, friends, Islamic conferences, CD/DVD, 
study circles with scholars, and (in last place) college courses. They may question and 
differ with parents and imams but the family and the mosque are still the primary 
sources for religious information. Islamic schools are established as a joint effort 
between parents and mosques. The Islamic school (full time or weekend) has evolved 
over time. As noted earlier, only 22 percent of the participants went to Islamic school for 
at least part of their early education where, along with state required curriculum, they 
also learned Islamic studies (Qur’an, history, and character education) and the Arabic 
language. A minority was homeschooled and nearly 43 percent participated in Islamic 
weekend education. The weekend Islamic school operates on Saturday and/or Sunday 
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and often uses the same religious curriculum as the full-time Islamic school, but teachers 
in the weekend system are usually parent volunteers without formal teacher training.  
Early on, the schools used improvised Islamic studies and Qur’an workbooks that 
were put together by teachers or imported from Arab countries (for Arabic language 
learning), but these proved to be inadequate. Over time, schools and parents recognized 
the need for a curriculum that met the linguistic and cultural needs of their children28. 
Typically, teachers are first generation immigrants or converts. Some younger generation 
teachers are returning to teach the next generation, often attempting to correct for what 
they think were the shortcomings in their experiences in these schools. Sharing with 
their students the experience of growing up Muslim in America and undergoing the same 
education (public and Islamic) systems, these teachers claim they can relate better to 
their students and their struggles.  Islamic education also takes place at home through 
homeschooling, formal discussions scheduled a few times in the week, or informally 
throughout the day.   
To determine how participants view their own and their families’ level of 
religiosity, they had the option to check the most suitable term (not religious, mildly 
religious, moderately religious, very religious) and explain in a space provided. Only a 
few of them considered their families to be mildly religious or not at all. Mildly religious 
meant that family members might fast during Ramadan, or attend Eid prayers and 
occasionally pray. More than half (59 percent) said they grew up in a moderately 
religious family and a modest number (22 percent) said their families were very 
religious. The numbers are nearly the same in responding to a question about how 
participants saw their own level of religiosity. This will be discussed below along with the 
problematic nature of these terms or categories.  
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Parents were ranked highest as the primary source of Islamic knowledge, yet that 
did not mean their practices or understanding was passed on unchanged. More than half 
of the participants said there were differences. As noted in the earlier, even some who 
said that no differences existed qualified their answer as did twenty-nine year old 
Shareefa, a Blackamerican from the Phoenix-valley, who noted a minor difference among 
family members. Her old brother approves of Muslim men marrying Christian or Jewish 
women, while she thinks there should be a moratorium on such marriages in the current 
context where Muslim women have limited pool of potential husbands. Shameela, a 
twenty-year old female Chicagolander, similarly says her parents “believe faith comes 
before anything else in life and it is compulsory to attend Jamatkhana [mosque of 
Islamili Shia] regularly.” She, on the other hand feels, “it is more important to just pray 
three29 times a day even though [she] cannot physically attend mosque.”  
Differences are not strictly generational; the children may find themselves more 
aligned with one parent and struggle with the other’s views. Some immigrant parents are 
also adapting to raising their children in a context different from that they were raised in 
and gear their teaching accordingly.  Parents are aware that their children are growing 
up in a secular society where Islam (and faith in general) is one option among many, so 
they employ different strategies to inculcate their religious traditions in their children. 
They may tolerate more questioning and open discussion about the beliefs and practices 
and the reasons or rationale for why things are done a certain way. Shafiqa, a twenty-
year old woman of Indian parentage in Chicagoland, is clear about her parents’ strategy. 
“My parents raised me to love Allah and fear Him with all my heart. They have 
influenced me to have a great relationship with Him and to be so happy with my faith, 
even though their parents may not have done so for them.” 
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Roy (2004) argues that immigrants came with a pristine culture that is rejected 
by the second or third generation. What he seems to overlook is that many immigrants, 
particularly to North America, were of a particular social standing in their societies and 
already “Westernized.” This fact is noted by members of younger generations, who 
recognize that their parents understanding of Islam was a product of their own class, 
culture, and the political situation in their home countries. If they grew up in the upper 
or middle class with a Western education and appreciating all things Western, then they 
were Muslims but practices such as hijab were for lower classes and prayers and fasting 
were something one did in advanced age. Other immigrants saw how Islam was used by 
their governments as a weapon of control and suppression and wanted nothing to do 
with it.   
Critics of the “pure/true Islam” narrative see young religious Muslims to be more 
conservative, rigid, and intolerant than their parents. Often this assessment is based on 
observations of Muslim Student Associations (MSA) on college campuses. What might 
be overlooked in this assessment is that student organizations, be they political, 
religious, social, or interest-based, are usually about distinguishing oneself on campus. 
Furthermore, the makeup of the group and the style and guiding ideology of its leaders, 
all influence and shape the members. An MSA is no different. The MSAs usually attract 
only a fraction of the Muslim student body. Many stay away from the MSA because they 
think it is only for very observant students; others do so because they heard or 
experienced them to be rigid and judgmental. Nevertheless, MSAs are seen by many 
members as a safe shelter from a college environment where drinking, dating and 
partying are often viewed as rites of passage for undergraduate students.  
Many of the participants in this project talked about the very dynamic nature of 
the MSAs, where the same chapter changes from semester to semester depending on the 
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personality and interpretive leanings of its membership and leadership. Participants 
have told me about inclusive MSAs where women and students of different ethnicity, 
faith and levels of practice felt welcomed. There were periods were foreign (or very 
conservative) students took leadership and tried to impose their cultural norms and a 
particular understanding of Islam and where conflicts ensued. Participants also talked 
about the evolution of their own understanding from exclusive and absolutist to more 
appreciation for the diversity of understandings and practices. Looking back, some 
identified a stage in their lives where they felt they were more “conservative” than their 
parents. Only a few of the participants noted that they remain more “conservative”, 
meaning that they might eat zabiha meat, that women (unlike their mothers) may wear a 
headscarf, or that they are otherwise more observant. This, however, did not mean that 
they saw their parents or others as less religious or that they defined themselves in 
opposition to their parents or rejected society. 
For example, eighteen-year old Jumana, a Chicagolander of Syrian background, 
considers herself very religious and thinks she is “more conservative in some things” 
than her parents. But she also grew up with a father who considered himself an atheist; 
she did not experience Islamic schooling of any kind and when she was growing up her 
family was only “mildly” religious.  Her self-described “conservative30” label 
notwithstanding, she is involved in both civic (education and political) and faith-based 
organizations. Her number one source of Islamic knowledge is her parents, followed by 
friends, scholars’ study circles and conferences then the mosque and college courses. To 
the usual question of where are you from she says: “I’m from America. Born and raised 
here. I identify with American core beliefs and ideals much more than Syrian/Arab 
ones.” Jumana says she is very optimistic about the future of Muslims in America 
because they are “moving ahead and the law is on [their] side”. It is evident then, that the 
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people that occupy these categories and labels (moderate, conservative, liberal and so 
on) are more complicated than the labels suggest. Additionally, less religious is not 
necessarily more open-minded and tolerant. Javid, a twenty-nine year male 
Chicagolander of Indian background, explains “conservative”:  
I feel that certain Islamic issues are more important to my family than to me.  I 
feel that sometimes they are more interested in using religion as a form of 
cultural preservation, social control, or as a way to make youth conform to a 
certain mode of thinking rather than the more revolutionary and deep aspects of 
Islam.  In fact, there is quite a bit of revulsion in my family towards people who 
are “too Muslim.”  I disagree with them on issues regarding interest [and] hijab. 
They find hijab/niqab awkward, I feel that it’s a woman’s right to choose.  
 
I asked participants about the notion that younger Muslims are more religious 
and more conservative than their parents. They did not deny it but had a different take. 
Maryam, of a Pakistani background, says that younger Muslims are “definitely” more 
religious and gives the example of how she and her friends took up the hijab against the 
wishes of their mothers who see no reason for it. She finds the notion that Muslim 
women are forced to wear hijab as both “ironic and funny,” since the ones she knows 
fight to wear it. She posits that immigrant parents, marked as they are by accents 
indicating their foreignness, try “so hard to fit in and are going above and beyond.” They 
see assimilation as an ideal; therefore, being as inconspicuous and under the radar as 
possible is crucial. Maryam and her generation, on the other hand, are “not as defensive” 
and have a “more nuanced” understanding of assimilation which they do not see as a 
“duty or expected” of them. After all, they are born here; this is their country, culture, 
and they “could not live anywhere else.” Consequently, they are more comfortable 
practicing Islam. They are more religiously and politically assertive as their blogs, 
anthologies, and op-eds suggest.   
Children of converts were as likely as those of immigrants to note some 
differences with their parents. Ameerah, for example, a twenty-year old Blackamerican 
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woman from Chicago, says she differs from her family in that she began to “think 
critically” about Islam so she can practice and apply it in her life at a “level more 
comfortable” for her. She is no longer taking “anything at face value” and is always 
exploring different dimensions of meanings and is “a bit rebellious in [her] 
interpretations at times.” In her rebelliousness, she is not rejecting beliefs or practices, 
but her studies lead her to ask, how does this “directly translate into my own life? Like 
what does this mean for me, how do I interpret this?” This creates some tension with her 
parents, who do not always approve of her “interpretation”. Ameerah grew up in a 
moderately religious home and also considers herself mildly religious, though she prefers 
to think of herself as “more spiritual than religious.” This phrase is usually understood to 
mean that the person does not engage in religious rituals. Ameera, however, is regular in 
her daily prayers and Friday mosque attendance. She studies the Qur’an and Hadith, is 
civically minded and involved with MSAs and other Muslim organizations, and performs 
religiously-inspired spoken word poetry. She is influenced by, and personally knows, 
some of the most prominent Muslim scholars, including the late imam WD Muhammad, 
imam Zaid, Dr. Umar Abdullah and Usama Cannon. Ameerah authenticates her need to 
think critically by saying that it is these very scholars who encourage Muslims to study 
and to think. She does not criticize her parents’ approach because she realizes that they 
had “converted for very different reasons” from what helped her “remain[e] Muslim”.  
She chose to wear the hijab as a high school junior partly because it helped her feel part 
of a community; but after her freshman year in college, she took it off to see what life was 
like without it. She, however, wears it when she performs her poetry in public in order to 
mark her identity as a Muslim and to “represent Islam”. 
Ameerah’s idea that she is thinking more critically reflects a recurring theme. To 
some of their offspring, parents seem to practice an unexamined faith adopted from the 
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“old country” where everyone was a Muslim or, in the case of converts, as they were 
taught by their imams and leaders without questioning it. Many participants intimated 
that being religious is a choice in America and they have to make sense of Islam for 
themselves and be able explain it to others. Nineteen-year old Nariman from the 
Phoenix-valley articulates this sentiment. She says her moderately religious Lebanese 
family adheres to an Islam based on the culture and the habits of Muslim Lebanon rather 
than the scholarly interpretation sought after by members of her generation who, 
growing up in secular society, had “to fight to follow” Islam. To do so, they must gain 
deeper knowledge. Seeking a closer relationship with Allah means performing rituals, 
cultivating deeper spirituality, and understanding the reasons behind what is allowed or 
not are other recurring themes among project participants. When parents reply that the 
reason for something is “because Allah says so,” the typical response is “yes but why” 
because to participants like Nariman there is always a reason for a divine decree.  
 As they get older, many younger Muslims embark on a journey of self-education 
that often includes studying the English translations of the Qur’an and Hadith 
collections. Some do so individually and others in groups. Naeema, the Blackamerican 
who rediscovered herself and her faith while serving in the military, joined a young adult 
group in her mosque when she returned to Chicago. The group met on Sundays for 
taleem (study) sessions to discuss among other things verses from the Qur’an and their 
implications. Afterward, they caravanned to feed the homeless and along the way, they 
would stop at a park to pray. Naeema said the group was “just wow! To me, it was like, I 
found the place. This is it! Conscious people that would help keep you conscious. Instead 
of other way around [where with] all these unconscious people, I [was] trying to keep the 
conscious and I’m struggling myself. You know what I mean and I need some support.”  
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  As they get older and read and study more, many realize that things are “not 
black and white” and there are indeed many shades of gray and scholarly differences in 
interpretations. At this point, they begin to appreciate complexities beyond rules and 
rituals. This propels some to embark on a spiritual path to give meaning to the rules as 
reflected on by Nada, a thirty-three year old former Syrian-Chicagoan now residing in 
the Phoenix-valley. She sees that, beyond the rules, developing one’s own connection 
with God is crucial. The connection enables one to discover that there is “a lot more 
loving, peace loving and openness” and to become “a more happy, spiritual person and 
feel like you’re connected to a higher being.” How does one go about doing that, she asks 
and answers, is through a kind of knowledge that sees the black, the white and is 
comfortable in the shades of gray and finds love and peace there. She explains that “you 
can read all the fiqh [jurisprudence] you want, that’s not gonna get you up for fajr [dawn 
prayers]. You can read all these books and legal things, and this is what you should do 
but how does that help you in daily life? So I kinda see it more as what helps you in daily 
life…as a person that’s more practical I guess.”  
 
Disentangling Haram and ‘Ayeb 
 
The narrative of pure/true Islam vs. cultural Islam is one often invoked to create 
a discursive space to challenge parental authority and cultural hegemony where religion 
is summoned to sanction cultural practices. One of the frequently cited examples of the 
differences across generational and ethnic lines is gender roles and interaction norms. 
Here the terms haram (religiously illicit) and ‘Ayeb (culturally disgraceful) are often 
conflated. The offspring of both immigrants and converts demand a differentiation 
between these terms because that which is explicitly illicit on religious grounds cannot be 
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challenged but cultural norms from “back home” are subject to negotiation and change. 
Nada illustrates this contested process and associated frustrations:  
that’s when you start knowing, ok this is just cultural, yes? And it’s not Islamic 
teachings…it’s just like this cultural taboo of: you shouldn’t [act a certain way], 
that’s ‘Ayeb.  They keep telling you something’s haram or ‘Ayeb, you start to 
differentiate; ok what’s haram, what’s not haram, and what’s just ‘Ayeb? …I 
remember I’d get into fights with my mom, especially, because my dad was 
always more progressive, more liberal. Like he was very religious but just much 
more open minded. Like [mom] you know what, this is not haram, it’s not haram, 
why the heck are you making life so difficult? But my mom, with the Syrian 
community, it was just so tight knit in Chicago [and] everybody talked about 
everybody and you didn’t want, especially your daughters to kind of [get] labeled 
as something. And so I remember getting into so many fights with my mom 
because she wouldn’t let me do things; like I couldn’t go to a plays to watch 
Shakespeare and it was like, I don’t understand! Why can’t I do that? … I’m like 
but it’s not haram so stop telling me it’s haram! You need to get over it, cuz I’m 
not gonna do anything [haram]. 
 
Nada understands and empathizes with her mother’s attempts to protect the family from 
being fodder for gossip mills, but she resents and challenges the use of religious 
discourse to justify the restrictions on her behavior and activities when they are not 
religiously prohibited.  
Zahra, a nineteen-year old Chicagoan of North African background, says that the 
conflation of haram and ‘Ayeb also happened in the Islamic school she attended. Though 
she excuses them for that “subconscious” mixing of the two notions, it nevertheless 
bothered her greatly because it “confuses people.” She appreciates the richness in 
cultures that immigrants bring but thinks “the bad point about that is they may not 
understand how it is to grow up in American society, especially if you’re a young adult. 
So they might expect things from a Muslim teenager that are very difficult.” An example 
she gives of this difficult expectation is an incident when high school teachers told them 
that when in college, Muslim girls are not “to talk to any guy unless it’s business related 
or something.” If they are partnered with males on projects or science labs, they are to 
tell the teachers that it is against their religion to do so. Zahra said: “I took that very 
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seriously and I was like college is going to be so hard and miserable…and [especially 
because talking to boys] is not even haram.” She also related an incident at a funeral 
where a woman who is considered knowledgeable in religion was speaking to the women 
attendees and gave a beautiful speech only to “ruin it” in the end by chastising the young 
women wearing makeup who came to offer their condolences. Zahra, who does not wear 
makeup, was offended and greatly angered by the words of this speaker who again mixed 
haram and ‘Ayeb and did not consider the fact that many of the young women who came 
had never visited a mosque before, and some were non-Muslim friends of the family of 
the deceased. This, she says, has motivated her to study religion so she could attain the 
authority that would enable her to give lessons and speeches to younger women to whom 
she, because of her experiences, can relate unlike that woman.  
The confusion and unease that younger people experience and which Zahra 
identifies is a recurring theme most palpable in gender interactions, but it is not one that 
should be read as evidence of an “identity crisis”. According to Mukarram, much of the 
confusion arises because young people of immigrant background think Muslim women 
are “are automatically Xed off [and] there is no room for dialogue” but interacting with 
non-Muslim women is unproblematic. He is exasperated by the contradiction: “I can’t 
talk to you because your name is Fatima but if your name is Jennifer, we’d go to lunch. 
It’s no big deal. I don’t understand what the origin of that is and how people can justify 
it, unless they just didn’t think about it at all.” When asked about his theory for why this 
happens, he explains it is in part due to the lack of critical thinking and also due to 
“shame and the culture”. Critical thinking would reveal the contradiction in attitude 
since both Fatima and Jennifer are women who should be respected and treated equally. 
Shame occurs and cultural norms are given priority because Islamic rules and the 
reasoning behind certain behavior and norms have been misapplied and obscured by 
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cultural values. If one thought critically and understood correctly, Mukarram notes, one 
would know when it is religiously recommended to guard one’s gaze (ghad el-nazer). In 
the absence of such understanding, one takes the extra precaution by avoiding 
interaction with “the girl who also holds on to that ideal and is equally ignorant” of its 
proper application. This is even more so because the young Muslim man and woman 
know that if an “auntie” sees them having lunch or coffee, to her this is “a big deal”; it is 
not just lunch. She will begin to inquire if they interested in each other and are planning 
to get married. To non-Muslim Jennifer, lunch is most likely just a meal together but the 
meaning of lunch with a Muslim girl becomes ambiguous because she and/or he is 
unsure how the behavior and interaction would be interpreted by the other. More 
importantly, both know how an “auntie” would interpret it. Thus, it is best to be on the 
safe side and avoid it altogether. If they are in a group then there is no perceived 
intimacy, and lunch is just lunch. This does not mean that there is no room for attraction 
in group setting, but the social boundaries of behavior and the safety in numbers make 
such occasions less likely to attract attention from on-looking aunties. Because even non-
observant Muslims travel in their ethnic circles, parents who might otherwise be very 
liberal or “secular” may not look favorably on openly dating offspring. Young people, 
hence, become very creative in keeping any romance under the radar of the community 
gossip channels.   
For its members, the MSA becomes a theater where gender interactions and 
norms and associated anxieties play out. MSA chapter leaderships as well as interactions 
in the meeting/prayer space and social events are contested and subject to ongoing 
negotiation.  Large educational events with guest speakers and “Islamic Awareness 
Week” activities where non-Muslims are invited are gender mixed. But questions arise 
with routine activities. Should the sisters’ prayer and meeting space be separate or is it 
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sufficient that the group naturally would divide across gender lines in a shared space? 
Should there be separate social events or separate dining tables if they are together? 
Should weekly or monthly study circles be mixed or separated? These are the issues that 
these younger people have to tackle and figure out, and they often feel ill- prepared 
because their interactions with each other are very limited in mosque, Islamic school or 
youth groups. Sometimes they have to seek guidance from the faculty advisor or the 
Muslim Chaplain on campus. Whatever is agreed on for that term is subject to 
renegotiation and change when the board changes or when new members join, or when 
the current group realizes their choice was unworkable. For these reasons, when I asked 
project participants about their experiences in MSAs, they were always very careful to 
point out the dynamic nature of the perspectives and the rules guiding interactions and 
activities even within one chapter.  A few did report feeling out of place and judged on 
their degree of religious observance or their behavior, when they joined an MSA chapter 
at a time when strict interpretive thinking dominated. However, the overwhelming 
majority of those interviewed generally had positive experiences as MSA members.   
On a few occasions people find their spouses in the MSAs. In general, however, 
because everyone is supposed to “behave Islamically”, they feel that not only do they 
have to address each other with the honorific terms brother and sister, but they have to 
see and feel that way about each other. Shareefa, the Blackamerican woman quoted 
earlier, reflects on her membership in youth groups and her MSA chapter and notes that 
they did not have “permission to like each other.” In order to work together in the 
association and for both parents and young people to feel comfortable with these 
interactions, young men and women had to “have in [their] heads that they are like a 
mahram (unmarriageable kin)”. This make-believe kinship, notes Shareefa, has “to shift, 
to say that it’s okay if you develop an interest in somebody, but this is how you go about 
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it.” How one goes about it would not involve dating as popularly understood. Instead, it 
would involve recognizing the attraction to a potential suitor and then getting to know 
that person, not only from what one says but also by observing how one handles oneself 
and treats others. This shift also involves alerting one’s family to the interest without 
making it a community affair. It means facilitating “normal interactions.” Shareefa’s 
choice of this phrase reflects her assessment that the way many young Muslim American 
men and women interact is odd. Like Mukarram, she has observed the cordial 
relationships that Muslims have with non-Muslims of the opposite sex but not with one 
another. She thinks that is because no one wants to be perceived by the community as an 
“outcast.” This, however, poses a problem for Muslim women and the community. If they 
are taught “don’t give anybody any hint” that you are attracted to them, then Muslim 
men conclude that “Muslim girls are just too untouchable, too unapproachable” and end 
up marrying “Suzie Q [who is] approachable.” These restrictive cultural norms that make 
younger people feel they cannot approach each other in Muslim settings are not limited 
to immigrants but exist among some converts as well. This is one of the things young 
people see as an intrusion of “cultural Islam” on “pure Islam”.  
Besides gender issues, different understandings of even simple routine 
expressions contribute to the notion that immigrants are prone to conflate religious and 
cultural ideas. For example, it is common for Muslims to respond with in sha’a Allah 
(God willing) when asked to do something. Those born/or raised in the West usually 
understood that to mean “yes, I shall do that, God willing.” But they soon discover that 
for most immigrants that does not necessarily mean the answer is in the affirmative.  In 
sha’a Allah may also be a face-saving strategy in social interactions when one does not 
want to commit to something. After a while, children’s response to parents’ in sha’a 
Allah is “in sha’a Allah yes, or in sha’a Allah no?”   
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“Media-Muslims” and Self-Image 
 
  Public discourse and images (news, film, TV) penetrate that mediation space 
within the self where these words and images interface with previous memories and 
inner speech and shape one’s identity. Therefore, how others see Muslims is critical for 
how Muslims see themselves, and the narrative of pure/true Islam is not limited to how 
believers see Islam but extends to concerns with how non-Muslims view Muslims. The 
images in film, TV or in print are incongruent with the images of “pure/true Islam” that 
these Muslims espouse or imagine. I shall return to the public views in the next chapter, 
but it is important here to point out a consensus among participants that the prevailing 
negative views and images of Muslims in “mainstream media as terrorists or otherwise 
violent” do not depict the “true nature of Islam”.  
As mentioned earlier, most of the project collaborators considered themselves 
either moderately or very religious. But the meaning of these terms is unstable and 
participants acknowledge the different ways that the terms are understood and used 
among Muslims and in public discourse. Many of those who self-identified as very or 
moderately religious listed ritual acts of praying and fasting, reading the Qur’an on 
regular basis, frequenting mosques and cultivating a closer relationship with God as 
what makes them identify in that way. These are also acts listed by some who identified 
as mildly religious and even those considering themselves more spiritual than religious, 
like Ameerah above.  
Jihan, a thirty-eight year old woman from Phoenix-valley, does not frequent 
mosques or pray consistently, nor does she wear hijab or “conservative” clothing (for 
example, she wears short sleeveless dresses); furthermore, she dates. She dresses up her 
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children for Halloween and puts their gifts under an “Eid tree” so “Eid is more fun”. With 
this profile, she exhibits the markers of that presumably silent secular Muslim majority. 
Yet, Jihan sees herself as moderately religious and says: “my faith is deep, my practice is 
inconsistent, my worldview accepting. I think I am deeply religious in my belief but 
based on the ‘popular’ connotation I’m more moderate.” She explains that what marks 
her as moderate in “popular” perceptions is the way she dresses, meaning no hijab. She 
does not think that her clothing choice indexes less religiosity, especially now that her 
intentions have changed.  Prior to performing the hajj she dressed “less modestly” and 
joined friends in clubs because as a divorcee with children, she felt she would have to 
“get noticed” if she is to have any chance of remarrying. Since the hajj and after much 
reflection, she is more “modest” and selective; if she buys short sleeveless dresses now, it 
is not to attract attention but simply because she likes them. Drawing on the legal maxim 
in the Islamic discursive tradition that actions are judged by the intentions behind them, 
Jihan believes the change in intention should still “keep [her] slate clean,” eluding to the 
idea that hajj, if performed well, erases one’s prior sins.  She thinks people obsess about 
rules and she disagrees with “the idea that there is this certain set of rules and if you 
don’t subscribe to this set of rules then you’re not Muslim. People forget that all it takes 
to be Muslim is to believe in one God and believe that Muhammad is a prophet.  And as 
long as you believe that, you’re Muslim.  And all of the other stuff supports that.” Here 
again, she draws in long debates in the discursive tradition about what minimally 
qualifies one as a Muslim.  
Women who wore hijab considered it as an act of worship that qualified them to 
whatever level of religiosity (mild, moderate or very religious) that otherwise best 
described them. Similarly, while realizing that both other Muslims and non-Muslims 
may consider them less religious, those who did not wear the hijab felt that not doing so 
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did not take away from their status as moderately or very religious.  This latter point is 
demonstrated clearly by Jihan’s example. While in public discourse and often among 
Muslims, the headscarf is a symbol of high religiosity and the lack of it as liberal marker, 
these women do not conform to these stereotypes. The hijab is only one act among 
countless attributes that enter into how one assesses one’s own piety; these other 
attributes include ritual acts of worship, one’s closeness to God, one’s virtues, and how 
one treats others. These women are not, however, untouched by discourses circulating in 
Muslim and public spheres. Hiba sees herself one way, but because she has internalized 
the negative connotation it has come to have, she avoids it. She explains: “I wanted to 
check very religious, but when someone says ‘very religious’, I perceive that as an 
extremist…It depends on who’s looking at you too. Some people might think I’m very 
religious while others see me as mildly religious. But to me alhamdulilah [praise be to 
God], I feel as though I am close to my religion.” While Muslim women are not 
impervious to the public and Muslim discourses where the hijab is a symbol of 
subjugation or liberation respectively, many of the participants in this project did not see 
the hijab in and of itself as a mark of piety. Several said they had to think hard to recount 
who among their friends wore it or not because they do not pay attention to its presence 
or absence.  
However they describe their level of observance, project collaborators were clear 
that religion was important in their lives and had become more significant as they get 
older. They do not find it necessary to “put it in people’s face”, but it is a central part of 
their sense of self and of the world; so they do not hide that aspect of their identity. 
Nureen felt mistreated by her mostly South Asian community even as her parents were 
pillars of that community. She also had a contentious relationship with her father, who 
she describes as authoritarian and who would not allow her to hang out with friends, 
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especially males. These factors have resulted in her becoming a “non-practicing Muslim” 
which, among other things, she says means she dates, does not perform ritual prayers or 
fast. She does, however, pray by sitting quietly and remembering God; so she feels very 
religious and close to God and has the “same core beliefs” as other Muslims. It is 
important to her that people know that she is, specifically, a non-practicing Muslim 
because she does not want people to assume she is not a Muslim or that she is a Muslim 
who does the “whole nine yards.”  
Engaging peers who seem free to do as they wish, encountering academic 
theories about science and about religion including that “religion is the opiate of the 
masses,” witnessing how religion is used by despots and extremists to justify oppression 
and violence, being dissatisfied with community and family’s conduct, and knowing that 
in this society Islam is an option among many, lead many young Muslims to wrestle with 
and question their faith.  Nearly everyone who participated in this project narrated a 
moment when they came to “own” their faith— a conversion story of sort. It is a moment 
when they realize that they choose Islam as a spiritual path because a relationship with 
God through this religion gives them “peace and strength”, gets them through good and 
through difficult times, and helps them make sense of the world. To some critics this 
sudden spiritual awakening is problematic and is seen as step on a path to extremism.  
Roy calls those who suddenly find their faith as “born again Muslims”, who, like 
their Christian counterparts, see religion as “the central principle” of their lives where 
rituals and religious formulae sanctify every act. They are often fundamentalists who 
“cannot accept the gray areas of secular life” (Roy 2004, 186). The now common practice 
of extending concepts such as fundamentalism, reformation, church-state relations, and 
born-again that are grounded in the historical trajectory of Christianity into Islam is 
problematic on several levels. The critique of such slippage has been elaborated by many 
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(Abou El Fadl 2005, Ramadan 2008, Asad 1993)31. These concepts do a lot of work for 
the arguments being advanced because of the mental frames they tap into. There is no 
question there are Muslims, in the Muslim East or West, whose religious awakening 
might follow a trajectory that leads them to intolerance, fanaticism or violent extremism. 
Demagogues of all stripes prey on alienated young people, including religious ones, for 
malevolent ends. But the markers of “born again” that Roy outlines are not suitable for 
Muslims. For one, the centrality of religion as the organizing principle in one’s life, 
including the peppering of one’s speech and the sanctifying of one’s acts with religious 
phrases, is a common Muslim phenomenon. Additionally, for my collaborators, their 
moment of spiritual awakening seems to enable them to see the gray between the “black 
and white” of rules and propels them to seek deeper religious knowledge and become 
agents of social change in their communities and society. Furthermore, their 
recommitment to Islam is not without internal conflicts or questions about some aspects 
of the religion. Sami, the nineteen-year old Arizonan of African heritage quoted 
previously, gives us a glimpse into this struggle. Sami is an aspiring scientist who 
questioned his faith when he experienced what he described as an episode of depression 
resulting from a combination of things, including wrestling with theories of religion and 
science and what he sees as the lack of critical thinking, consistency and transparency in 
his local Muslim community. He emerged from this episode with a renewed faith 
because without it he says: 
I would never have any peace for myself or any comfort and even if this [religion] 
all turns out to be a complete lie or fairy tale and any Muslim will say astaghfiru-
Allah [God forgive me], I think it keeps me at peace.  It makes me more 
comfortable within myself [more so] than would leading a life completely devoid 
of any religion or any God. And maybe it’s because I’m so accustomed to it at this 
point, maybe because I grew up with it.  Maybe it’s because when I pray or when I 
read Qur’an or whatever it is, I feel at peace.  Maybe it’s that.  I realize that 
religion is a part of my life that I think is essential, that I want to incorporate it 
into my future.  It’s something that I want to keep in it, even if there are some 
things that I’m at odds with as far as belief.  I don’t understand how they work. 
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Project participants share the “pure/true Islam” narrative with diverse others but 
they are neither ideologues nor extremists. They may consider themselves mildly or 
moderately religious or spiritual rather than religious, but these labels do not adequately 
reflect the complexities of their understandings or practice. They struggle with common 
questions about faith in the modern world and with contradictions between religious 
ideals and diverse Muslim cultural norms, and so they appeal to a “pure/true Islam”.  
 
A Crisis in Authority? Religious Authority in a Changing World 
 
The narrative of “pure/true Islam” is inevitably framed by critics as a crisis of 
authority in contemporary Islam. Therefore, a brief exploration of authority in Islam is 
necessary to consider these concerns and how project participants conceptualize 
authority. The oft-repeated truism that there is “no church in Islam,” implies that 
authority is not centralized in a particular institution, but that does not mean it is absent. 
As an article of faith, Muslims hold that ultimate authority resides with God and that the 
Qur’an is His literal word. The Prophet was the human authority that carried out God’s 
Will, and that explained and embodied the Qur’anic ethico-spiritual tenets. But even the 
Prophet was reproached in the Qur’an and questioned by his companions about issues 
pertaining to community affairs32; thus no human authority is absolute. It was 
disagreements on leadership and authority after the death the Prophet that resulted in 
the Sunni and Shia split. To the Shia, primary authority is limited to the descendants of 
Prophet’s household, while to Sunnis it is open to all qualified Muslims. Being a 
descendent of the Prophet gives Shia imams more interpretive latitude. Among both Shia 
and Sunnis, however, it is jurists (ullama) who hold the authority to extract legal rulings 
and to interpret canonical sources (Abou El Fadl 2005).  
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While there is no final or definitive authority that speaks in the name of God, the 
ullama form a jurist class in society that defines what is (or not) part of the religion. 
Jurists undergo rigorous training and have an intellectual lineage and guilds that issue 
certificates (ijazah) of competence and completion. The authority they enjoy is not 
binding but is one of persuasive argumentation dependent on textual evidence and 
sound reasoning. Individual Muslims, according to Islamic law, are duty-bound to do 
due diligence to inquire into the qualification and the evidentiary basis for the jurist’s 
opinion (Abou El Fadl 2005).  Individual Muslims may directly access canonical sources 
and the truth therein and are responsible and accountable for implementing God’s Will; 
nevertheless, the authority of the jurist is deeply rooted in Islamic beliefs and inherited 
tradition (Abou El Fadl 2001; Ramadan 2008) and safeguards against following ones’ 
whims and speaking for God.  
There are long debates and established distinctions between God’s Will in the 
ideal sense (Shari’ah, meaning the way to the source) and human understandings and 
applications (Fiqh, meaning deep understanding) of that Will.  Since it represents divine 
Will and —as an article of faith — God manifests perfect justice and benevolence, 
Sharia’h is believed to embody the ideals of justice and equity. Fiqh, on the other hand, 
is a jurist’s attempt at understanding and articulating the higher objectives and the 
intended purposes (maqasid) of Sharia’h. Jurists work through the rigorous 
methodology of the fundamentals of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) but diversity of opinion 
is an inescapable and acceptable outcome of these attempts at realizing these ideal 
objectives (Abou El Fadl 2001; Auda 2008; Ramadan 2004). This differentiation 
between Sharia’h and fiqh is essential because it underscores a recognition of the 
imperfection of human attempts at understanding and implementing the divine Will 
(Abou El Fadl 2001) . This spiritual precaution and intellectual humility is articulated in 
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how jurists and scholars in general usually end their legal opinions and scholarly 
treatises with the phrase wa Allahu a’alam “and God knows best” (Abou El Fadl 2001).  
Early Islam witnessed dynamic and productive debates as the Muslim empire 
extended in all directions and encountered diverse cultures, necessitating 
reconsideration of legal opinions in light of new contexts. Today’s inherited scholarly 
tradition shows, as a consequence, a rich diversity of opinion33 that was and continues to 
be positively viewed as a sign of divine mercy. In the past, a tradition of endowments 
afforded scholars financial independence from governing powers and enabled them to 
act as check. Coopted scholars were not authenticated by power; they still had to 
withstand an authentication process by their intellectual peers and the community at 
large (Abou El Fadl 2001). Qualified jurists must master Arabic, Qur’an and Hadith 
sciences, and juristic methodologies, and they must earn the critical regard of peers. It is, 
however, the acceptance of the Muslim community that ultimately marks a jurist’s work 
as either an authoritative opus withstanding the test of time or only a passing exposition. 
There are different prerequisites and distinctions between a jurist who followed 
precedents (muqallid) and those qualified to exert independent intellectual effort 
(Mujtahid) and propose new normative juristic canons (Abou El Fadl 2001, Ramadan 
2008). This resulted in numerous schools of law by the tenth century and, along with 
turbulent socio-political events, this led some to advocate for closing the “doors for 
ijtihad.” Yet, because it was more a “rhetorical device employed to resist [this] chaotic 
proliferation” (Abou El Fadl 2001, 38) than it was a mandate, this call to close the doors 
of ijtihad did not affect the Shia and did not fully stop Sunni scholars. But along with 
subsequent internal conflicts, external attacks and eventual colonization, the call had 
profound effects on Muslim scholars and masses. Consequently, the earlier diversity was 
pruned down to eight schools in contemporary Islam34 but the interpretive trends persist 
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and span from literalists to rationalists (Abou El Fadl 2001, Auda 2008, Ramadan 
2008).   
In the post-9/11 context, in the age of the “fatwa online,” “ask an imam,” and 
“efatwa,” and headlines like “Battle for the Soul of Islam,”35 statements about the crisis of 
authority in Islam abound and give the impression of an emergent phenomenon 
threatening not only the world of Islam but the world at large. However, there are 
countless works that date the decline of the privileged position of the juristic class to a 
much earlier period. Early signs began with domestic political and economic problems 
across the Muslim empire. Recovery from these problems would have been possible were 
it not for the onslaught of colonialism as Muslim societies began to fall one after another 
starting with Egypt in 1798 (Abou El Fadl 2005; Nasr 1994).  For a while, jurists still had 
enough social and religious authority to call for public resistance and rebellion. But 
gradually, they were rendered powerless as colonial powers instituted Western secular 
laws and privatized religion, relegating Islamic law to the limited arena of personal and 
family law (Mahmood 2012).  Further erosion of juristic authority was due to 
authoritarian native rulers often installed by the departing colonial powers. Cognizant of 
the power jurists can wield, these secular and Western-educated rulers closed many 
jurist education institutions and brought the rest under state ownership. The state 
became a de facto administrator, appointing faculty, firing and silencing those opposing 
it, restricting curriculum, lowering educational standards and wages, and limiting the 
scope of jurists’ activities to personal law, prayer leadership and pre-approved sermons 
(Abou El Fadl 2005; Mahmood 2012). Abou El Fadl notes that through these policies, 
the state effectively “ensured that the religious schools only attracted the least able and 
bright students” (2005, 36) and even then did not train them well. Subsequently, the 
graduates are “no longer jurists or legal experts…[and] the ‘ulama became more like 
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Western-styled ministers, who functioned at the margins of society as religious advisers 
without being able to influence social or political policy in any meaningful way” (Abou El 
Fadl 2005, 36).  
Modernity’s project, post-colonialism, globalization, and the primacy of identity 
politics and rigidly-defined boundaries of the self and the other all reduced the 
complexities of fiqh. Though they differed on where in Muslim history the dividing lines 
lie, the result privileged imitation (taqlid) of the past and aversion to innovation (bida’) 
regarding anything pertaining to religion (Abou El Fadl 2005).  But even the most 
restrictive groups, who limit the golden age period to the time of the Prophet and his 
companions and who advocate direct reading of the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition, 
cannot fully escape the accumulated scholarly commentary and juristic schools that they 
wish to bypass. The Qur’an can be read directly but its meaning and the Prophetic 
tradition itself —which explains the Qur’an and expounds on acts of worship and social 
interactions— are part of the scholarly heritage that complied it according to a rigorous 
methodology. On the other end of the spectrum are those described as “Progressive 
Muslims,” who take the position that only the Qur’an’s authenticity is unchallenged; 
everything else is human production that must be bypassed and individual Muslims 
should do their own ijtihad. Between these two poles, there are varying degrees of 
championing or criticizing imitation and the uncritical acceptance of the inherited 
knowledge and calls to re-engage canonical sources within the contemporary context (for 
examples see Abou El Fadl 2001; Abu Zayd 2006; Al-Alwani 2006; Al-Qaradawi 1990; 
An-Naʻīm 1990; Arkoun 1994; Moosa 2003; Ramadan 2008; Wadud 1999).  The 
challenge for Muslims is always one of how to acknowledge the past without becoming 
imprisoned by it and how to engage the present without being enamored by it. 
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 The advent of public education, print and translation and now the Internet have 
all put the Qur’an, the Hadith collections, and a great deal of the classic works of scholars 
in the hands of Muslim masses. The consequences have been analogous to that of the 
Internet and medicine. People go online to find about what ails them. The information 
empowers some to ask insightful questions and contribute to their medical care while 
others use it to self-diagnose and shop for therapeutic interventions pharmaceutical or 
otherwise. Similarly, some use these religious resources to deepen their understandings 
of religion and formulate insightful questions to address to qualified scholars. Others 
read them literally and form their opinions or shop around for opinions that agree with 
them. Western Muslims’ socio-cultural and political circumstances compel them to find 
answers to challenges and new situations they encounter in the West. Except in the old 
Muslim communities of Eastern Europe (for example, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania) with 
established scholarly traditions, Muslims in the West have had to look eastward for 
religious authority. Questions beyond the scope of “imported imams” were passed on to 
scholars residing “back home.” Their juristic rulings on mortgage, banking, meat, 
political participation and civic engagements in non-Muslim Western societies were then 
circulated among Muslims. But over time, particularly in the past twenty years, there has 
been an increasingly more vocal realization that as well-intentioned and reasoned as 
these religious edicts might be, the scholars that offer them lack an essential 
qualification for issuing an opinion: an experience-grounded knowledge of the social 
reality from which the questions arise.  
Understanding the social context is an integral component of any interpretive 
endeavor; without it, any religious authority risks not only being irrelevant but also 
betraying the historically-established methodological tradition and the higher objectives 
of the law (Maqasid Al-Shari’ah) (Abou El Fadl 2001, Auda 2008, Jackson 2005, 
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Ramadan 2008). Others qualified neither in religious texts nor in the social context have 
assumed authority in some mosques and in the transmission of knowledge to the young 
in weekend schools. This, however, has been changing and with greater momentum 
post-9/11. This development is due both to external factors (concerns with security as 
well as greater public scrutiny) and to internal ones including the realization of the 
disconnection between imported imams and the needs of the local community, especially 
pronounced with younger generations. These conditions have led to concerns that Islam 
could become irrelevant to future generations.  
 
In Search of “Evidence-Based” Islam 
 
The pure/true Islam narrative among younger American Muslims is emblematic 
of a search for a better understanding of what and why they practice Islam and for 
authenticity, a way to be grounded in one’s faith and in one’s reality. As young adults 
outgrow the phase of parental instructions— or of being “force fed”, as one participant 
put it— and influenced as they may become by the academic skepticism of inherited 
knowledge, they argue that the truth of their faith cannot be merely based on “my 
parents told me so”. Rather it must be validated and claimed for one’s self through a 
quest for deeper understanding. Malik sums up this thinking:  
this sort of proof by authority, well it must be true because my parents told me, 
[is not sufficient]. I mean you finish college and there are all these things that are 
not true because your parents told you, right? And so in the context it’s hard to be 
“I’m Muslim because my parents told me” and so that’s why I think like these 
deen intensives are popular and why like the ALIM program [is successful]. I 
went the first year they did it and it got bigger and they started doing an ALIM 
winter weekend… I mean the generations of Muslim that sort of grew up here, 
really feel like they need certain basis for their education that is more than 
inherited because you are a minority, because it’s a society that is skeptical of 
certain kinds of knowledge. So now a lot of people in this situation or have the 
quirky desire to like “Ok, I’m going to spend six months in Egypt”. 
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The desires of Malik and others to build their faith on an examined foundation 
and the “quirky desire” of some to travel to the Muslim East illustrate the irony of this 
pure/true Islam narrative. Both a repudiation and an idealization mark the relationship 
of American Muslims to the Muslim East. For while the narrative is invoked against first 
generation immigrants’ presumably “cultural Islam,” American Muslims seeking to 
ground themselves in Arabic and Islamic studies travel to a Muslim East imagined as a 
repository of intellectual heritage and religious knowledge. Going there and “extracting 
and de-territorializing sacred knowledge, they hope to reintroduce a common vocabulary 
of argumentation in their mosques to develop an indigenous, American expression of 
Islam” (Grewal 2006).  The duration and goals for their trips vary: some go for few 
months for self-development, others spend a year or two to become competent in a 
particular topic (for example, Qur’anic recitation), and yet others enroll in degree- 
granting institutions and return as credible imams and scholars. This transnational 
education became common in the 1990s but has been curtailed by post-9/11 security 
issues.  Several of the participants in this project, particularly Blackamericans, undertook 
this journey to learn Arabic and to deepen their religious knowledge, but they learned 
more. The initial elation of being in a Muslim country, waking up to the call of prayers, 
not worrying if alcohol or pork is in the food, and having a sense of heightened 
spirituality eventually gives way to the disorientation and disillusionment of 
immigration. As students who initially imagined and idealized a land of Islam encounter 
the lived realities of Muslims, diverse cultural constructions of race/color, time and 
citizen-state relations and the daily trials of navigating all sorts of bureaucracies, they 
grow weary and long for home.    
Nawaz and Salem are Chicagolanders of Pakistani descent who separately went to 
Jordan to study and later became friends in Chicago, where both are graduate students 
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of Islamic studies. Salem was there for only a few months and had to return to the US for 
family reasons. His memory of Jordan was one of blissful spiritual days devoid of the 
struggles of Muslims here.  Nawaz, on the other hand, lived and worked in Jordan after 
he completed his studies. He realized that his “subjectivity is American” and that being a 
Muslim in Jordan had its own struggles, including making it to the mosque for daily 
prayers. His teachers there told him that one can only authentically practice the faith 
from his particular subject position rather than try to become someone else. He said this 
helped him embrace his American, specifically his Midwestern, sensibilities. He 
observed that many Americans who live in Jordan live the life of an immigrant who 
nostalgically recreates and remains connected with home, an effort now made easier by 
the Internet and satellite television.  
Subsequent students benefit from the experience of those who went before them 
and who post their trials and triumphs online. Suhaib Webb is a Whiteamerican convert 
who obtained a degree from Al-Azhar University along with private instruction from 
scholars at Al-Azhar mosque and came back to serve as an imam and scholar.  In A 
Letter to the Aspiring Western Student of Islam, posted on his website, a second-
generation female of Indian descent and former student of Webb still living in Egypt 
advises the readers that the path to sacred knowledge is demanding in discipline, time, 
and energy. She warns them they will be homesick and even if they and others in 
America questioned if they belong, the trip abroad will make them realize how American 
they are. Most importantly, however, she warns them of the hazards of getting lost in the 
methodological debates and the “baggage of impassioned, unyielding opinions” on some 
issues. Those bringing back such “vitriolic debates to the West and centering their classes 
and programs on them” are faulted for focusing on issues irrelevant to Western Muslims 
struggling with practical issues36. But extracting any knowledge from its cultural milieu, 
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however unrealistic, is what many exhort returning imams and scholars to do.  Nawaz 
and Salem see this as untenable and think, instead, one should be cognizant of the 
relationship between knowledge and its cultural milieu and try to make knowledge 
relevant. This is achieved by grounding it in the new context while remaining normative, 
without “fudging” established juristic positions to suit the American context.   
The necessary funds and time make studying abroad a privilege of the few. For 
many second generation Muslims, the search for what Malik above called “evidence-
based” faith takes multiple tracks that usually start with parents and local imams. They 
then research reference books, join study groups or scholars’ study circles, or go online. 
Many critically examine what they read there and consider the veracity of arguments 
along with the credentials and credibility of authors or speakers. Musa gives an example. 
He wanted to know if it was necessary to pray both the congregational Friday and Eid 
prayers if they fall on the same day. He looked up a Hadith where the Prophet approved 
of either praying both or just the Eid prayers and Musa liked the latter dispensation. But 
he wanted to make sure he was not “just following [his] own whims”, so he checked 
online sites that he trusted and read various “scholarly answers” to readers’ questions on 
the issue. After considering the options, he took the latter dispensation.  
While some stick with one madhab (a juristic school), many younger Muslims are 
arguing that if the differences between these juristic schools are based on different 
evidence from the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition, then they are all acceptable ways 
and one could choose from among these options depending on the situation one 
encounters. This “post-madhhab” approach is not a uniquely American phenomenon but 
one characteristic of Islamic Revival. Anthropologist Saba Mahmood observed it among 
the women’s piety movement in Egypt and notes that it is a “character of modern 
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religiosity that has been glossed as talfiq, namely, an increasing flexibility displayed 
toward one’s fidelity to a madhhab in twentieth-century Islam” (Mahmood 2005, 81). 
Roy (2004) argued that a hallmark of neo-fundamentalism is a focus on personal 
piety and a “personal quest for an immediately accessible knowledge in defiance of the 
established religious authority” (2004, 6). Second generation Muslims are indeed 
seeking accessible knowledge and “evidence-based” understandings for their belief and 
practice as they strive for piety. But as evident from the participants in this project, the 
knowledge they seek is a normative kind acquired from authoritative texts and 
individuals conversant in canonical sources, classic debates and contemporary 
challenges.  They seek knowledge not as an abstract intellectual exercise but for its 
practical daily application and relevance. This is similar to anthropologist Saba 
Mahmood’s (2005) findings about the pedagogy of the women’s mosque movement in 
Egypt and is a common characteristic of the Islamic Revival movement in general. Roy 
likens this self-focused spirituality to that of Protestant Christianity, and one could even 
say that it resembles the modern self-help movement and associated industry, but there 
are great differences. In Muslim piety, there are “sources of authority on which these 
practices of self are based” in addition to “the architecture of the self and its sense of 
potentiality [which] are dramatically different in these [different] genres” (Mahmood 
2005, 80). Piety, in Islamic context, is focused on reforming the individual through the 
work of self-fashioning in thoughts, behavior, and body without fetishizing the self. The 
objective is to know self in order to fashion and discipline it. Rather than discipline 
coming from an external religious authority, it has to be cultivated from within and 
manifested internally and outwardly. In the tenth century, Al-Ghazali had dedicated a 
fourth (ten books) of his compendium The Revival of the Religious Sciences to 
technologies for disciplining the self and purifying the soul to achieve proximity to God. 
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Today, countless publications and nearly two million online search engine hits put these 
technologies at the fingertips of those seeking this piety and proximity. 
Malik attributes the perception that children are more religious and conservative 
than their parents to a phase that younger Muslims go through whereby, due to this 
“evidence-based” desire, they check their parents’ practices against the ideals they learn 
and find them wanting. Drawing on his experience, he theorizes that “the conservative 
piece comes in because very often people don’t have the opportunity to spend very much 
time” to digest what they learn. Theirs is a case of “I’ve read a book all at once, I spent 
two days in a deen intensive” and now want to put all of it into practice. It is not the case 
of “I’ve spent eight years immersed in the tradition” and learned the complexities 
therein. The difference in the two approaches leads to “very narrow understandings” on 
the part of the young. However, as their learning deepens, they begin to understand the 
nuances in juristic rulings and realize that this wisdom had been passed on through the 
lived experiences and inherited knowledge from grandparents to parents but they, the 
children, arrive at it only after time-consuming research. Along the way, there are those 
whose belief and practice is based on that inherited knowledge. Others take the approach 
of “I’m doing this because I learned three things and I’m applying all three” and work 
through things to “get to a sort of comfortable lived experience.” Malik related his 
experiences with a perspective gained through time as he reflected on his younger cousin 
who is experiencing this now. As this young man tells family what they are to do or not 
do, family members alternate between giving him time and space to explore and 
engaging him to point out that “here’s the other Islamic issue that you’re totally 
trampling on in your effort to be the, I don’t know, be the first in line at the prayer 
because that’s where the blessings descend. No, that doesn’t mean you can step on the 
old lady, not literally but you know [laugh].”  
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  That quest for a practice based on authenticated knowledge is one element of the 
generational differences participants cite. The other is what twenty-three year old 
Tasneem called the “intellectual Islam” she found in her MSA where both “conservative 
and liberal” students felt welcomed and engaged in discussions and attended lectures 
and scholars’ study circles.  This “intellectual Islam” is about:  
actual challenging ideas: thinking about Islam in the context of America, thinking 
about Islam in a philosophical context, thinking about Islam on a personal level, 
how does it manifest in my life every day other than the perfunctory prayers? And 
those conversations started happening by virtue of meeting other people who are 
all from different backgrounds religiously and socially and that’s when I really 
started to think about Islam in terms of myself and really formulate my Muslim 
identity. Who I do want to be? And that’s when on my own, over the course of the 
four years, I stopped doing a lot of things that my parents wouldn’t approve of 
and then started doing things my parents would never have thought about. Like, 
they would say “what is this you are going to a lecture? You’re going to listen to 
this person?” At first, they were like, “oh, it’s great, you go to iftars! You can go to 
jummah!” But then, to this day, they don’t get why I need to sit and explore Islam 
so much. They’re just like: do your things and be a good Muslim! You’re there to 
go to school. That’s what it’s about! Go to school, get a job and make some money 
or whatever. My parents, I realized this, at first there was that struggle because 
they didn’t want me to do certain things that I wanted to do when I was in high 
school. Things that weren’t Islamic. Then it became, I want to explore all these 
things and they’re like “no! This [school, work, family] is your function in life. 
You need to stick to that. And it’s great that you want to know about your religion’ 
but they never understood that or really encouraged it.  
 
Tasneem says that this focus on education and career is common to immigrant 
families because they came to seek better lives and futures. She seems puzzled because 
she sees them as very religious, but they do not grasp “this intellectual idea of going and 
learning more things in an academic scholarly setting”. Tasneem turns to her friends for 
answers to her questions and to online resources where she looks for “someone who is 
authentic.” In the end, she consults her heart because she believes if one is sincere in 
faith, one would know when something rings true or not. She must be humble, she says, 
and accept that she does not always have the “capability to know whether this is truth 
with a capital ‘T’.”  In those times, she uses her “moral compass” as she searches, studies 
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and reads. She realized she has to ground her knowledge in Qur’an and Hadith and 
began to feel less intimidated to go “directly to the Qur’an for guidance.” She finished 
reading the Qur’an at the age of nine and would occasionally pick it up during Ramadan 
but otherwise it was this “thing in Arabic which sounded nice” but which she did not 
understand. The translation was useful to get the literal meaning but did not help her 
with questions about life which she says is an interpretive level that requires linguistic 
competence in Arabic and most importantly sincerity. She approached the Qur’an by an 
ongoing process of “fixing [her] character” and praying for assistance to understand. She 
now engages in a “personal reading of the Qur’an” that gives her “a lot of insight.” But for 
“just academic knowledge”, she reads and attends lectures of prominent European and 
American Muslim scholars who, she says, have spent a lifetime studying and whose 
teachings resonate with her “ethics and morals” as well as with her “intellectual 
paradigm.” She may read a Hadith and reflect on it but realizes “you need more learned 
people to interpret for you.”  
Authority for Tasneem and project collaborators is not merely textual or 
personality-based; it has to also speak to their realities and intellect. Participants listed 
scholars that influence them most and whose work they consider as resource or 
reference. All but few of the scholars they listed where born and raised in the North 
America or Europe.  In order of frequency of listing, the top six included: Hamza Yusuf, 
Zaid Shakir, Suhaib Webb, Tariq Ramadan, Umar F. Abdallah, and Sherman Jackson. 
All are American converts except for Ramadan who is a second- generation Swiss 
Muslim of Egyptian parentage. All of these scholars underwent training in classic Islamic 
scholarship in the Middle East; Jackson and Ramadan are also renowned professors of 
Islamic Studies. The various reasons— intellectual and temperament— these scholars are 
influential is summed up by Abdul-Samad, a thirty year old man of Indian background: 
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It was only after I started thinking actively about issues relating to self-identity, 
my place in the world, and how to live in it as opposed to around it, that I started 
to look for answers that led me to directions that my parents had not investigated 
and most likely had no need to investigate in their formative years. These 
scholars speak to me on many levels. First and foremost, I feel that they each 
possess sound and authentic knowledge. That is very important to me because 
there are many charismatic (and sincere) speakers who I feel are not grounded in 
traditional Islamic knowledge. Second, they all grew up in the West and 
understand it not just theoretically but practically and in a deep way. They have 
developed a strong sense of who they are, as Americans and Muslims, and have 
balance, love, hope, open-mindedness, compassion, and humility. On a separate 
note, which is probably more related to psychology than anything else, these 
speakers tend to take a softer, contemplative, and accepting tone rather than a 
loud or aggressive tone. I feel more comfortable with this approach just because 
of my own nature of being fairly soft in tone and contemplative and also as a 
struggling Muslim I need more encouragement than being told how bad of a job 
I’m doing. So there are mainly intellectual reasons but some psychological 
reasons as well that I’ve gravitated towards these figures. I would add that I’m 
very tolerant of other religious leaders and love and respect our scholars. 
 
A peculiar feature of Islam in America is that authority has an ethno-racial 
dimension where immigrants, specifically Arabic speaking ones, are assumed by Muslim 
Americans generally to be more knowledgeable. This came up time and again in this 
project, often as an element of frustration not only by those who are excluded even when 
qualified but also by those assumed to be qualified. A young man of Arab background 
told me “just because I can pronounce خ (Kh) and ع (‘) [Arabic letters] people assume I 
know more and can be the imam [prayer leader].” While as Jackson says “olive skin – 
routinely functions as a proxy for religious knowledge and authenticity [and] it does 
reflect a prima facie presumption that no one else enjoys” (2008, 80), it does not 
preclude black or white skin from this authority. At the local level things may differ but 
as noted earlier, the most influential imams and scholars identified by participants are 
Black or White converts and their sessions at Muslim conferences are always packed 
with young and old immigrants alike.  
Project collaborators are also acutely aware of the various debates on authority, 
particularly as questions of “who speaks for Islam?” are frequently posed in public and as 
209 
Muslims across the ideological spectrum claim to speak authoritatively on Islam’s 
position on complex issues. Mukarram shared how second generation Muslims are often 
caught (and take sides) in a polarized discourse:  either everything is open for critical 
reevaluation and everyone is qualified to do so, or nothing is debatable and no one but 
“clergy” can render an opinion.  But there are those, like Mukarram, who hold the 
proverbial stick in the middle. They see the necessity of critical engagement with 
canonical sources and critique of social practices but it has to be done through valid 
methodology and credible argumentation.  To navigate the cacophony of voices in these 
diverse and partially overlapping public spheres, these younger Muslims need evidence-
based arguments and strive to sharpen their own critical judgment to assess the veracity 
of the arguments and discourses37.  
 At informal discussions and in interviews, collaborators were critical of the 
phenomenon of “Progressive Islam” for tackling issues of marginal concerns to the 
community (for example, women leading mixed prayers) when more pressing issues and 
problems exist (for example, proper space for women in mosques). The most common 
criticism, however, was that the public figures of this trend, like the journalist/author 
Irshad Manji, were not speaking from within the community or Islamic discursive 
tradition. The childhood and family experiences that inform Manji’s arguments generate 
empathy among Muslims but her “Muslim refusenik38” (2003) position is seen as alien 
and misguided. Mukarrum says that Manji and others in this camp present a “break in 
the chain of scholarly rhetoric.” He explains that authoritative scholars “amass all this 
knowledge and this criticism and mindset…in an evolutionary process.” Progressive 
Islam, however, “comes as a result of a break in that chain in the sense that there is some 
friction in the system and instead of dealing with the friction and removing the sand 
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from the gears, they decide to build a new gear box.” Advocates of progressive Islam, he 
contends, lack the scholarly chain on which to build and add their critical contributions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The nature of a narrative as a structure or a framework that holds different but 
related stories is illustrated by the variety of Muslims who invoke the pure/true Islam 
narrative. Some who use this narrative advocate an austere version of Islam but theirs is 
one among many. When this narrative is employed by young Western Muslims, it raises 
concerns about a de-cultured, demanding, and potentially dangerous Islamic neo-
fundamentalism. Considering the competing visions of the different groups of Muslims 
who appeal to this narrative, however, one is right to ask if one Islam is the pure/true 
version or if there are multiple “islams”. But this question and the implication that 
anyone appealing to this narrative is a potentially dangerous neo-fundamentalist are 
based on a particular conceptualization of religion, identity, and citizenship. This 
conceptualization is entangled with secularism and its relationship with religion and the 
resultant division of the public and private spheres.  
Different groups of Muslims from across the interpretive and political ideological 
landscape employ the same narrative but conceive of this pure/true Islam in line with 
their particular approach, objective or agenda; yet, they all appeal and ground their ideas 
and arguments in the Islamic discursive tradition. The participants in this project also 
ground their arguments in and authenticate their practices and thoughts through this 
tradition.  Critics may deem this “tradition” as a nostalgic reconstruction of the past and 
“auratic” nod or even as an “invented tradition” summoned to authenticate wholly 
modern practices (Mahmood 2005). This is the critique hurled at Islamists for apologetic 
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and illusionary readings of concepts such as the nation-state and other contemporary 
socio-political and economic practices back into Islamic history, when in fact these 
practices have no pre-modern Islamic historical precedents39. But while such critique is 
important, it is based on a particular understanding of tradition that is contrasted with 
modernity. And here, Asad’s conceptualization of tradition as discursive, which draws on 
MacIntyre and Foucault (Mahmood 2005), enables us to view tradition as a 
field of statements and practices whose structure of possibility is neither the 
individual, nor a collective body of overseers, but a form of relation between the 
past and present predicated upon a system of rules that demarcate both the limits 
and the possibility of what is sayable, doable, and recognizable as a 
comprehensible event in all its manifest forms (Mahmood 2005, 114-115).  
 
In such an understanding, tradition is dynamic and is a field through which 
subjectivities and identities of believers and the tradition itself are (re)made. When 
religion in general and Islam in particular, is understood as a discursive tradition, the 
Qur’an, Hadith collections, and juristic expositions are not the exclusive purview of 
scholars of religion but are instead essential embodied practices, sensibilities, discourses 
and relationships within a field of social power differentials (Mahmood 2005). A 
modernity that dethrones the old is a narrative contradicted by the reality of 
contemporary lives that are at once constituted through the past and lived anew through 
“revivals, reworkings, and rediscoveries, including rediscoveries of buried sensory 
experiences” (Hirschkind 2001, 642 ).  
 Project participants’ notions of cultivating a critically assessed and spiritually 
and intellectually grounded evidence-based faith, their arguments with their parents 
about distinguishing cultural norms from religious teachings, their wearing hijab against 
family wishes, and their civic engagement that they consider an ethic and a practice of 
piety as well as a civic duty, all invoke Islamic past but with contemporary recalibration 
suited to their lived reality. The themes that characterize the pure/true Islam that project 
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collaborators envision is one that both transcends and embraces categories of gender, 
race, culture, and nationality but it is not de-cultured or de-territorialized. Instead, it 
challenges the hegemony of immigrant cultural norms to create a space for norms 
grounded in American society but calibrated by models in the discursive tradition. They 
say it is “non-judgmental” of others’ piety or behavior because “only God knows what’s in 
the heart”. As they are reminded time and again in lectures, appearances can be 
deceiving and thinking badly of others is incongruent with the ethics of piety. The 
pure/true Islam they want speaks authoritatively through canonical sources and 
competently through the present social reality and is, therefore, normative and relevant. 
It is where self-purification is a personal jihad and a pre-requisite to changing the 
condition of the collective.  
Roy and others might see this focus on personal piety as a confirmation of the 
thesis that there is less focus on religion and more on religiosity.40 Though Roy concedes 
iman (the inner dimension of faith) has always been important in Islam, he argues it is 
the emphasis that contemporary Muslims place on it that is peculiar, Protestant-like, and 
represents the triumph of individual-based Westernization. Emphasizing religiosity (a 
focus on one’s relationship with God) rather than religion (with its social, intellectual 
and theological aspects) are the posited markers of this neo-fundamentalism. As 
participants in this project demonstrated, however, these two dimensions cannot be 
disentangled.  Additionally, this focus on the inner aspect of faith is not new but rather is 
one drawn from the discursive tradition. It is an institutionalized pedagogical objective 
for religious education/training that involves “the cultivation of the body, the 
disciplining of the self, the formation of moral character, the inculcation of the virtues, 
and correct conduct—all to be embodied practices” (Shakry 1998, 153).  
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These embodied practices are an essential part of the discursive tradition which 
necessitates correct, apt, and effective performance (Asad 1986). Having merely a set of 
beliefs that have no outward manifestation differs from the case where these intellectual 
ideas and belief system cultivate “lives that are organized around gradually learning and 
perfecting correct moral and religious practices” (Asad 1996, n.p). The former is 
characteristic of religiosity in Europe and of the very definition of religion in general (a 
set of beliefs) and differs significantly from the case where proper practice is both 
necessary for and an objective of religious virtue (Asad 1996). The latter is what matters 
in Islam and to the young Muslims here. Their arguments and questions about what is 
and is not part of pure/true Islam, is not merely about doctrinal issues, the answers to 
which have no bearing on their lives and let them live in the same way as everyone. 
Rather, cultivating correctly performed practices changes how one lives. These are 
methods and rules to bring about a way of being.  
Muslims in Western societies are told that they must abide by the separation of a 
private sphere where religious beliefs ought to stay and a public sphere where citizens 
are equal and differences of faith are transcended. But can cultivated embodied practices 
be left out of the public sphere? Or can their racialized bodies be unmarked and 
transcended?  Because of Christianity’s historical trajectory in the West, rituals have 
come to be viewed as merely serving a social control function. Viewed as irrational and 
external (unlike the inner state of belief), religious rituals and practices are seen as 
symbolic political acts challenging liberal states (Asad 2012). However, when 
identity/self is understood not as a solitary internal project but as something 
(re)constructed in and through social interaction, then these external rituals and their 
embodied public expression may be seen not merely as something imposed by a 
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submission-demanding authority but as both expressions of and cultivations of 
subjectivities and ways of being.  
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1 Afifa Jabeen’s interview with Eddie Redzovic of The Deen Show on 04/16/2011 
http://saudilife.net/life-and-society/84-personalities/11230-from-dunya-to-deen-movie-of-
gangster-turned-daee-eddie-of-the-deen-show accessed 9/16/2012 
2 Chicago Muslim Network has a membership of 328 including non-Muslims as of June 20, 2012. 
Two of the goals of this network are to provide a safe place for single Muslims and to encourage 
American Muslim engagement in the larger society 
http://www.meetup.com/ChicagoMuslimsNetwork/ accessed 6/20/2012 
3 This does not seem to be unique to Muslims as illustrated by a CNN 2007 poll which showed 
that 59 percent of Americans surveyed identified themselves as Christian first and American 
second. The number was smaller among Muslims in general where 45 percent identified religion 
first then nationality but among younger Muslim Americans the sentiment was 60 percent and 
nearly equal to that of Christians. “Poll: For Christians’ identity, it’s faith first, U.S. second”.  
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-08-22/us/gw.poll_1_younger-muslims-sampling-error-pew-
research-center?_s=PM:US accessed last 9/16/2012 
4 University of Chicago professor and terrorism expert, Robert Pape, examined a total of 315 
terrorist acts worldwide from 1980 to 2003 and concluded that there is little connection between 
religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Instead, the common thread in all suicide terrorism was 
“a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces 
from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”  Religion, Pape concludes, is but 
a “tool” used by terrorist groups to enlist volunteers and funds (2005, 1-2). The religion and 
ethnic background of the victims matter little. In another study, Pape and Feldman argue that 
understanding the roots of terrorism is essential to America’s approach to combating it. The 
authors argued that the failure of the efforts against terrorism thus far is in large part due to “the 
intellectual climate of opinion” that holds on to the narrative that terrorism to rooted in Islamic 
fundamentalism (Pape and Feldman 2010, 328) Additionally, a group of researchers have refuted 
the claim that terrorists are inspired by Qur’anic verses referring to violence and conclude that 
“verses extremists cite from the Qur’an do not suggest an aggressive offensive foe seeking 
domination and conquest of unbelievers, as is commonly assumed”. Instead, the verses they cite 
“deal with themes of victimization, dishonor, and retribution” (Halverson, Furlow, and Corman 
2012, 2). Additionally, a Gallup study found Muslims to be the least likely American religious 
group to see attacks on civilians by individuals, groups or governments as ever justified.  The 
report shows that only 11% of Muslims as compared to 19% Mormon, 26% Protestant, 27% 
Catholic, and 23% atheist/agnostic/no religion say that it “sometimes” justified for individual or 
group to kill civilian.  http://www.gallup.com/se/148805/Muslim-Americans-Faith-Freedom-
Future.aspx  accessed on 9/16/2012. 
5 A descriptive approach captures the primary facts of a phenomenon while a normative approach 
is interested in what religion “ought to be” typically taking one’s own religion as standard against 
which all else is evaluated. A functional approach focuses on what religion does or tries to do and 
particularly whether or not it meets its adherents’ needs to face adversity, pain, death and so on. 
The essentialist approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the “essence that is common to all 
religions or is at their collective roots” what Mircea Eliade called “element of the sacred” and 
Rudolf Otto “the idea of the holy” (Swidler and Mojzes 2000, 5). 
6 Creed is the “cognitive aspect”, code is guidelines for behavior, and cult consists in rituals 
relating adherents to the transcendent. The transcendent is defined broadly to include “spirits, 
gods, a personal God, and impersonal God, emptiness and so on” (Swidler and Mojzes 2000, 8). 
Conceptualizing transcendence in this way, Swidler and Mojzes argue, allows for inclusion of 
nontheistic faith traditions while excluding atheistic Marxism and secular humanism ideologies 
which some consider religions since they too provide to some a way to grasp the meaning of life. 
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In this definition, religion provides both the explanation of meaning and a Way or How to live in 
accordance with that meaning (Swidler and Mojzes 2000). 
7 For example, in the established Church of England and in Germany there is “state supported 
system of church tax collection” (van Bijsterveld 2000, 990).This system differs from the French 
république laïque (secular republic). Here the state at once determines what is an official religion 
and limits its authority and activity then partners with it for education, charitable and spiritual 
services and hires religious officials of those sanctioned religions for public institutions such as 
military, prisons, and medical facilities (Chelini-Pont 2005; van Bijsterveld 2000). The State also 
provides substantial subsidies to private Christian and Jewish schools contracted by the 
government. In these schools, attended by 20 percent of French high school students, there are no 
restrictions on dress-code or religious texts and no concerns that this may not produce strong 
French identity. The state also provides separate accommodations in public schools for the 
dietary restrictions of its Muslim and Jewish students at a time when it also bans “ostentatious 
religious signs” pressing Muslim girls, in particular, to choose between an education and religious 
practice. Furthermore, the state pays the salaries of clergymen and owns and maintains churches 
built before 1905 (Asad 2006).  Even in the USA, the state employs religious workers (chaplains) 
in the military and the correctional system. Congressional sessions typically open with prayers 
and, in 2005, some members of Congress created a “Congressional Prayer Caucus” see 
http://forbes.house.gov/prayercaucus/  accessed on 12/25/2012 
8 In her book Inside Gender Jihad (2006), Amina Wadud, a Blackamerican Muslim and Islamic 
Studies professor details the feminist Muslim movement in which she is a significant protagonist. 
Wadud had grabbed international headlines and was a subject of great controversy among 
Muslims when in 2005 she became the first female to lead mixed Friday communal prayers. The 
activists, intellectuals, and scholars engaged in this gender jihad appeal to the egalitarian message 
of the Qur’an that, they argue, liberated women long ago but which has been eclipsed by the 
accumulated tradition of patriarchal interpretations and practices. 
9 Some adopted Robert Redfield’s method of studying world religions by using a two tier system 
of orthodoxy (Great tradition) and heterodoxy (little tradition). In this model, Great tradition is 
followed by the urban elites residing at the center of the religio-cultural life of society. Also called 
textual or scriptural or high tradition, this orthodoxy is (re)produced institutionally (for example, 
in schools and places of worship) and assiduously inculcated in the next generation. Little 
tradition, on the other hand, is variously referred to as local or low tradition or popular religion, 
and is practiced presumably by the “unreflective” masses in a taken for granted unexamined 
fashion. The two traditions are interconnected and recursively influence each other (Lukens-Bull 
1999). 
10 The title Islam Obscured is itself a reply to Geertz’s Islam Observed which he based on his 
study in Indonesia. Varisco argues that Geertz’s particular definition of culture as “culture minus 
the social” (2005, 40) and religion as “hermeneutic in need of grounding in the nitty-gritty of 
daily life” (2005, 45) obscured more than they revealed.   
11 On regular basis, during Friday sermons and study circles, Muslim worshipers are reminded of 
the numerous Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions that convey the message articulated in this 
one:  
Say: “And whatever [wrong] any human being commits rests upon himself alone; and no bearer of 
burdens shall be made to bear another's burden. And, in time, unto your Sustainer you all must 
return: and then He will make you [truly] understand all that on which you were wont to differ” 
(Qur’an 6:163-164). 
12 Modern day purity discourse is usually traced back to the late 18th century and the political and 
social turmoil that swept Muslim lands starting with the fall of Egypt to the French and 
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subsequently to the British. The fall of Egypt was followed by the fall of India under British 
control, the decline of the Ottomans and Persians. The imperial civilizing mission of the 
colonizers aimed to extract Egyptians and other Muslim societies in general from “backwardness” 
attributed to their religion. Local social elites enamored by the advancement of the Europe 
became the agents of change in Egypt and women and their bodies were the battle ground even 
though Western women did not enjoy more rights in Europe. Qasim Amin, an upper-middle class 
French educated Egyptian lawyer and thinker, wrote a book titled Liberation of Women the main 
thesis of which was that the degree to which Muslim societies can be deemed advanced or 
backward is indexed by the degree to which they shed native norms and practices represented by 
the veil and emulate Western societies (Ahmed 2011).  He fused European views on the inferiority 
and backwardness of Islam presumably represented by the status and attire of women and the 
already underway debates about the need for the Arab societies to adopt and catch up the 
scientific, military and technical advancement in the West.  
13 ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) called for strict adherence to the example of the Prophet and the two 
subsequent generations and bypassed the centuries of scholarly heritage. He held the Ottoman 
Empire responsible for perceived cultural corruption and directed his polemics against it and 
against those engaged in purportedly heretical practices and norms (Abou El Fadl 2005).  He 
attributed much of the corruption to the influences from Persia, Turkey and Greece. He was a 
rather minor figure who was chased out of his hometown when he admonished the town’s people 
to return to the “true Islam” and rid the religion of what he saw as accumulated corruptions such 
as saint veneration, mysticism and Shi’ism (Abou El Fadl 2005). ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s hostility 
extended to non-Muslims whom, he argued, one should neither emulate in habits of thought, 
dress or behavior nor befriend or aide. While ʿAbd al-Wahhab rejected much of the Muslim 
intellectual tradition, he selectively appropriated one particular scholar, 14th century Ibn 
Taymiyya and even then ignored that which did not advance his ideas (Abou El Fadl 2005). 
Though he appealed to the discursive tradition couching his rhetoric in religious terms, his 
discourse was foremost ethnocentric Arab nationalist that deemed everything that did not emerge 
from the Arabian Peninsula as a corrupt innovation (Abou El Fadl 2005). He was severely 
criticized by Muslim scholars far and near, including his brother. These scholars argued that his 
supposed precedent was not only unsubstantiated, but it flies in the face of the ethical percepts of 
the Qur’an and Prophet. His ideas could have been a passing trend were it not for his political 
pact with the Al-Saud family. The pact gave ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s ideology an official sanction that 
allowed its resurrection from obscurity in the early 20th century when the founder of modern day 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted Wahhabi ideology. Saudi petrodollars then spread it across the 
Muslim world though not as Wahhabism but as the coopted more credible trend of Salafism 
(Abou El Fadl 2005) . 
14 Salafism is derived from the term salaf that means predecessors and applies to the Prophet, his 
companions, and the two successive generations. Following the example of the rightly guided 
salaf is foundational to Muslim understanding and practice. This gives “being salafi” both an 
appeal and a flexible meaning. The Modernist reformers conceptualized Salafism as the necessity 
for Muslims to engage the original canonical texts and reinterpret them in the context of 
contemporary challenges and not blindly adhering to interpretations of the subsequent 
generation of Muslims that came after the Salaf (Abou El Fadl 2005, Ramadan 2004). Originally, 
Salafism and Wahhabism shared deference to this Salaf period, but they widely diverged beyond 
that since the founders of the former were modernist reformers and the founder of latter was 
advocating for a particular notion of Arab culture. However, Wahhabis began to claim the term 
Salalfi for themselves and since the 1970s have conflated Wahhabism with Salafism such that 
they now have near exclusive claim to Salafism (Abou El Fadl 2005). 
15 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded on the idea that reforming society starts with 
reforming individuals through religious and character education that becomes publically visible 
through modes of dress and decorum and through and civic engagement. It attracted following 
from across Egyptian society drawing its leadership from the educated professional class. MB also 
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sought to reform society through political engagement but after its founder was assassinated in 
1949 and it was prohibited by successive Egyptian regimes, its exiled members spread around the 
world. In the West, they founded many organizations and institutions.  
16 They privilege aspects of a reconstructed 7th century Arabia customs. These customs are 
imagined and romanticized as more authentic since they were practices by the first two 
generation of Muslims. Members of this trend demonstrate their reverence in dress and some 
mannerisms. They ignore art/aesthetic and wish to bypass centuries of Muslim intellectual 
history, but they are nevertheless not “de-cultured”. After all they still speak their native 
languages, enjoy its food and many of its traditions, and they watch religious shows and listen to 
“Islamic” songs and engage science and technology.  
17 The narrative of purification and challenging the inherited cultural practices and tradition is 
also central to Blackamericans’ journey to Islam. For example, the Nation of Islam’s strict 
physical, esthetic, dietary, and conduct discipline was the necessary tool to purify the interior and 
exterior of Black men and women from indignity and contamination. Elijah Muhammad, the 
leader of NOI, found Islamic rituals to be the method by which this purification could be 
achieved. In a 1957 article, he reminded his followers of the rules of purity set by Islam which he 
argued “dignifies the black man. It gives him the desire to be clean, internally and externally. . . . 
It heals both the physical and spiritual by teaching what to eat, when to eat, and what to think, 
and how to act” (Curtis 2002, 172). 
18 “We narrate unto you (Muhammad) the best of narratives in that We have inspired in you this 
Qur’an, though aforetime you were of the heedless” (Qur’an 12:3) translated by Picktall accessed 
at http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/012-qmt.php on 12/31/2012 
19 For example, Volume I of Fiqh Us-Sunnah (1985) is a compilation by As-Sayyid Sabiq of the 
four Sunni schools jurisprudence on purification, prayers and fasting showing places of scholarly 
consensus and divergence. The book is translated into English by Muhammad Saeed Dabas and 
Jamal al-Din M. Zarabozo and published by American Trust Publications, a division of the North 
American Islamic Trust in Indianapolis, Indiana, USA.  
20 One such book Matharat al-Qulub (Purification of the Hearts) has been popularized among 
English speaking Muslims by the translation by Muslim American scholar Hamza Yusuf (2004) 
who also made it to a lecture series and CD collection.  
21 Hadith refers to narrations of what prophet Muhammad said, did, or approved of.  
22 see Sahih Al-Bukhari 2.158 (walking between the hills of Safa and Marwa during Hajj), 3.221 
(fasting Ashur’a), and 3.266 (engaging in market activities during Hajj) (M. M. Khan 1987). 
23 Sahih Al Bukhari hadith number 4.572 
 
24 Today’s Tea Party movement in the United States, for example, harkens back to the Boston Tea 
Party that sparked the American Revolution in protest of British rule. The current Tea Party  
came about in the midst of global economic crisis, American’s changing demographics and after 
the election of the first Black president whom the movement considers to be a socialist and a 
crypto-Muslim.   
25 Revival of the Religious Sciences is divided into four parts each further subdivided into ten 
chapters. Because of this book and other critically important works, Al-Ghazali holds a high 
station among Muslim scholars and masses and is referred to as hujjat al-islam (the proof of 
Islam). 
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26 As noted earlier, the path to violence has politics at its foundation rather than piety and 
conservatism but there is a puritanical religious ideology and identity to which violent groups – 
even secular ones – appeal.   
27 He identifies five levels of identity that he notes are not mutually exclusive but are in tension 
among Muslims of foreign descent in Europe. The levels are, an “original, well-bonded solidarity 
group” that is based on original hometown, an ethnic national identity based on culture and 
language, a “neo-ethnic” Muslim identity regardless of practice, a Muslim identity based on 
religion with no reference to ethnicity or culture, and an identity based on Western enculturation 
that gives rise to urban youth subculture (Roy 2004, 117).  
28In 1983, a husband and wife team frustrated by the lack of suitable education material for their 
own children established the IQRA International Education Foundation in Chicago to meet this 
need.  IQRA’s Islamic studies curriculum consists of four strands: Qur’anic Studies, Sirah and 
Hadith (narrations about the prophet’s life, actions and statements), Aqidah, Fiqh and Akhlaq 
(creed, juristic thought, and ethics), and Islamic social studies (stories of prophets, Islamic 
history, and geography). IQRA’s publications are now used in many English speaking Muslim 
communities globally.  source www.iqrafoundation.com accessed 06/15/2012 
29 Shia like Sunni Muslims pray the required five prayers but the Shia pray three times, combining 
the noon with afternoon prayers and the sunset with night prayers. Sunni Muslims combine these 
prayers mainly during travel or other difficult circumstances. 
30 Religious conservatism does not translate to political conservatism. While the public image of 
Muslims is one of being very religious and socially conservative, they are the least likely after Jews 
to describe themselves as conservative and most likely after Jews to see themselves as liberal. The 
younger they are, the less likely they see themselves as conservative. The 2009 Gallup Muslim 
report showed that the young Muslim Americans surveyed were the least likely religious group to 
say they are politically conservative (20 percent) compared Protestants (42 percent), Catholics 
(29 percent), Jews (22 percent), and the general U.S. population( 30 percent). The majority (39 
percent) of young Muslim Americans said they were moderate and a significant number (28 
percent) said they were liberal. This is compared to 35 percent and 19 percent respectively among 
Protestants. http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153572/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-
National-Portrait.aspx accessed on 6/30/2012 
31 Asad (1993), for example, noted that universalizing the particularly of Western historical 
trajectory is problematic and betrays an ideological underpinning. There are different social 
structures, tastes, experiences, fields and attitudes that may (or not) be necessarily 
interconnected but which have come to be assumed to all be related just because they happened 
to be in the historical model of Europe. 
32 For example, the Prophet is reproached in the Qur’an for being distracted from a poor blind 
man who came to learn more about his new faith and for attending to noblemen whose 
conversion would have provided political support for the nascent faith community. Furthermore, 
when deliberating community affairs, the Prophet’s companions always asked him if his position 
on a given matter was a revelation or his personal opinion. For example, during a battle strategy 
discussion, the companions asked the Prophet if the strategy he proposed was a revelation or his 
personal opinion because if it was the latter, they too had their ideas. He told them it was his 
opinion so a better alternative was proposed by a companion and it was accepted by the Prophet 
and community (Ramadan 2007). 
33 The ethics of disagreement that guided these early scholars was captured by the statement of 
Al-Shafi’i, a 9th century scholar and the founder of one of the four Sunni juristic schools. He said 
“our opinion is correct with the possibility of being wrong and your opinion is wrong with the 
possibility of being correct.” 
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34 In 2004 and in light of violence and political turmoil and an increase in groups engaging in 
takfir (declaring other Muslims as non-Muslims) a group consisting of the 200 most renowned 
Muslim scholars from 50 countries convened in Jordan and agreed on a then well publicized 
Amman message. Among other things, the message recognized eight juristic schools (Madhhab): 
the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali), two Shi’i (Ja`fari and Zaydi), an 
Ibadi school, and a Thahiri school. 
http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=74 
accessed on 9/25/2012 
35 Powell, Bill. “Struggle For The Soul Of Islam.” Time Magazine. 09/13/2004.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,995071,00.html accessed on 10/07/2012 
36 Ahmad, Shazia. 09/29/2011. “A Letter to the Aspiring Western Student of Islam.” 
http://www.suhaibwebb.com/personaldvlpt/seeking-knowledge/a-letter-to-the-aspiring-
western-student-of-islam/ accessed on 10/07/2012  
37 This is not challenging authority but is an integral aspect of tradition where “[r]eason and 
argument are necessarily involved in traditional practice whenever people have to be taught about 
the point and proper performance of that practice, and whenever the teaching meets with doubt, 
indifference, or lack of understanding” (Asad 1986, 16). 
38 Muslim Refusenik is how Manji describes herself. She says, “[t]hat doesn’t mean I refuse to be a 
Muslim; it simply means I refuse to join an army of automatons in the name of Allah” (2003,3).   
39 Social scientists and other analysts do not think of the non-Western world and specifically of 
the “Muslim world” in the same way as the West. If they did, they might see how these Islamic 
movements are efforts to both render the Islamic tradition relevant to Muslim contemporary 
realities and as “attempts at formulating encounters with Western as well as Islamic history” 
(Asad 1996). Islamic reform and revival movements have been influenced by the post-
Reformation Christianity and by the secular world it gave birth to. This is evident in these 
movements’ tendency to draw on particular modes of rationality from Western discourses and in 
their postures of measuring Islam, its laws and practices with a Western yardstick and showing it 
measures as well if not better. Grounded in modern reality, these movements use modern 
knowledge, technologies and techniques but they are also engaging an Islamic civilizational 
history and discursive tradition rich with debates and disagreements and a long established 
indigenous forms of reform, renewal and revival (Asad 1996). 
40 by this he means “individual reappropriation of religion, a return to the inner self and a direct, 
unmediated connection to religion. The insistence on faith stresses the individual dimension of 
Islam in a non-Muslim environment. Faith is not supported by the social authority of religion” 
(Roy 2004, 185). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE “ISLAMIZATION OF AMERICA”? 
          Muslims of different political ideology and interpretive trends invoke the narrative 
of true/pure Islam to ground their ideas and actions in the Islamic tradition and to argue 
against all those whom they think defile that tradition. But there is another unlikely 
group that invokes the narrative of true/pure Islam and references the Islamic tradition 
through its own ideological framework. This group, or perhaps more fittingly this 
movement, consists of an alliance of neo-conservatives, right wing conservatives, Tea 
Party leaders and members, some political and religious leaders, and some new atheist 
icons, along with some feminists and (former) Muslims validators. Pamela Geller, one of 
the leading forces in this movement, was asked on a CNN program if she agreed with the 
statement that “the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 were practicing a perverted form 
of Islam, and that is not what is going to be practiced at this mosque”. She said “I will say 
that the Muslim terrorists were practicing pure Islam, original Islam” (Kaye 2010 
emphasis added). The common thread to the discourse of this movement is that true 
Islam is a threat not only to the security of America but also to the very foundation of 
Western civilization. Backwardness, violent extremism, misogyny, intolerance of the 
other (religious or ethnic or otherwise) and opposition to freedom of thought and 
expression are not viewed as aberrant ideas of a fringe Muslim group but are purportedly 
rooted in the Islamic tradition. Muslims who argue otherwise are either engaged in 
Tuqia/Taqiyya (an allegedly Islamically-sanctioned lying), or they are reforming Islam 
to rid it of these dangerous and backward ideas.  
            In this chapter, I will explore how this strand in the pure/true Islam discourse has 
been used in the construction of a new narrative that warns of the potential “Islamization 
of America.”  This latter narrative has become a strong instrument in the process of 
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Muslim racialization. This racialization extends to those who “look Muslim,” including 
Christian Arabs and South Asians of other faiths, especially those Sikh men who wear 
turbans as part of their religious tradition. This racialization process and its associated 
discourses have significant consequences for how Muslim Americans, and particularly 
their younger generations, see themselves, how they practice their faith, and how they 
engage their religious community and society. To situate the perspectives and responses 
of these younger Muslims to this narrative and to the movement that draws on it, it is 
first necessary to describe the movement and the narrative it weaves. “Stop the 
Islamization of America” is both the name of an organization and a powerful narrative 
that draws on old and new images and tropes.   
 While some argue that this is a legitimate critique of Muslims, critics of this 
narrative have called it racist and more commonly referred to it as “Islamophobia”. I will 
sketch a brief genealogy of this concept and how Islamophobia and legitimate debate and 
critique differ.  I will also elaborate at some length on the racialization process in 
America by and through which Othering and belonging to the nation are defined and 
negotiated. I will then explore the perspectives of younger Muslim Americans as offered 
by project collaborators and as obtained from my fieldwork on the ground and online. I 
will give examples of the more assertive posture of younger Muslims and of converts as 
they at once respond to this narrative, critique their community, and assert their 
belonging. 
 
 “How Muslim Bashing Got Cool1” 
 
Two noteworthy events occurred during the third week of June 2012. The 
chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, New York Republican 
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congressman Peter King, completed the fifth of a series of congressional hearings on 
radicalization within the American Muslim community. The first of these hearings, 
which Rep. King had called, began in March of 2011 under the title “The Extent of 
Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response.”2 
The June hearing explored how the Muslim community was responding to 
radicalization. The three Muslim witnesses assessing this response were Dr. Zuhdi Jasser 
(a second generation Arizonan of Syrian descent), Asra Nomani (a 1.5 generation of 
Indian background journalist/author), and Dr. Qanta Ahmed (a British-Indian physician 
and author now living in New York). The three witnesses share a view that Islamism is 
rampant in the community from the leadership to the masses and that this ideology is 
the path to radicalization. 
 When, in early 2012, an Associated Press report revealed that the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD) was engaged in extensive surveillance of Muslim and Arab 
businesses, student groups and mosques, there was an intense outcry from Muslims, 
interfaith and civil liberties groups. These three witnesses, however, along with Rep. 
King were among the two dozen people demonstrating in support of the NYPD’s 
surveillance of the community. In their books and public engagements, Jasser and 
Nomani appear to be engaged in an existential battle against Islamist forces. Jasser 
wrote A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot’s Fight to Save His 
Faith and Nomani wrote Standing Alone: An American Woman’s Struggle for the Soul 
of Islam. Needless to say, Muslim leaders and activists argue that these three are not 
credible witnesses because of their peripheral and polemical relationship with the 
community and their collaboration with known Islamophobes. To the general public, 
however, they are credible witnesses who speak to the fear of homegrown terrorism.  
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The second event in June involved Pamela Geller whose lecture on “Islamic Jew-
Hatred: The Root Cause of the Failure to Achieve Peace” sponsored by the Los Angeles 
chapter of the Zionist Organization of America was canceled at the behest of the 
Southern California Interfaith Coalition (composed of Jews, Muslims, and Christians). 
Geller and her organization, “Stop the Islamization of America”, are listed by the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) as an anti-
Muslim hate group. Profiling Geller, SPLC notes that Geller is “relentlessly shrill and 
coarse in her broad-brush denunciations of Islam and makes preposterous claims, such 
as that President Obama is the ‘love child’ of Malcolm X.” She has made common cause 
with racists in Europe and South Africa and her uncritical support of Israel has 
generated scathing criticism from liberal Jews3. This assessment notwithstanding, 
Geller, as I will show below, is a critical contributor to this narrative and a formidable 
shaper of public opinion in America on Islam and Muslims.  
These two incidents represent two strands – state and public – of a discourse on 
a “Muslim problem” in America that has perilous policy and perceptional consequences. 
As noted earlier, public discourse shapes not only how one is seen and thought of by 
others but also profoundly shapes how one sees oneself and one’s community and fellow 
citizens. Public discourse, therefore, is critically important for one’s sense of both being 
and belonging. Participants in this project and Muslim Americans in general are acutely 
aware of the dominant narrative that frames them as a dangerous and degenerate Other. 
For example, less than 24 percent of those responding to the question “In your opinion, 
how do non-Muslim Americans view Muslim Americans?” thought they were seen as 
“same as any other American.” The rest thought Muslims were seen as outsiders and 
viewed with mistrust and suspicion.  
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This view is not limited to the children of immigrants. Eighty percent of the 
descendants of converts thought the same.  Jack, a twenty-three year old Blackamerican 
from Chicagoland, says that fellow Americans see Muslims as “outsiders because they 
never knew we were in America until 9/11. We were basically sleeper Muslims who lived 
in America, but no one knew we were Muslim. So when people found out we were 
Muslim they associated 9/11 attacks with us.” A thirty year old Blackamerican woman 
from the Phoenix-valley says “most people treat me with respect as long as I reciprocate 
or initiate a courteous behavior; however, they do not believe I am indigenous to the 
United States. They view the scarf as a cultural identity instead of a religious identity and 
usually keep inquiring about my cultural background as if I’m not telling the entire 
truth.” White privilege does not shield converts to Islam and their children from 
becoming racialized and minoritized as Muslims. Lisa, a Whiteamerican twenty-six year 
old woman from Phoenix-valley reflects this new positionality. She says, “they [non-
Muslim Americans] don’t really know what to think of us. We’re like the ‘other’ that 
some non-Muslims want to try and understand, but really don’t. I don’t think we are 
viewed as any other American to them. We are basically foreign to them no matter where 
we are from.” This assessment, however, is tempered by a widely held belief among 
Muslim Americans, no matter their generation or ethnic background, that fellow citizens 
who know Muslims are less likely to hold negative views. Muslims are, therefore, 
responsible for making themselves known to other Americans.  
How Muslims think other Americans see them has also affected how they see 
themselves. Seventy-seven percent of participants, many of whom were young children 
in 2001, see or sense a change after 9/11 in how Muslims see themselves. Sirad, a thirty-
five year old of woman mixed heritage (a Somali father and a Whiteamerican mother) 
sees this change as: “we are a lot more afraid. The ‘war on terror’ has made Muslims feel 
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insecure in their status here in America. I also feel the biggest thing we have to do with 
the non-Muslim community is assure them that we are not radical fundamentalists and 
distance ourselves from terror and extreme organizations.” Feeling the sting of an 
examining gaze, hateful words and denigrating epithets; or the alienation of being 
singled out for profiling and discrimination; or their fear for their safety and civil rights4, 
has led some Muslims to conceal their religion. For many more, however, this situation 
prompted greater assertiveness in reclaiming their belonging both to America and Islam. 
Those of immigrant background are, as put by a survey participant, now more “willing to 
accept that they are American and [that they] should be more invested in the American 
society.” These investments are civic, social, political and financial. Converts and their 
children are also becoming more assertive in expending their cultural capital both within 
a society that defines Islam as foreign and within a Muslim community that for long saw 
the American-ness of converts as “cultural baggage” and a liability to be overcome by 
adopting a “Muslim culture”. This new assertiveness is seen as a shared responsibility, as 
articulated by thirty year old Mustafa, a male Chicagolander of Indian background:  
I think for too long we felt that we just had to live in this country and practice our 
faith freely and that was it. However, I think what many Muslims learned is that 
unless we are actively engaging non-Muslims, having the difficult conversations 
(not just talking about the Cubs game and the latest election) but having real 
conversations, there is a risk that the void in real knowledge of Islam can be filled 
by anti-Muslim opportunists or simply the common tendency towards irrational 
stereotyping that we all possess to some degree or another but must actively work 
against through education and open discussion. So I think we see ourselves as 
having a greater responsibility than before. 
 
The anti-Muslim opportunists of whom Mustafa speaks now have more effective 
and far reaching strategies to engrain the notion of the “Muslim problem” in American 
popular imagination. In what follows, I will give a detailed example of the life cycle of 
this narrative and its main storytellers pointing out that it is not a new phenomenon but 
one with both transatlantic links and deep American roots. I will examine the power of 
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the narrative in mobilizing masses, motivating politicians and marginalizing as well as 
mobilizing Muslims. Beyond rhetoric, this narrative has serious consequence for 
identity, liberty and life of the individual, the community and the nation. I will explore 
how Muslims, and particularly second generation Muslims, are responding to or 
engaging this narrative.  
 
From the Margins to Mainstream  
 
The rhetoric that was prevalent early on in radio talk shows has, in the years since 
2001, crossed to mainstream entertainment shows. Jack Shaheen details how “TV 
producers have saturated viewers with Arab blackguards; they prowl law enforcement, 
intelligence agency and courtroom dramas.”5  It was, however, in 2010 when the rhetoric 
became national headlines and saturated public discourse. I was doing my fieldwork in 
Chicago in the summer of 2010 when the hot humid weather, steaming with an already 
charged public atmosphere, became thick with fear and boiled over with controversies 
surrounding a proposal to build a Muslim cultural center in Lower Manhattan, the 
winner of Miss USA beauty contest, and a Florida preacher’s threat to burn the Qur’an. 
The cultural center project was initially called The Cordoba House, in a nod to Muslim 
Spain’s legacy of multi-cultural and multi-religious tolerance. In an attempt at damage 
control, it was later renamed the Park51 Project, after it was dubbed by Gellner and a 
cadre of conservative activists as the “victory mosque on Ground Zero.” For more than 
two decades, Muslims have worshiped in lower Manhattan and they have outgrown their 
small mosque near this proposed site, two blocks away from site of World Trade Center. 
So when an old factory building in the area became available, a developer from the 
community teamed up with the imam to plan a cultural center with a mosque.   
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The project was proposed by “moderate Muslims” who were considered the 
“good” Muslims in the “Good Muslim-Bad Muslim” narrative. Sharif el-Gamal, the 
developer, is a second generation Muslim New Yorker of an Egyptian father and a Polish 
Catholic mother. El-Gamal did not grow up in a religious household but says that the 
“seeds of faith” were firmly planted in him and sprouted after 9/11 as he began to attend 
the mosque6. He partnered with imam Faisal Abdul Rauf, a Sufi imam, author of What’s 
Right in Islam Is What’s Right in America,7 and founder of the American Society for 
Muslim Advancement (ASMA). Rauf’s ASMA organization, according to its website, is 
“the first Muslim organization committed to bringing American Muslims and non-
Muslims together through programs in academia, policy, current affairs, and culture”. It 
is working to “[r]e-connect the Muslim World and the West for interfaith work.”8 The 
imam’s writings and work (interfaith, conflict resolution, public lectures) brought him to 
the attention of the State Department. The department saw in him a good representative 
of the “integration” of Muslims in American society and tapped him to join its public 
diplomacy efforts in the Muslim majority countries. Ironically, when the controversy 
about the proposed center broke out, he was scheduled for a State Department trip to the 
Persian Gulf Arab states to speak on religious diversity and tolerance in the United 
States. He was to “brin[g] a moderate perspective to foreign audiences on what it’s like to 
be a practicing Muslim in the United States”9, according to a State Department official. 
Daisy Khan, the imam’s wife and cofounder of ASMA, is a member of the National 
September 11 Memorial and Museum advisory team. Those associated with the project, 
therefore, were non-controversial “good” Muslims.  
The imam and the developer consulted with and modeled their proposed project 
after the Jewish Community Center (JCC) in New York. The new Muslim cultural center 
would house a swimming pool, a 9/11 memorial, a culinary school, an auditorium and an 
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exhibit; it would also offer educational, art/culture, and interfaith activities. The prayer 
space, allocated to accommodate the growing Muslim population in the area, would be in 
the basement floor. The architectural rendering of the project shows a 13-story building 
with a honeycomb façade. No dome, no minarets. So nothing would have identified the 
building from the outside as a mosque, which led an Associated Press reporter to note 
that the project building looks “modern and secular”10. If this was a monument for 
anything, perhaps it would be one for progressive Islam complete with all the liberal 
markers demanded of a reformed Islam: a Sufi “moderate imam” and his wife who does 
not wear hijab, a secular developer, an interfaith partnership, gender equality, and an 
appreciation of “high culture.” The project received the approval of the Community 
Board and the support of the majority of Lower Manhattan residents. In early December 
of 2009, a New York Times’ article titled “Muslim Prayers and Renewal Near Ground 
Zero” positively framed the project. The article quoted the imam explaining that the 
location, where a piece of the 9/11 wreckage landed, was chosen specifically because his 
group “wanted to push back against the extremists” and to send “the opposite statement 
to what happened on 9/11”11.  The article noted that Mayor Bloomberg had no objection; 
it cited a Rabbi and the FBI as praising the imam and the mother of a 9/11 victim calling 
the project a “noble effort.” It also reported that the Jewish Community Center director 
applauded the effort as sharing JCC’s vision. A Few days later, Ms. Khan, the imam’s 
wife, was interviewed by Laura Ingraham, the host of “The O’Reilly Factor” on Fox News. 
Ingraham liked what Ms. Khan’s group was doing and thought no one would have a 
problem with the project, which she referred to as the “Ground zero mosque”12.  With 
this, the project was featured prominently in a leading newspaper and on Fox News, but 
it did not raise any concerns and there was nothing written about it for the next five 
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months. So what happened? How did a project so positively framed come to be the issue 
of the summer of 2010?  
The day the Associated Press reported that the Community Board committee 
officially approved the project, the New York Post (henceforth the Post) ran an article 
titled “Panel Approves ‘WTC’ Mosque”13.  On the same day, Pamela Geller posted on her 
blog “Monster Mosque Pushes Ahead in the Shadow of World Trade Center Islamic 
Death and Destruction”14. She saw this as nothing more than another example of the 
“territorial nature of Islam.” She summoned a history of Muslims converting the Temple 
in Jerusalem and the Hagia Sophia cathedral in Constantinople to mosques to prove her 
assertion of Islam’s “domination and expansionism”. Geller along with Robert Spencer— 
a well-known critic of Muslims and Islam and founder of Jihad Watch— had co-founded 
the “Stop the Islamization of America” (SIOA) organization in early 2010 at the behest of 
and in partnership with the Danish founders of “Stop the Islamization of Europe”. Two 
days after her blog, Geller called for SIOA’s first organized demonstration on the 29th of 
the May to protest the “9/11 monster mosque” and to commemorate another time of a 
“Muslim siege”, the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans on May 29, 145315.  
 This role catapulted Geller into the blogosphere and public discourse, as the 
machinery of a network that the Center for American Progress (CAP) dubbed Fear Inc. 
kicked into high gear. A few days after Geller’s piece, the Post’s Peyser wrote an article 
titled “Mosque Madness at Ground Zero” that opened with “A mosque rises over Ground 
Zero. And fed-up New Yorkers are crying, No!”16. She added that the opening day was 
planned to coincide with the 10th anniversary of 9/11, though project planners never gave 
a date. She used Geller’s “monster mosque” phrase, attributing it to an unnamed “critic”. 
She informed her readers of a demonstration rally against the mosque planned “for June 
6, D-Day” by “the human-rights group Stop Islamization of America”. Peyser then 
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quoted Geller, the director of this “human-right group”. In this article, Peyser’s framing 
of the issue was quite significant. She described New Yorkers as fed-up with Muslims 
and added how she and a “chorus of critics” all “feel as if they’ve received a swift kick in 
the teeth,” and as betrayed by the committee that so “stupidly” approved the project. She 
invoked Pearl Harbor and Auschwitz by quoting a committee member who likened the 
alleged insensitivity of Muslims to that of Japanese or Germans wishing to build at these 
historical sites of tragedy. The claim that the opening date was to coincide with the 
significant anniversary of 9/11, “the day a hole was punched in the city’s heart”, provided 
the climax to this very emotive and powerful story that summoned the worst tragedies in 
Americans’ collective memory. In doing so, Peyser portrays Geller and SIOA as the 
premier and only “human rights” group standing up to defend America.  
With this piece Peyser wove a story that set up the terms of the debate and the 
frame of a narrative: the expansionist Muslims are coming to take over! Months earlier, 
both the New York Times and Fox News had featured the project in a neutral or even 
positive tone and nothing happened. But within days of Peyser and Geller’s portrayals, 
their phrases and arguments were repeated by conservative activists, politicians and 
pundits. The issue spread throughout media outlets (visual, print, and online) and the 
debates and demonstrations for and against the project saturated the public sphere. 
Rudy Giuliani, New York City’s former Mayor, called the project a “desecration.”  This 
notion that Muslim presence near the sacred ground would be a desecration quickly 
became part of the narrative, even as some people pointed out that the nearby strip clubs 
and bars desecrate the hollowed grounds17 but no one rallied to remove them. President 
Obama weighed in during the White House Ramadan dinner to affirm Muslim belonging 
and right to build anywhere that the law allowed them. After being criticized and framed 
as supporting this proposed “desecration”, he later affirmed the legality and right to 
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build but questioned the wisdom of doing so. In a Twitter message, former vice-
presidential candidate, Sarah Palin called on “peaceful Muslims” to “pls refudiate (sic)”18 
the project. Describing them as “radical Islamists” on Fox News, former Speaker of the 
House of Representatives Newt Gingrich likened the project team to Nazis trying to “put 
up a sign next to the Holocaust museum in Washington”19.  
This forceful opposition was met by strong support from New York Mayor 
Bloomberg, civil liberties and interfaith groups, and ordinary citizens. However, their 
support and the calls for reasonable debate had difficulty rising above the den of 
detractors. A committed chorus of detractors stayed on message repeating the same 
phrases and arguments and solidifying the narrative in the minds of the general public 
by stirring their passions. They were very effective. Within three months, a Time 
Magazine poll showed 61 percent of Americans opposed the project, 70 percent thought 
building the center would be an insult to 9/11 victims, 43 percent had unfavorable views 
of Muslims, and 46 percent saw Islam, more than other religions, to “encourage violence 
against nonbelievers.” 20.This sentiment has resulted not only in the opposition of this 
particular project but in the opposition to mosques in three Tennessee towns, New 
York’s Staten Island, Illinois and Wisconsin.  
The discourse became toxic and at time ridiculous, as exemplified by the reaction 
to a young Lebanese American Muslim woman’s winning of the 2010 Miss America 
pageant. It did not matter that she opposed the Park51 project or that Geller approved of 
her for “going against everything Muslims want a woman to be,” 21 because other right-
wing bloggers saw the young woman as a plant from Lebanon’s Hezbollah Islamist party 
which purportedly “rigged” the contest so a “Muslima [Muslim female] would win”22. 
Wajahat Ali, a second generation Muslim playwright and blogger, satirized the 
degradation of the public discourse in a post he titled “How Miss USA Will Push the 
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Secret Muslim Agenda.”23 Paradoxically, the charged debate about the alleged threat 
from Muslims occurred just few months after a significant study by Stanford and Duke 
Universities made CNN headlines as “Study: Threat of Muslim-American terrorism in 
U.S. exaggerated.”24 
The drama of the Park51 project and of a Qur’an burning threat by a Florida 
preacher in the summer of 2010 was followed in the winter of 2011-12 by a controversy 
surrounding The Learning Channel’s (TLC) reality show “All American Muslims”, which 
followed the lives of five Muslim families in Dearborn Michigan. The normalcy of their 
lives contradicted expected images of fanaticism and anti-Americanism, and that 
troubled the born-again founder of the Florida-based Family Association (FFA). He saw 
it as “propaganda” that hides the “the Islamic agenda’s clear and present danger to 
American liberties and traditional values”.25 He launched an email campaign to petition 
sponsors to pull out of advertising during the show and a few succumbed to pressures. 
There was extensive media coverage of the controversy. The questions that present 
themselves are: was the backlash on the Park-51project due to the “sensitivities” related 
to Ground Zero? Are the incidents mentioned here isolated tempests in a tea cup? Or is 
this Islamophobia, a phenomenon that is now becoming more bold and public?  
 
Islamophobia: A Myth or a New Reality? 
 
The negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in Western discourse and 
imagination dates back centuries, to the Crusades and colonialism,26but the term 
Islamophobia has only gained currency in the post-9/11 environment. It has no agreed-
upon definition and it is often used interchangeably with anti-Muslim racism, anti-
Muslim prejudice, and intolerance of Muslims. The genealogy of the term Islamophobia 
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is uncertain, but it first appears 1961 in its French form Islamophobie in a critique of the 
orientalist approach to Islamic texts written by a French painter and convert to Islam, 
Alphonse Etienne Dinet. As if in a reply, the first English form appeared in 1976 by an 
Egyptian Dominican Islamicist, Georges Chahati Anawati, regarding his concern that a 
non-Muslim scholar of Islam is always at risk of being accused of Islamophobia by 
Muslims (Vakil 2008).  
Edward Said used the term in Orientalism Reconsidered (1985), arguing that 
Islamophobia and anti-Semitism originate from the same sources, and in 1991 British 
Muslim sociologist, Tariq Mahmood, used the term in a book review (Richardson 2011). 
Through the early 1990s, British Muslims used “Islamophobia” to refer to prejudices 
they encountered. The concept entered public and policy parlance in a 1997 Runnymede 
Report by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia.27 The report 
acknowledged that Islamophobia as a term is “not ideal”, but that like xenophobia it 
could be a shorthand that refers to “dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or 
dislike of all or most Muslims” (Runnymede Trust 1997, 1). While recognizing the 
centuries-long history of this dislike or hate, the commission acknowledged a new, 
dangerous, and rising level of such sentiment and was concerned about its economic, 
social and public life consequences for Muslims. There was, the commission concluded, 
“a new reality which needs naming” (Runnymede Report 1997, 4). The report introduced 
both the concept and the phenomenon it was naming to public discourse. As 
importantly, it recognized and titled its report that “Islamophobia [is] a challenge for us 
all”. It is a challenge in that it threatens all citizens in pluralistic societies. Consequently, 
the report proposed concrete steps necessary to combat Islamophobia, including a public 
policy that moves towards an “ideal society” through “certain rules of engagement” for 
the media that protect free speech but combat bigotry, distortion and hate speech 
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(Runnymede 1997, 2). The report determined that the legal term of “racial violence” was 
no longer sufficient and needed to be expanded to “religious and racial violence”; 
additionally, inclusionary policies were needed for education and the culture at large.  
The “new reality” that the Runnymede commission found necessary to name only 
intensified after 9/11 and subsequent terrorist acts committed by violent Muslim 
extremists. Since then, there has been a significant backlash, including physical or verbal 
attacks and political or economic marginalization, against Muslim or Muslim-looking 
individuals, businesses and community institutions.28  
The terrorist acts do instill fear in people; therefore, one could argue that 
Islamophobia is not hatred of Muslims but a real and justified fear of them, and that 
some people may voice or act on these fears. Researchers are attempting to differentiate 
such genuine anxiety and fear from Islamophobia. A Center for American Progress (CAP) 
report, titled Fear Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America (W. Ali et al. 
2011), examined what it calls the “Islamophobia echo chamber.” It defined Islamophobia 
as “an exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is 
perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the 
marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from America’s social, political, and civic life” 
(W. Ali et al. 2011, 9). The authors detailed a network of “experts” and academics, think 
tanks and grassroots groups, the funders who finance them, and the media outlets that 
disseminate their output. The report identified the top seven funding agencies that 
together gave nearly $43 million to these think tanks,29 including Middle East Forum, 
Clarion Fund, and the Investigative Project on Terrorism. These funds provide the 
lifeline for a group of “experts” on all things related to Islam, including Daniel Pipes at 
the Middle East Forum and Robert Spencer of Jihad Watch and Stop Islamization of 
America. Pipes is sought out by the media and by government officials. He was 
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appointed by then President Bush to the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace against 
fierce criticism from academic and civic groups.30 Pipes created the website Campus-
watch.org for students to report professors of Middle East and Islamic Studies and those 
critical of Israel or the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East31. Pipes had left academia to 
dedicate his time to his activist and expert roles32.  
Funders enable the research of these alleged experts and scholars and the 
production and dissemination of their findings to public institutions and the media. But 
there is nothing like the testimony of “native” insiders to make this work credible to the 
public. These insider witnesses to the problems with Islam and Muslims include Arabs 
(regardless of faith) and current or former Muslims who confirm the tropes of Muslim 
backwardness and danger and present themselves as warriors committed to bring the 
values of Western Enlightenment to the backward world of Islam. These native 
informants are what CAP’s report called the “validators” or what Columbia Professor 
Hamid Dabashi calls a new “pedigree of comprador intellectuals” (2006, N.P). They 
include Jasser, the Arizona physician mentioned earlier, and Walid Phares a Lebanese 
Christian. It is, however, female insiders like Somali-Dutch and former Muslim Ayan 
Hirsi Ali who provide the best corroboration.  
The rhetoric— made credible by these scholars, validators, religious leaders, and 
politicians— reaches the public through grassroots organizations and media outlets such 
as Fox News and is then picked up by CNN and others. Whether it is out of genuine belief 
or political stratagem, conservative politicians embrace this discourse echoing the exact 
arguments and phrases and in the process provide an aura of official sanction.33 Political 
candidates who see in Muslims a wedge issue for elections pander to a populist 
impulse.34 The following example illustrates the workings of the network and its 
attempts at the political marginalization of Muslims. In 2008 Robert Spencer, one of the 
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network’s expert, wrote a book on Stealth Islam and the term entered the network’s 
narrative. In June of 2011, Walid Shoebat, one of the Arab validators, was interviewed by 
Frontpage, an online conservative magazine founded and edited by David Horowitz, 
another such expert. In the interview, Shoebat cited Huma Abedin, a second generation 
Muslim woman of Pakistani background, as an example of the Muslim infiltration of 
government. Abedin has been Secretary of State Clinton’s aide since the latter was the 
first lady in the 1990s. Shoebat cited Abedin’s marriage to a Jewish congressman as part 
of strategy to conceal her links to Islamists who purportedly made special dispensations 
for her to marry a non-Muslim35. In July 2012, Republican Congresswoman and 2012 
presidential hopeful Michelle Bachmann and four Republican congressmen sent a letter 
to five federal agencies. The letter warned the agencies that Islamists have infiltrated the 
highest levels of the Obama administration and cited Abedin’s position as evidence36. 
Religiously or politically conservative individuals were early vocal contributors to 
this narrative. Over time, well-known liberal and atheist thinkers have contributed by 
arguing that Islam in its essence is violent, misogynist and irreconcilable with the West, 
giving the narrative further academic and intellectual cover. They start by arguing that 
“Islamophobia”, put in quotation to dispute its existence, is a myth created by Muslims 
to silence critical discourse on Islam and Muslims. Leading this charge and thread in the 
narrative are Sam Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens, two prominent new atheists. 
While these thinkers are critical of all religions, they reserve a distinct contempt for 
Islam. For example, Sam Harris argues that in the “gradations to the evil that is done in 
name of God”, Islam holds an especial status because terrorism and intolerance are basic 
doctrinal teachings. Consequently, Islam presents the world with a global and unique 
problem. He acknowledges the existence of “some moderate Muslims who have decided 
to overlook the irrescindable militancy of their religion”; but even they, he theorizes, 
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cannot deny that theirs is a religion of conquest where “all infidels” are ultimately to 
convert or be killed. He says that we must stop “deluding ourselves with euphemisms 
and pandering to the religious sensitivities of Muslims” and to “admi[t] that we are not at 
war with ‘terrorism’; we are at war with precisely the vision of life that is prescribed to all 
Muslims in the Koran.” He concludes that “[a]ll civilized nations must unite in 
condemnation of a theology that now threatens to destabilize much of the earth.”37 
For better or worse, narratives and the media powerfully affect and shape public 
opinion. In covering religion in general, reporters usually use what Silk called “topoi”—
themes (for example, religions’ clash with modernity and clergy/leaders moral 
shortcomings) through which stories could be framed and anchored (Silk 1995). 
Reporters serve as “global storytellers” through whose constructions and framing, people 
find out about lifeways, define theirs and others’ identities, and evaluate the authenticity 
of prior reports. Media constructions also shape audiences’ perceptions of “the quality of 
the culture in terms of its aesthetic and spiritual vitality, and the significance of faith as a 
formative and deliberative motivational force for social good” (Badaracco 2004, 3). 
Today’s multiple and concurrent voices in multi-modality media compress time and 
space and bring global conflicts and discourses to people’s living room and reporters play 
a significant role in making this data digestible. Media, therefore, plays a critical role in 
shaping public perceptions and thoughts on political issues regarding “both the cultural 
identity of God and the spiritual basis upon which a national identity is imagined” 
(Badaracco 2004, 6). Consequently, the media could be considered an educator that 
provides an important public curriculum (Badaracco 2004; de Vries and Weber 2001).  
In the case of Islam, the topoi the media draws on include misogyny, violence, 
and fanaticism and the image painted in the minds of viewers is reflected to Muslims in 
the gaze and/or in words of many of their fellow citizens. Entertainment and news media 
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seem to have a feedback-loop effect on how they influence perceptions which then get 
reproduced in this media. These images create mental frames in the minds of audiences 
where Saddam Hussain or Osama Bin Laden stand in for Arab and Muslim. The images 
also give the creators of popular culture a plausible deniability of stereotypes; they can 
argue that the Arabs and Muslims in film are not ones they manufactured but the ones 
on the evening news38. The racial stereotypes of Blacks, Asian and Latino/a, and in this 
case Muslims and the associated narratives and images attest to the reality that the 
entertainment industry not only recycles but also exploits the images from the news 
media.   
According to Pew Research there has been a significant increase in the number of 
people who think Islam, more than any other religion, advocates violence. In 2002, 25 
percent of those surveyed held that view while 51 percent did not; by 2011, however, the 
numbers where 40 and 42 percent respectively. The percentage varies by political 
affiliation. More than two thirds of Republicans and Tea Party-leaning individuals hold 
that view compared to a third of Democrats,39 illustrating the impact of the anti-Muslim 
narrative prevalent on conservative media.  
Those espousing this discourse do not advocate violence against Muslims but 
their rhetoric, not unlike that of radical Muslim imams and ideologues, inspires some to 
act to stop the alleged threat of a Muslim takeover. Post 9/11 fear had silenced dissent 
and political criticism as thousands of Muslim men were required to register, many were 
deported, and countless others were detained for extended periods. The absence of 
dissent enabled the passage of the Patriot Act and rationalized profiling of Muslims 
without debates. Yet, while anti-Muslim crimes spiked by 1600% immediately after 9/11 
according to FBI crime statistics40, by 2002 they had dropped dramatically to one fifth of 
that. This drop was in part due to President Bush’s televised statements of the need to 
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differentiate the terrorists from all Muslims and Islam. Violent incidents, however, 
picked up again in 2010. For example, at the height of the Park51 debate, a young man in 
Manhattan slashed the throat of cab driver when he found out the driver was a Muslim. 
The joint Council on American Islamic Relations and the University of California-
Berkeley report of 2010 on Islamophobia lists forty incidents of opposition to mosques, 
violence, vandalism and threats compared to only sixteen such incidents in 2009.  
Reviewing the decade since 9/11, the Southern Poverty Law Center draws a link between 
anti-Islam propaganda and the increase in anti-Muslim or Muslim-looking attacks. 
During the 2010 controversies, for example, a fire was set to a rural grocery store owned 
by Sikh family mistaken for Muslims as indicated by the graffiti of “9/11 Go Home”; a 
Bronx imam received a partially-burnt Qur’an; a dry cleaning business owned by a 
Christian Arab was set ablaze with a swastika and a “fuck Arab” message41. Since 9/11 
several Sikh men mistaken for Muslims have been killed in Arizona and California, and 
in August of 2012 six were killed and many more were injured in a Wisconsin Sikh 
Temple massacre42.  Ironically, two Arab Christian men who traveled to join the rally 
against the Park51 project were overheard speaking Arabic and were accosted by a crowd 
shouting “go home” and had to be rescued by the police43.  
As the Runnymede report acknowledged, Islamophobia is not an ideal term; it is 
a problematic one for some Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The most common 
criticism of the term Islamophobia is that phobia implies irrationality and makes this 
label an instrument to silence all criticism of Islam and Muslims. The late Christopher 
Hitchens, a British American journalist and one of the influential new atheists, wrote: 
“the fake term Islamophobia is so dangerous: It insinuates that any reservations about 
Islam must ipso facto be ‘phobic.’ A phobia is an irrational fear or dislike. Islamic 
preaching very often manifests precisely this feature, which is why suspicion of it is by no 
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means irrational”44. Here, he echoes the “Stop the Islamization of Europe” organization’s 
motto: “Racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of 
common sense.”45  
The findings on the political roots of terrorism noted earlier notwithstanding, 
Muslim violent extremists have instilled fear in the general public and there is genuine 
anxiety and suspicion of Muslims that should not be dismissed. These acts raise the 
question of whether or not there is something in Islam and Muslim cultures that leads 
people to commit these violent acts. What distinguishes Islamophobia from a legitimate 
question? The Runnymede Report creates space for the legitimate criticism of Islam and 
Muslims by creating an “open versus closed” view of Islam with eight characteristics, 
including seeing Islam as monolithic and static vs. diverse and dynamic, and seeing 
Islam as Other and separate vs. similar and interdependent. It is not the critique of Islam 
and Muslims, undertaken by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, that is problematic, but 
the demonization and marginalization. The “closed view” is not merely an academic 
debate but has real life consequences where rights, property and lives are endangered 
when the fine line that separates rhetoric and actions is crossed. Critical debates are 
essential to democracy and freedom of speech is sacrosanct to the American public, 
though the latter has never been absolute. In pluralistic societies robust debates and 
open dialogue are crucial to civil society and, here, the choice need not be between 
demonizing or full embrace of all that the Other believes and practices; a middle ground 
of critical and respectful engagement is possible46.   
 I also have reservations about the term Islamophobia; I find the suffix phobia to 
be problematic (whether the prefix is Islam, homo, or xeno) because it connotes a 
medicalized irrationality and implies an affliction that potentially absolves anyone acting 
upon this phobia of any responsibility. Unlike terms like racism, sexism or anti-
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Semitism, phobia seems to diminish the seriousness of the discourses and actions they 
inspire. The label of Islamophobia could indeed be used by some to silence critique of 
Islam or Muslims by both Muslims and non-Muslims, but concerns about silencing 
critiques do not make terms like racism or anti-Semitism or sexism “fake.” Some who 
dislike the term Islamophobia have proposed “Anti-Muslim racism”, but because 
Muslims are not of a specific race, this word too is contested. One could argue, however, 
that since race is a social construct and it has come to mean color, nationality, or 
ethnicity; religion too could be added to that list (Richardson 2011).  However 
inadequate it might be, Islamophobia has come to describe a range of negative, 
marginalizing and at times dangerous sentiments, discourses, and behaviors towards 
Muslim and Muslim-looking people and towards Islam.  
 
Racialization in “Post-Racial” America  
 
Many scholars theorize that the foundation of race and racism and its persistence 
for centuries is inextricable from capitalist labor (Brodkin 1998; Guglielmo and Salerno 
2003; Horseman 1997; Roediger 2005). It is critical to note, however, that these racial 
ideologies had from the start a religious underpinning that divided the Christian 
colonialists from the “heathen” natives and Blacks. Tocqueville’s observation in 1835 of 
the tri-segmentation of America across racial lines into Indian, Negro, and European is 
frequently referenced. But less known is Reeves Kennedy’s coinage of the term “triple 
melting pot” in 1944, which segmented American society across religious lines into 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religious groups (Rumbaut 1999). 
In the United States, religious institutions have always played an important role 
in incorporating immigrants into society. Religion has often worked as a conduit and as a 
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space for immigrant groups to overcome internal diversity in language and regional 
origins. For example, nineteenth century immigrants from Italy viewed themselves as 
Sicilian, Neapolitan and Calabrese since Italy was not yet a nation. At church, however, 
they worshiped, socialized and fought discrimination and marginalization together as 
Italians (Rodriguez 2004). Creating a sense of community among these diverse people, 
who shared a national origin, churches and temples, overtime played a homogenizing 
role in inserting these groups into the segmented structure of Catholics or Protestants or 
Jews. While segmentation across religious lines has long existed, American society 
organized more along racial lines (Black, White, and Indian) and later added new ethnic 
labels as immigration brought groups that did not neatly fit the racial triad.  
Pan-ethnic labels such as African, Latino/a, Arab, Asian, and South Asian have 
come to designate internally diverse groups in American society and have been 
appropriated by the members of these groups. “Muslim American” seems destined to 
become such a label. Each of these labels emerged through/from a homogenizing 
racializing process that had also produced groups like the Irish, the Italians and the 
Jews, though these latter groups eventually became White and have since enjoyed its 
privileges. The Irish, for example, were the first non-Anglo and non-Protestant group to 
arrive in America. They faced such resentment and fear from old stock Americans that a 
political party, the Know Nothings, was formed against them and overt discrimination 
was displayed in “No Irish Need Apply” signs at businesses. Eventually, however, they 
were the first to move toward whiteness and were later followed by Italians. Since the 
Irish were considered “niggers turned inside out” and the Italians were referred to as 
“black guineas,” becoming White involved a double-move of seeking proximity to 
whiteness and distance from blackness in which religious institutions played a critical 
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role (Ignatiev 1995). This double-move remains the path of those aspiring to achieve 
whiteness. 
Religion played, and continues to play, a crucial role in the integration of new 
immigrants into American society. But the much celebrated wall of separation between 
church and state, which protects the religious freedom of people, emerged from 
competing groups and a contentious history. The founding and evolution of America’s 
public education and many of its Ivy League universities are rooted in religion and ethnic 
differences as is much of the long standing “culture war”47. Now, as in the past, the 
growing number of non-Protestant and non-Christian immigrants and nativist 
sentiments towards these new immigrants fuel those fears (see Eck 2001; Huntington 
2004; and Leonard 2005b).  
With the election of the first Black president in 2008, however, any talk about 
racism collides with the new narrative of a post-racial era in which America has 
presumably transcended race; race, therefore, should not be talked about or taken into 
consideration. Those calling attention to inequalities are accused of “playing the race 
card” to divide Americans and are themselves said to be racist. To Sumi Cho, a legal and 
ethnic studies scholar, post-racialism “in its current iteration is a twenty-first-century 
ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been 
made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based 
remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of 
social action” (Cho 2009, 1594). In this climate, calling attention to Islamophobia or 
anti-Muslim racism is dismissed as a myth because, anyway, Islam is a religion not a race 
or ethnicity. Anyone pointing out the difference between long established critique of 
Islam and the legitimate criticism of Muslims and today’s rhetoric as noted earlier is 
merely playing the race card to silence critics.  
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The Common Sense Nature of Race 
 
Categorizing and sorting all things, including people, into defined sets is inherent 
to the human brain’s ability to organize information. But the attributes of such 
categorizations and the meaning (good, bad or neutral) assigned to the sets are socially 
constructed and learned. The process of conflating color/race, religion, gender and 
sexuality is essential to the racialization process of constructing dangerous and 
undesirable Others (internal or external). It dates back to the origin story the nation tells 
itself about itself as an “Anglo-Protestant” nation. Princeton professor Samuel 
Huntington, who popularized the notion of the Clash of Civilizations, confirms this point 
in his book Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004). 
Gravely concerned by the post-1965 demographic changes resulting from immigration 
and by cosmopolitan liberals advocating multiculturalism, Huntington argued that 
America must act urgently to recover its identity. To do so “Americans should recommit 
themselves to the Anglo-Protestant culture, traditions, and values that for three and a 
half centuries have been embraced by Americans of all races, ethnicities, and religions 
and that have been the source of their liberty, unity, power, prosperity, and moral 
leadership as a force for good in the world” (Huntington 2004, Xvii). The presence of 
Latino/Hispanics, Asians and Muslims is a threat to America’s identity; but where the 
Mexican culture merely “retards” the assimilation of Mexicans (Huntington 2004, 188), 
the culture of Muslims and particularly Arab Muslims, Huntington says, makes them 
inassimilable. He claims that Muslim minorities have proved to be “‘indigestible’ by non-
Muslim societies” and considering the “nature of Muslim culture and its differences from 
American culture” their assimilation in America is even more problematic and unlikely 
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(Huntington 2004, 188). Like the terms Asian, Latino/a, and Blacks, the internal 
diversity in color, culture and national origin of Muslims is erased while their Muslim-
ness is magnified as the maker of their otherness in the racialization process.  
In their work on the formation of race in the United States, sociologists Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant introduced the concept of racialization “to signify the 
extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social 
practice, or group. Racialization is an ideological process, an historically specific one” 
(2004, 14). In constructing the racial other, this process draws on already existing 
images and discourses. Omi and Winant (2006) note that race is foremost a 
sociohistorical process where both the category and meaning index a social relation in a 
particular historical moment. Yet, the  
meaning of race is defined and contested throughout society, in both collective 
action and personal practice. In the process, racial categories themselves are 
formed, transformed, destroyed and reformed. We use the term racial formation 
to refer to the process by which social, economic and political forces determine 
the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn 
shaped by racial meaning. Crucial to this formulation is the treatment of race as 
the central axis of social relations which cannot be subsumed under or reduced 
to some broader categories or conception [2006, 16]. 
 
Omi and Winant argue that the apparent “common sense” nature of the 
prevailing racial order attests to the critical role of racial formation in constructing the 
meaning of race and identity. Our preconceived notions of what each racial group looks 
and behaves like serve as our compass for who a person is. The most obvious markers we 
give to racial categories (for example, skin color or appearance) also carry assumptions 
about personal disposition including temperament, intellectual and athletic abilities and 
about sexual and aesthetic preferences. Subsequently, we become confused when people 
do not act “Muslim”, or “Black” or “White” or “Latino/a”. The associated attributes may 
differ with time but a “system of racial meaning and stereotypes, of racial ideology” has 
endured in American culture (Omi and Winant 2006, 13). This system made diverse 
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people brought from Africa and diverse groups of Native Americans tribes into “Blacks” 
and “Indians” respectively and constructed diverse Europeans into “Whites” in 
contradistinction. With time, it added Jews, Hispanics, Asians and now Muslims. Such 
constructions arise from contending political and economic projects where scapegoats 
are needed to deflect responsibly and divide those who are struggling. Asians are raced 
as disloyal foreigners, Blacks as criminals, Arab and Muslim as backward/terrorists and 
Latinos as illegals.  The images and associated discourses with the latter three groups 
have defined the political landscape, particularly in this “post-racial” Obama era. Rather 
than seeing race as essence or mere illusion, Omi and Winant argue it is critically 
important that race be understood as “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social 
meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle” (2006, 15).   
This instability and transformation of the meaning does not necessarily lead to 
deep structural changes over time. In her influential book, The New Jim Crow (2012), 
Michelle Alexander argues that America has not so much transcended its race problem 
as it has just “redesigned it”. She notes that in a purportedly post-racial society, the 
change from the era of Jim Crow was not so much structural as it was linguistic.  In 
today’s “colorblind” society it is not acceptable to overtly discriminate or express social 
distain based on race. Instead, we use the criminal justice system and public discourse to 
label people of color as criminals, extremists, or illegals; then, we “engage in all the 
practices we supposedly left behind” (Alexander 2012, 2). This, Alexander argues, has 
created a new caste system, where people of color permanently and without recourse lose 
their rights. Blacks and Latino/as form the great majority of the steady stream of young 
people from the schoolyard to the prison courtyard and since prisoners lose, among 
other things, their voting rights they are permanently disenfranchised. Racist beliefs that 
were the foundation for past discrimination have since been replaced by a “racism lite” 
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that is “kinder and gentler” but that is no less effective than Jim Crow in maintaining the 
racial status quo. The defining elements of this new form are:  
1) [the] increasingly covert nature of racial discourse and practices 2) the 
avoidance of racial terminology and the ever-growing claim by whites that they 
experience ‘reverse racism’ 3) the invisibility of most mechanisms to reproduce 
racial inequality 4) the incorporation of ‘safe minorities’ (e.g., Clarence Thomas, 
Condoleezza Rice, or Colin Powell [and Obama]) to signify the nonracialism of 
polity; 5) the rearticulation of some racial practices characteristic of Jim Crow 
period of race relations. [Bonilla-Silva 2003, 272] 
 
 But among Whites too, there exists gradations and inequalities based on class, 
urban or rural residence, and education that unevenly distribute the privilege of 
whiteness; the epithets of “white trash” and “rednecks” index this hierarchy. Whiteness 
is, therefore, “importantly inflected by the markings of class” (Hartigan 2003, 96). Post-
racial intellectuals argue for decentering race and for universal justice but in doing so, 
Cho notes, they engage in a false universalism that restores White normativity and leaves 
things unchanged (Cho 2009). When the “war on drugs” is seen only as a Black and 
Brown problem, immigration seen only as a Brown problem, and terrorism only as a 
Muslim problem, profiling and surveillance become an acceptable necessity to protect 
society. The criminal Black, the illegal Brown, and the violent Muslim are to accept that 
the loss of their civil rights and liberties are a small price to pay for collective safety. So 
long as the entrenched public perception and consciousness are unchallenged, the legal 
or discursive criminalization and mass incarceration of people of color will continue and 
the underlying racial order will remain unchallenged and unchanged (Alexander 2012). 
Additionally, if the challenges and subsequent changes were not substantial, then the 
system will remain in a state that Omi and Winant call “unstable equilibrium.” In this 
case, it only morphs into another form as “convict leasing replaced slavery” or “it will be 
reborn, just as mass incarceration replaced Jim Crow” (Alexander 2012, 234-5). Legal 
challenges to Jim Crow did not end it until there was mass movement to raise public 
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consciousness and create consensus about the perniciousness of this system. Legal cases 
such as Brown vs. Board of Education then legitimated the demands of activists, 
invigorated a social movement and, at the same time, provoked a backlash (Alexander 
2012). The system and the problems continue in another form. 
 
 
Racialization: a path to belonging or a strategy of Othering? 
 
Though post-9/11 hyper-patriotism and slogans of “United We Stand” saturated 
the public sphere and deemed dissent or critique not only unpatriotic but a betrayal, race 
was significant in the different ways people reacted to the shock and the shared grief for 
the human tragedy. As the brown Middle Easterner became the primary public enemy, 
as the numbers of detained Arab and Muslim men approached thousands, and as the 
public was being prepared for war, minorities recognized the signs of the making of a 
new “problem people.”  Japanese Americans, recalling their internment experience, 
recognized the hysteria and spoke out and stood by Muslims; Black and Brown 
comedians in urban clubs gave voice to the recognition as expressed by comedian Ian 
Edwards: “Black people, we have been delivered. Finally, we got a new nigger. The 
Middle Easterner is the new nigger” (Jacobs-Huey 2006, 60). Anthropologist Lanita 
Jacobs-Huey was intrigued to explore how and why Blackamerican comics and their 
mostly Black and Brown audience were able to laugh after this tragic event, while White 
comedians were expressing their grief on television and found it difficult to tell jokes.  
Jacobs-Huey noted that the minority comics and their audiences understand the 
shifting grounds of American-ness where minorities’ belonging appears provisional. 
These comics condemn racial profiling and the “simplistic and ahistorical accounts of 
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U.S.–Middle East conflict that conveniently absolve America from culpability in past and 
present tragedies” (Jacobs-Huey 2006, 64). She found a prevalent theme of “Arabs as 
the new Niggers” that satirizes the reprieve Blackamericans experienced as 
discrimination was now focused on the “Middle Eastern” and Blacks were seen as real 
Americans and allies in the war on terrorism (Jacobs-Huey 2006, 64). But it was not 
only comics who drew this comparison. Legal scholar Jonathan Stubbs asked if on 9/11, 
Muslim Americans have come to occupy the “Bottom Rung of America’s Race Ladder” 
becoming “America’s New N.….s?” (Stubbs 2003). 
As volatile geopolitics in the Middle East and related media coverage and popular 
culture shape the public image of the Middle Eastern, many Arabs and Persians have 
attempted to escape demonization by engaging in what Iranian American scholar John 
Tehranian (2009) referred to as “covering”.48 Covering strategies include association, 
appearance and affiliation that allow one to be misidentified. Their phenotypical 
ambiguity, when compared to the exaggerated features of stereotypical Middle Eastern 
in popular imagination49, enables many Arabs and Persians to pass for Southern 
European, Indian or Latino. Arab and Persian Jews also play up the conflation of 
ethnicity and religion by claiming their Jewishness to cover their national origins 
(Tehranian 2009). This enabled them to perform whiteness and reap its benefits at the 
individual level, since passing for White shelters one from discrimination in the short 
term.  
To escape being racialized as violent and backward, Middle Eastern Americans 
covered their backgrounds and shunned organized activism for a long time. Their 
“Faustian pact with whiteness,” as Tehranian puts it, forestalled their efforts to fight 
discrimination and the erosion of their civil rights or to change the public discourse that 
racializes them as inferior and inassimilable aliens (2009, 20). This marginalization is 
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ultimately experienced at the individual level. These “invisible citizens” became more 
visible with each crisis since 1980s. They rose to hyper “visible subjects” (Jamal and 
Naber 2008) after 9/11 as Arabs (regardless of faith) and Muslims from diverse 
backgrounds were collapsed into the “terrorist fundamentalist Muslim”. In this 
racialization process, as Omi and Winant had pointed out, the brown or black skin carry 
cognitive and moral assumptions. Here, as Moallem noted, Islamic fundamentalism 
becomes shorthand for this Muslim or Middle Eastern other’s singularity “in its 
irrationally, morally inferior, and barbaric masculinity and its passive, victimized, and 
submissive femininity” (Naber 2008, 2). 
In its efforts to avert terrorist acts, the Homeland Security Agency asks 
Americans if they “see something, [to] say something.” The “something” is any 
“suspicious activity”50 such as unattended packages. As to what or who is construed as 
suspicious, the public relies on mental images and frames that have been constituted 
through centuries-old tropes and through the images on news footage or fictional 
dramas. Jack Shaheen (2001) studies portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in films from 
1896 onward. He concluded that today’s images do not qualitatively differ from the 
“celluloid Arab” except that this Arab man is more dangerous51 and, I would add, his 
womenfolk are more oppressed. The Arabs and Muslims represented on the screen 
(news or fiction) and in public discourse are not ordinary people whom one would want 
as next door neighbors. This portrayal is not necessarily a conscious agenda that 
constructs or perpetuates negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims but is the product of 
shared mental frames.  
In the racial binary of American society, only the belonging of Blacks and Whites 
is never questioned. Blackamericans may occupy the bottom rung of the racial order but 
their American-ness is assumed. Are, then, those in-between Black and White doomed to 
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a liminal state of questionable membership? Sherman Jackson (2008) argues that race is 
a critical marker and a path to authentic belongingness to America. That being the case, 
he contends that Muslims –immigrants in particular – must overcome a “racial agnosia” 
which proclaims there is no race in Islam, dismisses racism within the community and 
society, and overlooks their own racial identity. If they hope to belong and claim a place 
in society, Muslims have to grasp the work that “race” does in this society and abandon 
use of the simplistic proclamation that “Islam does not do race” to cover their own 
prejudices. Failure to do so, Jackson argues, only privileges whiteness, assigns Muslims 
the race category of a foreign Other, and perpetuates Islamophobia, which is racism by 
another name (Jackson 2008, 80). The Muslim-ness of Blackamericans does not strip 
them of their authentically American status, as evident by public views on the NOI and 
the ever growing numbers of Blackamerican embracing Islam. This, he notes, is because 
Blackness is “indigenized, identity-in-difference” that tempers and manages the nativist 
tendency that always threatens to malign non-whites. 
 Immigrant Muslims, many of whom are legally White, do not have this status. 
Though they are socially not White, they remain “unraced” in a society where belonging 
is race based. As non-White, immigrants’ only hope for belonging, therefore, rests on 
realizing that whiteness is not “the signature of authentic American-ness” and 
recognizing that blackness presents other possibilities for being authentically American 
(Jackson 2008, 84). This will involve doing away with the “undifferentiated America and 
undifferentiated Islam” frameworks that erase race; it involves embracing race and the 
necessity of Blackness to the racial order. Islamically, race can perhaps do the work that 
tribe or clan did in the Prophet’s time (Jackson 2008, 84). Here then, neither the 
universalism of post-racial America nor colorblind Islam would be in the best interest of 
Muslims, whether immigrants or not. This is because it has always been race, not 
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religion, that is “the core of America’s perduring pursuit of redemption and innocence” 
to atone for and redress the injustices of racial differences. Those who wish to remain 
“unraced’ risk their eligibility for authentic belonging or for benefiting for America’s 
perpetual quest for redemption (Jackson 2008, 85). 
Jackson’s insights are critically important and touch on the greatest intra-
community rift, between immigrants and converts, which I will discuss further in the 
next chapter. I would, however, argue here that the issue is not so much that immigrants, 
Muslims or not, are “unraced,” because as noted above they all eventually become 
racialized. The critical issue is that these immigrants could never be Black or White as 
demanded by an American racial ideology that marks authenticity only in this binary. 
This binary system even rendered native peoples forever absent from the discussion. 
Now as in the past, African and European immigrants easily blend into the Black or 
White racial binary and their offspring are not likely to be asked of their origins. 
Immigrants from the Middle East/North African, South and East Asia, and Latino/as are 
on a different trajectory. They fought for inclusion in whiteness for citizenship and its 
privileges when citizenship was legally restricted to Whites, and they were (de)classified 
as Whites more than once. They were, however, socially always non-White and maligned 
as Arabs, Turks, Persians, Hindu, Orientals, and Mexicans. Perhaps only the 
descendants of early Arab Christians have become fully White, as their Anglicized names 
(examples include Senators Spencer Abraham and John Sununu, and renowned 
journalist Helen Thomas) do not betray their Arab background. But even they are at risk 
of losing their whiteness and belonging if they dare express unpopular opinions, 
especially about America’s foreign policy, as exemplified by the case of Helen Thomas52.  
As citizenship laws dropped the race requirement, and as immigrants became 
cognizant of their racialized identities and the power that lies in numbers, they began to 
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organize and create coalitions to be recognized as groups in society and on the U.S. 
census forms. Between 1970 and 1990, the terms Asians and Latinos/Hispanics entered 
both the census and public discourse. Political crises in the Middle East and the U.S. role 
in the region have punctuated the group construction projects of Arabs, Persians and 
others from the region. Their pursuit for group designation in the U.S. census began in 
the 1990s but remains unfulfilled, in part, because of the social invisibility of Middle 
Easterners as individuals. It takes organization and resources –both material and 
cultural –to challenge racism and its consequences. Arab and Persian Americans have 
been organizing in earnest since the 1990s to push for group designation, but their 
project became a higher priority in the post-9/11 era and as the banner has been taken by 
their younger, American-born offspring. Determined to have the U.S. Census Bureau 
create Arab and Persian American categories in official documents, younger Arab and 
Persian Americans launched a “check it right, you ain’t White” campaign for the 2010 
census. They used social media and YouTube to urge Arabs and Persians to own their 
ethnic background by checking “other” and writing their ancestry. Their work is in 
progress. 
 
Interrogating Whiteness, Revising Tradition, and Asserting Belonging 
 
Many Muslims and other minorities are beginning to realize that passing for 
white may serve them well in the short term, but in the long run, it is to their individual 
and collective determinant. Many of this project’s collaborators of Middle Eastern or 
South Asian parentage grew up marked from childhood by their strange names or 
clothing. They might also have been aware of their olive complexion and its difference 
from both Blacks and Whites and might have sensed that they occupied a racially 
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ambiguous in-betweenness in the U.S. color spectrum. Immigrant parents might not 
have only courted whiteness but might have also thought of themselves as White in the 
racial ladder of America, but members of the second generation, regardless of ethnic 
background or class, know they are not nor are they seen as White. As noted in an earlier 
chapter, Brown and Black children become aware of their color difference very early 
whether in the neighborhood playground or in the classroom.  
With these experiences and growing up amidst the discourse of multiculturalism, 
these younger Muslims embrace their ethnic difference. Of the 246 survey participants, 
only five listed White or Caucasian as their ethnic category; only two of the five were of 
immigrant background. The remaining 241 listed Asian, South-Asian, Black, African 
American, Arab, or their families’ country of origin as their ethnic category. Where 
earlier immigrants or older generations might have concealed their ethnic identity, their 
descendants are socialized in American culture and racial ideas are imprinted in them 
from childhood. In a nation founded on racial polarity and where immigrants fought to 
be “white by law,” it is paradoxical, then, that the children and grandchildren of these 
immigrants learn and internalize that they are non-White minorities in a post-civil right 
era and in a presumably post-racial society (Rumbaut 2008). 
In the post-9/11 era, Muslims have more fully become a raced group. The 
conflation of ethnicity and religion has implications for identity and perceptions. Where 
some attempt to hide their religious and ethnic background, many are asserting both and 
all the complexities that entails but not without trepidation. Almost a quarter of eighteen 
to twenty-five year old participants are only slightly optimistic or not optimistic at all 
about the future of Muslims in America. This cohort came of age in a post-9/11 world in 
which their Muslim-ness presents a public problem. Salwa, a twenty-five year old of 
Pakistani background who describes herself as a “queer Muslim woman of color,” thinks 
256 
that Muslims will always be seen as outsiders. This, she notes, is because Muslims are 
stereotyped as Arab/brown and people of color in this country are “not catered to and 
are ‘othered.’”  The survey did not inquire about sexual orientation but, in comments 
lines, Salwa created a space to assert the multifaceted nature of her identity as a queer, 
Muslim, women, and an American person of color:  
Muslims are isolating each other...we are not immune to sexism, racism, 
homophobia, ableism and other oppressions.  We are a part of perpetuating these 
destructive things every day.  Since 9/11 Muslims have, understandably, cast 
ourselves as victims (which we are in SO many ways) but unfortunately this 
means that we have ignored the ways that we contribute to hate in the world as 
well.  I know that I would be much stronger presence in my Muslim community if 
I knew that there were internal efforts being made to combat sexism and 
homophobia amongst ourselves.  Instead, I have been isolated and left out in the 
dark because of my other identities.  In this way, I believe that we are screwing 
ourselves over - in the long run. The United States (just as any other imperialistic 
force) is going to succeed in their divide and conquer techniques.  They pit us 
against each other and then we have no hope. 
 
In the process, Salwa challenges multiple narratives among Muslims and in 
society that deny or erase the complexity of who she is. Perhaps because of the multiple 
ways she feels she is marginalized, she is one of those who are not optimistic about the 
future. Salwa’s statements above, like those of other participants in this project, reflect 
the double critique that many American born and/or raised Muslims feel comfortable 
with and compelled to articulate. Their critique of and within the community often 
invokes the pure versus cultural Islam narrative discussed earlier. While they hold the 
media accountable for showing Muslims only when “some bad, very bad things” happen, 
they also hold those Muslims who behave badly or violently responsible for providing the 
media with material. Participants see Muslims as partially responsible for contributing to 
their public image as outsiders when some wear foreign-looking clothes in public and 
when converts take on Arabic names.  
Participants are nuanced in their evaluation of other Americans’ perceptions and 
attitudes; these younger Muslims believe that most of those who view Muslims as 
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suspicious outsiders are not doing so out of malice. Rather, it is out of “ignorance” of 
Islam/Muslims and partially because of media misinformation. More importantly, 
however, it is because of the lack of contacts with Muslims as friends or neighbors. 
Participants’ peer experiences inform their conclusion that other Americans who know 
Muslims do not buy into the media image and are able to see terrorists as misguided and 
criminal individuals. Participants conclude that the responsibility for reaching out to 
fellow citizens falls squarely on Muslim shoulders. But “ignorance” and the absence of 
malice does not make the hurt and frustration any less, as expressed by Hiyam, a 
nineteen year old women of Palestinian parentage. At the height of the Park51 drama, 
Hiyam says Muslims are now more than ever seen as outsiders who cannot be trusted 
because of all that is on the news. Yet what bothers her most is not so much the 
“prejudice or racism that [she] might be faced with” but “the fact that people have it in 
them to think in such an ignorant and illogical manner.” She and others argue that 
education and engagement are the antidote for this ignorance.  
Though the Muslim community has been more proactive in educating the public 
and responding to controversies, it was unprepared for the Park51 drama. The cultural 
center team (developer, the imam, and Ms. Khan) were the public face of the project and 
were taken aback by the controversy and the avalanche of criticism that painted them as 
“radical Muslims.” But no one was more surprised than the Muslim leadership and 
activists who found themselves having to defend a project about which they knew only 
what the media reported. El-Gamal, the developer, is not known outside of his 
immediate community. The imam is better known among and works more closely with 
non-Muslims, and he did not have much contact with Muslim leaders. Muslim activists 
and leaders defended the project publically on the basis that Muslims should have the 
right to build in Lower Manhattan and elsewhere. But as they were pushing back against 
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those who conflate Islam and Muslims with the violent extremists, they were privately 
angry at the project team and particularly at the imam for not informing or consulting 
other Muslims. They criticized the team for being out of touch with public sentiment and 
the political discourse on Islam in an election year.  
To the public, however, they had to present a united front. The head of CAIR-
Chicago, a chapter of the national Muslim civil rights organization, and second 
generation Muslim of Egyptian background, was among the many Muslim leaders and 
activists who took to the airways, cyberspace, and print to “represent” and to “defend” 
Muslims. In a Huffington Post’s article, he writes “the whole brouhaha about the 
‘Mosque at Ground Zero’ is frankly bogus. It has little to do with sacred ground, or 
sensitive hearts. It does, however, have everything to do with the exploitation of the 
sacred and the sensitive for the furtherance of the sacrilegious and the insensitive: the 
phenomenon of Muslim-bashing that is ravaging our nation today”53. Leaders of major 
Muslim organizations met with the developer who fielded their questions and addressed 
their concerns. Many of these organizations appointed their younger staff and activists to 
handle the media. Young converts and second generation Muslim American activists and 
academics like Reza Aslan became the public face of the Muslim community. 
In the midst of the Park51 controversy came the Qur’an burning threat in Florida, 
and not long after these incidents came the controversy around the TLC’s “All American 
Muslims”. While the Qur’an burning threat became an international incident, Muslim 
American leaders and scholars advised their community not to respond to the 
provocation. They tapped into their interfaith network for public support. Christian and 
Jewish religious leaders were alarmed by the rhetoric and spoke up against Anti-Muslim 
racism. The Islamic Society of North America along with twenty representatives from 
prominent Christian and Jewish religious organizations created a Shoulder-to-Shoulder 
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campaign with the objective of “standing with American Muslims [and] upholding 
American values”54. Responding to the TLC controversy, a coalition of various Arab and 
Muslim organizations, interfaith groups, and activists from diverse backgrounds 
launched a counter-campaign appealing to the public and to the companies which 
canceled their advertising contracts. Music mogul Russell Simmons offered to support 
the show by compensating TLC for any lost advertising revenue. Late night comedy 
shows, and particularly The Daily Show’s Jon Stewart and his second-generation Muslim 
“correspondent” on Comedy Central, perhaps better than anyone else Muslim or not did 
much to educate Americans by highlighting the contradictions, misinformation and the 
absurdity of some of the rhetoric and statements by pundits and politicians.  
 Muslim American civil rights organization and activists are documenting hate 
crimes and discrimination incidents. They are also engaged in defining the term 
Islamophobia and doing research on this phenomenon. In 2008, The University of 
California-Berkeley’s Center for Race & Gender (CRG) created an “Islamophobia 
Research and Documentation Project” to provide a forum for scholars, activists and faith 
leaders to discuss timely issues. CRG joined efforts with the Muslim civil rights 
organization, Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and issued a report titled 
Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States: January 2009 – December 2010: 
Old Hate, New Target. The report defines Islamophobia and clarifies that the label does 
not apply to those who disagree with Muslims, or those who condemn crimes committed 
by Muslims, or those who conduct critical studies on Islam and Muslims. Islamophobia 
is reserved for those individual and entities “that produce and package materials, ideas 
or rhetoric about Islam in order to promote a skewed view of the faith and to induce fear, 
hate or prejudice in those who receive the materials” (CRG and CAIR 2010, 11). 
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Generational Differences: Different Trajectories and Strategies 
 
Participants in this project identify generational differences in how Americans of 
other faiths view Muslims. They think that younger Americans, like those in their social 
networks, view being Muslim as just another facet of being an individual and not a cause 
for concern. During the Park51 controversy, Shareefa, the twenty-nine years old 
Blackamerican quoted earlier, recalls an incident that touched her. Her Facebook male 
friend whom she has known since elementary school responded to negative comments 
about Muslims on his Facebook page. He wrote “I don’t know why people are against 
Islam. It’s not Islam who bombed us on September 11th. It was crazy people, you know, 
Muslims should be allowed to practice their faith.” Shareefa says he was “just completely 
defending Islam” and that meant a lot to her.  
When Sara’s father was telling her about the difficulties of being Muslim in the 
work place, she told him that will change with her generation. Where her parents’ 
generation has to educate coworkers, Sara thinks her generation does not find it 
necessary to do that because “it’s not a factor that’s going to make anyone shirk away.” If 
anything, finding out a friend is Muslim is “going to make them more interested.” Sara 
and her generation’s Muslim-ness is a point that leads them and their non-Muslim 
friends to conversation about “how is Ramadan?” and perhaps an invitation to the 
annual Fast-a-thon held by MSA chapters on campuses across the nation to raise funds 
for charity. The 2011 Pew study on the views of Americans on Islam, cited earlier, 
confirms participants’ assessment of their non-Muslim peers. The study found that 
nearly six in ten (58 percent) of those age 18-30 years rejected the notion that Islam is 
more violent than other religions, compared to only 31 percent who agree that it is55.  
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Besides their views on religion, this cohort is also more accepting of racial diversity and 
views immigrations positively (Pew Center 2010)56.  
These generational differences also inform how Muslims tackle Islamophobic 
narratives. Many immigrant leaders or activists see combating Islamophobia is best done 
through the legal system and through courting politicians and civic leaders. But those 
who grew up in this society draw on their knowledge of its history and psychology and 
contend that such a strategy is only one of many paths to belonging and is perhaps the 
slowest. Reactions to the controversies of the past four years including the Park51 project 
illustrate the divergent strategies employed by the different groups. Perhaps none is 
more illustrative than the approach of two members of the project’s team, imam Rauf 
and developer El-Gamal. To show that they were not opposed to a mosque but to the 
location, opponents of Park51 project asked Muslims to show sensitivity by building at 
another location. Overwhelmed and unaccustomed to the negative publicity, the imam, a 
first generation immigrant, conceded to relocate the project if another property became 
available. But El-Gamal, a second generation developer, rejected the idea; he 
admonished the imam saying that he had “no authority or control over the project or 
board of directors” and subsequently relieved him of leading prayers in the planned 
center57. El-Gamal was not dissuaded by the controversy or the many threats he and his 
family received. He is determined to proceed as planned because, he says, he wants to 
make the world better place for his young daughters. Additionally, he feels a 
“responsibility to reclaim who we are” from the “criminals [who] have taken control over 
the narrative” and the image of Muslims.  He wants people to know Muslims and to 
know that wherever an “Islamic facility is built, it cleans up a neighborhood” and “it 
becomes a beacon of light”58. He speaks back both to violent Muslims and to the 
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opponents of his project who suggested that the Islamic center will desecrate hallowed 
grounds and will be an insult to Americans.  
Since 9/11, and particularly in the past four years, young converts and second and 
subsequent generations of Muslims leaders, activists or academics seem to be 
everywhere on television, radio, and in op-eds and blogs. They are not repeating 
statements about how “Islam is a religion of peace”; instead, they are deconstructing 
critics’ arguments, pointing out racist narratives, and invoking the law and historical 
memory. For example, Intisar Rabb, a second generation Blackamerican Muslim and a 
Boston College professor of constitutional and Islamic law debated Arizona Republican 
Congressman Trent Franks and author David Gaubatz on Boston Public Radio’s popular 
show On Point59. Franks, who co-chairs the International Religious Freedom Caucus in 
Congress, and Gaubatz advocate the narrative of a “stealth”60 Muslim movement taking 
over America through “creeping Sharia’h”. The two oppose the Park51 project seeing it 
as the “victory mosque” of the terrorists. Rabb, made more credible by her academic 
credentials, cited her expertise in Islamic and American laws to argue that fears of 
“creeping Sharia’h” are unfounded. She pointed out the political use of Muslims and 
Islam as a wedge issue for the midterm election of 2010. She then challenged Franks’ 
framing of the term “Cordoba” as a nod to Islam’s victory over Christianity in Spain. She 
invoked historical records to reframe Cordoba and Muslim Spain’s spirit of convivencia 
as a celebrated period for interfaith co-existence and the thriving of art, philosophy and 
science.   
In the past few years, the most visible spokespersons of CAIR, the Muslim 
American civil right organization mentioned earlier, have been its media savvy, 
American-born younger leaders in its New York City, Chicago, Michigan, and Los 
Angeles chapters. These new spokespersons are mostly men. But a few Muslim women 
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have also taken a lead. For example, Los Angeles-based Muslim Public Affairs Council 
(MPAC) has a female Director of Policy & Program, Edina Lekovic. Lekovic, a second 
generation Muslim of Montenegrin parentage, appears on major television networks and 
radio and speaks at Muslim conferences on how to tackle Islamophobia by 
deconstructing its narratives. The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), 
a Michigan based think tank, was co-founded by second generation Muslims. ISPU 
created within it a Center for the Study of American Muslims headed by Zareena Grewal, 
a second generation woman of Indian background. Grewal is a Yale University historical 
anthropologist who studies American Muslims. ISPU generates reports and policy briefs 
on hot-button issues such as Islamophobia, radicalization, and Sharia’h and on social 
trends like Muslim political and civic engagement as well as foreign policy issues. 
According to its website, the objective of the organization is to provide trustworthy, 
empirically researched briefs to policy makers and experts and to make reports available 
to Muslims and to the general public.  
Reza Aslan, a second generation Muslim American of Iranian background and a 
professor of religion, wrote No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of 
Islam after 9/11 because he wanted to change the narrative that locks Islam between the 
extremes of radical Muslims and ex-Muslims. His stated objective was to show the 
dynamism and diversity of Islam’s interpretative tradition (Aslan 2005). His book was 
reviewed and well received in the media and since then Aslan has become a public figure; 
he is now a sought after authority for analysis of issues relating to Islam and Muslims 
here and abroad. Aslan’s perfect American accented English, his metrosexual look, and 
his calm but commanding demeanor belies the public image of a committed Muslim 
defending Islam and Muslims. His image better fits (ex)Muslim validators of the 
Islamophobia narrative. Consequently, his appearance on CNN61 with Jasser (one such 
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validator) and his deconstruction of the latter’s arguments provided a more credible 
counterpoint than a stereotypically foreign sounding Muslim or turbaned and bearded 
imam could have provided. The video was widely circulated among Muslims and many 
project participants recounted how happy they were that Jasser met his match.  
 
Changing Hearts and Minds 
 
Younger Muslim Americans of all backgrounds know that it takes more than 
laws, debates and reports to change hearts and minds. Aslan, for example, recognizes the 
power of storytelling to provide a counter-narrative. He co-founded BoomGen Studios, a 
“transmedia storytelling factory,” to both produce and consult on entertainment works 
related to Muslims. Additionally, following in the footsteps of Richard Pryor, George 
Lopez, and Margaret Cho, multiethnic Muslim and non-Muslim comedy groups like the 
Axis of Evil, Sultans of Satire, Allah Made Me Funny, along with many solo comedians 
(men and women) employ comedy and satire to critique, entertain, and educate both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. I will return the topic of art in chapter 8, but at this juncture 
it is important to point out that the activist role this art form serves does not diminish its 
being foremost a creative endeavor of self-expression that affirms the complexity of the 
identities of its practitioners. Some of these artists partner with other minority 
comedians in acts like Arab-issh in Chicago or DISoriented in California. These groups 
are multiethnic and frequently multifaith; group members are conscious of their 
racialized identity as ethnic and/or religious minorities and are in dialogue with the 
dominant narratives. For example, performing at a Los Angeles church, Sultans of 
Satire’s Mike Batayeh called out to a Blackamerican woman in the audience saying: 
“Black person, you’re welcome, by the way. Nothing good came out of 9/11. Nothing 
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except for the first time in American history, you guys are not public enemy No. 1.” The 
woman shouted back laughing: “We appreciate it.”62 This comedic exchange engages the 
theme of the Arab the new N….r noted earlier. Rather than hiding their faith or limiting 
their humor to the ethnic, female comedians also make their Muslim-ness a central 
feature of their acts. Zahra Noorbakhsh’s All Atheists Are Muslim and Mona Shaikh 
MuslimsDoItBetter exemplify this trend.  
These younger generations of Muslim activists attempt to respond to anti-Muslim 
narratives or negative stereotyping in creative ways. For example, in the summer of 
2010, National Public Radio reporter and Fox News commentator, Juan Williams, added 
to the already charged public discourse  with his statements on television that when 
boarding a plane, he worries whenever he sees “people in Muslim garb and identifying 
themselves first and foremost as Muslims”.63 Citing his books on the Civil Rights 
movement to prove he is not a bigot did little to protect him from the charge of racism. 
But while accusations of racism and views on the dangers of political correctness were 
being exchanged, the idea that there is a characteristic “Muslim garb” struck a chord 
with a young Muslim woman who chose to deconstruct this visual stereotype with images 
illustrating the diversity of Muslims and what they wear. She created a blog of “Pictures 
of Muslims Wearing Things: Muslims Dressed in their Garb”64 featuring famous and 
ordinary Muslims in “garbs”: police uniforms, sports jerseys and shorts, evening gowns, 
jeans, with and without headscarf or caps, and in ethnic clothing from around the world. 
Pictures are submitted by readers with a caption. One image shows a Muslim woman 
wearing a military uniform with a hat over her headscarf and a caption “Wafa is a 
Muslim, Zumba lover, cancer survivor, and Lieutenant Commander of the Canadian 
Armed Forces.” Another has the caption “Muslim guitarist Usman Khalid Kashmiri 
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enjoys rocking out wearing faux-hawks and skinny ties.”  The site received coverage from 
other blogs and major media like Washington Post65 and The Atlantic66. 
The repeated negative portrayals of Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist and a 
sexual deviant prompted Tarek el Messidi, a second generation Tennessean now living in 
Ohio, to create a Celebrate Mercy (CM) project as Facebook page and a YouTube 
channel showing Prophet Muhammad the way Muslims see him. CM has more than a 
thousand volunteers from around the world and more than 160,000 Facebook fans while 
its YouTube videos have, as of late 2012, been viewed more than 300,000 times. When 
the American ambassador to Libya was killed during demonstrations against the Muslim 
Innocence67 film, el Messidi started a ten days long Facebook and Twitter “MercyMail 
Campaign” to send one thousand letters of condolences to the ambassador’s family. 
Instead, he complied over 7500 letters from around the world and the message of the 
campaign “respond to an evil deed with a good one” was tweeted to millions more by 
celebrities like Deepak Chopra and Cat Stevens (Yusuf Islam). The campaign generated 
national and international media coverage further publicizing the effort and it prompted 
the ambassador’s sister to meet with el Messidi68. This was not el Messidi’s first creative 
effort to counter the negative narrative. Shortly after 9/11, he and his then college 
roommate Sean Blevins created a Ramadan Fast-A-Thon at his college where Muslims 
and non-Muslims break their fast together at a dinner event organized by the Muslim 
Student Association. The project was intended to educate, to breakdown stereotypes and 
barriers, and to raise funds for charity. El Messidi and his partner then created a manual 
for the project and it has since been adopted by MSA-national and it is now an annual 
event in over 300 campuses69.  
To counteract anti-Muslim websites like Jihadwatch.com that amplify the 
Islamphobia narrative, a group of mostly young Muslim bloggers and their friends 
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created loonwatch.com and WhatIfTheyWereMuslim.com websites. The creators 
describe the first as “a blogzine run by a motley group of hate-allergic bloggers to 
monitor and expose the web’s plethora of anti-Muslim loons, wackos, and conspiracy 
theorists”70. The second features stories of violence, racism, and hateful rhetoric 
committed or produced by non-Muslims. The sites objective is to point out that, unlike 
the case with Muslims, the religion of these individuals or groups is not maligned in the 
process. To avoid being attacked by the well-funded Islamophobia network, the identity 
of creators and bloggers is concealed and this itself has become a subject of much 
speculation.   
 Since blackness is authentically American and essential for the nation’s need for 
redemption, Blackamerican Muslims can more effectively challenge Anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. At the height of the Park51 affair, a coalition of Blackamerican Muslim leaders, 
imams, and activists representing diverse interpretive tendencies and ideologies, 
including NOI’s Farrakhan, held a press conference at the National Press Club. Though 
not attended by mainstream press, it was webcast and publicized online in ethnic media. 
These Muslims invoked the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow to remind America of its 
propensity to construct problem people. Imam Zaid Shakir, co-founder of Zaytuna 
College and an influential scholar listed by project participants, asserted that Park51 
opposition is a “symptom of a greater disease” of fear mongering and bigotry. It is but 
one manifestation and similar, he said, to the nooses hung in a school in Louisiana or the 
families destroyed when parents are arrested in immigration raids at work or on the 
streets in Arizona. He reminded the nation that “when people start to burn books, it’s not 
a great leap for them to start burning people” and when “nooses are allowed to be hung 
unchallenged publically […] it’s not long before strange fruit71 start hanging on Southern 
and Northern trees”(Shakir 2010).  
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At the same event, Mahdi Bray, one of the few Blackamericans heading a mostly 
immigrant organization (the Muslim American Society), reminds people that anti-
Muslim bigotry is not a new thing; it is the “same toxic soup of hatred and bigotry, just 
served in a different bowl.” He says that it is bad enough that he suffers the indignities of 
driving while Black, he now has to also endure indignities of flying while Muslim. He 
said he is not remaining passive and that “this is not a climate in which we want to 
operate nor will we allow ourselves to operate in it”(Bray 2010). This Blackamerican 
Muslim coalition called on the country to reject anti-Muslim racism. The strong language 
and the powerful images invoked at this press conference could not be said or painted as 
credibly or effectively by immigrant Muslims. Evident from these excerpts is the cultural 
capital these Muslims possess and are willing to expend as necessary. As Jackson notes, 
Blackamericans of all faiths 
know the grammar and semiotics of white privilege and fear; they know how to 
be authentically American without being white; they know how to survive – even 
fight! – under circumstances far more severe than those spawned by 9/11; they 
know that while the efforts of a Martin Luther King Jr. may heighten the 
dominant culture’s awareness of its own psychological predisposition, this is far 
less likely to succeed in the absence of a Malcolm X. [Jackson 2008, 85]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The need for and meaning of the term Islamophobia remains contested. As the 
Runnymede Report and critics noted, it may not be the best term; nevertheless, it 
describes a new reality of heightened fear which puts faith and freedom at risk. The 
consequences for Muslims and non-Muslims individuals and societies alike are great. A 
determined and well-funded network of people on both sides of the Atlantic collaborates 
in an increasingly successful effort to normalize a racist discourse and agenda to 
presumably “Stop the Islamization” of America and Europe. They are effectively 
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capitalizing on public fear, the rhetoric and terrorist acts of Muslim extremists, and on 
ambitious populist politicians looking for wedge issues for political gains.   
Muslims of divergent backgrounds and even “Muslim-looking” people have been 
affected by Islamophobia and the “war on terrorism”. But the degree of this impact varies 
by one’s socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, and immigration status. Recent 
immigrants (legal or not) are more vulnerable due to their limited material and cultural 
resources. Most of this project’s participants are of middle class background and their 
views and responses are no doubt shaped by that. However, even participants from a 
working class background are, like their middle class counterparts, American born or 
raised with an ethnically or religiously-diverse social network and are socially and 
civically engaged. They are, therefore, demographically different from the young South 
Asian working class young people whom Sunaina Maira had studied. 
 Maira’s research participants are from the New England area and arrived in the 
U.S. during 1994–2000. They are minimally to moderately fluent in English. These 
participants and their parents work too many hours in low-paying jobs to be involved in 
Muslim or ethnic organizations. Their engagement with popular culture is primarily 
through their work which defines and limits their social network and leisure activities to 
other immigrants. These recent and often undocumented immigrants may not have the 
opportunities to be part of organizations or to employ traditional activism or political 
vocabulary. Nevertheless, like the participants in my project, they speak their minds on 
racism, on Islamophobia, and on the “war on terror” that threatens Muslims here and 
abroad. Their backgrounds and the Othering discourses they encounter make them 
“grapple with an ethics of belonging” (Maira 2010, 115). But, like my collaborators, they 
too are defiantly asserting their Muslim and ethnic identity and are not afraid to criticize 
America’s foreign policy and this society of which they are members. Personal 
270 
experiences along and with the complexity of belonging to a nation-state and at the same 
time to a local and (trans)national ummah uniquely position younger generations of 
Muslims regardless of background. Citizenship demands dissent and national and 
transnational loyalties are not contradictory because they all draw on universal 
principles of justice and equality. Even the non-citizens studied by Maira freely 
appropriated aspects of citizenship models as needed to assert their belonging.  
Both in Maira’s project and mine, religion promoted rather than hindered a sense 
of belonging and a concern for the betterment of their society among younger 
generations of Muslims, even among those who are not citizens (Maira 2008; and Maira 
2010). This complicates simplistic conceptualizations of citizenship in nation-states and 
narratives of identity crisis and of “us and them”. Muslim civic engagement, 
assertiveness and visibility in the public sphere along with demands for equality and 
rights, including for religious accommodations in the work place, worry many. Some see 
this engagement and visibility as a threat to Western secular values. Others see it as a 
sign of a sinister agenda and a stealth Muslim movement, but these Muslims see it as not 
just a religious obligation but also as a citizenship right. As Rosaldo and Flores (1997) 
noted among Latino/as and like America’s other minorities, the identity of Muslim 
Americans is constructed in and through discrimination and marginalization and 
through their struggle in the space between demanding and negotiating. Through this 
process, their belonging is achieved as they work to realize full legal and cultural 
citizenship. 
The charged atmosphere in the past four years enabled notions of “creeping 
Sharia’h”, “Stealth Muslims,” and “a victory mosque” to enter public discourse and 
imagination. But it also pushed Blackamerican and younger Muslims forward to shape 
the face of Muslims and Islam in America. While immigrant Muslims still control the 
271 
majority of national organizations, many of them are making room for their younger 
members to take the microphone and to stand before the camera. Blackamerican 
Muslims are also more assertively taking or creating opportunities to speak for 
themselves and the community. Social media and creative methods democratize the 
process of representing Muslims; this influences, however minimally, public discourse as 
mainstream media highlights these individual and these efforts that would not otherwise 
be noticed.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CRAFTING AN AMERICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
The preceding three chapters covered in depth current narratives pertaining to 
identity formation, faith vis-à-vis culture, and the public discourse on Islam as these 
narratives relate to second-generation Muslim Americans. However, these are not 
disconnected themes. In fact, there is great overlap as they all shape and are shaped by 
Muslim Americans’ being and belonging and are of particular significance for the 
younger generations represented here, however tentatively, by the participants in this 
project. Culture-talk is the scaffold that holds together all three narratives: purportedly 
cultural conflict underlies identity crisis, culture contaminates the purity of the faith, and 
an alien Muslim culture threatens America. Culture-talk also runs through this chapter 
and the next, which will bring together issues of being and belonging and illustrate the 
(co)constructed and contested nature of identity and belonging. The narrative that ties 
these two chapters together is one of a communal imperative, a call for building the 
community and creating a “Muslim American culture.” The stories that are woven into 
this narrative are ones about the challenges and opportunities of intra-Muslim diversity 
and about the need for a common culture that fosters a locally rooted identity. In the 
next chapter, I will examine what inspires the call for creating a culture, what the call 
means, and what the institutions and products of this culture are.  In this chapter, 
however, I will focus on the state of community-building efforts. I will consider how 
disparate groups may become a community and what are the obstacles to overcome and 
the opportunities and strength to draw on in this community-building effort. I will 
analyze my collaborators’ narratives and Muslim public discourse to shed light on intra-
Muslim relations across race, ethnicity, age, and gender lines and on what may be 
involved in these community crafting efforts.  
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As the different groups of Muslim America struggle to assert their belonging, to 
define two critical aspects of their identity (Islam and America), and to counter 
hegemonic public discourse(s) that define them as dangerous internal and/or external 
Others, their challenges may seem to be on multiple fronts. These challenges are, 
however, facets of but one complex process. For, in as much as Muslim Americans 
succeed in practicing an Islam that remains normative, yet grounded in its social-
cultural context and relevant for believers whose specificity can provide a unique 
contribution to addressing societal challenges, they – as other minorities before them 
have– will normalize their presence and belonging. Granted, America’s racial legacy 
perpetuates white privilege and the normativity of whiteness as the archetypical 
American against whom all others are ethno-racialized and hyphenated. However, as 
noted earlier, whiteness has no exclusivity on belonging; for people of color, however, 
belonging is not without cost. Muslim Americans, internally diverse and divided as they 
are, stand as an interesting test case for the national narrative that maintains that the 
path to belonging is paved with suffering innumerable socially sanctioned indignities of 
racism. Facing demonizing public discourses and the erosion of civil liberties, Muslim 
Americans frequently invoke the nation’s treatment of the designated internal Other of 
different eras (Indians, Blacks, Jews, Catholics, Irish, Latino/a, and Asian). History, 
Muslims tell themselves, shows it is their moment to persevere and to do the difficult but 
necessary work on the path to belonging. This task involves: 1) accepting and asserting 
that this is home, 2) managing internal diversity and divisions in order to create a 
coalition-based community and a political identity that speaks for the group, 3) forming 
alliances with other minoritized groups, 4) asserting a positive presence through care for 
others and concern for social justice at home and aboard, 5) and, critically important, 
presenting their own social and cultural contributions.   
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As noted earlier, America’s unique history homogenized disparate peoples and 
made them into a group. For example, diverse tribes from Africa became “Blacks”; North 
American tribes became “Indians”; those from Europe became Catholics, Jews and 
eventually Whites; and later, diverse groups came to be seen as Asians or Latino/as (or 
Hispanics). While anti-immigrant nativist sentiment remains today and “model 
minority” status of Asians is used to further marginalize Blackamericans, the 
physiognomy of Asian Americans marks them as perpetual foreigners. Similarly, brown 
skin, ethnic features, and foreign- sounding names mark immigrant Muslims; as noted 
earlier, clothing and names also mark Black and White convert (wo)men. No matter how 
many generations they have been here, these Muslims, like Asian Americans, are always 
asked “where are you from?” and the naming of their American hometowns is usually 
followed by “where are you really from?”. This “ineradicable foreignness,” as Asian 
American anthropologist Dorinne Kondo put it, is based on an outward appearance 
(features, clothing, and so on) that exclude members of these groups from the benefits of 
being authentically and fully American. Consequently, for Muslims, as it is for Asians 
and Latino/as, “the narrative and performative production of home, community, and 
identity is a particularly urgent issue” (Kondo 1996, 98). This is ever more pressing in 
the aftermath of 9/11 where (not) belonging has significant consequences for life and 
liberty.  
In August 2012, a White supremacist killed six and injured many in a Wisconsin 
Sikh temple. Post-9/11, Sikh men’s turbans signal a foreignness that makes them visible 
targets of anti-Muslim hate that maintains that “they all look the same.” In this tragedy, 
the public shock and condemnation of the crime was curiously and alarmingly 
punctuated by a concerted effort to point out a “mistaken identity” and to clarify that 
Sikhs are not Muslims. This theme begs the question asked by Muslims and others: 
282 
would the crime have been less heinous if it had happened at a mosque? Following this 
shooting, a mosque was burnt in Missouri, another was shot with a pellet rifle while 
people prayed in Chicago, paintball guns were fired at a mosque in Oklahoma City, and a 
homemade bomb filled with acid was thrown on a Muslim school in Lombard, Illinois 
(Beinart 2012). These incidents were reported but there was no public outrage or visits 
by politicians to these communities. Muslim leaders and activists along with interfaith 
groups gathered in solidarity with the Sikh community as Bloggers, activists, and others 
decried the narrative of “mistaken identity” and deconstructed its implications. The 
response under such circumstances and in the specificity of the socio-cultural and 
historical context of the United States— which lumps diverse people together— has been 
the emergence of a political identity where violence and discrimination against one 
Muslim (Asian, Latino/a, Black) is an act against all in the group. The collective identity 
of Muslims, as in groups before them, becomes “a coalitional identity par excellence” 
(Kondo 1996, 98). The narrative construction of home, community, and their identity, 
along with telling their stories, safeguarding their civil liberties and asserting their 
presence, therefore, are seen by Muslim Americans as the imperative of the current 
chapter of their, and the nation’s, history. 
 
E Pluribus Unum: The Making of the American Muslim Ummah 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, immigrants and converts co-authored the first chapters 
of contemporary Muslim history in America. But in the second half of the twentieth 
century the members of the native and predominantly Blackamerican community and 
the members of the large immigrant community(ies) at best ignored each other or gazed 
at each other with mistrust and mutual resentment. They viewed one another through 
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prisms distorted by race, class and culture and through mental frames constructed by 
legacies of slavery, and colonialism, and racialized society. While all these elements 
existed earlier in their history, the socio-political context and their demographics could 
then have been a catalyst in their collaboration. However, in times of increased 
immigration, ethnic groups were more likely to associate and create organizations with 
people from back home than they were to find common cause with other American 
minorities. 
The term community, like all other social concepts, eludes definition. 
Additionally, in a globalizing world and in pluralistic societies, the “essential” shared 
elements (geographical co-location and regular face-to-face interactions on the bases of 
shared lineage or history) that used to define a community are no longer tenable. Now, 
communities are formed primarily out of a shared sense of identity, values, memory and 
often political destiny. A community now more than ever is defined as much from 
without as it from within; community, therefore, is socially constructed. It  
is the product of work, of struggle; it is inherently unstable, contextual; it has to 
be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political priorities; and it is the 
product of interpretation, interpretation based on an attention to history, to the 
concrete, to what Foucault (1980) has called subjugated knowledges [Mohanty 
2003,104].  
 
Nevertheless, community is not invented nor is it merely circumstantial and utilitarian; 
rather, it is constituted in and through mutually irreducible shared experiences, history 
and memory where the individual and collective are also always embedded in a matrix of 
power difference and competing tendencies.  
America’s motto of E pluribus unum (out of many, one) applies not only to the 
formation of the nation from diverse people, but also to the homogenizing process that 
lumps diverse people into an ethnic, racial and/or religious “community.” As noted in 
the previous chapter, the racialization process in America shapes group consciousness 
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and results in the construction of “communities” and “ethnic groups.” While throughout 
human history, people have always differentiated themselves in various ways, it is worth 
noting here that the concepts of race and ethnicity are rooted in the social engineering 
project of modernity that defines itself relative to an opposite Other and is part of 
modern European and American history (Norval 1996; Roediger 2005). 
In constructing a community, Muslim Americans have models from their dual 
heritage. They have the American model of “out of many, one” and an Islamic model 
based on the concept of the ummah that creates unity in diversity without sacrificing the 
specificity of the constituent groups. Ummah can allow for both celebrating 
ethnic/cultural variation and respecting sectarian differences and for making solidarity 
and mutual support a duty. Karim notes that the ummah concept “signifies both a 
common heritage and new modes of Muslim identity, unity and difference, exchange and 
conflict, and intra-Muslim networks and interfaith alliances” (2008, 12). This idea of 
unity in diversity draws on a core maxim in Muslim discursive tradition that juxtaposes 
the multiplicity of creation and the unicity (Tawhid) of the Creator. Consequently, in the 
United States, a new American ummah is taking shape, formed both by this shared 
Muslim heritage and by divergent ethnic traditions and inspired by other American 
minorities. Muslim American thinkers are proposing an organizing model that manages 
diversity within a unified political and cultural identity, while maintaining and 
capitalizing on the specificities of the various groups. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah (2004) uses 
the analogy of a peacock tail, Jackson (2008) proposes the function that the concept of 
tribe had served during the Prophet’s time, and Karim (2008) envisions a “network 
epistemology.” Such models sustain individual and group specificity, while knitting them 
through common faith ideals (beliefs), a communal religious language and practice, and 
a shared history (American and Islamic), all the while recognizing the authenticity of 
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multiple lifeworlds. The late imam W. D. Muhammad, the son of the NOI founder and a 
prominent Muslim American leader, proclaimed in 1994 at an ISNA-Canada convention 
that “someday we’ll see Muslims in the US not separated by the color of their skin or 
national origin or ethnic life or cultural preferences, [but] united as God had intended for 
us to be, united as one Ummah” and a “model community for all people” (Mohammed 
1994).  Since then a confluence of processes and circumstances seem to position Muslims 
in America at a historical juncture where a new kind of group consciousness and 
collective identity has been evolving.  
The category of “Muslim American” or “American Muslim” itself is an unstable 
and still emerging one. While Islam in America has deep history, its adherents were 
typically referred to by their race as “Black Muslims” or by their country of origin. A 
Lexis/Nexis database search returns the earliest use of the terms “Muslim American” or 
“American Muslim” to be twice in 1970s and then as increasing in frequency in the 
1980s. However, it was conflicts (the first Iraq war, the Oklahoma bombing, and of 
course 9/11) that solidified the term as a category describing Muslims of various 
backgrounds in America. Though now used frequently by politicians, the media, and by 
Muslim leaders and activists, most Muslims in America themselves are not quite sure to 
whom the term refers. As noted in previous studies (for example, M. Ali 2011) and as 
confirmed in this one, Muslims unequivocally assert their belonging to both Islam and 
America. Yet, because of the diversity of their origins and the recent coinage of the term, 
they seem uncertain of whom the category “Muslim American” includes. In this project, 
nearly 69 percent of the participants identified “Muslim Americans” as including “All 
Muslims in the US”, and a few more specified the term refers to Muslims who are U.S. 
citizens. A minority (10 percent) limited the term to only those born in the U.S. Some, 
however, did not quite know who is meant and stated so.  
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In an earlier study that I conducted among Arizona Muslims (M. Ali 2011), I 
included questions aimed to draw out the meaning of the terms American Muslim and 
Muslim American and whether or not the two terms differed. The responses to these 
questions fell into five themes, ordered here by the frequency of their occurrence: the 
terms meant the same and were interchangeable; the terms meant the same, but Muslim 
American is preferred for putting one’s relationship with God first; both terms 
exclusively apply to converts and their children; American Muslim is reserved for 
converts and their children, while Muslim American indicates immigrants only or all 
Muslims in America regardless of origin; and Muslim American is a category within 
American society (analogous to Catholic Americans) and American Muslim is a category 
within the global community (analogous to American Catholics or Egyptian Muslims). 
In daily interactions, within and outside the community, distinctions are made on 
ethnic bases and people do not refer to themselves as Muslim Americans for reasons 
articulated by twenty-one year old Shukri. He said, “I do consider myself a Muslim. I do 
consider myself an American, however, I consider myself an Arab American and not a 
Muslim American because Muslim is a religion and American is a cultural background. 
They are two different things.” Because these terms are not commonly reflected upon, 
some participants seemed to have realized from the question the diverse ways that the 
term could be understood. Thirty year old survey participant Hanadi expresses this new 
insight when she said, “this is a very fascinating question. I never thought about how 
there could be multiple definitions. I prefer to be inclusive and at the same time I 
recognize that the more inclusive you are the harder it is to generalize the thoughts, 
feelings, values, and dreams that the group ‘Muslim Americans’ possess.”  
Like other ethnic terms (Hispanic, Latino/a, Asian), the terms Muslim American 
and American Muslim were first introduced from the outside. Because those of 
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immigrant background make up the majority, Muslims in America are often discussed in 
terms of assimilation and integration. Consequently, the term Muslim American often 
conjures up images of recent immigrants and in doing so marginalizes the large and 
growing population of native converts and their descendants. It also erases the long 
history of Islam in America and raises questions about Islam’s authenticity as American 
religion. This, along with intra-Muslim politics, prompted the coinage of the notion of 
indigenous Muslims which I will discuss shortly. Yet, while these terms are gaining 
currency and Muslim American is becoming an ethnicized political identity, the meaning 
of these terms and who they include or exclude are in flux.  
Ethnogenesis has its roots in relations of inequality, and the politics of ethnicity 
is rooted in marginality. Ethnicity had always had a cultural connotation; it is made 
through “inter-reference” between two or more co-existing cultural groups which are 
defined against each other. Far from being invented by a group’s own elite, the names 
and the conditions of ethnic identity are typically provided by the dominant group 
(Hutcheon 1998; Wilmsen 1996). But the ethnicized group does not passively join in this 
process. Ethnicity arises as a definition from outside within a hegemonic context, but it 
is appropriated, redefined and at times acquiesced to by members of the group 
(Comaroff 1996; Eder 2004; Jonsson 2010; Pieterse 1996; Tsuda 2003).Therefore, 
though differences exist, the boundaries of the community in the Muslim American 
ummah are being gradually drawn and are becoming clearer. The terms, Muslim 
American and American Muslim gain salience with use across ethno-racial lines when 
referring to collective challenges and opportunities. The terms index rising 
consciousness among diverse Muslim groups who are realizing that no matter their 
internal differences and conflicts, they are seen as one group, and at this point in 
American history, they are a “problem people.”  
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The challenges Muslims face in the post-9/11 environment, from eroding civil 
rights to social and cultural Othering, have pushed many of them, particularly the 
leaders and activists and especially the younger ones, to recognize a shared socio-
political destiny. If they are to thrive individually and collectively, and if Islam is to have 
a future in America, they must regroup, resolve conflicts and manage diversity (ethnic, 
racial, sectarian, generational, gender, class) and leverage their resources (material, 
human, cultural). This is essential not only for their community’s protection and 
prosperity but is also seen as a faith imperative to contribute in a positive and distinctive 
way to society and to international affairs.  
 
Managing Difference and Diversity 
 
The singularity of Muslim Americans, within their society and in the global 
ummah, in their ethno-racial and sectarian diversity and with the usual economic, 
gender and generational differences, complicate their interactions and the potential 
construction and collaboration as a “community.”   
Assessing their impressions of the relationships between immigrants and converts, a 
majority (66 percent) of participants deemed these relations to be good, but the 
proportion of those who thought these groups have barely acceptable or poor relations 
was significant (34 percent). The quality of the relationship between the two groups is 
determined by their levels of interactions and how they view and treat each other. Project 
participants overwhelmingly (85 percent) noted that the two groups typically pray in the 
same mosque but they socialize together less often (54 percent). They sometimes work 
together on projects (48 percent) but less often (37 percent) govern together. Over a 
quarter (28 percent), however, thought that the two groups have little or no interactions 
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at all. As for the presence of converts in the local community or in mosque leadership, a 
majority of respondents (54 percent) sees little or no involvement. This view was more 
prevalent among male participants, perhaps because men are more likely to be involved 
in and acknowledgeable of mosque leadership. Differences in how religion is understood 
or practiced may be a factor in the degree of interaction and the quality of the 
relationships between immigrants and converts, but it is not a significant one. While a 
majority (74 percent) of participants noted some differences, most of them said that the 
difference were minor.  
One of the most frequent complaints about immigrants is articulated by this son 
of a Blackamerican father and an Indian immigrant mother who self identifies as an 
African American. According to Adam, 
immigrant Muslims see themselves as the guardians of the true Islam; so while 
they welcome converts, they patronize converts and sort of type-cast them into 
certain roles. Moreover, no matter the time the convert puts in or the scholarly 
learning the convert attains, the immigrants seem to always look down upon the 
converts. 
 
  In assessing relations between immigrants and converts, an interesting gender 
difference emerged between the two field sites. While, at both sites, a majority of men 
and women assessed the relations to be overall good, in the Phoenix-valley area women 
were less likely than men (56 percent compared to 73 percent) to say so, while the 
reverse was true in Chicagoland (75 percent compared to 58 percent). In other words, in 
the Phoenix-valley more women thought the relationship is barely acceptable or poor 
and in Chicagoland more men shared that view. Part of the reason may be that, 
comparatively, participants from the Phoenix-valley were more likely to pray in mosques 
that had Blackamericans and Whiteamericans because the Muslim community is smaller 
and residentially dispersed. This might be the basis for the men’s more positive 
assessment. The more critical assessment of the women in the Phoenix-valley could be 
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the result of their activities beyond Friday prayers. Here, women make up the majority of 
community activists and event organizers, and they are the founders/leaders of most 
organizations, though they are not always on mosque boards.  Additionally, during the 
fieldwork period of this project in Phoenix-valley, there were lectures, workshops, and 
Black History Month seminars that highlighted the difficulties of the immigrants-
converts relationship and the importance of honest discussion and reconciliation. In 
Chicagoland, ethnic Muslim spaces are more defined due to Chicago’s segregated 
neighborhoods. But Muslim women there, as noted in Karim (2008), tend to cross ethic 
boundaries and in this project were twice as likely to pray at a mosque that included 
Blacks and Whites. I frequently heard younger women “mosque hopping” to sample the 
activities in different mosques. The gender difference in their assessments could be due 
to these experiences.  
Members of younger generations are critical of the community as a whole but 
they are most critical of their own ethnic group. Musa, the Blackamerican Chicagoan 
quoted earlier, says that the Blackamerican Muslim leadership, especially in the inner 
city, lacks vision. Rather than working together and forming coalitions to address the 
serious challenges of life there, they are too focused on individual endeavors. He 
understands the fact that these challenges make people prioritize their families’ needs 
and leave little resources to help maintain the storefront mosques where the community 
prays. But he does not excuse anyone; instead, he proposes that if everyone gave a dollar 
and if leaders thought beyond “my little mosque,” the funds could be invested in social 
entrepreneurial projects. Investing in halal restaurants, barbershops, and grocery stores 
patronized by members would build a business and a community network around the 
mosque. This would in turn support the mosque and relieve individuals of the burden of 
being the sole source of mosque income. This could potentially not only solve the 
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funding problems of mosques and community centers but might also decrease 
unemployment, limit food deserts, and economically empower the community. Musa’s 
recognizes that there is precedent for his proposed model in what the Nation of Islam 
had implemented. He says: “people can hate the NOI as much as they want and I mean 
we already know we don’t agree with their aqeeda [creed], but they did some things that 
were unheard of in the Black community” that contributed to economic self-sufficiency.  
Immigrants’ offspring are critical of the focus on ethnicity that they see in their 
mosques and among their families. The passionate critique of Saba, a twenty-two year 
old Chicagoan of Pakistani background, captures a sentiment I heard time and again. 
She and others are empathetic and understand that immigrants came from homogenous 
communities. In the U.S., however, things have to change.  
within the Muslim community, we seem to be so in our own world. We don’t 
seem to go outside of the masjids. We seem to just stay in our little bubble. And 
I’ve noticed this especially in the Chicago…The ethnic groups are the ones that 
are just in their own bubbles and people in the Muslim community have forgotten 
that Islam…is beautiful because it’s so diverse in color. And since when did you 
decide that this is the Desi masjid [mosque] or this is the Arab masjid [and say] 
“don’t go there, only the Black community goes there, or only the Nigerian 
community goes there”. It’s like dude, this is Islam! When did you decide that 
Islam was only for Arabs or Islam was only for Pakistanis or it was only for 
Indians or it was only for Bengalis! 
 
Saba works for Muslim organizations and sees the inconsistency between the 
rhetoric about the importance of inclusion and the reality of ethnic enclaves. She 
observes and detests how mosque groups criticize others for not being inclusive, when 
attendees at their mosques are predominately from one or two ethnic groups and their 
neighborhoods are ethnic enclaves. Saba cannot understand how “irrelevant” reasons 
like differences in ethnicity or even hometown origins prevent people from “doing work 
for the deen.” She draws on the Islamic discursive tradition, citing the immigration of the 
Prophet and Qur’anic verses to argue for diversity as a divine plan. She then exhorts 
Muslims to jettison this limiting mentality and to get on with the necessary work of living 
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up to Islamic ideals. When I asked her if the views of her peers differ from the people she 
describes, she explained that there will always be some who grow up with and internalize 
such views, but that she and the majority of young people have grown up with diverse 
people and see difference as normal and as something to embrace:  
We are really lucky because we don’t have that mentality. We’re able to do our 
work and to engage ourselves in a way that we don’t think about that. In fact, we 
learn from each other.  Like my Arab friends, they know Urdu because their 
friends are Pakistani. And I know friends that are Pakistani and they’re learning 
Arabic because guess what, their friends are Arabs. I know the Black Muslim 
brothers that are always saying salaam to me, they’ve learned Urdu too. Guess 
what, because we’re all learning from each other. Hello, if anything, this should 
be a positive thing.  We should quit arguing over each ethnic group and help each 
other. Because we have to get the work of the deen done! And you’re not going to 
get the work of the deen done when you’re sitting around arguing over “we’re not 
going to let the Fellahis [peasants] come in, we’re not gonna let the Somalis come 
in.” That’s so stupid if you think about it. And you could ask any kid now, they’ll 
think it’s dumb because they’re interacting with students in their classroom who 
are different than them. Why do we have to have that internal conflict in the 
Ummah? Subhanallah!! [the last word is an Arabic term that glorifies God but 
one also used to express both amazement and exasperation as Saba does here]  
 
The critique of the young and the more assertive positions of converts, along with the 
changing socio-political environment post-9/11, have prompted community self-
reflection and efforts towards rapprochement.   
 
“Immigrants” and “Indigenous”: What’s in a Name? 
 
As I discussed in chapter 3, a theme of ostensibly parallel historical trajectories of 
immigrants and converts has dominated the story of Muslims in America. In reality, 
however, these are intertwined stories in a larger narrative of the history of Islam in 
American. The reader may recall, from the introductory chapter, the vignette from the 
MANA conference about the friction and fissures between immigrants and converts. At 
this conference, Blackamerican speakers addressed the need to reclaim the agenda and 
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the discourse of Islam in America from the immigrant face it has come to have. They 
called for restoring Islam in the U.S. to its indigenous and authentically American roots. 
The term indigenous Muslim is gaining currency among activists and leaders at the 
national level, but the general Muslim population seems unaware of it. More frequently 
used by those of convert background and contested by some of all backgrounds, 
“indigenous Muslims” refers to Blackamericans, Whiteamericans and Latino/as, all in 
contrast to Muslims of Middle Eastern, Asian, and African immigrant background. 
Interestingly, it does not seem to exclude Latino/as and Europeans of immigrant 
background who convert to Islam. Since immigrants privilege their cultures of origins 
where culture and religious norms cannot be easily disaggregated, converts – if they 
hope to be good Muslims – are always under pressure to become Arab or Pakistani or 
whatever group is predominate in the local mosque. Thus, indigenous is a conscious and 
assertive move to turn a liability into an asset and, in post 9/11 America, to brandish 
cultural capital. 
While the term indigenous is used more frequently in Muslim conferences and 
lectures, it is not a familiar one to the grassroots. Sixty percent of the participants never 
heard of the term or is not sure what it means, while nearly 20 percent thinks it refers to 
“all those Muslims who are born in the U.S. regardless of their background.” Another 10 
percent thinks it refers to “any Muslims (immigrant or not) who thinks of the USA as 
home.” Less than 8 percent identified the term with the meaning its users intend to 
convey, essentially to describe “only converts/reverts and their children.” Though it 
might have been used earlier, the term “indigenous Muslims” entered Muslim public 
sphere after the 2000 presidential election and the associated efforts to build a Muslim 
voting bloc. Instead of resulting in a bloc vote, however, the efforts split the community 
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into those who wanted Muslims to support then-candidate Bush for his proposed foreign 
policy and those who wanted to support candidate Gore for his focus on domestic issues.  
Those arguing for a domestically-focused Muslim political agenda were led by 
prominent convert imams and activists who subsequently created the Muslim Alliance of 
North America (MANA). At its founding, MANA was an organization for indigenous 
Muslims, and indigenous was defined as all those who think of America as home, 
regardless of their background.  Since then, however, indigenous is the preferred term by 
many converts to reclaim their belonging to America and the cultural capital that entails. 
As natives to this land, they argue, the right to define both the face of Islam and the 
agenda of Muslims in American belongs to them. Not surprisingly, some immigrants and 
their offspring take issue with the term and its exclusionary implications, but they are 
not alone in their criticism. Malik, a third generation Blackamerican Muslim, thinks 
indigenous is “really more of a racial category than anything. [It] generally means 
African American, sometimes Hispanics, and rarely Whites.” Safia, a Blackamerican 
female, conveys the problematics of the concept even for those, like her, who use it. She 
uses it when she needs “to distinguish” the different groups, but she does not like it 
because except for those whose “lands were stolen by the first settlers”, “barely anyone 
would be considered indigenous.” If it must be used, Safia thinks, it only makes sense 
when it refers to some “who can’t easily trace their heritage to another country because 
of centuries of settlement” in the U.S. To her, this means only Blackamericans and 
Whiteamericans.  
The term indigenous gained wider use after the publication of Islam and the 
Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection (2005) by Blackamerican 
Muslim religious scholar and academic, Sherman Jackson. Jackson examines the history 
of Islam in America, juxtaposes an “Immigrant Islam” with an indigenous one, and 
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analyzes the immigrant–indigenous community divide as he aims to make a case for the 
“Third Resurrection”1 of Blackamerican Muslims. This would be an era where 
Blackamericans emerge from the impasse resulting from the encounter between 
“Blackamerican Islam” and “Immigrant Islam.” The difference is not theological but lies 
in the fact that the former is shaped by a protest-based “Black Religion” that rejects the 
oppression of white supremacy, while the latter defines Islam through the lens of “Post-
colonial Religion” and in opposition to the West. “Immigrant Islam” “universaliz[es] the 
particular” of the Muslim world and sees danger in the behaviors, cultural norms and 
institutions of the West, all the while internalizing its prejudices and striving to achieve 
or appropriate its successes (Jackson 2005). These two root ideologies and Immigrant 
Islam’s monopoly on religious authority positioned Blackamerican Muslims in a liminal 
state, neither fully Black nor fully American, and informed their self-definition. In this 
new era of the Third Resurrection, they will be able to self-authenticate their identity and 
agenda through mastery, engagement, and appropriation of Sunni Islam’s discursive 
tradition and become subjects, rather than the objects, of this tradition (Jackson 2005). 
Jackson’s book generated some discontent among immigrants who felt vilified as 
authoritarian and stigmatized as foreign/outsiders; many apparently shared their 
sentiments with the author, who was surprised by the reaction. Many Blackamerican 
activists and leaders, on the other hand, felt vindicated by the critique of immigrants and 
empowered by the book. Subsequently they have taken as their own the agenda for an 
indigenous Islam, as the title of the MANA conference suggests. Professor Jackson was 
the keynote speaker at this conference. At a 2011 Islam in America Conference at DePaul 
University, a spirited exchange that reflected the contested nature of these terms took 
place between Professor Jackson and Dr. Rami Nashashibi. Nashashibi, one of the few 
non-Black speakers at that first MANA conference, is a sociologist of Palestinian descent 
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and a prominent community activist whose work on social justice in the inner-city 
bridges communities. Nashashibi said that he understands Jackson’s intent to expound 
on the forces and experiences that shaped Islam in America. He even sees a utility of the 
concepts for “agitating for race consciousness” among Muslims who, even in their second 
and third generations, may not escape and might have internalized racist attitudes. 
Nashashibi points out, however, that the “binary construction” of the terms is, 
nevertheless, problematic on several levels. First, using indigeneity, which is a specific 
anthropological concept, makes Muslims “look very unsophisticated and crude”; second, 
the immigrant–indigenous binary erases the real-life complexities of people who blur the 
boundaries and equates immigrants with suburbs and Blacks with inner-city poverty and 
problems; and third, the divide invokes a nativist discourse that historically co-opted 
Blacks and pitted them against immigrants and ultimately only served White 
supremacist interests. [fieldnotes]. 
 Responding to this critique, Jackson unequivocally argued that understanding 
his immigrant–indigenous juxtaposition as a racial or ethnic divide is “a fundamental 
misreading” of his book. The aim of what he wrote, he added, was to define an  
ideological prism, a point of departure, a way of looking at the world. Do we look 
at Islam in America through the prism of experiences, histories, narratives that 
are indigenous to Islam or do we continue to superimpose upon those who are 
born here understandings that are shaped by histories, experiences, narratives 
that were born elsewhere. That was the divide. [fieldnotes].  
 
To illustrate his point, he notes that some Blackamericans are on the immigrant side of 
this divide because, more than someone born elsewhere, they espouse an immigrant 
mentality that privileges and wishes to impose those imported experiences and norms. 
As for the particularly social science understanding of indigeneity, Jackson does not feel 
beholden or bound by those understandings nor does he feel the need to shun the term 
because of a post-colonial critique that see indigeneity as “a nasty colonial repost.” Here, 
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he draws on the Islamic discursive tradition to point out how this tradition itself has 
made distinctions between those who were there already in a particular place (for 
example Al-ansar or ahal-e-dar) and those who came later (for example, Al-
Muhajerreen or al-ajaneb) 2 without an implied exclusion (fieldnotes).   
In this book, Jackson does indeed make an explicit distinction between 
“Immigrant Islam” and immigrants, particularly those from second and subsequent 
generations. The Third Resurrection, he notes, fights the hegemonic ideas of Immigrant 
Islam but not immigrant people. He does concede, however, that since there is not yet an 
American alternative, “most immigrant Muslims are likely to remain at least provisional 
supporters of Immigrant Islam” if for no other reason than “preserving their sense of 
authenticity, identity, and ownership” (Jackson 2005, 13). This distinction in the book, 
however, gets blurred because as he analyzes and discusses Blackamerican–immigrant 
relations, the two groups seem to be divided precisely because they embody the 
respective (Indigenous or Immigrant) ideological prisms. To the reader –whether 
immigrant or not– the author’s use of “Immigrant” with an upper case “I” for the ideas 
and lower case “i” for immigrant people, and the hedging evident in “likely to remain at 
least provisional”, get lost. In this reading process, people not just ideas seem to be the 
problem. Subsequently, converts and their offspring —including those who internalize 
the ideological prism of “Immigrant Islam” and accuse immigrants who do not of 
betraying true Islam— assert their indigenousness. All immigrants and their offspring 
are then lumped together and are viewed as representatives of the hegemonic ideology of 
“Immigrant Islam.” 
To some outsiders, Muslims’ use of indigeneity would indeed appear 
“unsophisticated and crude”, as Nashashibi points out. However, the contested nature of 
the term both inside and outside of anthropology and among Muslims reveals the work 
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“indigeneity” does as a potent tool in the politics of belonging and power. In introducing 
the edited collection on Indigenous Experiences Today, de la Cadena and Starn (2007) 
note that understanding indigeneity requires recognizing that it is first and foremost a 
“relational field.” It “emerges only within larger social fields of difference and sameness; 
it acquires its ‘positive’ meaning not from some essential properties of its own, but 
through its relation to what it is not, to what it exceeds or lacks.” Additionally, it is “at 
once historically contingent and encompassing” of all of us—indigenous or not. After all, 
as Mahmood Mamdani noted, native and settler necessarily and mutually construct and 
define each other (de la Cadena and Starn 2007, 4-5). Furthermore, as Mary Louise Pratt 
argues in the same volume, indigeneity is about “prior-ity in time and place.” It is about 
who was where first before whom, and thus it is “relational and retrospective”. A group 
claims indigenous or native status “by virtue of the recognition that someone else arrived 
in a place and found them or their ancestors ‘already’ there.” Indigeneity, Pratt notes, is 
not a condition but a force and a process that begins, not ends, with securing the label; a 
“nonteleological process of becoming, self-creation, and self-determination, the living 
out of a collective being in time and place” (Pratt 2007, 399–400). This is the work the 
label “indigenous Muslim” does in Muslim America.   
Discussion of indigenousness always involves a relationship with the state, which 
may at first appears irrelevant to the claims of Muslim converts. But state policies and 
policing loom large in this case also, as should be evident from this dissertation. 
Consequently, with the above conceptualization of indigeneity and the looming presence 
of the state in Muslim lives, the converts’ claim of indigenousness at this historical 
moment may be divisive, but it is neither crude nor unsophisticated. It is at once a 
process and a force for self-definition, reclamation of authenticity vis-à-vis those 
immigrant Muslims who long expected converts to shed their American-ness, and a 
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political gesture toward state policies and a society that ignores the existence of converts. 
But as noted above, indigenousness entails a settler (a colonizing outsider) who usurps 
the rights and resources of an indigenous native. This is where, in my opinion, the 
problem and danger of this term lie. To immigrant Muslims, whose self-definition and 
self-understanding as the oppressed indigenous subjects of the colonial West have 
shaped the very “Immigrant Islam” prism that Jackson argues against, to be seen as the 
oppressive colonizing settler is not an insult but an injury that jars the foundation of 
their self-understanding. Therefore, the argument of indigenousness as being a “colonial 
repost” cannot be easily dismissed. For it is not merely an intellectual post-colonial 
critique and a discursive exercise; it is one foundational to the identities of both 
immigrants and converts and it remains at the heart of the issues and the divide that 
Jackson addressed in his book. The terms that define immigrants and converts will 
continue to be contested and will no doubt shape their relationship. But as the 
American-born descendants of the two groups take the helm of the religious and political 
leadership of the community, the point of labels might become moot.  
 
 
Prejudices, Privileges, and Power 
 
 Bridging the ethno-racial Muslim divide is critical if the community is to leverage 
its numbers and resources for solving its critical local and national issues and for playing 
any significant role internationally. Success or failure in this effort will also have a 
determining role in the future of Islam in America (Jackson 2005; M. Khan 2002). There 
are several causes for the intra-community fractures, but one root cause may be 
attributed to the respective historical experiences of the two largest groups (immigrants 
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and Blackamerican), which have served as the greatest impediment to unity and 
collaboration. One could sum up this obstacle as the incoherence resulting from the 
encounter between the formerly enslaved and the formerly colonized, each group having 
had differing experiences that have shaped their respective identities and their agendas. 
In this context, until the late 1990s, immigrants had given priority to the political and 
social struggles of the Muslim world over domestic issues. Furthermore, the Muslim 
world has been–and in many ways continues to be –viewed as the point of reference and 
repository for religious knowledge, etiquette and esthetics, and gender norms and 
behavior. The historical association of Blackamerican Islam with the Nation of Islam and 
its ostensibly syncretistic, heretical and race-based theology has long exacerbated the 
situation by shaping immigrant views of Blackamerican Muslims. In result, immigrants 
maintain scholarly religious interpretive authority and determined what is or is not 
Islamic. Consequently, as Jackson (2005) points out, unlike everywhere else Islam 
spread, this delayed the transfer of this authority to native-born hands and the 
development of a locally-grounded Islam cloaked in an American cultural garb. This 
monopoly of religious authority, combined with the resources available to affluent 
immigrants, enabled them to create and lead national institutions and thereby help to 
shape the “foreign” face of Islam in the U.S. It has also led to a sense of marginalization 
among converts, most of whom are Blackamericans.   
 Another factor in the intra-community divide is what Lawrence (2002) calls 
racialized class prejudice whereby, from early American history until today, new 
immigrants encountering the privilege of whiteness strive to simultaneously align 
themselves with the White and distance themselves from the Black side of the racial 
divide (also see Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2005). While even poor immigrants have this 
tendency, the post-1965 Muslim immigrants, who were predominantly well-educated 
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urbanites or university students, were more likely to do so. Engaging in the covering 
strategies discussed earlier, they settled comfortably into the American middle class, 
buying wholeheartedly into the notion of American meritocracy. They became blind to 
the plight of countless other Americans and particularly the many Indianamericans and 
Blackamericans who occupy the bottom rungs of the racial ladder and who have long 
been economically and politically marginalized by structural and social racism. The myth 
of meritocracy and model minorities are based on the assumption of a level playing field 
and ample opportunities; if one only works hard enough, everyone can achieve the 
American dream. Those who do not achieve the dream are, purportedly, just not 
applying themselves enough. In this thinking, successful Blackamericans and other 
minorities are the exception that proves the rule of meritocracy and accessibility of the 
American dream for all. The election of Obama as the first Black president is now taken 
as a case in point. This thinking is particularly internalized by many first-generation 
middle class immigrants who see their own success as evidence.  
On the south side of Chicago, as in other urban areas, class, ethnicity and religion 
encounter each other to construct the lens through which different groups gauge and 
gaze at each other. For example, many of the corner stores in the largely Blackamerican 
urban neighborhood of south Chicago are owned by Arabs, many of whom are Muslims. 
In spite of Islam’s prohibition on trading in alcohol and gambling products regardless of 
the religious background of the buyer, these stores sell these products. To Blackmericans 
of all backgrounds, these merchants are racists exploiting their community and 
contributing to its destruction. To Muslim Blackamericans, these Arab Muslim liquor 
store owners are bigots, immoral, and religious hypocrites who engage in illicit 
businesses and then attend mosques as observant Muslims. In and around these 
interactions at the corner store is where stereotypes are (re)constructed: poor, violent, 
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drug and alcohol using Blacks and moneygrubbing, irreligious, racist Arabs. The term 
these Arab store owners use for Blacks is abd which literally means slave and which 
some Arab groups use to refer to Black people in general3. Though abd prefixes the most 
common Muslims names (for example, Abd-Allah, Abdul-Rahaman) as an honorific that 
means slave of God, used alone and in the American context, this word is derogatory and 
leaves potent psychic residue. Musa remembers such encounters at the corner store and 
with his mostly Palestinian and Syrian American friends and classmates in an Islamic 
school in a Chicago suburb. He says, 
I was twelve, I was amongst a lot of Arabs and there were few Pakistani, may be 
one or two, few African Americans in school. The first Arabic word I learned was 
abeed [plural of abd], it was just common terminology among the kids. At that 
time, when they told me what it meant, they were forward with anything, they 
defined it for me, and told me it means, they laughed before they defined, but 
they told me it meant slave… So when I was young, I was walking to these stores 
and I would hear that word and I would know what they are talking about.  
 
Musa does not think color-based racism inspires the use of the term abd because 
in America it does not refer to Black immigrants; those are, instead, referred to by their 
national origins as Sudanese, Somalis or Nigerian, for example. Abd is reserved, Musa 
notes, for “people who are born in this country, Black African Americans” and reflects a 
particular bigotry that stems from that particular history. Musa’s observation is 
confirmed by Jihan. The daughter of Indian immigrants, she elaborates on the nuances 
of this distinction from the point of view of the middle-class immigrants and the 
intersectionality of class, color and culture. At this intersection, being professional, being 
member of the ethnic group, being White, or being of an “Eastern” (Arab, Asian, or 
African) background improves one’s position in the community. In this hierarchy, a 
Blackamerican doctor will be more likely to be welcomed than a Bosnian or Ghanaian or 
Indian taxi driver, but a Ghanaian doctor is more likely to have a better status in the 
community than the Blackamerican doctor because of his “Eastern” culture. The degree 
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of cultural differences fades into the background when the person is a White professional 
or a business owner. Jihan explain that  
there’s very much racism there. But it’s not because of race, right, because the 
Somali is the same color as the African-American. It’s a stigma associated with 
African-Americans. I think [it is] the same preconceived notions that people have 
about African-Americans in the United States.  That they’re from the ghetto and 
that they’re, you know, loud and that they’re not educated and, they’re lazy and 
that they’re, you know, all of those things 
 
The various groups of Muslims decry intra-Muslim fissures regardless of their 
causes, but they do little to mend them because any one group often does not see itself as 
part of the problem. While working on this project, I had several discussions that reveal 
the depth of the angst among converts and of the bafflement of immigrants. In these 
discussions, inevitably immigrants were faulted for many things. Their reasons for 
immigration, for example, were attributed to their search for wealth and the dunyia (this 
world) rather than a desire to work for God and his deen (religion).4 Desires to pursue 
education or to flee oppression (economic, political, or religious) indeed motived 
Muslims to immigrate, but these immigrants do not see themselves as chasing after 
dunyia. Instead, they respond by locating their reasons squarely in the Islamic tradition 
and with reference to its founding narrative of escaping oppression. While some 
immigrants pursue their American dream fulltime, many are able to balance that pursuit 
with “Islamic work” and worship. The response of immigrants to this critique from 
converts, however, misses what is implied in the criticism; namely, that immigrants have 
reaped benefits paid for in life, limb and liberty by Blacks. Rather than appreciating 
these sacrifices and doing their part for social justice, immigrants are seen as having 
aligned themselves with Whites and further contributing to the oppression. If they are 
concerned at all, converts say, it is not for the wellbeing of their brethren across town but 
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for problems of Muslims across the ocean, to whom they send aid and single out in 
communal prayers.  
Along with this critique and apart from the struggle over religious authority, 
convert grievances also include the erasure of Blackamericans from the history of Islam 
in America. Immigrants often talk as though Islam immigrated in the 1960s rather 
having deep native roots. A prominent female Blackamerican Muslim convert concludes 
that the problem between the two groups is largely due to cultural differences and 
mistrust, further complicated by differences in how immigrants and Blackamerican 
converts view the history and present role the NOI. In Black communities, she notes, 
there is a fluidity that enables one to easily cross religious and sectarian borders without 
sanctions, while immigrants draw more rigid boundaries and do not understand this 
fluidity among Blackamerican Muslims. Regarding cultural differences, she posits the 
existence of a “cult of womanhood” among Blackamericans in general that makes it 
difficult to engage immigrants. We, she notes, “don’t have the hang-ups about men that 
you [immigrant women] have.” She adds that Blackamerican women have “no interest” 
in immigrants except for “can she teach me how to cook that, can she show me how to 
pronounce that Arabic word, or why are they like that?” (fieldnotes). She and another 
female academic both reiterated that immigrants, without exception, have a sense of 
superiority towards Blackamericans, whom they see as “ghetto.” Immigrants privilege 
their own history and discount Blackamerican Muslim history; subsequently, they draw 
on these privileged perspectives to frame all issues. She and other female converts, 
however, are also critical of male converts who, the “cult of womanhood” 
notwithstanding, dominate the leadership of Blackamerican mosques and organizations. 
These men, women note, neither want to work with women nor ask for their opinions 
(fieldnotes). Nevertheless, like their immigrant counterparts and as in other faith 
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communities, women do much of the work of religious communities without the benefit 
of leadership positions. The angst and distrust are palpable, and stereotypes abound on 
both sides of the immigrant-convert divide. Here, as is the case with the other narratives 
considered in this dissertation, culture is invoked and carries the explanatory load for 
every behavior, idea and individual discretion.   
Because most converts are Black, discussions about immigrant-convert relations 
are frequently framed in terms of race or racism. In a youth workshop in a mosque in 
Phoenix-valley, a guest speaker talked about the racism he faced as a biracial child in 
America. After he converted, he said, the treatment he received among Muslims was no 
better. A Black female convert and community leader among immigrants and their 
offspring, also shared her experiences with the attendees. She often feels excluded when 
socializing with immigrants, who converse in their native languages without translating 
to include her “They know I don’t understand and most of them speak English but don’t 
[in the group].” She adds that “converts have to prove [their Muslim-ness], have to be 
authenticated,” and all this “hurts [her] heart.” She struggled to hold back tears as she 
said that. To deconstruct perceptions, the workshop outlined the problematics of Black 
images shaped by rap music and popular culture and addressed how young people of all 
races, trying to be cool, feel free to use the “N word”, ignorant of its potent symbolism 
and history. The guest speaker reminded people that racism is incompatible with Islam. 
He cited the Prophet’s strong reprimand of one of his companions, who belittled the 
background of the great companion Bilal, the first Black Muslim5. Racism is also seen by 
Black and White converts and by some of immigrant backgrounds in the way White 
converts are welcomed in the community and fronted as spokespeople.  
Immigrant Muslims are not immune from the bigotry that they bring with them 
and/or they internalize in their new home, but it would be too simplistic to attribute all 
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inter-ethnic tensions to it. Muhammad, a Blackamerican academic, imam and activist 
who works and socializes across the immigrant–convert divide, concluded that racism 
exists among some immigrants, but it is not so pervasive. The causes for the division, he 
believes, are more complicated. But because of Black history in America, he theorized, 
racism is foremost on Blackamerican minds and negative interactions are generally seen 
through that lens. Being one of a few Blackamericans working in predominantly 
immigrant organizations, he advocates for involving more Blacks in its leadership. He 
was told that Blackamerican Muslims are more than welcome to join as voting members 
and to run for positions like everyone else. He recognized that on this issue, the crux of 
the matter is a misunderstanding. Because of their historical exclusion from society, 
Blackamericans are not likely to apply like “everyone else.” Because the playing field has 
never been level, a corrective process is necessary. At the societal level, Affirmative 
Action serves as this corrective. Within the Muslim community, there needs to be an 
equivalent— a “special invitation” extended to Blackamerican Muslims so they are not 
fighting to get in but instead are welcomed, wanted, and valued. Not sharing the same 
historical memory, immigrants are relatively oblivious to this Blackamerican need. 
Experiences and social contexts shape individual and collective identity and the frames 
of reference on which we draw to understand our world. This was obvious as the various 
groups were talking about (though rarely to) each other. Blackamericans saw immigrants 
as racist newcomers incapable of fully understanding or belonging to America. While 
White converts are typically better received, they too complain of the cultural 
chauvinism of immigrants who expect them to abandon their American ways.  
Because immigrants have assumed religious authority and defined the public face 
of Islam, converts see immigrants like guests who take over the home of their host rather 
than sitting back and showing due deference. “How would they feel if we went to Egypt 
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or Pakistan and tried to teach and lead them?” was a common refrain I heard from 
converts. Interestingly enough, however, such sentiment was rarely expressed by the 
children of converts. Immigrants, on the other hand, may laud the courage and the 
knowledge converts acquired through their spiritual quest while all the while pressuring 
them to become an Arab, South Asian, or African and not realizing the problematics of 
cultural apostasy. On the other hand, coverts do not appreciate the disorienting 
experience of immigration. Immigrants feel the need to hold on and value all that is from 
back home in order not to lose something of themselves. To immigrants, wanting 
converts to dress and act like them is a form of inclusion, an adoption of sort. 
Additionally, immigrants left their home countries and embarked on an uncertain 
journey to make better lives for themselves and their families. This being their priority, 
they aim to join those who are successful in society and see no good reason to “rock the 
boat” by advocating for social justice for other marginalized people, after all, these 
people seem to them to be much better off than many others “back home”.  
In their conceptualization of Islam in America, immigrants are blamed for not 
acknowledging the contributions and belonging of converts, and until recently, 
immigrants glossed over race as a social construct and neglected its real life 
consequences. When I asked Muhammad if the offspring of both groups hold the same 
views as their parents, he said they do not. He travels extensively and on every campus 
eager young people from diverse backgrounds surround him and other Blackamerican 
scholars. He noted, “even in society, older generations see everything through that [race] 
lens but for younger people that is not even on their radar.” He cited how diverse young 
people mobilized to elect Obama while older generations were debating whether he was 
too Black or not Black enough. The participants in this project are fully aware of these 
intra-community problems. They see the prejudices of the older generations and 
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acknowledge that they may also have “subconsciously” shaped the ideas and actions of 
their own generation, though participants contend that such prejudices are much less 
prevalent among them. 
 
Rapprochement Through Recognition and Acknowledgment 
 
As Muslim Americans see how Islam dominates headlines that are associated 
with conflict, fear and violence, and as they lament their conditions at home and abroad, 
a common refrain among them is, “Verily, God will not change the condition of a people 
until they change that which is in their inner selves” (Qur’an 13:11). There is much that 
separates immigrants and converts, but what should bring them together is greater and 
is both a matter of religious idealism and American pragmatism to which current events 
provide a catalyst. For decades, divisions across and within ethnic groups simmered 
under the surface and were only discussed among group members. As noted earlier, 
disagreements on forming a Muslim voting bloc during the 2000 election brought these 
divisions to the surface, but the events of the past decade pushed them to the foreground 
with even greater urgency. Many immigrant leaders and activists at the national and 
local level realized that U.S. born Muslims –and especially converts – are better and 
more credible spokespersons for the Muslim community because of their linguistic and 
cultural competence. While realizing and relishing the important role they could play, 
some of these new representatives felt used by immigrants who ignored them for years. 
This was articulated by Jackson, a Blackamerican from Arizona who had converted to 
Islam twenty years prior. According to him, “brothers in the masjid, in Tempe 
[immigrant majority] were intelligent enough to know that the questions about Muslims 
should be answered by American Muslims rather than by a foreigner.” Being 
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“foreigners,” he contends, immigrants do not understand the “psyche of America” (M. Ali 
2011, 373). The task of educating fellow Americans, then, is best done by “American 
Muslims”, those of non-immigrant heritage. Naeema, a second generation 
Blackamerican female from Chicagoland argues that rather than a genuine inclusion and 
rapprochement there is a “convergence of interests” whereby “indigenous” Muslims get 
their due recognition and immigrants have more credible native spokespersons.  
Speaking on the reasons for the foreign face of Islam in public, Shareefa, the 
second generation Blackamerican female from the Phoenix-valley quoted earlier, 
theorizes that both media and Muslims perpetuated the image of Muslims as foreigners 
who “just got here 30 years ago.” She asserts that Islam had a Blackamerican face until 
about thirty years ago, when geopolitics sent media reporters looking for the perspectives 
of Muslim immigrants on foreign events. Instead of responding “no, we’re descendants 
of Malcolm X,” they spoke as foreigners. Prior to this shift, Shareefa postulates, 
everybody knew Muslims because they had family members who were “Moozlums” or 
saw Muslim places of worship and Muslim entrepreneurs selling bean pies and 
perfumes. 
The theme of the 2008 MANA conference, mentioned at the beginning of this 
dissertation, was Forging an American Muslim Agenda. The conference started with an 
airing of grievances and quickly moved on to such urgent issues as training imams and 
developing mosques, establishing social service centers, and creating community re-
entry programs for incarcerated Muslims. It also included the first organized effort for a 
“National Campaign for Healing and Reconciliation.” Representatives from the major 
Muslim organizations and the leaders of different factions within Blackamerican Islam 
attended the session. The goal was to heal the  
many historical and cultural differences that have prevented us from living up to 
the command of Allah, differences within the African American Muslim 
310 
community; differences among the indigenous Muslims–African Americans, 
Hispanics, White Americans and second generation Muslims; and differences 
between the immigrant and indigenous communities6.  
 
According to the campaign statement, this is the path to actualizing the 
“wonderful image of our unity”, an image of the ummah described by the Prophet as a 
single body that responds with fever and sleeplessness when one part of it is afflicted7. 
The campaign was ambitious and outlined work at the national and local levels. The 
various leaders were to take the idea back to their respective organizations for their roles 
and contributions. 
Two Blackamerican women from Arizona attending the session heeded the call 
and organized a diversity workshop for Black History Month in 2010, with Altaf Hussain, 
a member of MANA board, and imam Amin Nathari as invited speakers. The speakers 
were both second generation Muslims; Hussain is the son of Indian immigrants and 
Nathari is the son of Blackamerican converts. Hussain is very active in both immigrant 
and convert organizations. He serves on the boards of ISNA (a predominantly immigrant 
organization) and MANA (a Blackamerican organization) and is a national speaker 
popular with younger Muslims. Nathari is an author, national speaker and commentator. 
In the workshop, Nathari toured the history of Islam in America from the 1960s onward, 
focusing on the Blackamerican experience, while Hussain focused on the immigrants, 
starting in the late 1800s. The two converged on the present state and future prospects 
and aspirations and laid out a plan to acknowledge grievances and contributions; to 
recognize and reclaim all strands of the history of Islam in America as the heritage of the 
Muslim collective; and to create inclusive communities and do the intra-faith work with 
no less dedication than the inter-faith work. Though the formal work of the campaign at 
the national level has yet to begin, this agenda for change resonated with many, as was 
evident in conversations long after the event.     
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The discussion on reconciliation that MANA began was picked up two years later 
by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the largest national but mostly 
immigrant organization of Muslim Americans. Timing it to fall on M. L. King holiday 
weekend to amplify its message for managing and celebrating diversity, ISNA convened a 
“Diversity Forum” in Detroit in 2011 to address immigrant–convert, sectarian, 
generation and gender divides. Blackamerican and immigrant leaders, along with 
activists and scholars, some of whom were speakers of the 2008 MANA conference, 
presented their assessments and outlined a path forward.  The offspring of converts and 
immigrants along with young converts were everywhere organizing, moderating, 
entertaining and presenting. The event concluded with acknowledgements of problems 
and a plan to work at the national and local level. The forum reconvened in June of 2012 
in Detroit with a representative set of speakers, but from the online program what was 
once framed as a national agenda now appears to be a local Michigan project.  
 
 
Claiming History and Healing the ‘Hood 
 
The dominant thread in MANA and ISNA’s forums and similar efforts in the past 
decade is that the first step towards reconciliation is recognition and acknowledgement. 
As noted previously, recognition is critical for individual (and group) identity. 
Philosopher Charles Taylor argued that 
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them 
a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. [1994, 25] 
 
The suffering of Blacks in America is a deep and slow-healing wound in the body of the 
nation. But there is a sense among converts and their offspring that their marginalization 
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by Muslim immigrants, who are their brethren in faith, is even more injurious. To many 
Blacks –Muslim or not – immigrants reap the benefits of the Civil Rights movement and 
Black struggle only to look down upon Blacks as they climb the socio-economic ladder, 
internalizing and reflecting back racist attitudes and actions. Furthermore, Black 
converts sought in Islam a new identity that would emancipate them from what they saw 
as Christianity’s complicity in their oppression. So when Muslim immigrants marginalize 
Blackamericans and their historical contribution to Islam, immigrants not only commit 
injustice but do so at their own and their community’s peril. Recognizing this shared 
fate, the various speakers at the MANA and ISNA’s sessions discussed the importance of 
acknowledging the problems within the community, including racist tendencies, and of 
recognizing the history and contributions of Blackamerican Muslims as part of the 
collective heritage of Muslim America. Muslims in post -9/11 America realize that 
reconciliation of the different segments of their community and reclamation of their 
history is necessary for their survival and future aspirations. Shareefa sums up this 
point:  
So if Muslims don’t claim and hold onto the history of the African American 
Muslim, and I mean all of the indigenous people, but we know the history, most 
of them were African Muslims. But then we did have Caucasian converts 
centuries ago as well. We have to claim all of that and own it so that we can take 
claim to this society as opposed to saying “we’re American.” I mean, I know the 
naturalization process. I appreciate that. I respect it, but it’s kind of 
disingenuous; it sounds like some people may claim their American-ness out of 
convenience. Sometimes they’re American, most of the time they’re Palestinian, 
you know. And that, we hear that, Muslims hear it [is disingenuous]. You know 
non-Muslims hear it. And that only shoots us in the foot.  
 
The importance of knowing the history of America and of Islam has become a 
dominant storyline in crafting an “American Muslim” identity and community. 
Prominent scholars and converts like sheikh Hamza Yusuf and imam Zaid Shakir put 
together research-based power point presentations titled Islam’s Contribution to 
Civilization and the Historical Roots of Islam in America. Presented at national and 
313 
regional conferences, the message is that Islam is rooted in America both through its 
civilizational contributions to knowledge and to culture8 and through its “North 
American chapter” that starts with Pre-Columbian contacts and spans every chapter of 
American history to the present day. The audiences are then reminded to claim this 
history as their own, no matter their background, just like all Muslims claim Islam’s long 
history and large heritage; this is but another chapter, they are told, in the history of the 
ummah. 
This reclamation of history is to be accompanied by critical assessment of the 
community, including recognition of prejudices. The children of immigrants 
acknowledge the prejudices that they see among their elders and sometimes among their 
peers. Maryam, a twenty-four year old Chicagoan of Pakistani parentage, said she and 
her husband discussed the reasons for prejudices and concluded it is lack of positive 
interactions. She noted that immigrant interaction with Blacks too often occurs in 
situations where Blacks are disadvantaged or distressed and the immigrant is in position 
of social power, such as in clinics as patients and doctors, or at the immigrant-owned 
corner store, or as recipients of assistance from immigrants for mosque funding, or as 
when immigrants deliver goods and/or services in the south side of Chicago. These are 
not situations where normal friendships can develop and more meaningful exchanges 
can occur. Maryam and her peers see diversity as an asset spiritually but also socially and 
politically. Zakiyah, a thirty-three year old woman of African parentage, makes the same 
point, arguing the Muslims represent every ethnic and racial group in America as well as 
all of the socio-economic levels and geographical locales. Consequently, 
“demographically the Muslims are the most diverse and probably the most 
representative of America,” and the task then is how to reflect that institutionally, from 
leadership to membership and to allocation of resources. This, Zakiyah argues, should 
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not only be across ethnic and racial lines but also needs to happen across sectarian lines 
(between and within Sunni and Shia groups) which now happens even less.  
To bridge the gap, addressing ethno-racial tensions, particularly those created 
due to economic injustice in inner cities, is a necessary place to start. For example, in 
2006, some members of a NOI splinter group became fed up with the influence they saw 
as contributing to the destruction of their community and vandalized some Arab-owned 
liquor stores in West Oakland, California. In response, the community, headed by imam 
Zaid Shakir,9 organized to remove any religious or economic cover from the ownership of 
these stores and highlighted their exploitative and destructive (social and spiritual) 
effects. This led to a campaign to assist the owners to “get out” of the liquor business 
and, through grants and loans, to switch into food markets. A similar effort is carried out 
in Chicago by a coalition of organizations, activists, and state institutions. In reclaiming 
history to change the present and shape the future, the Inner City Muslim Action 
Network (IMAN) created a Muslim Run project that recalls the Black Owned campaigns 
of the NOI that aimed at transforming neighborhoods. With a pledge and a grant funded 
in part by the Muslim community, liquor store owners are transitioning to ownership of 
food markets. But Nashashibi, the sociologist mentioned earlier and also IMAN’s 
founder and executive, points out that “Muslim Run” is not only about not selling 
alcohol; it is about principled business practices that respect, engage and empower their 
neighborhoods.10  
 
Create Families and Craft a Community 
 
Time and again in interviews and discussions, participants advocated for 
opportunities for positive and instructive interactions, from cross racial/ethnic/sectarian 
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imam exchange programs, to twining of mosques and communities (especially pairing 
the inner city and suburb), to “tell me your story” gatherings. In a discussion I had with a 
group of second generation Muslims of immigrant backgrounds and young converts, the 
sentiment was the same. Though this particular group was mostly Shia, it also had Sunni 
members and their social networks included both Sunni and Shia. As to differences, they 
said that intra-community differences should just be that—different ways of being 
Muslim. Sectarian and ethnic differences do not matter to them because being a young 
person of color and member of an ethnic and a religious minority group is difficult 
enough. These younger people do not see distinguishing themselves across sectarian 
lines as important or useful. Zakiyah notes, and this was echoed by Sunni Muslims 
across the different ethno-racial lines, 
the average American Joe doesn’t care if So-and-So is Bohra [Shia] and So-and-
So is Ithna’asheri [Shia] and So-and-So is Maliki Sunni. To him we are all the 
same. We pose the exact same threat and we may pose the exact same solution. 
And so why not get our house in order here?  And you know, it’s happening! A lot 
of people from my generation marry across sectarian lines. And for some people 
that’s the solution.  
 
Marriage also serves as a portal for discussions of color, race, gender and religion 
and “long after religion has faded as the cornerstone of social protest against racism in 
the US, Muslim youth in American mosques revive it in debates” about such issues 
(Grewal 2009, 323). Where parents prefer their children to marry not only within their 
ethnic group but specifically from their hometowns of origin, younger Muslims see a 
larger pool of potential marriage partners from which to choose. But even within the 
hometown or ethnic group, the preference for many parents is for “fair” or whiter skin, 
especially for women. This politics of color hues and the preferences for lighter skin color 
along with the advantages it entails are well documented among African Americans 
(Russell, Wilson, and Hall 1992), Asians and Asian Americans (Rondilla and Spickard 
2007) and other groups, as noted in the collection edited by Evelyn Nakano Glenn 
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(Glenn 2009)11.Stratification by skin hue is not new, but the preference of lightness and 
the social, political and economic advantages it entails are the legacies of colonialism and 
slavery. Its meaning, therefore, cannot be retroactively imposed on pre-modern social 
constructions of difference based on color (Grewal 2009, Jackson 2005). In the modern 
era, lighter color and associated meanings and status served an intermediary function in 
the Black and White color regimens of power and powerlessness. Among Middle 
Easterners and South Asians, whiteness is both “coveted and disparaged” (Grewal 2009, 
238), for while such people may pass for white and enjoy its privileges, they also 
frequently refer to whiteness in disparaging terms, rejecting it and distinguishing 
themselves from “White people.”   
While they would like to preserve some of the language and cultural elements 
they grew up with, many young Muslims’ criteria for a potential spouse is, “as long as the 
person is Muslim,” and if there is personal compatibility, color and ethnicity do not 
matter. They use religious discourse and arguments to make their case to parents (Karim 
2008, Naber 2005, Grewal 2009). Rather than drawing on secular anti-racist reasons 
and sensibilities, their arguments emerge from a discursive traditions that both they and 
their parents hold authoritative and on a colonial history that their parents experienced 
and remember, all of which make younger people’s “moral claims [more] persuasive” 
(Grewal 2009, 325). Nevertheless, cross-ethnic marriages still mostly take place between 
south Asian, Arab, and White Muslims and occur less frequently between Blacks and 
South Asians or Arabs. Immigrants and converts may disagree on the kind and degree of 
differences that divide them, but they agree on the seriousness of the gender and 
generational gaps that affect all groups. 
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Bridging the Gender Gap 
 
Gender norms and family expectations vary within as much as across ethnic 
groups and socio-economic class and they are based on difference in cultural, religious 
interpretation, and ideological leaning. After jihad and violence, the issue of “Muslim 
women” dominates the discourse on Muslims and Islam. Public discourse shapes and 
seeps into both Muslim discourses and the individual’s inner speech in (im)perceptible 
ways. The issue of “women in Islam,” their space at the mosque and their place in the 
community are debated in the community. The ever-present matter of the headscarf and 
its meaning as symbol of oppression and an act of cultural aggression or a symbol of 
liberation and an act of faith and self-fashioning are deliberated in Muslim public 
spheres and private lives.  
Some survey questions aimed at eliciting participants’ assessment of women’s 
space in the mosque and their role in the community. On the issue of space, the great 
majority (78 percent) considered space for women in the mosque to be good or very 
good. Of those who thought it was barely acceptable or poor, interesting trends were 
noticeable. Most of those who did not approve of the space were men who thought it was 
inadequate; hijabi women were as likely as non-hijabi women to deem the space 
unacceptable. A majority (74 percent) of participants thought women were frequently 
involved in community affairs. Women are the majority of Islamic school teachers and 
often school principals; they serve on committees and organization boards but less 
frequently on mosque boards. 
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 Participants in the Phoenix-valley were more likely (62 percent) to say women 
served on mosque boards than those in Chicagoland (52 percent). Women in the 
Phoenix-valley were also as likely to give lectures or presentations to women only (46 
percent) or to mixed groups (44 percent). In Chicagoland, however, women spoke before 
mixed groups only 28 percent of the time. This difference reflects the impact and 
activities of a handful of women activists and founders of organizations in Arizona who 
do speak on social services, interfaith work, and civic engagements and present Islam’s 
teachings on these issues. In addition to activists and organization founders, 
Chicagoland has Muslim female professors of Islamic studies who give public lectures 
locally and nationally, but their work seems eclipsed by prominent male leaders and 
activists, which Phoenix-valley does not have. In the Phoenix-valley, participants were 
able to name one or two female leaders/activists but, besides imams, they had more 
difficulty identifying male leaders. On the other hand, in Chicagoland, even activists 
(both men and women) who are well informed had difficulty identifying women leaders 
or activists. To some degree, this might be because the Chicagoland area has “super star” 
male leaders/activists, including the leaders of IMAN, CAIR-Chicago, Interfaith Youth 
Core and CIOGC. The first three leaders are frequently on local or national media and 
command a lot of attention. At the national level, most participants from both sites could 
only name Dr. Ingrid Matteson, ISNA’s former president as an example of a female 
Muslim leader. The consensus was that women are very involved and do a lot of the work 
in the community, but they are not in the spotlight12.  
While controversial issues such as women leading mixed prayers steal the 
headlines, most Muslim women are more concerned about having better access, space, 
and roles in the mosque and community. They refuse to enter the mosque from the 
backdoor, and the majority of them dislike the dividers that conceal the imam and other 
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speakers from female worshippers. Some places have solved these issues with closed 
circuit TV that allows women to view the speaker, but when women are involved in 
mosque construction plans, they add a parallel space or mezzanine that gives them both 
privacy and a view of the happenings in the men’s section. The struggle over the divider, 
for example, periodically erupts in two Arizona mosques with vocal men and women 
arguing for and against the dividers. Imams at both mosques draw on the tradition of the 
Prophet to argue against the divider but mosque politics often trump their religious 
authority.  
In a panel on gender relations during a 2010 annual conference of a national 
organization held in Phoenix-valley, imam Suhaib Webb—the Al-Azhar graduate convert 
scholar quoted earlier— passionately and from scholarly sources argued for doing away 
with dividers. He asserted that dividers were belatedly introduced by Muslims in 
reaction to specific challenges at a particular historical moment and were not intended to 
be for all times and places. A first generation immigrant Arab woman interrupted him to 
argue for the dividers because, she said, today’s women do not dress as modestly as did 
the Prophet’s contemporaries. Visibly perturbed by both the interruption and the 
challenge to his historical knowledge and religious authority, Webb replied “people say 
they want a scholar’s opinion but then when they don’t like it, they might be thinking this 
is a ‘White guy’ but I can give you text, chapter and page and line.” He rattled off detailed 
references, but she still tried to interject until he emphatically said “khalto [aunty] let me 
finish!”, and proceeded to reaffirm his scholarly position on the issue. Typically, talks on 
gender issues focus on women’s role and the guidelines for interactions between the 
sexes. But in this workshop, men issues were also discussed. Imam Webb said,  
Do we understand terms like equality? Because if we understand them in modern 
terms we may be talking about something that doesn’t exist in Islam: Equality is 
before God but [there are] differences in roles and responsibilities. Brothers are 
picked on and [as speaker, to] get women to clap for you, men are demonized. We 
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lost John Wayne for [Homer] Simpson but we have to address that. There is great 
apathy among men for Islamic work, lack of confidence, not equipped to be 
husband, our community doesn't talk about sex. We need mentorship and 
preparing ourselves for marriage. [fieldnotes] 
 
  
The “Muslim Woman” as Spokesperson 
 
As the converts and second generation immigrants were fronted to become 
spokespersons for Islam in America post-9/11, women too were deemed by community 
leaders as more credible speakers to the larger society, but only if they “represent” the 
community well through their words, actions, and dress. Hijab is a requirement for this 
more visible role even though the majority of Muslim women in America do not wear the 
hijab. A female speaker on the same panel as imam Webb said that  
we needed something like 9/11 to get us to defend Islam and prove to the West we 
treat women equally. So we see women being pushed to the front lines but ‘giving 
women a voice’ is lip service. It only changes when you brothers – I’m sorry- 
think what women say is worthwhile because she is a human being (fieldnotes). 
 
Though it is interesting that she had to apologize for her criticism of men even as she was 
arguing that women’s thoughts are noteworthy, her statement opened a space for a 
spirited discussion on the critical role of Muslim women in their community and society 
at large.  
Women and their bodies are essential to dueling ideologies and, often, to wars. 
Since 9/11, a cottage industry emerged in the West to churn out books, blogs and 
film/TV images of Muslim women, Islam, and the hijab. This has had profound effects 
both on how Muslims are seen and how they see themselves individually and collectively. 
The increased public interest in these issues has led to heightened activity by Muslim 
women, as some speak back to dominant narratives in word and action. This 
development led Harvard academic Leila Ahmed to conclude that “[i]n consequence, 
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Islamic feminism in America is more lively today than at any other time in my own 
lifetime” (2011, 15). However, while in recent years some Muslim women working on 
gender justice have promoted an “Islamic feminism,” many of the young women I 
encountered saw no contradiction or a need to qualify their gender justice stances by 
labeling them Islamic even as they drew on Islamic religious discourse and history to 
argue their points. For example, Iman, a thirty-two year women of Syrian descent, said 
that as a feminist teenager, she argued with her parents to let her wear the headscarf and 
jilbab,13 and she won those arguments. She later decided to wear a face-veil which they 
also opposed and which she wore anyway only to take off later— ironically, while she was 
in Saudi Arabia. She convinced her parents of her need for college education and rejected 
the proposals of immigrant men in favor of those from American-born Muslims with 
whom, she said, she shared cultural experiences. As she explained her arguments and 
thinking, Iman effortlessly wove feminist and Islamic discourses to ground her reasoning 
without having to defend or qualify either.  
As a product of liberal humanism and enlightened modernity, mainstream 
feminism challenged the public–private dichotomy but came on the side of secularism 
the in secular–religious divide. It saw in religion a patriarchal ideology with only 
negative impacts on women, who presumably suffered from false consciousness for 
embracing it. Consequently, religion has seldom been included in the various qualifiers 
of gender (i.e. class, race, ethnicity) even though it cuts across and “often complicates 
these other categories rather than reinscribing them” (Castelli 2001, 6). Muslim 
American as a pan–ethnic category exemplifies this complicating effect. Post–feminism 
and third wave feminism, on the other hand, open a space within which one could 
explore these complexities. These later trends are more comfortable with contradictions 
and allow women, such as Iman to definite feminism for themselves, reflecting their own 
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identities and setting their agenda based on issues that matter to them. Within the 
community, as they challenge male monopoly of authority and community space, 
however, Muslim women ground their arguments in the Islamic discursive tradition and 
the example of the Prophet and his companions.  
 
Bridging the Generational Gap 
 
Gender issues matter to all women but younger ones also share with their male 
counterparts generational-based challenges, many of which they also share with their 
generational cohort in the wider society. Participants identified their parents as their 
primary source of Islamic education but at the same time noted differences in 
understandings, interpretation and practice, and the sources of their knowledge. 
Additionally, and as noted earlier, to younger generations of Muslims credible religious 
authority is grounded both in canonical texts and in context and cultural competence. 
Knowing the socio-cultural, political and historical specificity and the challenges 
encountered by young people in general and Muslims in particular is paramount in 
shoring up the credibility of one’s leadership and/or scholarship. Those with a 
knowledge and an ability to discuss the challenges young Muslims encounter but who 
also recognizes the authenticity of being both Muslim and American are better 
positioned to win the hearts and minds of these younger Muslims, especially those of 
immigrant background. Fostering an “American Muslim identity” has become almost a 
mantra for leaders, activists and scholars alike since 2001. This discourse began more 
than a decade earlier as noted by Manar, now in her late thirties, who relates her first 
experience at Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA) in seventh grade:   
I still had not chosen Islam for myself but I remember that one weekend I 
happened to go to an ISNA convention and I was put in a MYNA program. I later 
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understood why that one weekend left such a mark and it was because for the 
first time in my life, I was introduced to an Islam that was American. Islam was 
always something that I associated with being Arab or a culture though I was not 
thinking in these terms, but a culture that was not mine. And then I was thinking 
this is cool! This is mine. They are Rapping! They’re totally Rapping! And then 
there were these women who were wearing hijab, in this very American stylish 
ways but they were so modest and I looked up to them and they were not wearing 
jalabeeb. And then I remember them having debates about real open issues, I 
thought, wow, its Ok to talk, they were debating hijab, they were debating God, 
and I just thought wow, we could talk about things. There were mock debates but 
the purpose was to get critical thinking going and I really appreciated that. And 
then the fact that these young teenagers and early college students were the ones 
holding the mic and running the show made me feel like that this faith was so 
relevant to me. And there was also another component for me. I saw a future 
because I now saw brothers who I could see myself marrying and I saw myself 
wanting to have a Muslim family. Now it was something I could see myself having 
a future and actually want it in my future. Now Islam became for me!  
 
Manar’s profound realization that this is the Islam that belongs to her and is not merely 
part of her parents’ Arab culture, gives us glimpses into what resonated with and defined 
it for her. It was not a particular doctrinal teaching or theological reasoning but the 
cultural markers of Rap, dress, debates and critical thinking and the fact that young 
people were facilitating and experiencing this with her. At home, Islam had Arab sights 
and sounds and belonged to her parents, but at this event, that same Islam now looked 
more like her, at home in America without having to deny her cultural roots. How much 
have things changed since the 1990s? 
An overwhelming majority (83 percent) of participants reported that local 
organizations and centers are led mostly by men born and raised overseas. Participants 
concede that those willing and able to take the responsibility should always lead, but the 
problems arise when leaders enforce their ethnic norms, which may not only contradict 
“pure/true Islam” but also clashes with the cultural practices of other groups. There are 
several reasons for the near absence of members of younger generations from mosque 
leadership. One such reason, as theorized by Fahmi, a twenty-one year old of Chinese 
background, has to do with religious authority having long had an Eastern face. But 
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when these leaders, Fahmi notes, do “not understand the nuances of American culture” 
or are not “efficient as managers,” then “they drive away American Muslims, especially 
youth, who otherwise may have eventually taken over the reins.” There are signs that 
members of younger generations are gradually getting more involved. Knowledge of the 
religious tradition determines who assumes the role of the imam or teacher, but material 
resources and social/cultural capital within the local community determines who leads 
mosques. Organizations are usually led by founders and likeminded people and here is 
where younger Muslims and women are taking charge of shaping the agenda and the 
image within the community and beyond. These organizations are started by those who 
remained connected to the community and those who return after having children for 
whom they wanted to provide a more suitable and engaging environment. These 
organizations or activities outside the mosque are started to either avoid power struggles 
with the mosque leadership or after a group failed in swaying, or parted ways with, the 
leadership.  
Activities such as ThinkDot, Boy and Girl Scouts, after school programs, the 
Webb Foundation and IMAN in Chicagoland exemplify these parallel efforts. Members 
of second and subsequent generations want their children to have different experiences 
in the Islamic weekend school because they “all lived it” but did not like it. They disliked 
the “fear-based” education where parents are so fearful that their children will go astray 
that they instill in them the fear of wrath of God and focus too much on what is haram 
(illicit), leaving a lasting and negative imprint on children. Additionally, they do not want 
their children exposed to politics and ideological battles. They instead want them to 
learn more about the mercy of God and “the peaceful side of Islam” and to focus on 
character education. They prefer to equip them with a “moral compass,” rather than 
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instilling fear-based practice where you worry, as one young mother put it, that “God is 
just keeping track of all your mistakes.”    
Unlike immigrant parents, converts parents have experienced the challenges of 
growing up in the U.S. but they too may not fully appreciate the challenges of growing up 
Muslim in America. The NOI excelled in creating programs for younger people and 
institutions that mentored them, but these institutions did not fully transition with the 
community as it embraced the less hierarchical Sunni Islam. As noted earlier, unlike 
immigrant majority mosques which are typically led by boards, Blackamerican mosques 
are headed by an imam who, at his discretion, may delegate tasks to community elders 
and/or activists. In response to my question about how second generation Muslims 
interact with the imam and other leaders in her local Blackamerican community, 
Naeemah replied “they get squashed! I mean just again those same leaders that are vying 
for power they don’t want anybody to have limelight and so that’s one of the battles we’re 
having right now.” The battle she is referring to is a small school she, her husband, and 
few second-generation couples are trying to start in their area.  
These struggles with leadership notwithstanding, members of younger 
generations are involved in the activities and affairs of their communities. Nearly 61 
percent of the survey participants said they participated in one or more of the following 
activities: Friday communal prayers (79 percent), halaqa (study circles) (38 percent), 
Muslims lectures/conferences (66 percent), and interfaith work and events (35 
percent)14. Only 10 percent of project participants were not involved in any of these 
activities. In general, however, the majority of all Muslim Americans does not participate 
in any of these activities, whether they be very observant or only attend Eid prayers. 
Involved though they may be, participants felt they “do all the work” but have no say in 
decision-making or in setting the goals of organizations. An oft-voiced sentiment is that 
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younger Muslims are just waiting for the “uncles” to “pass on” by either dying off or 
becoming too feeble to lead. Yet, many first generation leaders claim to hold on to their 
positions because members of the younger generations are not willing or able to take the 
helm. It takes time, energy and financial resources that younger Muslims who are 
building their careers and families do not or cannot allocate to the demands of 
leadership.  
The age and background of leaders are not an issue if they are perceived to have 
the pulse of the community and especially the pulse of the younger generations. While a 
significant number (46 percent) of those surveyed thought that the imams were 
knowledgeable of their issues, the majority either did not think so (37 percent) or did not 
know (18 percent). Asiyya, a twenty year old female of Pakistani background, captures 
the sentiment of many when she notes that some imams understand the situation of 
young people, but the majority cannot relate because they had different childhood 
experiences. Because issues like dating, drinking and more recently radicalization are 
often talked about in general terms in the community, younger Muslims think that their 
elders are too uncomfortable and/or ill equipped to “sit down” and have a frank 
discussion about these issues and others, like addiction or depression. Imams and 
leaders may solicit input and assistance from the younger generation to address these 
issues but participants at both sites were split on whether or not that was the case in 
their area. Chicagoland’s COIGC, the Muslim umbrella organization, did have a staff 
position for coordinating youth programs. In a day-long leadership workshop I attended, 
youth leaders representing numerous organizations voiced the aforementioned 
frustrations and assessment.  
The post-9/11 discourse on Islam and Muslims has brought community attention 
to ethno-racial and gender issues, but it has also brought greater focus on younger 
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Muslims. How fear of radicalization shaped this new focus was discussed in earlier 
chapters, but that concern is not the only driving force behind the new attention. 
Younger generations are more vocal in demanding a leadership role and attention to 
their issues. For example, the 2010 conference in the Phoenix-valley with the gender 
relations panel referred to earlier was organized by second generation activists and 
reflected the issues that mattered to them. In addition to religious knowledge and a 
gender panel, the conference featured frank discussions about drugs, depression, and 
parenting styles. Two of the presenters, a male and a female marriage and family 
therapist addressed these issues and educated at once parents, leaders and younger 
generations. The male also held a certification in Islamic studies which afforded him a 
degree of religious authority beyond his professional credibility as a therapist. As a 
counselor of young Muslims, he gave an assessment of the prevalence of depression and 
drug use, but also spoke from a religious perspective that destigmatized mental illness 
and naturalized sexual desires. Regarding depression, he argued that telling people to 
“have faith and be patient” is not helpful and might be dangerous. Instead, he said, “we 
need to normalize depression by talking about it. Imagine if Friday khutbah15 was on 
depression” and if individuals who inquired about seeking help were told to seek it from 
culturally-competent professionals regardless of their faith. He reproached parents by 
warning them of becoming “culturally irrelevant to their children,” if they insisted on 
recreating “back home” or do not contextualize Islamic teachings16.  
Younger people are also becoming more aware that they have to step up and take 
the lead. They want to change leadership models by bringing to bear their real life 
experiences and professional skills as articulated by Talib, a third generation 
Blackamerican Chicagoan. “We have to perfect leadership. We have to look at leadership 
like a science, like it’s an ‘ology’, like it’s something to study.” In this assessment, the 
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children of converts and immigrants agree because, as over 90 percent of them noted, 
they have common experiences, despite some cultural differences based on their ethnic 
background. Second and subsequent generations of Muslims, even the whites among 
them, have in common – among other things – experiences that are shaped by being a 
racialized religious minority. Of course there are also cultural differences in the 
households of their childhood and in the degree to which they retain and internalize 
those differences. They also share a critique of the parental generation and particularly 
of immigrants, but this at times put the offspring of immigrants in a bind. Hannah, a 
Chicagoan of Egyptian background, told me she feels distressed when her friends of 
convert background get “very angry” at immigrants and accuse them of narrow 
mindedness and of imposing their “cultural baggage” on others. She shares their 
criticism but still, she says, “it hurts, because you know, I’m like, you know these are my 
parents” that you are attacking. She and others have noted that sometimes negative 
views of immigrants go too far and those who hold them are guilty of the excesses they 
criticize. Some children of converts thought that their parents’ views of mainstream 
culture were even more negative than those of immigrants. These parents see American 
society to be in state of jahilya (ignorance) from which these converts are trying to 
extricate themselves. In all cases, besides the experience of growing up as Muslims in 
America and sharing many experiences with people of their own age in society, these 
younger Muslims share what Safia called the struggles of the “growing pains of parents –
immigrants and converts- who are trying to adjust to a new lifestyle.” 
In the introduction to her edited volume, Living Islam Out Loud: American 
Muslim Women Speak, Saleemah Abdul-Ghafur (2005), a second generation 
Blackamerican Muslim, captured the sentiment of her generation: 
This anthology is about women who don’t remember when they weren’t both 
American and Muslim. We are the children of immigrants from Pakistan, Egypt, 
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and Senegal. We are the distant descendants of African slaves brought to the 
Americas as well as the children of American men and women who accepted 
Islam in adulthood. Unlike us, our parents were raised largely in other countries 
or in other faith traditions. Our education was a colorful mix of home schooling, 
local mosque, and Public School # 9. We wore Underoos and watched MTV. We 
know juz’amma (the final thirtieth of the Qur’an) and Michael Jackson’s Thriller 
by heart. We played Atari and Game Boy and competed in Qur’anic recitation 
competitions. As we enter our twenties, thirties, and forties we have settled into 
the American Muslim identity that we’ve pioneered. [2005, 1] 
 
 
 
 
Bridges “Under Construction” 
 
Differences across class, ethnic, racial, gender and generational divide are not 
unique to Muslims, and the power struggles along all these rifts are shared with other 
fellow citizens. Muslims, however, have the added burdens of unparalleled diversity and 
the pressures of an accusing outsider’s gaze as they attempt to bridge their various rifts, 
as they work to construct a cohesive political community out of disparate groups. 
Community, as noted earlier, is defined both from within and without, but the process of 
working out internal differences and creating a cohesive political community with a 
vision and agenda is an entirely internal and a perpetually “under construction” project. 
Some Muslim Americans may be motivated by religious ideals, others might be 
motivated by pragmatism and the convergence of interests, and still more might be 
motivated by both, but regardless of underlying motives there is an emerging realization 
that something needs to be done. Trying to find inspiration in the religious concept of an 
ummah and in the struggles and success stories of other American minorities (such as 
Blacks, Jews and LGBT), the project of constructing a Muslim American community is 
still in its infancy. MANA’s reconciliation project and ISNA’s diversity forums are 
conversations at the national level that may have local reverberations, but at both levels 
the efforts are in fits and starts.  
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The prescription for reconciliation includes overcoming the residue left by 
colonialism, slavery and racialized class prejudices; establishing a religious authority and 
leadership based solely on qualifications that include linguistic and cultural competence; 
acknowledging and claiming the history and contributions of all segments of the 
community; and leveraging all available human/material/cultural resources. Some 
younger generations of Muslims, regardless of their background, are pushing to hasten 
this community construction project. While not numerous, their impact is consequential 
as they offer a critique of their families, ethnic groups, leadership and gender relations, 
and as they create institutions that meet their needs and as they serve community and 
society. Muslim women, meanwhile, are working on multiple fronts. They are trying to 
disabuse the public of the negative stereotype of Muslims and at the same time 
attempting to balance pushing for a better space at the mosque and a better station in the 
community without seeming to echo the criticisms of outsiders or to be implementing an 
outsider agenda.    
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1 The 1975 death of the founder of the NOI, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, defines this 
periodization as his followers called his lifetime the “First Resurrection” when Blacks were 
“delivered from the darkness of slave mentality into the light of their true Blackamerican selves.” 
The “Second Resurrection” marks the period after his death when NOI split with the majority 
transitioning into Sunni Islam under the leadership of the founder’s son and a a smaller group 
continued in the NOI under the new leader, Minister Farrakhan. Jackson notes that in these two 
eras, it was a “charismatic leader rather than any objective method of scriptural interpretation 
that made or unmade religious doctrine.” The third Resurrection that he is arguing for would be 
one where Blackamerican Muslims necessarily gain mastery of the Islamic discursive tradition 
which is the primary authenticating agent (2005, 6). 
2 Al-Ansar (the supporters) is the term used to distinguish the natives of the city of Yathrib from 
Prophet Muhammad and his Meccan followers (Al-Muhajereen-the immigrants) whom Al-Ansar 
offered material and moral supported. Ahal-e-dar literally means the residents of the house and 
al-ajaneb means foreigners.  
3 The Arabic word for the color black is aswad and for white is abyad. Different Arab groups may 
use asmr or aswad to refer Black people in general whether or not they are Arabs. Abd is more 
frequently used by Palestinian and Syrians and some from the Gulf. For example, the 
neighborhood of the ethnically African Palestinians in Jerusalem is referred to as harat al-abeed 
(abeed plu. Abd ).    
4 This notion of emigration for the sake of deen (faith in God) or dunya (earthly desires) invokes 
an Islamic tradition that is oft repeated in such Qur’anic verses as “And whosoever leaves his 
home as an emigrant unto Allah and His Messenger, and death overtakes him, his reward is then 
surely incumbent upon Allah” (4:100). The contrast of such migration to that for worldly reasons 
(for dunya) is articulated by the Prophetic tradition narrated by Umar bin Al-Khattab who said: “I 
heard the messenger of Allah salla Allah u alihi wa sallam (Peace be upon him) say: ‘Actions are 
but by intention and every man shall have but that which he intended. Thus he whose migration 
was for Allah and His messenger, his migration was for Allah and His messenger, and he whose 
migration was to achieve some worldly benefit or to take some woman in marriage, his migration 
was for that for which he migrated’” (Bukhari volume 1, book 1, hadith # 1 in M.M.Khan 1987). 
5 The story of Bilal, an Abyssinian slave and one of first companions and the first muezzin in 
Islam, figures prominently in Islamic history. His courage and perseverance, as he opted to 
endure the torture of his polytheist master rather than to reject Islam, is part of every Muslim’s 
education. Bilal is ultimately acquired by another companion and is set free and is honored by the 
Prophet. The symbolic power of his story inspired W.D. Muhammad to name the new community 
he transitioned from NOI to Sunni Islam as the Bilalian Muslims. 
6 MANA’s National Campaign for Healing and Reconciliation Proposal for 2009 accessed on 
8/30/2012 at http://mana-net.org/pages.php?ID=projects&ID2=&NUM=1108 
7 MANA’s National Campaign for Healing and Reconciliation Proposal for 2009 accessed on 
8/30/2012 at http://mana-net.org/pages.php?ID=projects&ID2=&NUM=1108 
8 They list English words of Arabic origins (for example, algebra and alcohol, banana, caraway 
and coffee, and magazine and mattress), food items, along with practices like academic chairs and 
diplomas 
9 The store owners who are mostly Yemenis argue that lack of education limits their economic 
opportunities and owning such shops requires little skills. Because the stores presence in the 
neighborhood predated their ownership, they do not think they created an exploitative business. 
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This, however, does not lesson the conflict they feel as they trade in religious prohibited 
merchandise (Pauline Bartolone. 2007.  “Muslim Liquor Store Owners Face Criticism.” 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7217584) accessed on 8/30/2012 
10 “About Muslim Run” see http://www.imancentral.org/organizing-advocacy/muslim-run/  
accessed on 8/30/2012 
11 Glenn and her co-authors propose that in addition to “prejudice” (interpersonal) and “white 
supremacy” (institutional and group approach) racism should be explored through economies of 
color. They note that colorism and racism are not identical and can be independent and that 
“hierarchies of color destabilize hierarches based on race” but they are nevertheless linked. 
Colorism “operates sometimes to confound and sometimes to restructure racial hierarchy. 
Meanwhile, the circulating meanings attached to color shape the meaning of race” (Harris 2009, 
1–2). The authors also explore the commodification and consumption of whiteness which 
globalizes esthetics and standards of beauty through skin lightening products and plastic 
surgeries. Colorism is based on lighter skin, Eurocentric features, class, culture and education are 
all seen by members of these societies as marks of beauty, intelligence and higher socio-economic 
status (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009). 
12 In a presentation of this project that I gave at a Christian theological seminary, Christian and 
Jewish female academicians told me that this is the case in most religious communities. Women 
do the work but are not in the spotlight. Similarly, a few women lead in academia and the 
corporate world though their presence in these areas is well established 
13 Jilbab (Pl. Jalabeeb) is an outer overcoat-like garment worn primarily by some Arab hijabi 
women. 
14 There was a 10 percent difference between Chicagoland and Phoenix-valley residents in 
attendance of study circles or interfaith events with the former more frequently attending the 
study circles and the latter more frequently participating in interfaith events. This difference is 
due to the extensive interfaith work in the Chicagoland area including Interfaith Youth Core, 
interfaith Ramadan iftars and interfaith alliances on community services engaged by 
organizations like IMAN and Muslim Women Alliance.  
15 Khutbah is the sermon given during the Friday communal prayers. 
16 To drive his point home, he gives an example of how blind imitation of the Prophetic tradition is 
problematic. In this story, a young man asked the Prophet for permission to fornicate. The 
Prophet, living a society where sexual moral virtues especially of one’s women folk, were 
paramount, asked the youth if he would approve of that for his sister, mother, or aunt. The youth 
said no and the Prophet told him others do not want that for their women folk either. He 
dissuaded the youth through this process and prayed for him acknowledging, in the process, the 
natural desire of sexuality. The therapist-imam pointed out to the audience that today if a boy 
asks his father to date and the father follows the example of the Prophet and asks the son “would 
you be Ok with you if your sister dates,” the boy is more likely to say, “why not if that is what she 
wants”. So parents must be relevant and not just blindly imitate. 
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CHAPTER 8 
“CREATING” AN AMAERICAN MUSLIM CULTURE 
As noted earlier, this chapter and the previous one are linked by a narrative that 
calls for building a community and creating a culture. This chapter considers the 
inspiration for this call and examines its background, meanings, and contested nature. It 
then grapples with the question of whether or not there are uniquely American Muslim 
norms, practices, and expressive/material cultural products. Exploring these areas is 
essential to the primary concern of this dissertation, the formation and the expression of 
identity (a sense of being and belonging) of the younger generations of Muslim 
Americans. Cultural products are the technologies for/of the dialogical process of the co-
construction of self, community, and nation and for/of the meanings and relationships 
that sustain each. Additionally, these products serve as tools for both presenting and 
representing oneself and one’s group and for struggling against marginalizing ideologies 
and practices. In other words, as Myers (1995) notes, the producers of this cultural 
products engage in “a form of social action in uncertain discursive spaces” in and 
through which collective cultural values are (re)produced (Mahon 2000, 469). 
As noted earlier, Muslims have a long history in the United States, living both as 
Muslims and as Americans with all the struggles (with self, family, community and 
society) that this dual heritage entails. They have created institutions, norms, and 
expressive and material culture along the way.  The young woman recalling her 
“American Islam” at MYNA camp in the 1990s points to one sign of the existence of this 
culture. Yet, at the dawn of the twenty-first century and in the post-9/11 era, there are 
assertive calls for creating an “American Muslim identity” and an “American Muslim 
culture.” The calls are from leaders, activists, and ordinary Muslims of diverse 
backgrounds.   
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The meaning of this call to the speaker and the listener varies depending on the 
background of the speakers and the context in which it is made. To many, this is at last 
an affirmation of their experiences, sentiments, and identity as authentically both 
Muslim and American. It is the answer to all of those who told them “don’t be too 
American” whenever the speaker did not like something they did. Others, however, read 
in this call various hidden agendas. Members of both camps span the ethnic and 
ideological spectrum. Some Blackamerican Muslims assert that as long as they have 
existed, an American Muslim identity and culture has been their daily reality, so what is 
all the fuss about? In this call, they see nothing but immigrants’ belated realization that 
they want to assimilate and “want to be Americans.” But some Blackamericans argue 
that they embraced Islam to distinguish themselves from a jahali (living in era of pre-
Islam ignorance) society, and that they have no desire to emulate that society by 
embracing its culture.  
As for immigrants, some agree with Blackamericans that this is their daily reality 
and not something that needs to be “created”, while others see a need to protect 
themselves from assimilationist impulses and to try to recreate their home culture. Other 
immigrants, suspicious of the agenda, see in the call to create an American Muslim 
culture a hegemonic social engineering project aimed at marginalizing their own ethnic 
heritage. This project, they say, is one largely put forth by converts who initially 
committed cultural apostasy by shunning everything American to become Arabs and 
Asians. Now, they are trying to reclaim their American-ness by imposing a particular way 
of being American, centered on black urban or white middle class norms and 
normativity, on everyone. Salem, the thirty-four year old Chicagoan of Pakistani 
background quoted earlier, articulates this position. He studied Arabic and Islam and 
lived a few years in a Muslim country and was pursuing a doctorate in Islamic studies at 
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the time of my fieldwork. He elaborated with fondness on his Midwestern upbringing, 
which left an indelible imprint and an embodied mode of living and viewing the world. 
So to him, Muslim American identity and culture are self-evident. Salem, however, 
understands “the narrative of the converts where they feel they have the right to be the 
moniker of the American Muslim and that they want to define that moniker”. He thinks 
that the champions of this call, like sheikh Hamza Yusuf and Dr. Umar, “who are 
pushing this ‘American Islam’ ” narrative, have a specific vision that systematically 
precludes some images typically associated with Islam. These images, he postulates, are 
ones that popular culture associates with Arabs and South Asians and consist of “some 
brown person dressed in some kind of weird head cover and usually a beard that is 
unkempt or a headscarf.” Though both Dr. Umar and Sheikh Hamza are White, Salem 
knows well that both men are bearded and alternate wearing suits with wearing head 
caps and North African attire. Nevertheless, he notes that the proponents of this call 
want to replace these images of “weird” brown people and their restrictive gender norms 
with “white upper middle class”-based images and unrestricted gender norms. To him 
the irony is that many so-called immigrants, like his father, already live this White 
middle class life. Salem also argues that this narrative promotes a West coast middle 
class or Black urban culture at the expense of Midwestern or Southern cultural norms 
and sensibilities.  
Many Muslim Americans conflate images of immigrants as suburbanites and 
Blacks as urbanites. While it is true that many post-1965 immigrants were or became 
middle class professional or business people, waves of immigrants and refugees followed 
and often occupy the lower socioeconomic rungs in American society, while many 
Blackamericans are middle class professionals or business owners. Nevertheless, there is 
some merit to Salem’s arguments. “Immigrants” tend to be homogenized and reified as 
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conservative islands of “back home” cultures when they, like others, in fact reflect 
America’s social–religious–political spectrum, and some are already in many ways 
culturally “mainstream” middle class. Additionally, some converts understandably 
champion the call to create an American Muslim culture as a means to reclaim a cultural 
heritage that they might have given up in order to be Muslims. 
 I would argue that, rather than a social engineering project invented by converts 
or by the desire of immigrants to assimilate, calls to create an American Muslim identity, 
community and culture are evolutionary products of the collective Muslim American 
experience. In particular, these calls have resulted from a confluence of historical 
developments that include the transition of the majority of NOI followers to Sunni Islam; 
the acceptance by most immigrants that they are in America to stay; the coming of age of 
the descendants of both immigrants and coverts in multicultural, post-civil rights 
America; and the discursive and real consequences of conflicts in the Middle East and 
America’s foreign policy. In different stages of their community development, Muslim 
Americans have had to grapple with social and ideological hurdles. In the 1980s, they 
debated political participation by engaging the Islamic discursive tradition and concepts 
such as Dar el Harb and Dar el Islam (abode of war and abode of Islam). Recognizing 
the inapplicability of these concepts in an interconnected world and the consequences of 
their nonparticipation, the West was reclassified as an abode of peace, or of witnessing 
or of treaty, where Muslims can and must participate in order to live and thrive 
(Ramadan 2004). In the 1990s, the focus shifted to bolstering Islamic knowledge and 
students of all ages headed to the Muslim East, imagined to be the repository of Islamic 
knowledge and heritage (Grewal 2006). There were also efforts to bring immigrants and 
converts together as some realized that their common interests necessitate this bridge- 
building. 
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 A volatile Middle East, the first bombing of World Trade Center, and a Sufi 
leader’s accusation that 80 percent of the mosques are controlled by extremists have 
contributed to the conflation of conservatism, terrorism and Islam. The charged 
atmosphere and greater public scrutiny that resulted, propelled activists and leaders in 
the late 1990s to push for local financing of their institutions and more scrutiny of their 
political and religious rhetoric (Leonard 2003). The Clinton era brought greater Muslim 
public visibility: the first White House Ramadan Iftar (breaking fast), an imam offering 
an opening prayer in congress, and a second generation Muslim female physician serving 
as a U.S. delegate to the International Conference on Women in Beijing. The twenty-first 
century began with an attempt at a Muslim bloc vote in the 2000 presidential election. 
Rather than resulting in a unified vote, however, this attempt only revealed the intra-
community fissures and launched the discourse for “an indigenous” American Muslim 
agenda. Discussions and debates that began long ago, about religious authority and 
about the role of context in the interpretations of canonical texts, continue today. After 
debating political engagement and religious knowledge acquisition, it was inevitable that 
culture, the common thread in all these narratives, would be the next frontier to tackle. 
While the call seems more urgent now, this identity and culture “project” has been in the 
making for decades. It is at once a call for a community building project, a conscious 
shaping of a political subject, and an assertion of belonging and cultural citizenship. 
 
“Islam is Like a Pure River” 
 
Almost like a mantra, I heard it time and again from men and women of diverse 
backgrounds with slight word variation: “Islam is a like a pure river that reflects the color 
of the bedrock1.” The mechanism by which Islam spread –whether or not by the sword– 
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is the subject of great polemics. History, however, shows that the spread of Islam was not 
a homogenizing and Arabizing project, as evident by the presence of culturally-distinct 
Muslim majority societies and minority communities around the world. By the eighth 
century, Islam had spread from its birth place in Arabia and extended from China across 
Africa to Europe. As it spread, it did not provide its new adherents with a comprehensive 
cultural script, nor did it require them to jettison their cultural heritage. Arabic terms 
and some cultural aspects might have survived but as many noted (Abd-Allah 2004; 
Jackson 2005; Ramadan 2004), Islam may be the religion of most Arabs, but Arabic 
culture is not the exclusive culture of Islam. While they share the history and 
civilizational heritage of Islam, the names2, foods, arts, architecture, myths and folklore 
of Muslim Chinese, Malians, Egyptian, and Turks are particular to their locale and –
except for some names and some foods – are usually shared by their non-Muslim 
neighbors. New Muslims everywhere engaged in a cultural inventory whereby what did 
not conflict with a specific religious precept was accepted as inherently Islamic. This 
allowed for a distinct cultural identity and an Islam that is dressed in the local cultural 
garbs of China, Persia, Mali and Bosnia, to name a few.  
This indigenization process is illustrated by the conceptualization of the term 
Islam in Chinese. In China, the term qīng zhēn (pure and true) refers to Islam, Muslim 
foods, and their institutions. In using this term, Chinese Muslim scholars rendered the 
meaning of Islam in an authentically Chinese idiom. Gladney points out that when the 
ethnically Hui Chinese Muslim scholar Ma Fuchu said “To deny oneself is pure, to 
restore propriety is true,” he was elaborating this conceptualization of Islam as a “pure 
and true” religion in Confucian values. In doing so, Gladney notes, the concept “reveals 
two aspects of Islam in China central to Hui community interests and self-
understanding: pure (qīng), in the sense of ritual cleanliness and moral conduct; and 
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truth (zhēn), in the sense of authenticity and legitimacy” (Gladney 1996, 13). For the Hui, 
these characteristics of purity and truth point to the two elements of their identity: a 
moral purity grounded in their Islamic faith and a lineage, way of life, and cultural 
heritage that are authentically grounded in their society (Gladney 1996); this is not 
unlike what Muslim Americans are struggling with and for. 
This indigenization process has been a complicated one in the Unites States. 
While it has deep roots, an Islam dressed in a uniquely American grab and commanding 
recognition and consensus among the various segments of Muslim Americans has been 
slow to emerge. Its racial supremacy and problematic theology notwithstanding, the 
Nation of Islam’s ingenuity and longevity lie in its creative appropriation and 
refashioning of Islam and American norms (Jackson 2005). The process has been more 
difficult and complex in the extraordinary ethnic and sectarian diversity of the rest of the 
Muslim American community. Therefore, today’s discourse on Muslim American culture 
and identity by diverse groups is about the reasons for and the features of an Islam with 
an American cultural garb. A unified sense of self with locally grounded sensibilities and 
esthetics, intra-group reconciliation and collaboration, civic engagement and cultural 
contribution, and the development of local interpretative authority are at once the 
essential elements and the byproducts of the process of the indigenization of Islam. The 
coalescence of these elements in the Muslim community in the U.S. has been hampered 
by historical, sociological and geopolitical factors, including the long standing divides 
among its constituting groups.  
While many argue that globalization is but another name for Americanization, in 
a multiethnic America segmented by multiculturalism, culture wars, and 
cosmopolitanism, Americans periodically ask if a common American culture even exists3. 
It is not surprising then that Muslims, similarly segmented by ethnicity among other 
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things, contemplate if there is an American Muslim culture; that itself is a 
quintessentially American trait. This is also the assessment of Naeema, a Blackamerican 
second generation woman from Chicago, when I asked her if there is an American 
Muslim culture. She said “no! As there is no American culture because we are a 
patchwork; we are diverse, that’s the beauty it is. Just like I wouldn’t normalize or 
minimize all white Americans or African Americans as one, I can’t say that Muslims in 
America are one. We’re very diverse, which makes us that much more American because 
that mirrors everyone else here.” To Naeema and many participants, Muslim American 
culture is a quilt and to be otherwise would be un-American. In his widely circulated 
paper, Islam and the Cultural Imperative (2004), which sparked this discussion in the 
Muslim public sphere, Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah uses the metaphor of a peacock’s tail. 
Here, each feather stands for the various ethnic cultures and the tail represents the 
envisioned unique American Muslim culture. But because difference stands out and 
represents a challenge to be managed, it is often too easy to focus on the patches or the 
individual feathers, to the neglect of the quilt or the peacock’s tail. Therefore, while such 
a culture has been difficult to identify by looking at the groups and their specific 
heritages, a shared culture has nevertheless been in the making for decades. Yet, because 
of the diversity and the tacit nature of culture, most Muslims do not take note of the 
specificity of their shared norms and practices that are grounded in U.S. culture. But that 
is changing, and it is part and parcel of a process of cultural citizenship that other 
minorities have also experienced.  
Beyond legal citizenship, cultural citizenship creates a space to be both different 
and belong, a space for creative self-expression, representation, engagement and 
contribution. It at once challenges the black/white color line that defines citizenship and 
the nativist anti-immigrant discourse that marginalizes cultural differences, especially 
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those of “new minorities” (Flores and Benmayor 1997). Cultural citizenship involves 
forming and defining a collective and demanding a group’s political rights. Equally 
important, however, it is also about how groups (re)interpret their history and cultural 
heritage and use that knowledge to create new cultural norms, sensibilities, esthetics, 
and discourses that are grounded in and transformative of their new context. Cultural 
citizenship encompasses a range of activities that define a space for self-definition, 
empowerments, and expression. However, a group’s efforts and demands are not aimed 
at carving out a space to remain isolated and different, but at finding ways to be 
comfortable and at home in their difference; in short to belong (Flores and Benmayor 
1997). Thus far, this chapter and the preceding ones have explored Muslim Americans’ 
cultural citizenship efforts regarding self-definition and empowerment. The remainder 
of this chapter explores how these efforts are manifested in institutions and expressive 
cultural products.  
 
American Muslim Institutions 
The Family 
 
Family is the primary institution in every community and society; it is the first 
educator of religious and societal norms and values. Like other Americans, Muslim 
Americans primarily live in nuclear family households, often away from extended family 
members. They struggle with the demands of childrearing and worry about aging parents 
and relatives. While caring for one’s elders is a religious obligation and a cultural 
tradition for many Muslims, the reality of contemporary society presents seemingly 
insurmountable challenges. Discussions about these issues have only begun in Muslim 
America. 
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Most Muslim American families are dual income by economic necessity but, 
when able, many younger women are choosing to put careers on hold and stay home to 
raise their children, at least in their formative years. Delayed marriages, rising divorce 
rates, domestic violence, and drug addictions are on the rise and are now becoming 
topics of discussion among Muslims. Both marriage and divorce for most Muslim 
Americans, observant or not, involve a religious officiation in addition to civil 
registration (for marriages) or the use of the court system (for divorce). Differences in 
expectation and backgrounds, the role of the in-laws, gender roles and life–work balance 
issues are some of the reasons for divorce. Alarmed by the rate of divorce among Muslim 
Americans and to forestall severe conflicts and domestic violence, some imams and 
Muslim social service professionals and activists have proposed pre-marital counseling, 
imam education in family counseling, and the spelling out of expectations in marriage 
contracts. Sharifa Alkhateeb (1946–2004), a prominent second generation activist, 
leader and educator who worked across the different Muslim organizations and groups, 
founded the Peaceful Families Project in 2000. The project has a group of qualified and 
diverse speakers that includes imams, counselors and social service providers who do 
workshops on all matters related to family life.  
 
The American Mosque 
 
The American imam serves a role that is more like that of a church pastor than 
that of a typical imam in Muslim majority countries. This makes it very difficult for 
“imported imams” to serve the community effectively. Subsequently, many communities 
now couple religious education and cultural competence in their job descriptions for 
potential imams. Besides leading the prayers and Friday services, imams must now serve 
343 
as spiritual counselors, conflict mediators, family and marriage counselors, interfaith 
representatives and community spokespersons. The mosque in America is a 
multipurpose space that serves as a place of worship and education, a meeting and 
planning venue for various activities, a venue for social services, a place to prepare the 
dead for burial, a center for public education about Islam, and a destination for officials 
(domestic or foreign). Mosques hold general membership meetings and house Islamic 
weekend schools which are uniquely a Western Muslim phenomenon. In the United 
States, they also host Ramadan suhoor and iftar potlucks (meals before dawn and after 
sunset) and organize Eid picnics/barbeques with games and entertainment for children. 
  As mentioned earlier, Blackamerican mosques are headed by an imam, whereas 
predominantly immigrant mosques are managed by boards (usually elected but 
sometimes appointed) who then hire an imam. Recently, citizenship or legal permanent 
resident status has been added to the qualifications for board membership and there is 
greater scrutiny in the community regarding the activities and discourse of its leaders. 
Whereas foreign students or those on work visas could serve before, now there is 
heightened vigilance as articulated by Shareefa, a second generation Blackamerican 
female quoted earlier. She says  
now they’ve [leaders] come to the realization that we’re invested here, our kids 
are from here. We need knowledge coming from here. We need leadership 
coming from here versus [someone] from someplace else who is not necessarily 
invested here, who plans on leaving, who didn’t grow up here, who has no clue 
about our laws here. And I think what pushed them to that is the law, is that the 
FBI is hot. The scrutiny is high on the Muslim community, legally, and you can 
get into a lot of trouble.  And so I guess the fear factor has kind of popped in and 
they realize “we can’t just have ‘Abdullah Schmoe’ from foreign country X on our 
board signing our financial documents and making decisions, because we can all 
end up in Guantanamo”. So you know, Alhamdulillah [glory be to God]. We were 
trying to tell them, but I guess they had to see it to believe it. 
 
Younger people and women are filling more of these board positions but that still 
varies from mosque to mosque. Additionally, young men are starting to serve as regular 
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imams though more commonly they may serve as guest imams who deliver the Friday 
sermon or lead the long Taraweeh prayers during Ramadan. Taraweeh is a 
recommended nightly prayer that involves reciting the entire Qur’an from memory over 
the month. In several of the mosques I attended during my fieldwork and since, younger 
men often led this nightly prayer and then delivered short lectures. They were popular 
with younger as well as older worshipers.  
Many of my collaborators noted that they are not attached to a particular mosque 
and do a lot of “mosque hopping” because there is not one mosque that has all they are 
looking for. I asked them to describe their ideal future mosque and with their responses 
they constructed the following composite vision of such a mosque. It would be designed 
as a community center with prayer space; there would be no dividers between women 
and men but because of postural positions during prayers, women would be in the back 
of the same space or in a parallel space; it would be multi–ethnic/racial in membership 
and administration; and potluck dinners would include burgers, biryani, bean pie, and 
baklava symbolizing a splendid multicultural table reflecting the community diversity. In 
this community center, there will be learning opportunities (religious, health, civic) and 
town- hall meetings as well as leisure activities (movie nights, ball courts, and gym). It 
would be a space where non–Muslim friends and relatives could come and feel 
comfortable and where neighborhood activities are welcome. A place, Angie notes, 
“where you feel at home, it belongs to you and you are accepted and not constantly 
judged”. This envisioned mosque echoes the earliest Islamic centers founded by a 
previous second generation, the descendants of the early 20th century immigrants.  
Some in Chicago gave the Webb Foundation as an example of this envisioned 
center, a welcoming place with education and leisure activities. Its name is chosen to 
symbolize its grounding in America and honors Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb 
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(1846-1916), the first prominent Whiteamerican convert to Islam. His life story was 
brought to the attention of Muslims by the Chicago-based Nawawi Foundation scholar-
in-residence and Whiteamerican convert Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah— often called Dr. Umar 
in the community. The foundation was founded by a group influenced by Dr. Umar and 
is intended to be a concretization of the narrative of creating an American Muslim 
culture4 that Dr. Umar called for. Manar, who is not a member, notes that Webb 
Foundation serves converts as well as those who do not attend mosques. Here, they all 
feel welcomed and not judged; they find a community to belong to.  
Though a long way from the ideal kind of centers envisioned above, mosques are 
gradually changing. Recently, The American Mosque 2011 study found that only a few 
mosques (3 percent) are today frequented by the members of only one ethnic group, and 
that even those where 90 percent of the worshipers are of one ethnic group are 
decreasing (now 16 percent). In the year 2000, for comparison, these numbers were 7 
percent and 24 percent respectively. Furthermore, where it has been common for mostly 
Arabs or South Asians to attend the same mosque, now 81 percent of all mosques have 
Blackamericans as well (Bagby 2012). 
 
Civic Organizations 
 
The mosque and the Islamic school take first priority in Muslim communities and 
have the lion’s share of community funding. The Nation of Islam was focused on 
uplifting Blacks, so it created institutions that attended to the economic, health, and 
educational needs of the community. As most Blackamerican Muslims transitioned to 
Sunni Islam, the community sustaining these institutions declined. The NOI, however, 
continues to operate them in some areas. Sunni Blackamericans have created diverse 
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organizations, including a short-lived Islamic Party of North America (1971-1981) for 
political and social activism (Mamiya 2010). Former members of the NOI who 
transitioned to Sunni Islam under the leadership of W.D. Muhammad created the 
American Muslim Society, operated Sister Clara Muhammad schools, and later formed 
the Mosque Care project. Today, the Muslim Alliance of North America serves as a loose 
coalition of Blackamerican Muslim mosques and organizations and is trying to create 
social services centers. 
 If today’s children of immigrants are eager to take over organizations led by 
older immigrants they refer to as “uncles,” this completes a circle. Foreign Students 
founded the Muslim Student Association which gave birth to many of today’s national 
organizations, as noted earlier. It was, however, Abdallah Igram (b.1923- d.1981), a 
second generation Muslim and a World War II veteran, who founded the first umbrella 
organization, the Federation of Islamic Associations in the United States and Canada, in 
1952 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Echoing today’s goals and cultural citizenship efforts and 
prompted by the discrimination against Muslims that he witnessed in the military, Igram 
put out a call to create an organization and found a receptive audience. The goal was to 
unite Muslims and connect them to the global ummah, provide education for Muslims 
and non-Muslims, and work towards obtaining recognition and accommodations from 
the state and from society (Howell 2010). Igram asked President Eisenhower the reason 
why, unlike other religions, the religion of Muslim servicemen was not recognized by the 
military. It was at Igram’s behest that “I” for Islamic was added to Military identification 
tags (dog tags). He also worked for recognition by the Boy Scouts of America, which 
subsequently created the “In the Name of God” merit badge for learning about Islam 
(Howell 2010). Like participants in the project, Igram saw no contradiction between his 
dual heritages; in the midst of his campaign to organize the Muslim community, he was 
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also working to bring the Y.M.C.A to Cedar Rapids. He was quoted as saying, “I was 
president of the Islamic Federation and the Y.M.C.A. at the same time” (Harsham 1976).   
After focusing inward for decades, many of today’s national organizations (for 
example, the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Circle of North America, and 
the Muslim American Society, Muslim Alliance of North America) have the same goals of 
education, service, unity, representation, and interfaith work as Igram’s federation did 
more than half a century ago. Others, like CAIR and MPAC, have civil rights and 
politically-focused missions while education remains central. There are also professional 
associations like the Islamic Medical Association, the Islamic Social Services Association, 
and the Muslim Social Scientists Association. Additionally, Muslim-founded free clinics, 
food banks, and social service organizations dot the landscape. There are also Muslim 
think tanks, the most important of which is the Institute for Social Policy and 
Understanding (ISPU) with the mission to research and provide expert analysis on issues 
related to Muslims at home and abroad. Created post-9/11, ISPU has since generated 
reports, policy briefs, and articles, and its expert academics— who are mostly Muslims of 
diverse background— have been called on by various media outlets and political officials. 
 
Education and Scholarship 
 
Islamic schools offer state-mandated curricula along with Arabic and Islamic 
Studies but also aim to provide an “Islamic” environment for the young, as discussed 
earlier. Some families send their boys to boarding schools where, along with the 
standard curriculum, they learn to memorize the Qur’an. Americans who have 
memorized the entire Qur’an are in great demand, particularly during Ramadan. 
However, few families encourage careers in religious studies. While most direct their 
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children toward professional careers in medicine, engineering and technology, as noted 
earlier, Muslim Americans have gradually realized the importance of social services, law, 
social sciences, and humanities. There has also been growing interest among younger 
generations of Muslims for specializing in Islamic studies, both in the Muslim East and 
more recently in American universities. In American universities, Islamic studies is a 
field that has long been dominated by non-Muslim faculty, but there is now a small but 
growing number of Muslims men and women in this field. 
In previous decades, Muslim Americans who desired training in “classic” Islamic 
scholarship went to the Middle East or South Asia. There they trained with scholars who 
then authenticated their studies with an ijazah (certificate) that qualified them to 
transmit knowledge in a specific field. The problem has been that, frequently, these 
students returned as “Arabs” or “South Asians”. Having internalized the culture of these 
countries, they were judged to be as removed from the American context as “imported 
scholars”. As a remedy, in the past decade, some organizations have sponsored students 
to attend established universities (Al-Azhar University, for example) to obtain academic 
degrees on the condition that they return to address the specific issues and concerns of 
their community.  Ubaidullah Evans represents this group. He was co-sponsored by 
IMAN, the Chicago-based culture and social service organization, to study at Al-Azhar 
University in Egypt. In that period, he also had scholar-in-residence status with IMAN 
where, during a short visit to the U.S. in the summer of 2010, he facilitated a class titled 
“Ramadan Reflections”. Rather than a typical lecture, the class was an interactive 
seminar. Because the meaning of the Qur’an is continuously revealed to each believer, he 
exhorted participants to allow their “own lived experiential reality [to] interface[e] with 
the word of Allah”. He argued that “if we don’t engage the Qur’an, we risk it becoming 
irrelevant” (fieldnotes). The homework for the next session was to select verses from the 
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Qur’an and derive a personal meaning that was then to be put in dialogue with the 
authoritative tafsir (exegesis) which Evens planned to present. In doing so, he aimed to 
illustrate the importance of and the parameters for personally engaging canonical texts.  
New institutions such as ALIM5 and Bayyinah were founded by second-
generation Muslims who wanted more rigorous explorations of Islamic studies (the 
ALIM program), or mastery of Arabic, and more intense but local and context-relevant 
learning of the Qur’an (Bayyinah). These institutes along with the Zaytuna Institute, 
Deen-Intensive Foundation (DIF), and AlMaghrib offer weekend, month, or summer-
long workshops and programs for interested Muslims. Zaytuna, DIF, and the Chicago-
based Nawawi Foundation also offer Rihla. Rihla (a journey) typically consists of two to 
four-week long education trips to Muslim countries and communities (for example, in 
Russia, China, or Bosnia) for religious and historical education and to connect with the 
global ummah. The teachers in these institutes are mostly converts and second 
generation American Muslims with few scholars from the Muslim East. These teachers 
are very popular with younger Muslims on whom these institutions rely to organize local 
workshops. Bayyinah Institute, for example, held a two-day intensive workshop in 
Phoenix-valley in 2010 on Divine Speech: Literary Characteristics of the Qur’an. The 
workshop entailed an $85 per-person fee, the commitment of an entire weekend, 
punctual arrivals and very short breaks. Led by a young and relatively unknown teacher, 
the event was the most demanding and intensive program the community had had. It 
was also widely attended by men and women of diverse age and ethnic backgrounds. The 
workshop organizers offered scholarships with funds raised from the attendees for those 
who could not afford the fees.  
There are also seminary schools that train Muslim chaplains for universities, the 
military, and healthcare. Most notable among these new institutions is Zaytuna College 
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in Berkeley, California. It is the first four-year college that combines general liberal arts 
education with the option to major in Islamic Law and Theology or Arabic Language6. 
The college was founded by two converts who are religious scholars, imam Zaid Shakir (a 
Blackamerican) and sheikh Hamza Yusuf (a Whiteamerican), and an immigrant who is a 
University of California-Berkeley academic, Dr. Hatem Bazian (a Palestinian American). 
Its mission is to prepare religiously and culturally-grounded future leaders and 
educators.  
 
Expressive Culture and the Cultural Production of Home 
 
As noted above, whenever a culture encountered Islam, it was able to retain its 
unique identity through a reflexive process of assessing and harmonizing its communal 
praxis and ethos with Islam. Consequently, be they the majority or minority, Muslims 
produce a rich tapestry of expressive culture through art and architecture, music and 
film, theater, fashion/textile and literature, each carrying the stamp of a particular 
community, country or region marking its identity. This is at once a “cultural product 
and social process,” through which “individuals and groups negotiate the constraints of 
the particular material conditions, discursive frameworks, and ideological assumptions 
in which they work” (Mahon 2000, 468). The producers of this expressive culture are not 
merely capturing a social reality but are actively engaged in (co)constructing, contesting, 
and transforming the lifeworlds they inhabit. Scholars have viewed such creative and 
expressive endeavors as “sites of the reinscription of dominant ideologies and also as 
contestatory interventions with the potential of contributing to social transformation” 
(Mahon 2000, 468). Furthermore, there are “cultural politics of aesthetics, authenticity, 
and appropriation that underpin these productions” (Mahon 2000, 468). These politics 
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reflect different positions and subjectivities and their associated power differentials 
between producers and consumers. Consequently, as Abu-Lughod (1999) points out, 
these cultural producers are often working within the confines of these “structures of 
power and organizations that are tied to and doing the work of national or commercial 
interests” (Mahon 2000,469).  
Muslim Americans, like all cultural producers, are also enmeshed in specific but 
multiple intersecting historical, socio-cultural, local and global spheres of power. These 
spheres and their associated discursive frames can both create and limit the expressive 
and transformative possibilities of these cultural producers. Yet through (and because of) 
it all, the narratives of word and image they create in arts and other forms of expressive 
culture subvert hegemonic tropes and topoi circulating in the popular and political 
discourse and in media. In the process, Muslim Americans engaged in cultural 
production not only alter the frames that hold Muslims as a foreign, violent and an 
existential threat but also create “new subjects and new subjectivities articulating shared 
experiences and constructing social identities” (Mohan 2000, 470) for both Muslims and 
other Americans. Besides being a form of creative individual self-expression, this is also 
a form of cultural activism and civic engagement with consequential political and social 
dimensions, whereby the producers employ these creative forms to change the narrative 
and the terms of debate and to challenge stereotypes and marginalization. They also 
(re)construct and propose meanings consonant with the multiple dimensions (gender, 
race/ethnicity, religious, sexual, and national) of their identity (Mohan 2000).  
Today’s Muslim artists and cultural producers are following in the footsteps of 
Blackamericans, Latino/as, Jews and other minorities before them. Lacking institutional 
powers, they all used esthetics, comedy, and sports to present satirized, idealized or 
realistic portrayals of their groups to counter the negative images created by outsiders 
352 
and hegemonic images imposed from within (Mohan 2000). Since culture is shared but 
is unevenly distributed in a collective, and because the public sphere is a space where 
ideas are put forth and contested by differentially powered actors, it is here where these 
cultural producers employ various media to influence others.   
  Expressive culture in Muslim countries and communities through the ages has 
been productive and rich, but Western Muslims face special challenges. These challenges 
stem from the current historical context of an ever globalizing world where “culture” 
becomes contested spaces of piety, belonging and politics. Additionally, the diversity of 
the constituent groups of Muslim America means that the producers of expressive 
culture must clear the “ethnic” hurdle, both to appeal to their larger community and to 
represent Muslims to the larger society. For these cultural products to serve these 
purposes, they have to be known and recognizable to those whose lifeworlds they 
portray. To discern this, I asked participants to list any Muslim American religious 
scholars, musicians, fiction/non-fiction writers, poets, and artists whose work they think 
is both Islamic AND specifically American. Then I asked about what makes these works 
“Islamic” or “specifically American”. Only half of the participants responded and some 
included in their lists Canadian and European Muslim artists or scholars who lecture or 
perform at Muslim events and speak to their social-cultural realities. Less than a quarter 
of participants listed an American artist or writer. As for the reasons their works are 
identified as “Islamic,” it is the themes/topics and values the artists/writers address, 
articulate, or uphold in the practice of their craft as noted by this survey participant:  
in a lot of their music, they [Muslim musicians] discuss values that exemplify 
Islamic principles. For example Lupe Fiasco, who is openly Muslim refuses to 
accept endorsements from alcoholic beverage companies and discusses 
volunteering and giving back to your community. 
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As for what makes these works specifically American, the overarching theme is captured 
by another survey participant: “They talk or express experiences of being American, and 
they are American themselves.”  
Muslim artists have a long presence in American culture but their religion has 
been incidental to their art and often is unknown to their audiences and left unexpressed 
in their work. But a new generation of Muslims is asserting both its American and 
Muslim identity and is creating art, fashion, comedy, music, and creative and religious 
literature that unequivocally expresses and claims this dual heritage. I will now briefly 
explore these oft-contested different areas of individual creativity and the (un)intended 
cultural activism they serve. 
 
Muslim Musical Landscapes 
  
Music is one of the 3Ms (music, meat, and mortgage) about which Muslim 
Americans always ask scholars and seem to endlessly debate, and some are growing 
weary of it all. The discussions continue because there are, and have been for centuries, 
differing opinions on the permissibility (and conditions) of music. Through it all and 
through the ages, Muslim artists and the music they produce or influence— from 
traditional Arabic and Swahili music, Sufi devotional music, to flamenco, jazz, and hip-
hop— have enriched cultures around the globe. In North America, the historian Sylviane 
Diouf (1998) notes that the musical imprint of slaves from Muslim West Africa survives 
today in the traces of their melisma style in Blues music.  
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American Muslim Musical Roots 
 
While their more explicitly religious values and themes may be a recent 
phenomenon, Muslims have played a pivotal role in America’s music history, including 
in the founding of its best known record label, Atlantic Records, in 1947. Ahmet and 
Nesuhi Ertgun, the sons of the then Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., were passionate 
about music and combed the neighborhoods of Washington, DC offering to buy music 
records. They accumulated over 15,000 records, many of them rare. They then invited 
groups of White and Black musicians to play at the Turkish Embassy in what was, 
perhaps, the first integrated concert and the start of a lifelong mission for Ahmet to 
integrate music production and consumption7. For this purpose, he cofounded Atlantic 
Records with Herb Abramson and for the next fifty years they together launched or 
advanced the careers of such American and British music icons as the Rolling Stones, Bill 
Crosby, Aretha Franklin, and Ray Charles. According to Time Magazine’s Richard 
Corliss, the mark Ahmet left on Jazz, Blues and Rock ‘n Roll makes “this son of a Turk a 
virtual deity of music in the American century” (2001). 
 Many well-known jazz musicians were Muslims; for example, Grammy award 
winner Arthur “Art” Blakey, led The Jazz Messengers, a band composed entirely of 
Muslim musicians. His band launched or advanced the careers of many jazz giants, 
including Wayne Shorter and Wynton Marsalis (Morrison 2009).  Jazz pianist and 
composer Ahmad Jamal, who played with Dizzy Gillespie and Billie Holiday, toured 
Europe and performed in Istanbul’s 2012 “Jazz in Ramadan” program. His “After Fajr” 
(after Dawn prayers) album was critically acclaimed and described by a New York Times 
music critic as “one of his best”(Ratliff 2005)8. 
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The contributions of Muslim musicians to jazz are well documented, but it is hip-
hop the soundtrack of today’s global youth culture, where Islam is the religion of the 
music genre and the associated cultural phenomenon. Originating in the 1970s in New 
York’s poor and predominantly Black and Latino/a “urban wasteland,” hip-hop reflects 
the influence of its early practitioners, who were members of the NOI and its breakaway 
group the Five Percenters9 (FP) (Abdul Khabeer 2011). Neglected in the transition from a 
manufacturing to a service economy, the deplorable conditions in the area and the 
resultant social problems inspired hip-hop’s early classics and shaped its image. Its 
sights, sounds and movements, however, spring from the deep cultural roots of the Black 
diaspora and of Latino/a immigration to the United States (Abdul Khabeer 2011). NOI 
has influenced the lyrics and themes of its followers who are members in famous groups 
like Public Enemy. But Islamic idioms are part of hip-hop culture and available for use 
by non-Muslim artists10. While the FP and the NOI have been the main routes of Islam 
into hip-hop, Sunni Islam and the Muslim world at large also offer artists an 
inspirational palette to sample (Abdul Khabeer 2007). Famed Muslim hip-hop artists are 
many; those listed by project participants include Mos Def, Lupe Fiasco, and Everlast. 
Commercial success in the crowded hip-hop world is difficult enough. Muslim 
artists have to also balance the demands of their faith with their art, where success 
results from contents and contexts antithetical to the religious mores. Even when they 
adhere to Islamic mores, however, they are still encumbered by debates on the 
permissibility of music and by the expectations for gender norms. Some, like the artists 
listed above, play for general audiences and vary in their adherence to religious 
stipulations. Other musicians, hip-hop or otherwise, play “Islamic music” which, until 
the few years, used percussion as the only instrument and limited its lyrics to devotional 
themes (loving/fearing God, loving the Prophet, controlling desires and so forth). 
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Consequently, such music was limited to Muslim communities and even then appealed 
to only a small segment.   
The three member hip-hop group, Native Deen, met and performed during the 
MYNA camp in 1992, where young Manar first encountered and experienced her 
American Islam. They formed their band in 2000. All second-generation Muslim 
Blackamerican activists in their local communities, Native Deen band members were 
seeking innovative ways to inspire and motivate young Muslims. To achieve this goal and 
to stay above the permissibility fray, they decided on a “fusion of street Rap, hip-hop and 
R&B flavors” and restricted themselves to percussions “in line with the majority Muslim 
opinion on the use of musical instruments”.11 This decision earned them annual 
appearances at the largest Muslim convention (ISNA) and events across North America 
and Europe.  
Unlike Native Deen, Remarkable Current (RC) does not limit itself to percussion. 
RC is a collective of musicians, writers, producers and a record label started in California 
in 2001 by Anas Cannon, a Blackamerican convert. RC boasts musical influences ranging 
from Santana, Miles Davis and Sting, to Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (a world renowned 
Pakistani Sufi devotional singer). Though it focuses on hip-hop, RC also draws on Rock, 
Jazz, and traditional World Music. Like Native Deen and others, RC is a creative 
endeavor with an activist agenda through its Hip Hop Ambassadors program whose 
mission is “presenting positive examples of African American musicians to the 
international community, as well as spreading the messages of peace & love through the 
universal language of music.”12   
  Popular perception shaped by music videos with images of nudity and violence 
with misogynistic lyrics informs many parents’ opinion of hip-hop. However, for many 
young people, including Muslims both in the U.S. and abroad, hip-hop is the music of 
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protest against all forms of oppression and represents a call for empowerment, self-
definition, and solidarity with which they identify. It is a cultural phenomenon that 
transcends ethno-racial, faith, class and (sub)urban boundaries and forms what Rami 
Nashashibi (2011) calls Ghetto cosmopolitanism. In the post-9/11 era, the encounter 
between Islam and hip-hop has been employed by diverse subjects for different motives 
and ends (Nashashibi 2011). By stressing the connection between Islam and hip-hop, 
Muslims have attempted to authenticate their belonging. By firmly grounding 
themselves in this most identifiably American art form and its urban roots, they aim to 
counter the Othering discourses and practices that place them outside the national 
belonging. Some Muslim artists have also used their platform to critique and push back 
against negative images and demonizing discourses (Nashashibi 2011). For example, 
Lupe Fiasco Words I Never Said expressed a range of themes starting with a scathing 
critique of the “war on terrorism,” government policies, reality TV, racist commentators, 
fear mongering, and the media and President Obama’s handling of the 2008 Israeli 
attack on Gaza. He also takes on Muslim extremists, at once criticizing them and 
educating the public as he says “Jihad is not a holy war/where’s that in the worship?/ 
Murdering is not Islam!/ And you are not observant/And you are not a Muslim”13. 
 
Musical Ambassadors  
 
The State Department and other agencies also use the connection between hip-
hop and Islam in the government’s counter-terrorism project as it tries to promote a 
“moderate” Western Islam (Nashashibi 2011). RC as well as Native Deen bands have, at 
the request of the State Department, toured Muslim countries like Indonesia and post 
revolution Tunisia,14 where they engaged in jam sessions with local hip-hop artists. This 
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program of “people-to-people diplomacy” is modeled after the cold-war era “Jazz 
Ambassadors” program which sent jazz luminaries Louis Armstrong and Dizzy Gillespie 
to Europe, Middle East, and Asia for an intercultural dialogue through the international 
language of music. Reinvented as “Rhythm Road” by the Bush Administration for its 
Public Diplomacy efforts in the midst of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the new musical 
ambassadors included practitioners of jazz and other musical styles with an emphasis on 
Black music and particularly on the internationally resonant style of hip-hop (Aidi 2011). 
Including hip-hop was seen as ideal because of its Islamic roots and its origins as an 
“outsider’s protest” of the system by young inner-city Muslims drawing on the “African-
American Muslim tradition of protest against authority, most powerfully represented by 
Malcolm X.” The designer of the Rhythm Road project said his inclusion of hip-hop 
aimed at “the greater exploitation of this natural connector to the Muslim world” (Aidi 
2011, 28). The risk of exploitation for political ends and loss of credibility was not lost on 
Native Deen when they were first asked in 2005 to go on a trip to Muslim West Africa. 
The band members discussed their misgivings about being “puppets, going over there 
saying: ‘Everything’s O.K. We’re bombing your country, but we have Muslims, too!’”. So 
they invited “people of knowledge” and called for a community consultation which 
resulted in the decision to selectively accept invitations that are consistent with their 
“mission to spread tolerance and faith” (Oppenheimer 2011).  
The ghetto cosmopolitanism that Nashashibi (2011) describes materializes 
biannually at Marquette Park on the south side of Chicago in a day-long Takin’ it to the 
Streets festival of art, music, forums, education and service. The event is the brainchild 
of IMAN, an organization Nashashibi co-founded in 1996. In the 2010 event, there were 
multiple music stages that included a world Music stage where Qiwwali Sufi and Turkish 
music was played. But the main stage, Streets Stage, was where this cosmopolitanism 
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was most at work. Here performers from several countries and multiethnic groups from 
the U.S. were featured. The audience also reflected this cosmopolitanism, as women and 
men both young and old, of different ethnicities and religions, swayed to the beat. 
Streets, as the event is referred to, offers a creative space for Muslim artists and brings 
together activists, artists, scholars and communities. It features collaborative projects 
and raises consciousness about the common concern for social justice. 
 
Muslim Women Musicians: Gender, Faith, and Art  
Muslim female artists like Anaya Mcmurray have the added challenge of their 
gender. Even if they adopt the majority scholarly opinion of the conditional 
permissibility of music, they encounter the even more contentious issue of women 
performing to mixed audiences. Additionally, women, Muslim or not, unlike their male 
counterparts must overcome the priority their appearance is given over their talent in an 
industry where women’s bodies play a central role in the making and marketing of 
music. In her article on Black women, hip-hop and Islam, Mcmurray laments the 
expectations put upon a Muslim woman to be “good girl” and the often limited roles 
available for Black women as over-sexualized dancers and/or rappers. These factors 
make it very difficult for Muslim women to break into the field. She is troubled by what 
she sees as a double standard that has allowed Muslim men “to carve a substantial niche 
in the industry” , a development that is “partially because the spaces men are encouraged 
to occupy in hip-hop are far more expansive” than those available to women (McMurray 
2008). McMurray is undeterred by the challenges and uses her music for creative and 
activist purposes. She may reference only a few Islamic idioms, but her spirituality 
informs and inspires her socially-conscious work. Her critique of society and of her faith 
community extends from her lyrics to her appearance. In her dress, she does not 
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conform to stereotypical images of Muslims and through it she attempts to challenge 
these images and the “assumption that women who are not visibly marked as belonging 
to another faith are by default Christian” (2008,86).   
Miss Undastood, Tavasha Shannon, started rapping as a child in the bathrooms 
of her very strict Islamic school and chose this stage name to reflect her being a 
misunderstood Muslim woman. For a long time, she did not do “Islamic” and instead 
focused on “street stuff” in her lyrics, but after an extended spell of writer’s block what 
she wrote “came out Islamic.” Since then, her work has been equal parts critique of her 
faith community, her society and of geopolitics. In her song Hijab is the One thing, she 
combines all three as she problematizes the potency of this symbol, infused as it is with 
multiple meanings. She asserts that: “just because I cover don’t mean I’m more 
righteous/ Just because she doesn’t, don’t mean she’s less pious” (Brown 2007).  Like 
Miss Undastood, Ms. Latifah is another young second- generation Blackamerican hip-
hop artist who dons a hijab and writes socially-conscious lyrics. They are among the few 
Muslim women artists who perform in Muslim conferences and large events in addition 
to performing for general audiences. All three of these Muslim female artists say they 
wish to serve as role models for other female artists by focusing on a positive message 
and by carving out a space for their message and for women of color. 
 
Performing Identity 
 
The children of immigrants not only consume but also create works that are 
informed by and contribute to hip-hop. Palestinian New Yorker Suheir Hammad, an 
award winning artist/activist, is among the most notable of these younger Arab Muslim 
artists. Hammad’s first poetry collection is titled Born Palestinian, Born Black. Having 
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grown up in midst of New York City’s diversity and reading Blackamerican literature and 
poetry, she agrees with poet Audre Lorde that black, beyond cultural identity, is a 
political identity. Hammad notes that in her Palestinian culture as in other cultures, 
black is associated with negative forces. Therefore, in her poetry, she wanted to “take 
back the negative energy that is associated with black, reclaim it, and say that this is 
something that is about survival, something that is positive” (Handal 1997).  Omar 
Offendum and Ragtop (Nizar Wattad) similarly speak to their experiences as Americans 
and in solidarity with oppressed people at home and abroad.  
Western Muslim artists and Americans in particular see their entire community’s 
heritage as their own to sample and integrate into their art. They effortlessly switch from 
English to Arabic to Urdu or Somali or Turkish and back to English in the same track. 
Many of their parents may object to hip-hop, not because they object to music but 
because they dislike this particular style of music, which they associate with clubs, drugs 
and sex and with negative images of blackness. Arab and South Asians are framed as 
cultural, not racial, minorities, but they too are no less racialized as groups. Therefore, 
the young hip-hop artists, Muslim or not, from these communities find it necessary to 
eschew the racialized representations by performing and redefining the complexities of 
their identities (Sharma 2010). 
Suad Abdul Khabeer, a second-generation Blackamerican Muslim female 
anthropologist and hip-hop artist, argues that hip-hop enables younger Muslim 
Americans to “construct and perform Muslim Cool, a practice of American Muslimness.” 
This she notes is a “practice of religious self-making by young American Muslims that is 
cool because it operates at the intersection of blackness, hip-hop, and Islam” (2011, 22). 
This Muslim cool enables them to cross ethno-racial and class barriers; additionally, hip-
hop’s central focus on these issues informs their activist projects. Here  
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establishing connections to specific notions of blackness and the ‘hood become 
important techniques in configuring a sense of American Muslim identity. These 
techniques are located in the everyday performance of self, including how, by way 
of style and activism, the body is a site of American Muslim self-making. [Abdul 
Khabeer 2011, iii]. 
 
Documentary films like The New Muslim Cool as well as Deen Tight feature the deep 
connections of Islam and hip-hop as well as the complexities and challenge Muslim 
artists encounter as people of color and as Muslims in post-9/11 America.  
Muslim cool is one of several different modalities available for American Muslim-
ness. Hip-hop may dominate youth music, but Muslim American musicians span the 
musical styles from punk and country. Like hip-hop, punk music has an anti-
establishment stance, a global following and a distinct fashion and music style, and it 
offers younger Muslim Americans another modality for authenticity in difference. 
Growing up in 1990s California, Tanzila Ahmed, a contributor to the Love InshAllah 
anthology, was the only brown girl at Saturday night punk concerts and was driven there 
by her Indian immigrant mother who waited for her in the parking lot. The next 
morning, Ahmed would put on a headscarf and attend her mosque’s Sunday school. 
Rather than being lost in contradiction and suffering identity crisis, she says: 
I was defiantly proud of being desi and Muslim in an Islamophobic and racist 
America, and to me that translated into punk. If I told fellow punks that I was 
straight edge— meaning I didn’t drink or do drugs—they didn’t bat an eye. And 
when I went to work in political organizing because I wanted to make the world a 
better place for my people, that wasn’t just an Islamic value— it was a punk value, 
too. [Ahmed 2012, 60].  
 
Tanzila Ahmed details the “Muslim punk” scene aware that the term seems 
inappropriate since, rather than devotional lyrics, punk lyrics “to[e] the line between 
Islamophobia and orthodoxy” (T. Ahmed 2012, 64). Fitting-in is antithetical to punk, but 
as a marginalized religious and ethnic minority, Muslim punks claim their ethnic 
markers as they mix boisterous music and provocative politics without regard for the 
consequences. This image materialized in the scene of a Muslim punk wedding she 
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attended. Here, bodies were adorned with “piercings and saris, dyed hair and kurtas, 
sunglasses and cholis.” The Muslim punk scene is a space where they can mix “racid 
lyrics and fighting against racial profiling in the same breath, and top it off with ‘fuck 
that shit, inshAllah,’ and no one would blink” (T. Ahmed 2012, 64).   
If “Muslim punk” seems like a contradiction in terms, then “Muslim country” 
music would seem no less incongruent. Kareem Salamah is Muslim country singer, a 
peculiarity that brought him media attention and an Obama White House invitation. An 
Oklahoman son of Egyptian parents, Salamah credits his mother for supporting his love 
of music. But unlike Tanzila Ahmed’s mother, who waited for her in the parking lot, his 
mother was the one attending the musical events; he accompanied her as she followed 
her “insatiable desire to learn and experience all” of Oklahoma’s mixed heritage. The 
rodeos, fairs and the Grand Old Opry to which she took him were his initiation to 
country music. His upbringing nurtured his talent and emboldened him to defy 
stereotypes and to cross boundaries as he mixed studying law, boxing, country singing, 
and memorizing classical Western and Arabic Poetry. His début at ISNA a decade ago, 
singing cappella solo, introduced him to Muslim audiences; since then, he has added 
instruments and has risen to international fame touring with his band. Salamah 
performs in North America and Europe and recently completed a tour of several Muslim 
countries as part of the State Department’s Rhythm Road program. Salamah too uses his 
art form to speak back to his community and society as he when he sings “I know it’s 
hard to listen to the words you just can’t stand\Gonna take more than a fist to enlighten 
an ignorant man”15.  
In the construction of the American ummah, the borders of what is (or is not) 
Islamic are closely patrolled and debates abound about the proper role of art and about 
the need for a space for artistic expression within the community. IMAN’s biannual 
364 
Takin’ it to the Streets festival and monthly Community Café have charted the course by 
creating that space for artists, though its focus has been primarily urban and world 
music. IMAN has a full-time staff for its Art and Culture department and considers its 
programs and events as a vehicle to showcase Muslims in the arts, to foster new talent 
with an “urban Muslim identity”, and to mobilize and organize for a social justice 
agenda. Though based in Chicago, it has organized events in New York at the Apollo 
Theater, an enduring symbol of African American renaissance. Being here is not by 
accident as noted by Amir Al-Islam, who lectures on African American history and who 
chairs IMAN’s board. He says that “bringing IMAN to the Apollo is a reminder to the 
Muslim American community of its roots in the African American community”.16 Though 
Islam’s presence in the U.S. is perceived as new, the musical imprint of Muslims is 
documented in music that is quintessentially American and which America exports into 
the global soundscape. 
 
 
Comedy: “Turning Fear to Funny” 
 
In their abilities to make explicit a culture’s tacit norms and beliefs and to offer a 
critique, Koziski (1984) likens comedians to anthropologists. The comedic context offers 
a safe space from which standup comedians jolt audience sensibilities by making the 
familiar strange and the strange familiar. As deep seated beliefs and mental frames are 
made explicit, a shock of recognition ensues. Comedians hence serve as “cultural critics” 
who bring about new cultural awareness (Koziski 1984, 57). Comedians from 
marginalized groups recognize the powerful role of this art form. They subvert their 
powerlessness by offering critiques both of their group and of the society at large from a 
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safe comic position that shields them from retribution from within and without their 
group. Cognizant of their role as cultural critics and finding examples in Billy Crystal, 
Richard Pryor, Margret Cho’s crucial roles in changing societal perceptions of Jews, 
Blackamericans, and Asians respectively, Muslim American comedians began to stand 
up and step out. Laughter, let alone comedy, is not part of the public image of Islam 
which makes the jarring category “Muslim comedian” itself a powerful tool in changing 
perceptions. While some Muslims (for example, Preacher Mos, Dave Chappell, and Dean 
Obeidallah) have long been in comedy, their religion has not been part of their act.17 In 
May 2008, Public Television Stations (PBS) aired an hour-long documentary entitled, 
Stand-Up: Muslim American Comics Come of Age which showcased the works of five 
comedians in a post-9/11 America. The program introduced Muslim comics to a wider 
audience; since then, Muslim comedians of all backgrounds, whose acts are not merely 
ethnic but address Muslim experiences, have emerged.  
Chicago native Azhar Usman, the son of Indian immigrants, left law and took up 
standup comedy in 2001. On his website18, Azhar says that growing up in suburbia in a 
non-White Family made him “naturally beg[i]n to think of himself as Black.” He sees 
himself greatly influenced by rap’s rebellious lyrics and by leftist political writings, but 
among his multiple selves as a citizen of the world, he says he is “Psychologically Black.” 
Preacher Mos, a Blackamerican convert who has done standup comedy for over 20 years 
tackling race and cultural issues, teamed up with Azhar and Muhammad (Mo) Omer 
(Palestinian-American). They formed the Allah Made Me Funny comedy troupe which 
has since gone international. The trio has entertained Muslims and non-Muslim alike by 
poking fun at their families, their community, post-9/11 security issues and anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. They critique Muslims with insider jokes that they often have to explain to the 
general audience, and they test the limits of tolerance of both audiences while carefully 
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treading religious boundaries and keeping their humor “halal” (free of profanity and 
sexual references). They have been featured in most major news outlets, both 
print/digital and visual. This trio is among the many Arab and Muslim Americans who 
have taken the path of entertaining while educating and critiquing. Making the most of 
the current hyperawareness and hypervisibility of Muslims, these comedians are 
“perhaps helping to ease tensions surrounding the nation’s newest persecuted 
minorities. With self-deprecating jokes about terrorism, racial profiling, religious 
customs and international politics, the comedians turn fear into funny, following a long 
tradition of ethnic humor in America.”19  
The Axis of Evil was formed by three second generation Arab Americans and one 
Iranian American. This comedy group’s cultural critique started with its name, taken 
from a post-9/11 speech by President Bush. The group earned a spot on the show 
Comedy Central and toured Muslim countries before it broke up in 2005 and its 
members took up solo acts. Dean Obeidallah, one of founders of this group, is the son of 
a Muslim Palestinian immigrant father and a Christian second generation Italian 
American mother. Where Azhar saw himself psychologically Black, Dean says he grew up 
thinking of himself as “regular White American” with White friends. But all that 
changed, he says, when “after 9/11, I found that my membership in ‘The White Club’ had 
been revoked. I was now a minority, which, truthfully, was not something I wanted to 
be.”20 He does not want it because, he says, as a minority, you are responsible to answer 
for the vices and crimes of the worst in your group. Disoriented by his new status as no 
longer white, Dean eventually came to terms with his Arab roots and saw comedy as a 
way to push back against the rhetoric and misrepresentations of Arabs and Muslims. In 
2012, he collaborated with Negin Farsad, a second generation American Muslim of 
Iranian background and a standup comedian and filmmaker. They co-produced and co-
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directed The Muslims Are Coming, a film and roadshow by Muslim standup comedians 
“using the only weapon they have: jokes” 21 to counter Islamophobia and fear mongering. 
The two comedians traverse the country performing and engaging locals and confronting 
hate and fear. They enlisted American cultural icons like the Daily Show’s Jon Stewart, 
Rachel Maddow, CNN’s Soledad O’Brien, and hip-hop artist and business tycoon Russell 
Simons and others, along with an imam and rabbi, to share their insights and 
assessment22.  
Maysoon Zayid is among the comedians in this film. She is a self-described 
“Palestinian Muslim virgin with cerebral palsy from New Jersey.” She is an established 
standup comedian performing across the country, the cofounder of Arab American 
Comedy Festival, founder of a children’s charity, an actress and a screenplay writer23. 
Tissa Hami is an Iranian American comedian who grew up in Boson. Hami rose to fame 
as a Muslim comedian post-9/11. In one of her acts, she comes on stage in full head cover 
and black jilbab (overcoat) then takes them off midway in an effort, she says, to show she 
is the same person and in the process break misconceptions about Muslim women.   
Part of Muslim American comedy’s aim is to address intra-community relations 
across ethno-racial, gender, and generational lines, and these multiethnic comedic 
partnerships illustrate that differences can be assets as much as they are challenges. For 
some of these artists, comedy is one among several activist projects. For example, Azhar 
from the Allah Made Me Funny group is the cofounder of the Nawawi Foundation and 
works closely with Dr. Umar, author of the Cultural Imperative paper discussed earlier. 
Standup comedy, therefore, is to Azhar an important step in creating that uniquely 
American Muslim culture, which he says is the most critical task for the community. This 
is the charge of his and subsequent generations of Muslim Americans because, he argues, 
if Islam in Saudi Arabia does not look like that in India, should it not in America look 
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American?24 How Islam can be American and remain normative is what these artists are 
experimenting with.  
 
Literature and the Need to be Visible 
 
American author Anee Lamoot insightfully noted that “[w]riting can be a pretty 
desperate endeavor, because it is about some of our deepest needs: our need to be 
visible, to be heard, our need to make sense of our lives, to wake up and grow and 
belong” (Rosaldo 1997, 37). Literature in all of its forms is one way for Muslim 
Americans to both perform and negotiate a third way of being and belonging to their 
ethnic heritages, America and Islam. They seek an alternative to full assimilation that 
demands giving up something of one’s self, and to isolation that defines one in 
opposition to one’s own heritage and history as an American (Jackson 2012). This new 
way is brought to life as much through the creative imagination represented in literature 
as it is through living reality. 
Muslim literature, however, is not a post-9/11 phenomenon, though one could 
argue that this latter period has been the most productive. The first writings of the 
Muslim experience in America are also the first works of Blackamerican literature, 
namely the slave narratives exemplified by that of Job ben Solomon (1701-1773), whose 
given name was Ayuba Suleiman Diallo (Diouf 1998) . In more recent history, Muslim 
American literature starts with the 1960s Black Arts Movement (BAM) that accompanied 
the Black Power movement, of which “Black Muslim” authors, artists, and activists were 
integral protagonists. BAM paved the way for all ethnic American literature. It did so 
through what Houston Baker, a scholar of literature, called its “metaphorical 
rebelliousness” and its “willingness” to “postulate a positive and distinctive category of 
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existence and then to read the universe in terms of that category.” Having done so, it is 
both “a radical political act” and, more importantly, “a bold critical act designed to break 
the interpretive monopoly” of “white, literary-critical establishment that set a ‘single 
standard of criticism’” and thereby create an alternative ethnic “reference public” (Li 
1998, 37). 
Compared to other and more culturally diverse minority groups, such as Asian 
Americans, BAM had a large and more ethnically homogenous readership, prompting 
competition among great publishing houses to print and market its works (Li 1998). 
Nevertheless, Asians, Latino/as, Arabs, South Asians, and other minorities have 
benefited from the path-breaking efforts of BAM, while encountering their own 
challenges stemming from their diversity and their status as perpetual foreigners. The 
significance of minority literature is that it serves an important role indexing the cultural 
presence of the group. Here, writers offer a “professional service” of sort to their group, 
not because of any formal obligation but due to connection by association (Li 1998, 181). 
Unlike White authors who can at once maintain their individuality and stand for 
American normativity, ethnic authors can scarcely “transcend their ethnic collective to 
claim sovereignty of the self” and they seem almost compelled to link “each individual 
intrigue” to politics and not to neglect the role they serve for their readers and the social 
world they inhabit (Li 1998, 181). More than a mere creative endeavor for self-
expression, ethnic literature is a way to negotiate cultural citizenship and belonging for 
minorities.  
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A Muslim American Literature? 
 
As with the case of music and comedy, Muslim Americans of various ethnic 
backgrounds have long been writing fiction, anthologies, historical narratives, and poetry 
that reflect their experiences and creativity. Most of that work, however, has been under 
the genre of ethnic American literature. Mohja Kahf (2008), a second generation Syrian 
American who is a professor of literature and an author, argues that it might be useful to 
read these works together as part of a developing new cultural field of Muslim American 
literature (MAL). After having surveyed this literary landscape, Kahf formulated an 
inclusion criteria based on the cultural Muslim-ness of the author, regardless of religious 
observance; the linguistic or aesthetics of the writing; and the inclusion of content that 
explores the experiences of Muslim Americans. She then proposes a four-tiered typology 
for MAL that starts with what she calls the “Prophets of Dissent.” This typology consists 
of BAM authors who first wrote from a distinctly Muslim cultural position and the 
current authors whom they have influenced. Together, they occupy an “outsider’” status 
and offer a moral and cultural critique of mainstream society in a powerful and 
“prophetic, visionary tone” (Kahf 2008, 43). Malcolm X is the primary figure in this 
group and he still looms large. In one way or another, his legacy inspires Muslims in all 
of Kahf’s subsequent categories and in other art forms; as noted earlier, Malcolm X 
continues to offer many of today’s Muslim youth a mode of being authentically American 
Muslim. 
 Though Kahf offers Marvin X’s Fly Me to Allah (1969) as possibly the first 
published Muslim American collection of poetry, it is actually second generation Arab 
American Sam Hamod’s Beaten Stones Like Memories (1965) (Beausoleil and Shehabi 
2012) that occupies this post. Marvin X is a Blackamerican Muslim poet and playwright 
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who was an influential figure in BAM and who remains an important advocate for 
Blackamerican Theater. Hamod is a Midwestern son of Lebanese parents who came of 
age and spent his life surrounded by Blackamerican artists and thinkers and had 
personal relationships with Malcolm X, Marvin X, and Alijah Muhammad25. Both 
Hamod and Marvin X continue today as “prophets of dissent” and are joined by a 
younger generation of spoken word poets, authors, and hip-hop artists of all ethnicities 
whose work is socially conscious. These younger authors are more difficult to categorize 
as they use multiple media to feature their works. For example, Anida Yoeu Ali, a 
Cambodian Muslim from Chicago, composed a poem on the dramatic increase in the 
targeting of Muslims post-9/11 and turned it into the 1700% Project: Mistaken for a 
Muslim, which includes a video performance of this poem and a blog. This project, Ali 
notes, is “conceived as a collaborative project utilizing art not just as a means to address 
critical issues but also as strategic intervention”.26  
As with BAM, the 1960s were also a time for Arab and other minorities, who in 
prior generations had assimilated, to stand up and reclaim some of the history that has 
been lost; in the process, they tried to reclaim something of themselves.27 Writers from 
that time and the present day who write ethnic literature fall in Kahf’s second category of 
“Multi-Ethnic Multitudes”. These writers have earned fine art degrees, published in 
trade and academic outlets, and been critically reviewed in mainstream media. These 
writers, hence, enjoy an “insider’s status” in the American literary scene. The diversity in 
their aesthetics, ethnicities, and spiritual or secular leanings makes Kahf’s lumping 
together of these multitudes provisionary (Kahf 2008). In this group, she includes Agha 
Ali (a Kashmiri American poet), who introduced Ghazal28 in English to American 
literature, and Palestinian American poet Naomi Shihab Nye, whose work has a lot of 
“Muslim content” because, though she is spiritually ecumenical, her Muslim heritage 
372 
through her father figures prominently in her writings.29 In this same multi-ethnic 
multitudes tier, Kahf also includes Mustafa Mutabaruka (a Blackamerican), author of 
Seed (2002); Samina Ali (an Indian American) author of Madras on Rainy Days (2004); 
and Michael Muhammad Knight (a Whiteamerican), punk rock author of the Taqwacore 
(2004). Yet Ali, Knight, and several new authors’ work seem different from the earlier 
ethnic literature in that the Muslim-ness of the protagonists is central to these works and 
all seem to tackle issues of Muslim identity and experiences. Therefore, I would propose 
a modification in this typology which would accommodate these and similar authors. I 
shall return to this matter shortly.  
The third category in Kahf’s typology for this nascent Muslim American literature 
is what she calls “New American Transcendentalists,” who share a common aesthetics 
inspired by the Sufi cultural underpinnings of their writings. This group is influenced by 
classic Muslim Sufi poetry and by 19th century American Transcendentalists and, 
therefore, the group’s work is spiritual in nature. Rumi, a 13th century Sufi poet, is 
America’s most read poet and a major influence on the works of the members of this 
category. Daniel (Abd al-Hayy) Moore’s Ramadan Sonnets (1986) exemplifies the 
writings of these New American Transcendentalists. The fourth category in this typology 
is “New Pilgrims” for whom, Kahf notes, Islam is not only a source of inspiration for their 
writings but is also the object and the objective. Unlike the previous three groups and 
more like America’s Puritans, the authors here write with explicitly religious motivation 
and voice. This group is also ethnically diverse but differs from the second group in its 
tendency to “come together around a more or less coherent, more or less conservative 
Muslim identity” (Kahf 2008, 44). Interestingly enough, she includes Pamela Taylor in 
this category. Taylor writes Muslim American science fiction and is a co-founder of 
Muslims for Progressive Values and has led mixed gender congregational prayers. These 
373 
activities and the fact that she serves on the board of Rabbi Lerner’s Spiritual 
Progressives30 defy the category’s defining characteristic of “conservative Muslim 
identity”. Taylor, however, is a member and former director of the Islamic Writers 
Alliance, which was established by Muslim American women writers and which Kahf 
includes in this fourth category. Another member of this category whose work may better 
exemplify Kahf’s characterization is Umm Zakiyya (pen name) and her book If I Should 
Speak (2001)31, about young Muslim Americans in college.  
 
Agency and Activism: The Muslim Protagonist 
 
To overcome the limitations of the “New Pilgrims” category and the 
expansiveness of the “Multi-ethnic Multitudes” category, I propose a modification to 
Kahf’s categorization. I would redefine her fourth category to accommodate all the works 
(fiction and no-fiction) from these two tiers where the Muslim-ness of the protagonists, 
irrespective of the “conservative” or “progressive” voice of protagonist or author, is 
central and not merely an element or a background. Here Taqwacore (2004), about 
punk rock Muslims struggling with religious interpretations and identity; Madras on 
Rainy Days (2004), about a second generation Muslim woman struggling with her 
family’s frozen idea of back home and her struggle as a minority in India and America; If 
I Should Speak (2001), about interfaith college roommates and a Muslim woman’s 
balancing of a passion for art and her religious teachings; and the science fiction of 
Pamela Taylor would all fall in this fourth category. If there is a unifying theme to this 
modified category, then, I think it is one about belonging and defining a space for one’s 
self to be whole. All of these works in some way are inspired by the author’s own 
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struggles with expectations that simplify complexities with which the authors and their 
protagonists have, overtime, grown comfortable. 
The past few years have brought a burgeoning collection of Muslim fiction (for 
adults, young adults, and children) where the challenges and identity of Muslim America 
are again not incidental to the protagonists but are central and essential to the plot and 
where 9/11 and its aftermath figure prominently. Kahf’s own novel, The Girl in the 
Tangerine Scarf (2006), falls in this forth category. The novel is about a second-
generation Syrian woman growing up in middle America and dealing with the challenges 
of diversity within her community and of racism in society, all in the context of love, loss, 
and self-discovery. Nafisa Hajj, a second generation of Pakistani parentage, has two 
novels, The Sweetness of Tears (2011) and The Writing on My Forehead (2009), that 
exemplify this post-9/11 motif. Reflecting on writing this latter book, Hajj notes that: 
On one hand, in writing this book, I wanted to tell a story about one family only, 
without trying to write a commentary on the state of the world. On another, more 
personal note, I was trying to come to terms with being an American Muslim in 
post 9/11 America. I used to think I had resolved the question of who I was, a 
hyphenated American comfortable in my own skin and at ease with the 
complexity of my heritage. I felt I was neither defined by the past and no longer 
twisting and contorting my sense of self in order to escape it. Now, that carefully 
cultivated complexity was being reduced before my very eyes. Stereotypes of 
Muslims—of Muslim women in particular—were nothing new. But those old 
caricatures were being imposed with renewed fervor and virulence, forcing me to 
revisit the old question all over again. How does the individual quest to define 
oneself play out in the larger narrative of family history, social development, and 
political upheaval? What does the individual owe the group and at what cost 
should the debt be paid? These are universally human questions, played out again 
and again from one generation to another. In the end, heritage, duty, and the 
tension between family and individual all came into play when I began writing 
The Writing On My Forehead.32 
 
Female authors have been the most productive in the area of fiction. In addition 
to the above, these works also include Maryam Sullivan’s The Size of a Mustard Seed 
(2009), on urban Muslim life; Sahar Alam’s The Groom to Have Been (2008); Alia 
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Yunis’s Night Counter (2009), about two second generation immigrant families in the 
contexts of post-9/11 New York and Los Angeles, respectively; and Shaila Abdullah’s 
Saffron Dreams (2009), about the double grief of a Muslim 9/11 widow. In this modified 
forth category, I would also include conversion narratives like Willow Wilson’s Butterfly 
Mosque (2010), because they too are about belonging to two ostensibly conflicted 
universes and about carving out a space to be comfortable in one’s own skin.  
Also in this newly defined fourth category is a group of non-fiction anthologies 
aimed at demystifying Muslim American lives and showing their rich diversity and 
complexities through the various styles and voices. The nonfiction work of Muslim 
women garners greater public attention and acclaim than their works of fiction. In great 
part, this is because the dominant narrative on Islam, after Jihad and violence, is that of 
oppressed voiceless women; consequently, the real voices of Muslim women seem more 
intriguing than fictional characters. Cognizant of this reality, younger Muslim women 
took it upon themselves to tell their stories. Taking a line from pop culture and not 
waiting to be “given a voice,” Saleemah Abdul-Ghafur (a Blackamerican) edited the first 
of these anthologies and titled it Living Islam Out Loud: American Muslim Women 
Speak (2005). It was followed by I Speak for Myself: American Women on Being 
Muslim (2011), co-edited by Maria M. Ebrahimji (a CNN editorial Producer) and Zahra 
T. Suratwala, both of South Asian background. I Speak for Myself (ISFM) has since gone 
from a book to a project, an ISFM series that focuses on delivering “narrative 
collection[s]” of diverse interfaith and intercultural stories that at once connect, inspire, 
and educate33. The series has published the first anthology about/by Muslim men titled 
All American: 45 American Men on Being Muslim (2012). The contributors represent 
diverse ethnic backgrounds and are accomplished in a variety fields in addition to being 
socially conscious and engaged.  
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A third anthology, intended to give a more intimate look at the private lives of 
Muslim women, sparked the interest of readers with its tantalizing title Love, Inshallah: 
The Secret Love Lives of American Muslim Women (2012). The editors, Ayesha Mattu 
and Nura Maznavi, are community activists and civic minded. Yet, they were unprepared 
for the controversy generated by the subtitle’s evocation of Orientalist fantasies and 
obsessions with secluded Muslim sexuality. They explain that their intention and 
objective was twofold: to challenge stereotypes about Muslim women in the larger 
society by providing untold stories and to push the Muslim community to open up spaces 
for women to “share their lives honestly, across the full range of their experiences” 
(Mattu and Maznavi 2012, x ). These experiences include growing up in families where 
cultural norms as well as the understanding and practice of Islam varied. The book 
details how women navigate their desire and sexuality and try to balance the demands of 
their faith, family and larger society. In the process, they paint an essentially human 
story of trial and triumph, love, loss and longing.   
Muslim male works of fiction, on the other hand, are fewer in number but enjoy 
greater publicity and critical acclaim. Khaled Hosseini’s Kite Runner (2003), which was 
later made into a movie and a play, was an international best seller. Michael Muhammad 
Knight’s The Taqwacores is described by Carl Ernest, an Islamic Studies professor at 
North Carolina University-Chaper Hill, as the “Catcher in the Rye for young Muslims” 
and is on the reading lists of several colleges and universities34.  The Mother of the 
Believers (2009) by Kamran Pasha is a fictionalized account of the life of Aisha, the wife 
of the Prophet and an important figure for Islam’s critics and defenders alike. Through 
the narrator, the voice of Aisha at the end of her life, the author addresses and attempts 
to disabuse the readers of all the stereotypes and smears of Islam. The American Dervish 
(2012) by Ayad Akhtar was barely out when it was selected for translation to over twenty 
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languages. The novel is a coming of age story about a second generation Muslim 
American man of Pakistani background, a story about discovery and the loss of love and 
faith. 
There is also a rapidly growing body of children’s literature. Some of this 
literature, like Asma Mobin-Uddin’s (2005) My Name is Bilal, like its adult 
counterparts, deals with issues of identity and is written for a Muslim audience. Others, 
like Alexis York Lumbard’s The Conference of the Birds, based on the widely translated 
work of a 12th century Persian poet, is written for general audiences due to its moral and 
spiritual import and its relevance to character education. Lumbard has also written 
books aimed at Muslim audiences, including Meow, Meow, Maulana: The Story of the 
Muhammad. In keeping with the times, this is a book with a mobile technology 
application for its interactive features35. 
 
The Power of Playwright 
 
Theater is about storytelling through representing and performing life on stage in 
front of an audience. It lends itself to tackling sensitive and otherwise divisive issues 
through storytelling that humanizes the Other. It provides both a distance inherent in 
performance and an emotional intimacy that enable understanding and empathy to 
challenge cognitive schemas and attitudes in the safety of the audience. Muslim 
playwrights and theater performers are utilizing this transformative space to tell their 
stories and to challenge perceptions. They are producing works that address themes and 
issues pertaining to their spiritual and ethnic communities while aiming for greater 
social impact and cultural contribution. The Domestic Crusaders36, by Wajahat Ali, 
premiered in 2005 and is a two-act play about a day in the life of a Pakistani-American 
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family, as its members gather for the twenty-first birthday of the family’s youngest child 
against the backdrop of 9/11. The heated discussions and debates along with the 
generational and gender tensions take audiences into the private lives of Muslims, lives 
that are often exoticized in the public imaginary. Ayad Khtar, mentioned earlier, has also 
written two plays, The Invisible Hand (2011) and Disgraced (2012). The author 
describes Disgraced as a story about a “Muslim-American lawyer who is rapidly moving 
up the corporate ladder while distancing himself from his cultural roots. At the moment 
of achieving his life-long ambitions, he falls victim to professional and personal 
betrayals, not least of all, his own betrayal of himself.”37 The play premiered in 2012 at 
the American Theater Company and earned positive reviews.  
From the diverse ordinary women performing their stories in Hijabi 
Monologues38, to the one woman act “Unveiled,”39 to the plays of Progress Theatre, 
Muslim female playwrights have self-consciously aimed at dismantling stereotypes and 
restrictive modes of femininity that frame Muslim women from within and without as 
agentless and silent. In so doing, they also express their creativity and humanize their 
community. Qasim Basir is charting the course for screenplay by and about the 
experiences of Muslim Americans with his first full feature film Mooz-lem40 starring 
Danny Glover which debuted in 2010 and received positive reviews from national 
media.   
 
 
In Word and Image: Educating While Entertaining 
 
Muslim artists in various creative fields have always been part of the American 
creative and expressive cultural scene. As noted previously, their religion was for the 
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most part not known to their audiences or readers. Their difference was/is primarily 
marked by their ethnicity; often, their creative work was classified as ethnic. Cultural 
producers draw on their private lives and on occurrences and discourses in the public 
sphere. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath have inspired diverse cultural producers 
regardless of their background. For those of Muslim background, the national and family 
conversations on 9/11 inform their creative works and, whether they intend to or not, 
their works have an educational effect. For example, novelist Saher Alam says she does 
not write specifically for Muslims nor does she know if Muslims even read her books. 
Additionally, she did not set out to write the novel she did in The Groom to Have Been 
(2008). This is a novel that deals with identity issues and its main characters grapple 
with post-9/11 fears and prejudices. Alam says: “when the attacks of September 11 
happened, the conversations that my characters were having in various stories reflected 
aspects of the national/international conversation about the decisions Muslims 
should/could/would make about their negotiation with Western norms”41.  So though 
she did not set out to make the Muslim-ness of her the characters an essential feature, it 
ends up being so. 
Lately, however, many Muslims regardless of their religiosity are recognizing the 
power of word and image to at once educate and entertain. These musicians, comedians, 
authors, filmmakers, photographers and fashion designers are producing works that 
reflect their needs, experiences, and talent. They are using these works to express their 
creativity, to educate the public, and to humanize Muslims. The camera of photographer 
Sadaf Syed, a young Chicagoan, composes iCOVER: A Day in the Life of a Muslim-
American COVERed Girl42. Syed lets the framed images of a woman judge, a truck 
driver, a car sales-woman, a scientist, a playwright and many other American Muslims of 
diverse age, occupation and ethnicity shatter monolithic images of Muslim women.  
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Some younger Muslims are explicitly combining creativity and activism. Marwa 
Atik and Tasneem Sabri are two Californian sisters of Syrian-American parentage who 
founded a handmade hijab company because, as Americans, they did not want to wear 
hijab like Turkish or Emirati girls43. Their style and fashion sense is shaped by the 
esthetics of their American culture. They combine fashion and social justice by being 
involved in “Shop for a Cause” and they give a portion of the proceeds to charity both a 
home and abroad. In this activist-fashion, they share a common cause with a group of 
young women at University of California-Irvine who started Fashion Fighting Famine as 
an innovative way to wed their two passions and raise funds to fight hunger locally and 
globally. They ended up organizing the largest annual Muslim fashion show in the U.S., 
complete with runway glamour, media buzz, and fashion designers from as far as 
Singapore (Aduib 2012)44. In the 2012 New York Fashion week, Muslim American 
Nzinga Knight grabbed headlines with her designs. Her Caribbean heritage, Muslim faith 
and native New Yorker sensibility inspire her fashion style and design. She does not 
design for Muslim women only but for all women who want a modest yet trendy 
alternative to what most designers offer (Smith 2012). 
Michael Wolfe and Alex Kronemer (both Whiteamerican converts) formed a 
production company that creates films featured on public television. Their films have 
been historical docudramas with experts and academics; they include: Islam an Empire 
of Faith (2000), Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet(2002 ), Prince Among Slaves 
(2007), Cities of Light: The Rise and Fall of Islamic Spain (2007) along with the more 
contemporary On a Wing and Prayer: An American Muslim Learns to Fly ( 2008)45. 
Dearborn, Michigan is considered the Arab American capital. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Dearborn has a public school, Fordson High School, where 98 percent of the 
students are of Arab background. Fordson: Faith, Fasting, Football46  is a documentary 
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that tells the story of the school’s football team training for a face-off with a rival team in 
the middle of Ramadan and as the tenth anniversary of 9/11 approaches. It too addresses 
issues of faith, identity and the forces that shape them as it attempts to talk back to the 
prevailing Othering discourses.  
Citizenship has both legal and cultural aspects. The first is about being permitted 
to be in a place and having rights and obligations in it. The latter is about being at home 
in a place where one could be at once different and belong; a place where giving up a part 
of one’s self is not the expected price of admission. This cultural citizenship also involves, 
however, an inventory of what one brings to this home and a (re)interpretation of one’s 
history and heritage. This process of inventory and rereading of heritage informs 
individual and group efforts to create new cultural norms, sensibilities, esthetics, and 
discourses. Their efforts, over time, in turn, change these individuals and their society.  
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1 Many said this was an African proverb, though the analogy is attributed to West African Muslim 
writer and ethnologist, Amadou Hampate Ba (b.1901-d. 1991). 
http://cmes.hmdc.harvard.edu/research/ecmes/photo/beranek accessed on 09/04/2012 
2 Even when the Arabic names are adopted, they are appropriated with cultural inflections. For 
example, Muhammad in Arabic is rendered Mahamadou or Mamadou  in West Africa, Mehmet in 
Turkish and Ma in Chinese. 
3 Academics grapple with this issue as well. For example, in 1998 sociologist Robert N. Bellah 
wrote Is There a Common American Culture? and political scientist Samuel Huntington took up 
the challenge almost a decade later in Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National 
Identity. 
4 The group “wanted to promote the practice of Islam while embracing the positive aspects of 
American life and culture. It seeks to provide facilities and programs that offer guidance and 
create a spiritually uplifting atmosphere”. http://www.webbfound.org/sundayprograms/sunday-
program-updates/kg-1st-updates/ accessed on 12/05/2012 
5 The American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM) was formally founded in 1998 as a result 
of long discussion among Muslim Islamic Studies professors and their Muslim students. The 
students complained that the Islam they learned at home, the mosque and the Islamic school was 
very different from what they learned in college. The latter “was not cake baked by imams or 
parents” (fieldnotes); it required critical thinking. So the students convinced their professors, who 
were already involved and lectured in the community, to teach academic style seminars at an 
institute that would be found and managed by these students.  
6 Zaytuna College’s motto is “where Islam meets America”. Its mission is to “educate and prepare 
morally committed professional, intellectual, and spiritual leaders, who are grounded in the 
Islamic scholarly tradition and conversant with the cultural currents and critical ideas shaping 
modern society.” It aims to remedy “two lamentable situations”: the scarcity of scholars prepared 
to “meet the religious and pastoral needs of a rapidly expanding Muslim community in the West” 
and the growing alienation of youngers “from the mosque and from religious culture”. 
http://www.zaytunacollege.org/academics/ accessed on 9/4/2012 
7 Corliss, Richard. 2001. Ahmet’s Atlantic: Shake, Rattle and Roll. Time Magazine 
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,169279,00.html  accessed on 9/4/2012 
8 Fajr is Arabic for dawn prayers.  
9 The full name is The Five Percent Nation of Gods and Earths. It is a movement that began in the 
1960s when a NOI youth minister’s teachings expanded from the eschatology and origin story of 
the NOI to include masonic mysticism and numerology among other things. The minister became 
known as Father Allah. Additionally, whereas NOI considers the Black man to be the “original 
man”, the Five Percenters consider the Black man to be god (Abdul Khabeer 2011) 
10 For example, the artist 50 Cent used the title Ghetto Quran, while Jill Scott’s A Long Walk 
lyrics includes “maybe we can talk about Surah 31:18” a reference to the verse in the Quran 
warning about arrogance. 
11 deen means religion in Arabic. Group website http://nativedeen.com/2011/ accessed on 
12/05/2012 
12 Group website: http://www.remarkablecurrent.com/ accessed on 12/10/2012 
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13 lyrics for this song could be found on http://www.metrolyrics.com/words-i-never-said-lyrics-
lupe-fiasco.html accessed on 12/10/2012 
14 Tunisian youth musicians and rappers in particular and their large followings were powerful 
players in the revolution. They gave voice and a beat to the people’s increasing rage after the self-
immolation by Bouaziz, the poor young man who was the spark that lit the fire of the Arab spring. 
Well known rapper El General posted online a track that was a scathing open letter titled “Mr. 
President” about the regime’s oppressive laws including anti-veiling laws. The regime imprisoned 
him but could not imprison his track which was played from Egypt to Bahrain. Arab artists 
inspired and mobilized Arabs and Muslims on both side of the Atlantic and in a call and response 
fashion, Muslim American rappers led by Syrian American Omar Offendum posted a track 
“#jan25” in support of Egypt (Aidi 2011). Offendum has been touring extensively in support of the 
Syrian uprising.  
15 Excerpt from lyrics of Generous Peace. http://www.kareemsalama.com/media/ accessed on 
12/15/2012 
16 Abed Z. Bhuyan “Muslims in America: A celebration”. 
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/01/muslims_in_america_a_ce
lebration.html accessed on 12/15/212 
17 When asked about his religion, famed comedian Dave Chappelle said that his religion is very 
important but he does not discuss it publically because “I don’t want people to associate me and 
my flaws with this beautiful thing. And I believe it is a beautiful religion if you learn it the right 
way. It’s a lifelong effort. Your religion is your standard. Coming here [to the beach] I don’t have 
the distractions of fame. It quiets the ego down. I’m interested in the kind of person I’ve got to 
become. I want to be well rounded and the industry is a place of extremes. I want to be well 
balanced. I’ve got to check my intentions, man.” See Peter Van Agtmeal’s 2005 Time Magazine 
interview at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1061415,00.html#ixzz266GmlKVl 
accessed on 12/15/2012 
18 Azhar Usman’s website at http://www.azhar.com/about/ accessed on 12/15/2012 
19  Jodi Wilgoren. “Arab and Muslim Comics Turn Fear Into Funny”. September 01, 2002. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/01/us/arab-and-muslim-comics-turn-fear-into-funny.html 
accessed on 12/15/2012 
20 Dean Obeidallah. “How 9-11 eroded our shared faith and American identity”. 2/22/2012. 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/10/opinion/obeidallah-muslim-september-11/index.html  
accessed on 12/15/212 
21 The Muslims are Coming website. http://themuslimsarecoming.com/about/synopsis/ accessed 
on 12/15/202 
22 The Muslims are Coming website. http://themuslimsarecoming.com/about/synopsis/ accessed 
on 12/15/202 
23 Roja Heydarpour. “The Comic Is Palestinian, the Jokes Bawdy”. New York Times. 11/21/2006. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/21/nyregion/21ink.html?_r=0 accessed on 12/15/2012. 
24 Janet I Tu. 2005. “Truth in laughter for Muslim comedy troupe”. Seattle Times. 10/01/2005 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2002532643_muslimcomics01m.html accessed  on 
12/15/2012. 
25 Sam Hamod profile page on http://contemporaryworldpoetry.com/?page_id=1317 accessed on 
12/15/2012 
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26 Project website: http://1700percentproject.wordpress.com/ accessed on 12/15/2012 
27 Hamod’s famous poem “Dying with the Wrong Name” laments some of what has been lost: 
“something lost down to the bone/ in these small changes. A man in a/dark blue suit at Ellis 
Island says, with/tiredness and authority, ‘You only need two/names in America’ and suddenly—
as cleanly/as the air, you’ve lost/your name” (Hamod 1980, 19).   
28 Ghazal is a poetic form with roots in 7th century Arabia that spread to India, Pakistan, Turkey 
and Iran through the works of poets like Rumi and Hafiz. It invokes “melancholy, love, longing, 
and metaphysical questions” and it is usually sung by Iranian, Indian, and Pakistani musicians. 
http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/5781 accessed on 12/15/2012. 
29 For example, in her poem titled “Different Ways to Pray” she writes “Some prized the 
pilgrimage,\wrapping themselves in new white linen\to ride buses across miles of vacant 
sand.\When they arrived at Mecca\they would circle the holy places,\on foot, many times,\they 
would bend to kiss the earth\and return, their lean faces housing mystery. See full text at 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/178315 accessed on 12/15/2012 
30 See Pamela Taylor’s profile on 
http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/muslimwomen/bio/pamela_taylor/ accessed on 12/12/2012 
 
31 If I Should Speak and the rest of her books are published by Al-Walaa Publications which 
appears to only publish her books and may in fact be a self-publishing establishment for Umm 
Zakiyyah 
 
32 Excerpt is from the Nafisa Haji official website at http://www.nafisahaji.com/musings/ 
accessed on 12/15/2012 
33 The official website of the I speak for Myself series  http://www.ispeakformyself.com/ accessed 
on 12/12/2012 
34 Christopher Maag. “Young Muslims Build a Subculture on an Underground Book”.12/22/2008. 
The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/us/23muslim.html?_r=0 accessed 
12/12/2012 
35 See the home page of  “The Story of Muhammad A Children’s Book App & Ebook” at  
http://www.storyofmuhammad.info/about  accessed on 3/1/2013 
36 For more details on the play and the media attention it received see its official website at 
http://www.domesticcrusaders.com/ accessed on 12/12/2012 
 
37 This is how Ayad Akhtar describes his play on his official website at 
shttp://ayadakhtar.com/main.html accessed on 12/12/2012. 
38 For more see the official Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/pages/Hijabi-
Monologues-Official/100387320045758  accessed on 12/12/2012 
 
39 Chicagoan Rohina Malik is the creator and performer of this play. See her official website at 
http://rohinamalik.weebly.com/ accessed on 12/12/2012 
 
40 “Mooz-lum” the movie’s Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/Moozlumthemovie 
accessed on 12/12/2012 
 
41 This was a personal email communication dated 3/6/2013 
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42 See the official website of the photographer at http://www.sadafsyed.com/ accessed on 
12/12/2012 
 
43 Atic and Sabri’s website http://www.velascarves.com/designer accessed on 12/12/2012 
44 Fashion Fighting Famine is one of many efforts where Western Muslim women are seeing 
fashion as both a way to express one’s artistic talent and a space for activism and positive 
contribution to society. Rachida Aziz is a Belgian designer with boutique in the heart of the 
fashion district in Brussels. She hires single mothers in different countries and pays them fair 
wages, contracts with Belgian factories that train immigrant women, and her fabrics are from 
factories with earth friendly policies and good working conditions (Descartes and Abida 2012, 
85–9). 
 
45 Their production company, United Production Foundation, presents itself as “Working for 
Peace through the Media”. See UPF’s official website for more information 
http://www.upf.tv/index.php accessed 12/12/2012 
 
46  The movie’s official website is http://www.fordsonthemovie.com/ accessed on 12/12/2012 
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CHAPTER 9 
CLOSING THOUGHTS: A MISSION AND THE CHALLENGE FOR/OF MUSLIM 
AMERICANS 
The last two chapters began with the call from Muslim scholars and activists to 
build a community and to create an American Muslim culture and identity. The narrative 
underpinning this call is in dialogue with the three other narratives that frame this 
dissertation: the one purporting the presence of an “identity crisis” among young 
Muslims triggered by a conflict between the culture at home and in society, the one about 
the need to recover “pure/true Islam” from cultural contamination, and the one about 
saving America from cultural take-over by Islam/Muslims. In engaging the “identity 
crisis” narrative, I outlined its roots as a concept in psychology and a stage in the normal 
development of identity. I then situated this background in the vast theoretical landscape 
of identity studies and the discursive social context of this narrative. I sketched a 
theoretical framework of how identity is understood in this dissertation and 
operationalized this framework with the voices, positions and perspectives of second 
generation Muslim Americans who seem comfortable with the complexities of their dual 
heritage and multiple belongings. No doubt, these younger Muslims struggle with 
growing up as members of a racialized religious minority, but the alarmed tone of this 
narrative of “identity crisis” greatly exaggerates and pathologizes their struggles. If there 
is an identity crisis problem, it might be that some parents and society at large are the 
ones suffering from it, since these young people do not always meet the expectations that 
parents or society have of them.   
The narrative of pure/true Islam vs. cultural Islam that is invoked by younger 
Muslims has also been a cause of concern for Muslims and non-Muslims alike and is 
inseparable from issues of identity. This narrative is invoked by multiple groups across 
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the ideological and religious interpretive spectrum and has different connotations and is 
used for different ends. In discussing it, I reviewed how the concept of religion is 
constituted vis-à-vis secularism and how it informs how religious people in general are 
viewed and how Islam in particular is conceptualized. I drew on Asad’s idea of Islam as a 
discursive tradition and situated this purity narrative in that tradition. I then teased out 
its various strands, including how younger Muslim Americans, as represented by 
participants of this project, use it. I explored their reflections, experiences, activities and 
their conceptualization of religious authority and authenticity. I aimed to illustrate that 
the narrative is invoked in this case as a discursive tool to challenge parental authority 
and the cultural hegemony of immigrants. It is used to create a space for expressing an 
Islam that is grounded in American cultural realities. Some younger Muslims may 
indeed advocate an austere “cultureless” Islam at one point in the maturation process of 
a religious awakening, but once again this observation tends to be overgeneralized and 
assumed to be a sign or a symptom of puritanism and eventual fanaticism. This 
hypervigilance may be understandable in the post-9/11 environment, but it deflects 
attention from something important that is taking place: a process of religious 
indigenization, one might say, and cultural citizenship. 
I argued that my collaborators draw on this narrative to construct and express an 
Islam dressed in an American cloak while remaining normative. The productive 
expressive culture generated mostly by younger Muslims should reassure those fearful of 
younger, religiously-conscious Muslims said to be seeking a “cultureless” Islam. The 
increased visibility and assertiveness of Muslims in the West has caused an identity crisis 
for Europe. This visibility, in the setting of volatile geopolitics and economic crises, has 
become a wedge issue used by populist politicians in Europe to advance a narrative of 
Islamization. This narrative found fertile ground in the United States, where anti-
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immigrant sentiment and the election of the first Black president unleashed fears and 
(un)veiled racism. While the “war on terrorism” showed the fragility of civil rights, it has 
also brought Islamophobia and sanctioned racism to the surface and hastened a process 
of Muslim racialization.  
 It should be apparent to the reader by now that, the urgent tone of all these 
narratives notwithstanding, a uniquely American and Muslim identity and culture have 
been in the making for decades. Since identity is not a finished product but a process of 
becoming and self-narration in dialogue with a social other in an ever-changing socio-
political and physical landscape, Muslims (be they first or subsequent generations, 
immigrants or converts) have individual and collective identities, at once shared and 
unique. Muslim Americans have divergent origins but share a common faith, history, 
and a present where they are seen as the Other and as America’s latest “problem people”. 
Their identities are rendered unique at the intersection of personal disposition and the 
specificity of experiences based on class, gender, age, and race/ethnicity that take place 
in power-laden contexts.  
Muslim American culture is like America itself; it is made up of a collective and 
the ever-changing sum of its immensely diverse constituents. The resultant sum, in this 
case, has lately been even more visibly expressed and shared among the groups, within 
the nation and across the world through music, comedy, art, and literature (the latter 
including academic, religious, fiction and non-fiction literature). It might be that as, Dr. 
Umar put it, “unity in multiplicity is Islam’s hallmark” but “the dominant beat” in 
Muslim American culture will be Blackamerican (fieldnotes). Like the stories in the 
national narratives that America tells about itself (that is, America is a project rather 
than a product), so too is the Muslim American community and culture. They are 
389 
projects continuously contested and negotiated between and across all the dimensions of 
difference among Muslims and with fellow citizens. 
In many works of art and cultural expression, Muslim Americans portray all the 
diversity that their hyphenated identity masks. They offer their experiences to 
themselves and to others as they try to understand themselves individually and 
collectively through these works. They are addressing and challenging exclusionary 
discourses and practices, from both inside and outside the Muslim community, that offer 
only limited options for being and belonging. Rather than attempting to fit in the narrow 
definitions of self and the collective that is offered to them, the younger Muslims are 
finding ways to be comfortable with the messiness and complexities of being and 
belonging in today’s world.  
Through it all, no matter the growing anti-Muslim rhetoric from officials and the 
public, and no matter the intra-community fissures and fault lines, the participants in 
this project are optimistic about the future. Though a third of them listed “slightly 
optimistic,” together with those who affirmed they are optimistic or very optimistic, 93 
percent of the participants are hopeful about the future. Their vision for the future is one 
where the ideals of their faith and their country are realized and their presence is 
normalized through critical self-assessment, dialogue within the community and with 
society, civic engagement and contribution in all professions, and through “evidence-
based” knowledge about “pure/true” Islam. They envision a community unified within 
its diversity where women and younger generation have physical and leadership space. 
They envision a mosque that is a place not just for “good Muslims” but for all Muslims 
and where non-Muslims are welcomed. They hope for a future where being Muslim 
becomes “mainstream” and where seeing Muslims pray in the park is like seeing a group 
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doing Tai Chi in the park, intriguing but not fear-evoking. To Safia, this mainstreaming 
means 
not [being] singled out…just integrated and everybody is just accepted...You don’t 
have a stamp put on you, “this is who you are”…When I was growing up, I had to 
explain to my whole class what Ramadan was and why I was not eating, and I 
hope that my kids don’t have to explain that, don’t have to be the teachers at such 
a young age and don’t have [to have] all the answers for everybody else in their 
generation. I hope it’s just kind of like, we all are included. I knew as a kid that 
Christians went to church on Sundays and that the Jewish people in my 
community didn’t drive their cars after sundown on Friday until Saturday, I just 
knew that stuff. But they didn’t know anything about Islam, and I hope that’ll be 
the difference. I hope it’s just, you just know, and that’s just okay, that’s just the 
way that things are “that’s the way that they are raised and that’s what they 
believe and that’s fine”. It’s not like let’s pick one thing, one belief, and criticize 
the heck out…that you feel like you’re constantly defending yourself. And it’s so 
tiring…It’s just tiring and it’s a big burden to have to be the teacher so 
young…Islam’s about how to better yourself and I want people to understand 
that’s the real aspect of Islam itself. Take away the cultural crap and everything 
that comes along with it, it’s all based on peace. It’s all based on being good 
people.  And there’s always gonna be somebody out there who is an extremist and 
giving Islam a bad name, but why is it Islam’s under attack? Why isn’t that 
individual under attack?  I hope there’s enough understanding 20 years from now 
where should somebody go and blow up an area that [the question would] “what 
happened in that individual’s life where it went so wrong? Where it got so skewed 
and messed up that they thought it was okay to do that? Because nowhere in 
Islam does it say that that would be okay”.   
 
Safia and others hope that fellow Americans will have at least rudimentary knowledge of 
Islam that enables them to avoid conflating individual actions with the teachings of a 
religious tradition or an entire community.  
Among the things younger Muslims envision for the future is an important role 
for themselves in the global ummah, where American Muslims serve as a bridge between 
the Muslim majority countries and Muslim communities and the United States. In order 
of importance, they envision their contributions to the global ummah as educating the 
American public, shaping policy through engagement in the political process, Islamic 
scholarship, art and cultural products and financial assistance. As Muslim Americans 
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build institutions and create cultural products in various fields in the context of (and in 
reaction to) the fervent post-9/11 anti-Islam/Muslim discourse, the opportunities and 
risks are great. One serious risk is that “American Muslim identity and culture” will 
become an object in the service of the empire, to be showcased abroad as evidence of the 
success of Muslim “integration” and of American-style multiculturalism. Muslim artists, 
films, as well as notable individuals are already part of the State Department’s people-to-
people diplomacy program at a time when the civil rights of Muslims are curtailed and 
their belonging is questioned by a growing number of their fellow citizens. In this 
context, there is also the danger of the “domestication” of Islam. Domestication, a 
concept introduced by Stephen Carter, is one “whereby religion is moved from a position 
where it can resist or challenge the state and the dominant culture to a position where it 
can only applaud” them (Jackson 2005, 19).  
In their writings, workshops and lectures, the Muslim scholars whom 
participants listed as those influencing them most, scholars such as Sherman Jackson, 
Tariq Ramadan, Ziad Shakir, and Hamza Yusuf, warn Muslims about falling into this 
trap. They admonish them for being obsessed with being a minority. While they may be a 
numerical minority, these scholars argue, they ought to know that they subscribe to 
universal principles and should speak and act from a principled position. If for fear of 
retribution or for desire of favors, they do not speak truth to power and turn a blind eye 
to injustices except when it affects Muslims, then they betray both their faith and 
America. The Muslims of America have a unique role to play. In their visible practice of 
their faith, they serve as a reminder to fellow citizens of their own spiritual lives. In 
acting and speaking from a principled position, they serve as a “moral conscience to a 
state that happens to wield so much power” and should be willing to pay the price of 
standing up and speaking truth.1 Scholars and the activists who echo their message 
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remind Muslims that serving in this vital role requires deep internal spiritual work, 
mental and moral fortitude, and a historical grounding that calls to mind that some of 
the most innovative and intellectually and culturally productive periods in Islam were in 
times and contexts where Muslims were a numerical minority2. These scholars, as well as 
the activists who attentively listen to their lectures and read their works, ground this 
mission of Muslims both in America’s history and in the Islamic discursive tradition. 
They call the community to heed the lessons of the Civil Rights movement and to 
continue its work. Additionally, they remind immigrants that Prophet Muhammad was 
an immigrant who made a new home in Medina and never returned to live in Mecca even 
after he re-entered it victoriously. They also remind them also that the Prophet did not 
shun his Arabness or succumb to the demands of those who hinged his membership in 
the group on abandoning his new and alien ways. Instead, he claimed his belonging to 
his community but provided a new modality, an alternative way for being Arab that is 
neither the old nor in opposition to it3. This task of creating an alternative modality for 
being and belonging involves a critical examination and requires a vision that sees 
beyond the urgent matters of protecting civil rights, creating alliances, and providing 
social services. It instead needs to interrogate the system that produces such inequalities 
and the associated defensive coping postures. This indeed is a radical idea that can 
transform a society, their society, for the better.  
In their activism and assertive postures, these young Muslim Americans are not 
aggressively implementing an “Islamization” agenda or courting controversy. They 
instead draw on their religious and national discursive traditions where the ideals of 
rights and responsibilities, activism, service, critique (self, community, country, faith) 
and continued self-improvement are the ethics of both piety and citizenship. This 
engaged spiritual and social work, they say, is their greater jihad. The faith they aspire to 
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seek is reflective and reasoned, spiritual and ritual, visible and internal and they see no 
contractions in these aspects. Culturally, this Islam is grounded in America and 
embellished by the diverse cultural backgrounds and roots it has at its disposal; as they 
do in their fashion, younger Muslims freely mix and match these various influences and 
inspirations. They might be motivated by faith or civic mindedness or political 
stratagem, but all these motives converge on the necessity of civic engagement. The 
overwhelming majority (92 percent) of project collaborators are involved in 
organizations, and a great majority of those involved (67 percent) are working with both 
Muslim and non-Muslim organizations. In addition to Muslim Student Associations and 
professional (law, medical, and so on) organizations, they are also involved with 
organizations focused on youth, women, education, relief/charity, civil rights, politics 
and health.  
A public sphere saturated with “the Muslim problem” and particularly Islam’s 
supposed monopoly on misogyny has dramatically increased activism, especially among 
Muslim women. Leila Ahmed (2011) notes how the discourse of activism and piety that 
are characteristic of the Islamic revival movement has informed and shaped the great 
majority of prominent Muslim American activists and leaders. They, she says, are visibly 
Muslim and feel at home drawing on their dual ethical traditions. They are part of the 
minority of Muslim Americans who frequent Islamic institutions and events where they 
are exposed to the discourse of the Islamic revival movement. Unlike those who are not 
influenced by this discourse, to these groups and individuals being “Muslim American” 
supersedes but does not render irreverent their ethnic and other belongings. Ahmed 
(2011), who shuns the model of public piety promoted by the Islamic revival movement, 
was quite surprised to see how  
this younger generation of American Muslims who are grounded in Islam as faith 
and/or identity seem to see themselves first of all as part of a multiethnic Muslim 
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American generation whose bonds of commonality as Muslim Americans are 
stronger and more important—in contrast to perceptions and sense of identity of 
their parents’ generation—than are other national or ethnically based identities. 
Consequently, they work collaboratively as Muslim Americans, and their activism 
and writings are intensely in conversation with each other. [2011, 297]  
  
Ahmed had expected that secular Muslims or those who, like her, privately 
practice their faith would be more fully if not completely integrated. She had to abandon 
that idea once she discovered that it was those who have internalized Islamic revival 
movement’s piety model that are most integrated and at home. They are redefining 
America’s tradition of protest and activism in the service of social justice on gender and 
on human rights issues that concern Muslims and, ultimately, society at large (Ahmed 
2011). Be they of immigrant or convert background, these Muslims may be a numerical 
minority among Muslims in America. However, as they lead local and national 
institutions and produce and engage the discourse on Islam in America, those whose 
piety or identity prompts their assertive visibility and their committed action are poised 
to define the face and the course of Islam in America. They are enabled by the fact that 
they are comfortable with (and in) their multiple belongings and heritages. This, 
however, may seem puzzling and problematic to observers who view these heritages as 
mutually exclusive and who conceptualize identity as a zero sum product; that is, the 
more Muslim one is, the less American, with the opposite also true. These views and the 
behaviors or activities they inspire are not irrelevant to the process of identity 
construction. They are views held by fellow citizens or co-religionists, the social others 
who play a significant role in shaping individual and group self-image. 
Muslim Americans and particularly their younger generations may find solace in 
the history of other minorities in America. But they differ from them in one crucial way. 
Islam and the West are presumed to be mutually exclusive and engaged in a perpetual 
conflict, and that conflict is imagined to be also occurring within American Muslim 
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selves. Their position and predicament are more like that of Sami Michail, the renowned 
Israeli author. His award-winning status notwithstanding, what is noteworthy is that he 
is an Arab Jew, or specifically an Iraqi Jew4. For most people, being an Arab and a Jew is 
a contradiction in terms, since these two peoples are presumed to be in existential 
conflict not unlike that imagined by some for Islam and the West. But Michail and the 
participants in this project beg to differ; after all, they are the living example that gives 
lie to the rhetoric. Michail’s literary eloquence sums up the complexity of being and 
belonging and his simile is a fitting ending to this dissertation, which began with the 
words of Black and young Muslim Americans asserting their dual heritage and speaking 
back to those who tell them they cannot be both. Michail says: “Half of me is Arab, half is 
Jew but I’m not like a political nation where one is fighting the other. I’m like the layers 
of baklava, each layer loving the other layers in my person.” 5 So is being Muslim, a 
member of an ethno-racial group, and American: A rich melody of visual sensations, 
palpable textures, robust flavors, and a powerful mix! 
                                                     
1 Field notes of a lecture by Sherman Jackson given at the Islamic American College in Chicago on 
Islam in America on 9/29/2010 
 
2 Sherman Jackson. “Muslims as a Marginal Minority in America.  The Gift of Historical 
Consciousness”. 10/23/2012. http://www.alimprogram.com/author/drjackson/ 
 
3 Sherman Jackson. “Understanding Our Present and Looking to Our Future”. September 12, 
2012. http://www.alimprogram.com/articles/understanding-our-present-and-looking-to-our-
future-by-dr-sherman-jackson/ accessed on 12/15/2012 
4 As political dissident in 1940s Bagdad, Michail and his Iraqi communist comrades were 
persecuted and were either killed or left the country. He escaped to Iran and when it proved too 
dangerous to return to Bagdad, he immigrated to Israel in 1948 and settled in the Arab 
neighborhood there. Michail writes in Arabic and Hebrew and longs for Bagdad. 
 
5 Excerpt from an interview with Sami Michail in the film Forget Bagdad by Sami Naqqash  
http://www.forgetbaghdad.net/index.php?topic=michael&lang=e accessed on 12/15/2012 
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Table 1 
 
Ethnic Background of Project Collaborator  
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Ethnicity        Number of People 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
African/African American/Black     23 
 
Arab/Arab American       71 
 
Bosnian/Turkish/White/Middle Eastern     13 
 
Asian/South Asian       112 
 
Mixed         17 
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INTERVIEW INFORMATION LETTER 
 
 
 
Islam, Identity, and Intracommunity Relations Among Second Generation 
Muslim Americans 
 
Dear Participant:                                                      Date:________________ 
 
I am, Muna Ali, a graduate student under the direction of Professor James Eder at 
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at 
Arizona State University.  I am conducting a research study on the views of second and 
third generations Muslim Americans (those born and/or raised in the US regardless of 
background). 
 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve a one-on-one interview which will 
last for 60-90minutes. I will conduct the interview at your choice of place and time. You 
will be asked to share your thoughts about being Muslim and American, your views on 
the relationship between women and women and between Muslims of different 
backgrounds, how is Islam practiced in America, and the present state and future of 
Islam in America.  
Approximately 220 subjects will be participating in this study. Half of the participants 
will be from the greater Phoenix area and the other half from the greater Chicago area. 
You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  If you choose not to participate or to 
withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. You must be 18 or older 
and/or born and raised in the USA to participate in the study. 
 
Although there may be no direct benefits to you, the possible benefits of your 
participation in the research include contributing to a better academic and public 
understanding of the diverse perspectives of Muslim Americans –particularly the 
younger generations. This could also help generate discussion among Muslims and 
enhance their intergenerational understanding.  
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. 
 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential. The results of this research 
study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications, but the researchers will 
not identify you.  In order to maintain confidentiality of your records, you can choose a 
pseudonym and I will assign you an ID number. All notes containing you words will use 
this assigned pseudonym.   
I would like to audiotape this interview. The interview will not be recorded without your 
permission. Please let me know if you do not want the interview to be taped; you also can 
change your mind after the interview starts, just let me know.  The interview will be 
audio-taped using digital voice recorder and will then be transcribed. The audio-file will 
be deleted within 24months. Only the researchers will have password access or the key to 
the audio or transcribed materials. 
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If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research 
team Professor James Eder or Muna Ali at (480) 965-6215 School of Human Evaluation 
and Social  Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you 
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional 
Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 
965-6788. 
 
Please indicate verbally if you agree to be interviewed.  
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SURVEY FORM 
The following survey is being conducted by a Muslim doctoral student at Arizona State 
University as part of a dissertation research project. Please take few minutes to answer 
the following questions as completely and with as much details as possible. Your input is 
valuable, so please explain as much as you’d like in as clear handwriting as possible. 
 
1) Where do you live?   City __________ State____________ 
 
2) How old are you? _______     Place of Birth:  City_______________ 
State __________ 
(If you were NOT born in the USA, how old were you when you moved the to 
USA?______________) 
 
3) Sex:  Female□    male□ 
 
4) Marital Status: Single□       Married□      Divorced□       Widow□ 
 
5) What ethnic background best describes you: _____________ Spouse’s ethnic 
background:____________  
 
6) Education: Less than high school□    High School□   Bachelors degree□     
Masters degree□     PhD□     MD/DO/DD/DVM□         Law□          
Other (specify) ________________________________ 
 
7) Occupation: Student□    Homemaker□   Teacher□  Physician□   Nurse/Therapist□   
Engineer□    Business□     
Other (specify)___________________________________ 
 
8) Number of people in your household: __________ 
 
9) Annual income: Less than $20,000□     $20-30,000□        $30-40,000□       $50,000-
70,000□  Over $70,000□ 
 
10) How would you answer the following question: “Where are you from?” 
_____________________________________________________ 
         Explain as needed: 
________________________________________________________ 
 
11) Where were your parents born?     Mother _______________ 
father__________________  
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12) Your Primary language at home: _______________ Other languages spoken 
_________________________________________________ 
 
13) Your family’s religious background is:  
Father:  Muslim □     Christian □        Jewish□     others (specify) __________ 
Mother: Muslim □      Christian□      Jewish □    others (specify) __________  
 
14)   Type of school attended as a child:  (check all that apply):  Public schools □   
Private School □ Full-time Islamic school□    Weekend Islamic school□    Other (specify) 
_________________________________________________ 
    
15) Growing up, your family was:  Not religious□      Mildly religious□      Moderately 
religious□      Very religious□ 
 
16) List to which ethnic group(s) most of your friends belong (check all that apply): 
Arab□     African/African American□      Asian/South Asian□   
Latino/Hispanic□      Anglo/European□       Mixed□      
 Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
17) Which faith tradition(s) do your friends follow? (check all that apply) 
       Islam□        Judaism□    Christianity□       Hinduism□      Buddhism□      
   Other (specify)__________________________ 
  
18) Do you consider yourself:  Not religious□      Mildly religious□    
  Moderately religious□     Very religious □  
  [Please explain] 
_________________________________________________________ 
            
19) If you are a female, do you wear hijab on regular basis? Yes□      No□  
20) In your mosque, women pray in:   Same room as men □    Same room as men with a 
curtain/divider□   Different room with TV to view imam□       balcony with view of 
imam□   No space for women□       
 
 21)  What do you think of women’s space in your mosque?  
             Very Good□      Good□     Barely Acceptable□    Poor□      Very Poor□    
   
22) What are the roles of women in your mosque & community? (Check all apply) 
   Islamic school teachers□    mosque board members□   committee members □     
organizations board members□  Lectures/presentations to women only □   
Lectures/presentations to men & women □   Help in but don’t run projects□   Women are 
not involved□   
  Other(specify) ________________________ 
 
23) Women involvement in the affairs of your local Muslim community is:  
    Very Frequent□   Frequent □    Occasional□     Rare□    Very Rare□     Never□  
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 (please explain) 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
24) The level of women involvement your local community is:  
     Too much□        Just right□     Don’t have an opinion□       Not enough□    
(Comments) 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________     
  
25) Do you attend mosque organized activities? (Check all that apply):   
   Friday service □   Study circles/halaqa□     Muslim lectures/conferences□       Interfaith 
events□   None□   
 
26) The ethnic makeup of the mosque you attend regularly is mostly:  
             Arab□     African/African American□        Asian/South Asian□    
Latino/Hispanic□       Anglo/European□       Mixed□       Other (specify) 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 27) Rank your source of Islamic knowledge from 1=most applicable to     5=least 
applicable 
Books□     Internet□    CD/DVD/Tapes□   Friends□   Parents□   Mosque□   College 
courses□     Study circles with scholars□    Islamic conferences□       
Other (specify) _____________________ 
     
28) Converts/reverts are ___________in your local community or mosque leadership 
or activities: 
 Not involved□     Slightly involved□    Frequently involved□          Very frequently 
involved□    
 
29) Immigrant Muslims and convert/reverts to Islam: (check all that apply) 
      Have different mosques□  Pray in same mosques□  Work together on Boards□  Work 
together on projects□       Socialize together□      Have very little social interactions□      
Have no social interactions□  
 
30) The mosques/organizations that you're familiar with are mostly governed by 
Muslims born/raised outside US                 True□       False□   
(Please explain your thoughts on the issue) 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
31) Second generation (born & raised in USA) Muslims are ____________in your 
mosque/community affairs & activities. 
      Not involved□     Slightly involved□  Frequently involved□  Very frequently involved□  
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32) Growing up in America, the children of immigrants and the children of 
converts/reverts have______in common:     
 Nothing□    Little□     Something□      Much□         Great Deal□ 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
33) Imams of the mosque you attend are knowledgeable about the issues facing younger 
Muslim Americans. 
        Strongly Agree□   Agree □   I don’t know□   Disagree□   Strongly Disagree□ 
 
34) Imams and leaders of the mosque you attend often involve the younger Muslims to 
address issues facing youth: 
        Strongly Agree□   Agree □   Undecided□   Disagree□   Strongly Disagree□ 
 
35) The relationship between immigrant Muslims and convert/reverts to Islam in your 
area is: 
    Very Good□      Good□      Barely Acceptable□     Poor□      Very Poor□    
Explain:_______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
36) Who are the current Muslim scholars whose teachings/writings influence you 
most? _________________________________________________  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Why? _________________________________________________  
_______________________________________________________ 
 
37) Is there a difference between yours and your family’s understanding/practice of 
Islam?   Yes □    No □ 
Explain difference & similarities: 
_________________________________________________  
_________________________________________________ 
 
38) Immigrant and non-immigrant Muslim Americans understanding / 
interpretation of Islam is  
Completely different□     Mostly different□     Slightly different□   Mostly the same□   
Exactly the same□ 
Please explain any differences: 
_____________________________________________________________    
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
39) I am currently (or have been in the past 5 years) involved in: (Check all that 
apply) 
Muslim organizations□      Non-Muslim organizations□       Both □        Neither □   
Types of organizations: Muslim Student Associations□  Relief/Charity□     Civil 
rights□   Education□     Youth□     Women□   Political□    Health□  Professional (AMA, 
Law etc.)□    None□    Others(specify) __________________ 
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40) In your opinion, how do Non-Muslim Americans view Muslim Americans? 
    With distrust/suspicion□  Same as any other American□  As outsiders□  I Don’t Know□ 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________  
 
41) Is there a change in the way Muslims see themselves since 9/11?      
 Yes □      No □      Not sure□ 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
42) There are __________ in your neighborhood 
      No Muslims□          Few Muslims□        Many Muslims□       Mostly Muslims□ 
 
43) Do people at work/school or neighborhood know that you are a Muslim? 
  Yes□        No□     Not sure□ 
    Does knowing that affect how they treat you or how you interact with them:  
Yes□      No□         Not sure□ 
Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 
44) The term “Muslim American” includes:  All Muslims in USA□ Only Muslim born in 
the US□   Only Converts/Reverts & their Children□   Not Sure□    Other 
(specify)_______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________      
  
45) “Indigenous Muslim Americans” are:  
        I never heard of this term□   Indian Americans□   Any Muslim (immigrant or not) 
who thinks of USA as home□    Only Converts/Reverts & their children□  All Muslims 
born in the US regardless of background□   Not sure□   
 
46) In your opinion, when compared to Muslims in Muslim majority countries, being a 
Muslim in the USA is:  
 Easier□     Harder□      Easier in some ways and harder in others ways□   I Don’t know□ 
Please explain your response 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
47) List any Muslim American religious scholars, musicians, fiction/non-fiction 
writers, poets, artists whose work you think is both Islamic and specifically American: 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
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_____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
These works are Islamic because: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
These works are American because: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
48) The global Muslim Ummah can benefit from the work of Muslim Americans in: 
[rank from 1=most important area to 5=least important area] 
Islamic Scholarship□       Politics□       Art & culture□      Educating the Public□      
Financial assistance□   Nothing□ 
Please explain: 
____________________________________________________      
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
49) Thinking about the future of Muslims/Islam in America society in 20 years, you are:  
    Not optimistic□ slightly optimistic□ Optimistic □ Very optimistic□ 
Please explain what you envision as the future:  
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Additional Comments (use back of 1st page, if space here is limited): 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for taking part in this survey. Your ideas and opinions are 
invaluable.   
If you are interested in discussing your thoughts on these issues further by taking part in 
a one-on-one interview and/or a focus group with other participants, please indicate 
here by providing your Ph#______________email_____________ to make 
arrangement.   
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 Please, tell me a little bit about yourself: your background, where were you born, 
education/occupation and anything else you would like to share? 
 When someone asks you “where are you from?” What is your usual response? 
 What is your family’s religious background?  
 What was it like growing up in your hometown? 
  What was school like and were there other Muslims in your school? 
 What role does religion play in your life? 
 How did you learn about religion when you were growing up and what is your 
source of religion knowledge as an adult? 
 Are there differences and/or similarities between your own and your family’s 
understanding/interpretation of Islam? 
 Have you had disagreements about religion with you parents/family? If so, what 
was it about? 
 If you have questions about a religious matter (whether something is allowed or 
prohibited or Islam’s position on something) who do you consult or ask? 
 Are there Muslim scholars whose teachings/writings influence you? Who are they 
and why? 
 What are some of issues/challenges/opportunities facing younger Muslim 
Americans? 
 What might an American Muslim in Egypt or Indonesia notice in terms of 
differences and similarities with the Muslims there and in America?  
 Tell me about your social network (what’s the ethnic and religious background of 
your friends?) 
 Do you attend mosque activities, organizations functions, or social gatherings? If 
so, tell me more about your involvement. If not, can you share some of your 
reasons for not being involved? 
 What is the ethnic makeup of the mosques you are familiar with? What space is 
available for women? What role do women and young adults play there? 
 What is your impression of the local Muslim community in terms of:  
- Who is in (and the quality) of leadership? 
- space available for –and role of- women? 
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- space available for -and role of- younger generations? Are imams & 
leaders knowledgeable and/or addressing issues facing younger 
generations?  
- interactions between different ethnic groups? 
- interactions between those of convert background & of immigrant 
backgrounds? 
- interaction with the larger society? 
 What are your perceptions of the ways immigrant Muslims and American born 
Muslims understand/interpret Islam? Are there differences and/or similarities? 
 How do the younger generations of Muslim Americans (the children of converts 
and immigrants) view each other? Are there similarities and/or differences in 
their experiences and views? 
 Would you consider marrying someone from a different ethnic group or country 
of origin and how do you think your family might react? 
 Would you marry someone of less education or income and how do you think 
your family might react? 
 Some critics (both Muslim and non-Muslim) say that Islam and America are not 
compatible. What do you think?  
 Are you involved in any non-Muslim organizations or interfaith activities?  
 What do you think of Muslims getting involved in the society by participating in 
politics, civic organizations and social issues?  
 Do you think there is a Muslim American culture? If so, what are its features? 
 Are there Muslim religious scholars, musicians, fiction/non-fiction writers, poets, 
artists whose work you think is specifically American? 
 How do you see Islam/Muslims in America in the next 20 years? 
 Does the Muslim American community have a role in the ummah (global Muslim 
community)? 
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